Duties created by inspector's rules. - Inspector's rule 5, section 15, requiring masters of steam vessels to keep the fire apparatus thereon in complete working order, and to post station bills and exercise the crew in their duties in connection therewith, is within the power conferred on the board by R. S. sec. 405, 6 Fed. Stat. Annot. 10, and valid. It does not purport to create offenses, but merely to prescribe duties; but a breach of it, resulting from a master's misconduct, negligence, or inattention, causing death, is manslaughter, because so provided by Congress in R. S. sec. 5344. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 592.

Violation of navigation laws. - While it is not primarily the duty of the master, under the statutes and inspectors' regulations, to equip a vessel with life preservers or fire apparatus, it is his duty before navigating to exercise care to know whether the ship has such equipment, and whether it is apparently sufficient and in accordance with law, and afterwards to exercise some care respecting its maintenance, the extent of such care being dependent on his opportunities to examine the appliance and perceive its condition; other duties, relating to the posting of station bills for the crew, and their exercise in fire drills and the use of appliances, are imposed directly upon the master by rule 5, section 15, of the inspectors' rules and regulations; and his neglect of any of such duties, whereby the life of any person is destroyed, renders him subject to indictment.

and prosecution for manslaughter under section 5344. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 593.

66

"Violation of law." The owner of a steamship who fails to comply with the stat ute requiring it to be equipped with life preservers and proper fire appliances, either by supplying none or by supplying those that are unsuitable, inefficient, and useless, and do not conform to the inspectors' rules, is guilty of a violation of law," and subject to prosecution under this section, where such violation results in the death of a person; and in either case the offense is one which may be aided and abetted by a third person who "caused and procures the omission, and such person may properly be charged in the indictment as a principal. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 592.

Corporation. A corporation owner of a steam vessel may be guilty of the offense stated in this section, which provides that every owner through whose fraud, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any person is destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and upon conviction thereof. shall be sentenced

to confinement at hard labor," etc., notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be subjected to the punishment imposed; and such fact does not affect the right of the government to prosecute individuals, under said section, who aid and abet the corporation in the com. mission of the crime. U. S. v. Van Schaick, (1904) 134 Fed. 592.

Vol. III, p. 259, sec. 4826.

Eligibility of managers. The question whether a congressman can be appointed a member of the board of managers of the Soldiers' Home, and become local manager of one of the homes, is wholly a matter for the decision of Congress itself. There is no con

Vol. III, p. 265, sec. 4834.

stitutional objection to the election of a member of Congress as a member of the board of managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteers, although such an election would seem to be contrary to sound public policy. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.-Gen. 457.

Vol III, p. 298, sec. 1.

Contract laborers. — In Botis v. Davies, (1909) 173 Fed. 996, it appeared that the petitioner, who was a Greek boy then sixteen years old, wrote to a distant relative in Chicago to know if the latter would give him employment if he came to the United States, and receiving an affirmative answer he came; his father paying his passage. On his arrival the relative gave him work at fifteen dollars per month and board, where he remained for fourteen months, and then bought a horse and wagon and started in business for himself as a fruit peddler. He had no contract for employment before he came, and no wages were mentioned, and he would have come merely

Vol. III, p. 301, sec. 5.

Vol. III, p. 304, sec. 1.

-

Effect of Act of March 3, 1903. Act Cong. March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 102, amending and reenacting the immigration laws pre-existing, and providing for the repeal of all other conflicting provisions, re-enumerated all the excluded classes of aliens specified in this section, with some additions, but specifically omitted the clause relating to contract laborers excluded under Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. L. 332, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 298. The Congressional Record (page 3205), as to the passage of the Act of 1903, showed that the omission was intentional, but that Congress thereby intended to leave intact the contract labor laws as they previously existed. It was held that the omission to provide for the deportation of contract labor

ers in the Act of 1903 did not repeal the provisions of Acts Cong. Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. L. 332, and March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. L. 1084, relative thereto. In re Ellis, (1903) 124 Fed. 637. See also (1907) 26 Op. Atty.-Gen. 180.

A native of Porto Rico who was an inhabitant of that island at the time of its cession to the United States by the treaty with Spain, of April 11, 1899, 30 Stat. L. 1754, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot. 814, is not, upon her arrival at the port of New York, an alien immigrant, within the meaning of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1891, providing for the detention and deportation of alien immigrants likely to become public charges. Gonzales v. Williams, (1904) 192 U. S. 1, 24 S. Ct. 177, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 317.

Vol. III, p. 305, sec. 3.

Exception of states. The only exception made in the contract labor laws in favor of states is contained in this section and section 6 of the Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 104, in

reference to advertisements printed and pub. lished in foreign countries, stating the inducements they offer for immigration. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 181.

Vol. III, p. 310, sec. 10.

Immigrants defined. This section applies only to the entry into the United States of immigrants, who, according to standard definitions of the term, are persons removing into the country for the purpose of permanent residence, and the penalty imposed on the master of a vessel for neglecting to detain on his vessel any "alien who may unlawfully come to the United States' on such vessel, or to return him to the port from which he came, must be construed in the light of such general purpose, and limited in its application to cases of alien immigrants. Moffitt v.

U. S., (1904) 128 Fed. 375, 63 C. C. A. 117. Extent of shipowner's duty. - Shipowners who have wrongfully brought aliens into the United States, and have received them back on board the vessel for deportation, are not made absolute insurers of the return of the immigrants to the port from whence they came, by this section punishing as a misdemeanor the "neglect " to detain the persons so received, or to return them to that port; but nothing more is required than a faithful and careful effort to carry out the duty so imposed. Hackfeld v. U. S., (1905) 197 U. S. 442, 25 S. Ct. 456, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 826, reversing (1903) 125 Fed. 596, 60 C. C. A. 428, and overruling Warren v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1893) 58 Fed. 559. Followed in Hackfeld v. U. S., (1905) 141 Fed. 9, 72 C. C. A. 265. Evidence of violation of section. In Moffitt v. U. S., (1904) 128 Fed. 375, 63 C. C. A. 117, it appeared that the defendant was indicted under this section for neglecting to detain on the steamship of which he was master an alien not entitled to land in the United States, by reason of which neglect the alien escaped and landed in the United States. On the trial the following facts were shown by an agreed statement: When defendant's ship was anchored off shore at a Mexican port a number of native peddlers came on board to sell their wares. When one of them came on deck to go ashore he found that the vessel had started and proceeded some distance. Defendant refused his request that he be taken back and landed, but promised to stop and leave him on the return trip, and

Vol. III, p. 311, sec. 11.

Limitation. Where a proceeding for the deportation of an alien as authorized by this section was not begun by the seizure of the alien within one year next after his last entry into the United States, as required by section

thereupon put him at work, but without placing him on the crew list. On arriving at San Francisco an immigration officer noti fied defendant not to land the Mexican without permission, but the latter stated he did not wish to land, but wanted to be taken back home, and he was not confined. Just before the vessel sailed, however, he left it without the consent or knowledge of defendant or any of his officers, and had not returned when she left the port. It was held that such facts were not sufficient to warrant the defendant's conviction, the alien not being an immigrant within the meaning and intent of the Act, whom defendant was required to put in irons or keep under guard to secure his return on the vessel, and there being no evidence or claim that defendant did not act in good faith.

Habeas corpus. Whether the executive officers of the government, in deporting an alien immigrant, are proceeding according to law, is a judicial question, which may be inquired into on habeas corpus. Lavin v. Le Fevre, (C. C. A. 1903) 125 Fed, 693.

To what country deported. Under this and the following section providing that all aliens unlawfully coming into the country shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought in, and that any alien unlawfully coming into the country may be returned as provided by law at any time within a year thereafter, where alien immigrants unlawfully came into the country from France, and after being temporarily absent in British Columbia, returned within a year of their arrival from France, it was held that they were properly deported to France. Lavin v. Le Fevre, (1903) 125 Fed. 693, 60 C. C. A. 425.

Remission of fines. - The Secretary of Commerce and Labor has no power to remit a fine imposed by a United States court upon a steamship company for its failure to detain and return to the country whence they came aliens whose deportation has been ordered under this section. (1908) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 624.

11, the proceeding was barred. In re Russomanno, (1904) 128 Fed. 528. See under

To what country deported. this title, vol. 3, p. 310, sec. 10.

tary of the Treasury.]

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Conclusiveness of decision. The decision of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, affirming the denial by the immigration officers, after examination, of the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter the United States, is no less conclusive on the federal courts under this section in habeas corpus proceedings when citizenship is the ground on which the right of entry is claimed than when the ground is domicile, and the belonging to a class excepted from the Exclusion Acts. U. S. t. Ju Toy, (1905) 198 U. S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 1040.

Vol. X, p. 102, sec. 1.

Citizens of the Philippine Islands coming to the United States from foreign ports are not required to pay the head tax prescribed by this section. (1904) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen.

131.

Alien diplomatic officials. This section applies as well to alien officials coming into the United States on diplomatic missions as to aliens who are private individuals and come here for other purposes. The duty thus imposed is not a tax upon the officials of foreign governments, but is merely a charge imposed upon the transportation company for every passenger brought into the United States by it. (1905) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen. 370. Validity of department regulations regarding head tax. - In Stratton v. Oceanic Steamship Co., (1905) 140 Fed. 829, 72 C. C. A. 241,

Vol. X, p. 103, sec. 2.

Alien residents. An alien who in good faith has acquired and maintains his residence in the United States, on his return from a temporary absence in a foreign country is not an alien immigrant within the meaning of the immigration statutes, but has the right to leave and re-enter the United States with the same freedom as a resident who is also a citizen. In re Buchsbaum, (1905) 141 Fed. 221; Rodgers v. U. S., (1907) 152 Fed. 346, 81 C. C. A. 454; U. S. v. Nakashima, (1908) 160 Fed. 842, 87 C. C. A. 646. Contra, U. S. v. Williams, (1911) 186 Fed. 354.

Where an alien arrived by water at the port of New York and was subject to deportation, as belonging to one of the classes of aliens whose entry is prohibited, it was held to be no defense to his deportation that he had three years before arrived in the United States by water, and had remained for four months, during which he bought a farm, took out his first naturalization papers, and since his second arrival he had contracted marriage in the United States. In re Kleibs, (1904) 128 Fed. 656.

Insanity developed after debarkation. Under this section, where an alien deserted from the vessel on which he was brought to the United States, but there was no evidence that he was either insane, epileptic, a pauper, or a person likely to become a public charge, when the vessel arrived in port, or at any

Due process of law. The constitutional guaranty of due process of law is not infringed by the provision of this Act making the decision of the appropriate department on the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter the United States conclusive on the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings, in the absence of any abuse of authority even where citizenship is the ground on which the right of entry is claimed. U. S. v. Ju Toy, (1905) 198 U. S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 1040.

it was held that a regulation requiring the master or owner of a vessel bringing an alien to a port of the United States for the professed purpose of proceeding directly therefrom to foreign territory, to deposit the amount of the head tax with the collector before such alien shall be permitted to land, the same to be refunded on proof satisfactory to the immigration officer in charge of said port that such alien has passed by direct and continuous journey through and out of the United States, was not an amendment or addition to the statute, but was a reasonable and lawful regulation for the purpose of protecting the United States from fraud and loss, and within the power conferred on the commissioner. See also (1904) 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 109.

other time when he was on board, nor until a month later, when he was arrested, and when he first gave evidence of insanity, it was held that the master was not chargeable with bringing an alien not entitled to land into the United States. Waterhouse v. U. S., (1908) 159 Fed. 876, 87 C. C. A. 56.

Lithographic artists. In (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 284, it was held that two lithographic artists, who came to the United States in pursuance of a contract of employment entered into with the American Lithographic Company, of New York, their passage being prepaid by that company, and who had been excluded upon the ground that their admission would be in violation of this section relating to contract labor, should be admitted, it being shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was not a sufficient number of lithographic artists in the country to meet the demands of business.

Burden of proof. The effect of the payment of the passage of an alien by another is to throw upon the alien the burden of proof that he is not liable to exclusion for the reasons mentioned in this section, or as a contract laborer under the Act of Feb. 26, 1885. 23 Stat. L. 322, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 298. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.-Gen. 199.

Deportation of contract laborers. See under this title, 1909 Supp., p. 162, sec. 2.

Vol. X, p. 103, sec. 3.

Repeal.

This section in so far as it placed no limitation on the length of the holding of a female alien for prostitution for which the holder might be prosecuted, was repealed by Act Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, sec. 32, 34 Stat. L. 911, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 178, requiring that the offense of holding must have been committed within three years after the alien entered the United States. Ex P. Lair, (1910) 177 Fed. 789.

Element of offenses. To warrant the conviction of a defendant charged with a violation of this section where the charge is that of holding a woman so imported by the defendant and another for the purposes of prostitution, it must be shown that the defendant, either alone or in connection with such other, knowingly and wilfully imported, or caused to be imported, such woman for the purposes of prostitution, and thereafter, to

Vol. X, p. 104, sec. 4.

Construction of statute. A person is not liable for penalty under this and the following section, unless in addition to assisting, encouraging, or soliciting, it is also charged that the immigration is "by reason 99 of an offer, solicitation, promise, or agreement to or with him, or that the immigration has been in order that the immigrant may perform labor or service by reason of an offer, solicitation, promise, or agreement to or with him. Darnborough v. Benn, (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 580.

Transportation paid by state. - A state may prepay the passage of an alien immigrant out of its public funds, provided he is qualified in other respects, the advertisement being lawful, and neither the state, nor its officers, nor anyone else having otherwise solicited or encouraged the immigration. The status of such an immigrant would be the same as that of any other alien lawfully admitted to this country. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 199. See also (1907) 26 Op. Atty.Gen. 181.

"Person." The word " person " in this section does not include a state, but it does include an officer of a state professing to act

effect the object of such illegal importation, knowingly and wilfully held such woman for such purposes. It is not necessary that the defendant should have detained such woman by physical force, but it is sufficient to constitute a holding within the meaning of the statute if such woman was detained for the purpose of prostitution by physical means applied to her either directly or indirectly by defendant, or by threats, express or implied, directly made to her by defendant, or by commands made to her directly or indirectly by defendant, and calculated and operating to restrain her freedom of action and will. To warrant a conviction for attempting to hold the same proof is required, except that it is not necessary that the means used should have been successful. U. S. v. Giuliani, (1906) 147 Fed. 594.

under its authority. Gen. 199.

(1907) 26 Op. Atty.In U.

Alien residents temporarily absent. S. v. Aultman Co., (1906) 143 Fed. 922, affirmed 148 Fed. 1022, 79 C. C. A. 457, it was held that this section did not apply to a man who entered the United States as an immigrant from Germany when young and remained continuously domiciled and working in this country for twelve or more years, although without becoming naturalized, and who then went temporarily into Canada, where he had been for two weeks when the contract alleged to be in violation of the statute was made.

Promise to father of immigrant. Where the immigration of an alien minor was procured by reason of an agreement with him through his father, who was the owner of his services, no promises or offers save those made to him "through his father" as the person entitled to his services being shown, his immigration was not obtained by means of any promise or agreement "with him,"

and was therefore not a violation of the statute. Darnborough v. Benn, (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 580.

form labor or service by reason of an offer, solicitation, promise, or agreement to or with him. Darnborough v. Benn, (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 580.

Direction of verdict. — The trial court may direct a verdict in favor of the government plaintiff in an action of debt to recover the penalty incurred under sections 4 and 5 of this Act for inducing an alien to migrate to the United States for the purpose of performing labor there, where it appears by undisputed testimony that the defendant has committed the offense out of which the cause of action arises. Hepner v. U. S., (1909) 213 U. S. 103, 29 S. Ct. 474, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 720,