not a defense that such woman had previously been domiciled for a time in the United States and had departed therefrom with the intention of returning. U. S. v. Villet, (1909) 173 Fed. 500.

Venue. The offense of importing a fe. male alien for prostitution in violation of this section is committed and is complete the moment the immigrant is landed in the United States, at which point the offense is triable under Const., art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 3, declaring that the trial of all crimes except cases of impeachment shall be held in the state where the crime has been committed, and the Sixth Amendment, declaring that accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial in the state and district wherein the crime has been committed. Ex p. Lair, (1910) 177 Fed. 789.

Indictment. In Ex p. Lair, (1910) 177 Fed. 789, an indictment charged that petitioner, in connection with another, at Chicago, in the eastern division of the northern district of Illinois, unlawfully, etc., imported into the United States for prostitution, and unlawfully, etc., did hold from Jan. 1, 1906, until July 15, 1907, pursuant to such illegal importation, in a house of prostitution in Chicago, for the purpose of prostitution, an alien named P., then a citizen of France, within three years after her entry, and that she came to and entered the United States within three years prior thereto. It was held that such allegations charged the offense of holding and harboring a female alien for the forbidden purpose within three years after entry, and not her illegal importation for such purpose.

1909 Supp., p. 164, sec. 4.

-

Construction of statute. This section being penal in its nature must be strictly construed. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

Evidence. On a trial of an action against a defendant charged with having prepaid the transportation of a contract laborer into the United States in violation of sections 4 and 5, a proposed manifest for the immigrant on the form prescribed under section 12 of the Act, filled out by a third person before sailing of the vessel, and which was not used, but

1909 Supp., p. 164, sec. 5.

Criminal prosecutions or criminal action for penalty. Congress, by providing in this section for a civil action for the recovery of a penalty for a violation of section 4, did not preclude a prosecution by indictment to enforce such penalty. U. S. v. Stevenson, (1909) 215 U. S. 190, 30 S. Ct. 35, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 153.

Intent. To warrant the recovery of the penalty prescribed by this section for encouraging immigration of alien contract laborers, there must have been a conscious violation of the Act. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

Jury questions. Whether a construction company for which alien contract laborers were imported in violation of sections 4 and 5 had such knowledge of the unlawful acts as to warrant assessment of a penalty was held under the evidence to be a jury question. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

which contained a statement that the immigrant's passage was paid by the defendant, was held to be incompetent as evidence against him, as the declaration of a third person not made in his presence. Regan v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1910) 183 Fed. 293.

Measure of proof required. In an action brought under sections 4 and 5, the government has the burden of proving the violation of the Act by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Regan v. U. S., (Č. C. A. 1910)

183 Fed. 293.

Costs. A successful party in a suit under this section for penalties for encouraging immigration of alien contract laborers is entitled to costs. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

Evidence. In an action under this section for penalties for encouraging immigration of alien contract laborers, evidence of statements made by the associates and employees of one with whom the defendant contracted was held to be admissible to show the acts done under the contract, though the evidence also tended to show defendant's knowledge of the unlawful acts. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

Likewise it was held that a decision of a board of special inquiry of the federal immigration service respecting the status of the particular aliens was properly received in evidence. Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. U. S., - (Ariz. 1911) 114 Pac. 955.

1909 Supp., p. 165, sec. 6.

No exceptions in favor of state. — This section contains no exceptions in favor of a state in reference to specific promises of employment to individual immigrants, nor any re

quirements that the promises of employment, in order to work exclusion, must be the sole inducement to exclusion, (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 410,

1909 Supp., p. 165, sec. 8.

Venue. The offense of bringing into and landing in the United States an alien not lawfully entitled to admission, made a misdemeanor by this section, can be prosecuted only in the district where such alien is landed, and the fact that the person who un

1909 Supp., p. 166, sec. 10.

Finality of decision. Where, on the arrival of an alien, he was examined by the medical officer of the United States public health and marine service, who certified that he was "afflicted with idiocy," and thereafter a board of special inquiry decided on such certificate that the alien was not entitled to enter and directed that he be deported, it was

1909 Supp., p. 166, sec. 12.

Manifest. Where an alien endeavored in Europe to secure passage to New York, and was told that if he purchased a ticket to Halifax and wished to continue to New York he could do so without extra charge, and was thereupon ticketed by the steamship officers and entered on the manifest as destined to Halifax, N. S., when, in fact, his destination was New York, it was held that such acts by the officers of the steamship would constitute a violation of section 12 requiring

1909 Supp., p. 169, sec. 19.

Construction of statute. - This section provides that if the owner of any vessel bringing an alien not entitled to enter shall make any charge for the return of such alien, or shall take any security from him for the payment of such charge, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It has been held that such provision applies only to acts done within the United States, since to construe it as applicable to acts occurring wholly within foreign territory would render it violative of international law. U. S. v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, (1911) 186 Fed. 391.

"Taking security." — Under this section an indictment alleging that the defendant at Bremen collected return passage from certain proposed immigrants who were within the excluded classes, and held the money as security for a charge to be made for deportation, did not charge the taking of the money as security within the United States, since to

1909 Supp., p. 170, sec. 20.

Nature of proceedings. A proceeding for the deportation of an alien is not criminal in its character, and an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime so as to entitle the alien to the constitutional guaranties and safeguards accorded to a citizen accused of crime. Sire v. Berkshire. (1911) 185 Fed. 967, 971; Ladaux r. Berkshire, (1911) 185 Fed. 971,

lawfully brought in a child under sixteen years of age, unaccompanied by one or both of her parents, afterward took such child to another district, does not confer jurisdiction on the court in such district. U. S. v. Capella, (1909) 169 Fed. 890.

held that the decision of the board was a conclusive finding as to the existence of the physical disability and that the applicant was within section 2 providing that all idiots shall be excluded. U. S. r. Rodgers, (1910) 182 Fed. 274, affirmed (C. C. A. 1911) 185 Fed. 334.

the master of a vessel to deliver to the immigration officers at the port of arrival a list or manifest made at the time and place of embarkment, stating the name, nationality, etc., and the final destination, as well as the seaport for landing in the United States, of each alien destined to land therein. U. S. r. Fielding, (1909) 175 Fed. 290.

Hawaii. A territorial government, such as Hawaii, is not a municipality or a quasimunicipality. (1909) 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 479.

retain money taken in a foreign country was not a continuous repetition of the "taking " within the United States by reason of the fact that the aliens were brought to the United States and ordered deported because not entitled to enter. U. S. v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, (1911) 186 Fed. 392.

"

Charge."-It has been held that the word charge," as used in this section, does not import a continuing act, but means an overt act, by which the charging party manifests his purpose to demand the money charged from the person charged, excluding the subsequent relations which are consequences of the act, and that an indictment is fatally defective which fails to allege that the forbidden "charge was made with the intent to apply the amount so collected to the return of the aliens under deportation. U. S. r. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, (1911) 186 Fed. 391.

for the cost of her deportation from the port of entry, since the provision of that Act for deportation at the expense of the steamship companies should be construed as prospective and only applicable to aliens brought to the United States after its adoption, since if otherwise construed it would be unconstitutional as depriving such companies of their property without due process of law. U. S. r. North German Lloyd Steamship Co., (1911) 185 Fed. 158.

Right to counsel. Where an alien in deportation proceedings did not deny her alienage nor that at the time of her arrest she was engaged in immoral business, and it appeared that she was represented by counsel on a hearing before the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, the deportation was pursuant to due process of law, though she was not permitted to consult an attorney before she was first examined by the immigration officers. Sire r. Berkshire, (1911) 185 Fed. 967; Ladaux v. Berkshire, (1911) 185 Fed. 971.

"Entering in violation of law."- An alien who falsely represents himself to be a citizen, and by such artifice and fraud secures admission to the United States, is guilty of "entering in violation of law," within the meaning of this section. Williams v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1911) 186 Fed. 479.

Expiration of time. - Under Act Cong. March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 109, and this section, providing for the deportation of aliens unlawfully in the country within three years after landing, deportation need not be completed within that time, the government having the whole of the last day of the three years in which to make the arrest, and prescription being interrupted by the arrest, the government is entitled to a reasonable time in which to carry out the sentence of deportation. U. S. v. Redfern, (1910) 180 Fed. 506. See also U. S. t. International Mercantile Marine Co., (1911) 186 Fed. 669.

In Matsumura r. Higgins, (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 601, it appeared that the petitioner, a Japanese alien, was convicted of importing an alien prostitute into the United States, sentenced to imprisonment, and on investigation by the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor was found to belong to the excluded class and ordered deported. It was held that since domiciliary rights could not grow for the benefit of petitioner during the period of his incarceration, the deportation writ was in abeyance during such period, and on its expiration was subject to immediate execution, though petitioner then had been in the United States more than three years.

Likely to become public charge — involving moral turpitude. In Ex p. Saraceno, (1910) 182 Fed. 955, it appeared that the petitioner, having immigrated to the United States in 1899, returned to Italy in January, 1909, and was followed about four months thereafter by his wife and children. He remained there until September, 1910, when he returned to the United States alone. He was a barber by trade and had followed that occupation in New York during his residence there, was twenty-nine years of age, and had

twenty-five dollars when he landed. He intended to go to his brother, and was not subject to any mental or physical disability. On his examination it was shown that he had been twice arrested during his former residence in New York, and on the second occasion was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen days, his offense being a misdemeanor under the New York law. It was held that petitioner was not a person likely to become a public charge, or a person convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and was not subject to deportation on either of such grounds.

Clandestine entry at border port. A Chinese alien entering the United States from Canada surreptitiously in the night, avoiding inspection and examination at a designated place of entry, enters in violation of section 36, and, like any other alien so entering, is subject to arrest on a warrant issued by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and to be deported to Canada or to China, the "country whence he came," under the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Act, without regard to the provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. And it is no defense that he is a domiciled merchant in the United States entitled to enter under such Acts; the deportation in such case being without prejudice to his right to subsequently apply for admission in a lawful way. Ex p. Li Dick, (1909) 174 Fed. 674.

Chinese Exclusion Act. This and the fol- lowing section do not affect the previous special provisions of Chinese Exclusion Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, secs. 7 and 13, 25 Stat. L. 477, 479, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 770, 772, for deporting Chinese laborers, especially since section 43 of the Immigration Act provides that the Act should not affect existing laws relating to Chinese exclusion, and the Chinese Exclusion Act furnishes an exclusive remedy for deporting Chinese laborers. Wong You . U. Š., (C. C. A. 1910) 181 Fed. 313, reversing order 176 Fed. 933.

That an

Living in adultery after entry. alien is living in adultery within the United States is not ground for deportation, such conduct being solely within the police power of the state. U. S. v. Sibray, (1910) 178 Fed. 144.

Country to which deported. Under the immigration laws providing for the deportation of aliens not entitled to enter the United States, to the country whence they came when they illegally entered the United States, regardless of their nativity, except aliens intending to enter the United States for the convenience of their voyage, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor has no discretion as to the place to which an alien must be deported; and hence a warrant attempting to deport an alien to a country other than that from whence he came is illegal and void. U. S. v. Redfern, (1911) 186 Fed. 603.

as to require attendance and care during the voyage. The steamship or transportation companies by which such aliens came to this country are required to receive the attendants so selected at the same time that they receive the aliens to be deported, and convey them, with the aliens, to the foreign places of destination. The steamship companies are required to furnish such attendants transportation to and from the alien's destination and to defray all expenses incident to such employment. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 381.

Alien resident temporarily absent. —- Under this section which authorizes the deportation of any alien who has entered the United States in violation of law at any time within three years after entry, the fact that an alien entering is a resident of the United States and left temporarily is immaterial, and the legality of the last entry is to be determined as though there had been no previous entry, with the right to deport within three years thereafter if such entry is unlawful. Petterson, (1908) 166 Fed. 537; Ex p. Hoffman, (1910) 179 Fed. 839, 103 C. C. A. 327; Sibray v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1911) 185 Fed. 401, reversing (1910) 178 Fed. 144, 150; U. S. v. Sprung, (C. C. A. 1910) 187 Fed. 903, reversing (1909) 182 Fed. 330. Contra, Redfern v. Halpert, (C. C. A. 1911) 186 Fed. 150.

Ex P.

In U. S. v. Hook, (1908) 166 Fed. 1007, it appeared that the petitioner, a Canadian by birth and citizenship, entered the United States in 1901 and was an inmate of houses of prostitution in various cities until 1905, when she went to Philadelphia to care for an invalid sister. She remained there two years, when she resumed life as a prostitute, and in, the fall of 1907 went back to Canada, where she stayed four days, when she returned to the United States and continued her miscon duct until she was arrested. It was held that the three-year period within which she was subject to deportation dated from her return from Canada, and that she was therefore unlawfully within the country.

In U. S. v. Williams, (1911) 187 Fed. 470, it appeared that an alien of the excluded classes, having been in the United States more than three years, shortly before his arrest as an alien not entitled to enter, while in Niagara Falls, passed from the American to the Canadian side to view the falls, and, after staying there an hour or more, came back to New York, and shortly thereafter was arrested. It was held that his return to the United States after going into Canada constituted a re-entry, after which he was subject to deportation.

A judgment of acquittal in a criminal prosecution of an alien for falsely claiming citizenship, entered on a directed verdict, is not a bar to proceedings for his deportation, under this section, for having obtained admission to the United States in violation of law by falsely representing himself to be a citizen. Williams v, U, S., (C. C. A. 1911) 186 Fed. 479.

Review by courts. There is no provision in Immigration Act March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 102, nor Act Feb, 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. L.

898, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 161, making the decision of the immigration officers conclusive as to the right of an alien domiciled in this country to remain, and where such decision involves a question of law as well as of fact it will be reviewed by the courts. Botis v. Davies, (1909) 173 Fed. 996.

In proceedings for the deportation of alien immigrants, while the courts are bound by the findings of the Executive Department they cannot properly refuse relief where on the admitted facts it appears as a matter of law that the person sought to be deported is not within the inhibition of the statute. Watchorn, (1908) 160 Fed. 1014; Ex p. Petterson, (1908) 166 Fed. 536; Ex p. Koerner, (1909) 176 Fed. 478; Davies v. Manolis, (1910) 179 Fed. 818, 103 C. C. A. 310.

Er p.

Habeas corpus. - Where an alien seeking

to enter the United States is ordered deported by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, a district judge has no jurisdiction to set aside such order on habeas corpus, unless the secretary violated the statute in respect to all of the grounds on which the deportation is based. U. S. v. Williams, (1910) 175 Fed. 274.

Where an alien not entitled to enter the United States was held under an illegal warrant directing his deportation to a country other than whence he came, it was held that he was entitled to a release on habeas corpus, under the rule that a prisoner is entitled to his liberty where the sentence is illegal. U. S. v. Redfern, (1911) 186 Fed. 603.

Where neither the application for the warrant of arrest nor any of the papers on which it was issued were shown to an alien or her counsel during the hearing, and before the passing of an order for deportation, as required by immigration rule 35e, it was held that she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of her detention. Ex p. Avakian, (1910) 188 Fed. 688.

On habeas corpus to determine the legality of the detention of an alien in deportation proceedings, the only question for review is the legality of the alien's detention on the return day of the writ, and matters subse. quent thereto are not proper in a traverse to the return. Ex p. Avakian, (1910) 188 Fed, 688.

Warrant. Neither the Immigration Act nor the promulgated regulations require that a warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings shall state the alleged grounds on which deportation will be demanded. U. S. v. Williams, (1910) 175 Fed. 274.

A warrant of arrest of an alien for deportation, charging that he had been induced or solicited to migrate to this country by an offer or promise of employment or in consequence of an oral agreement to perform unskilled labor in this country, was held to be sufficient, especially where unobjected to on the hearing and criticised for the first time after deportation was ordered and collaterally on a writ of habeas corpus. Ex p. George, (1910) 180 Fed. 785.

A warrant for the deportation of an alien charged to be unlawfully in the country is not insufficient because signed by the Assist

ant Secretary of Commerce and Labor instead of the Secretary. U. S. v. Redfern, (1910) 180 Fed. 506.

A deportation warrant charged that the alien was a member of the excluded classes, in that he was a contract laborer and had been induced to migrate by an offer or promise of employment under an agreement to perform manual labor in the United States. It was held that the charge was sufficiently set forth in the warrant. Ex p. Michele, (1911) 188 Fed. 449.

1909 Supp., p. 170, sec. 21.

Class of transportation of attendant. — A regulation of the department which provides that "attendants will accompany aliens to official destination, and will, when proceeding abroad, be required to travel under the same conditions as the alien," is appropriate, if in nearly all cases the usefulness of the attendants would be seriously impaired unless they went in the same class as the alien; but the second part of the regulation, providing that all attendants "when returning shall travel second class," is not binding upon the vessel owners. If the attendant in going has trav eled in a class in which he would not naturally travel, by reason of the necessity for his constant attendance upon the disordered alien, his ticket may be changed on the return trip. If there are a variety of cases properly admitting of the separate classification of the two persons, the Department of Commerce and Labor cannot determine arbitrarily to what class the attendant is to be consigned. The steamship company, on the other hand, cannot nullify the law by insisting that attendants travel in the steerage when they are not needed there and are persons who could not be reasonably expected to accept employment upon such conditions. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 381.

"Expense incident to such service." — The phrase "expense incident to such service," as used in the proviso of this section, is all the expense directly and incidentally caused by the fact that such service has been required. This includes the return trip of the attendant and also his compensation. The expression 'all the expenses incident to the employment and detail of attendants " under the same head. (1907) 26 Op. Atty.Gen. 381.

comes

Fair trial. An alien was arrested on Sept. 19, 1909, and was accorded a hearing before the immigration officers on the next day, when she was informed of her right to be represented by counsel, but, waiving such right, she was sworn and examined at length.

and Labor for violation of Act March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. L. 1213, 10 Fed. Stat. Annot. 102, then in force, without a hearing on such charge, and that a person taken into custody on a warrant so issued was entitled to discharge on a writ of habeas corpus. Davies v. Manolis, (C. C. A. 1910) 179 Fed. 818.

Marriage to citizen after deportation order. - Where, after an alicn had been ordered deported because she was afflicted with a contagious disease, she married a citizen, it was held that she was not thereby relieved from the order of deportation, under R. S. sec. 1994, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 786, providing that any woman married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen. Ex p. Kaprielian, (1910) 188 Fed. 694.

Conviction of crime in foreign country after admission. See under this title, 1909 Supp., p. 162, sec. 2.

She was again examined by the officers a few days later, when she was represented by counsel, who also examined three other witnesses before the officers, and she was again examined before one of the immigration inspectors on Nov. 23, 1909. It was held that she was accorded a fair trial before the department, which precluded a review of their conclusions of fact, reached on conflicting evidence, by the courts. De Bruler v. Gallo, (C. C. A. 1911) 184 Fed. 566.

Former jeopardy. Const., Amend. 5, providing that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, applies only to criminal proceedings, and hence has no application to proceedings for the deportation of an alien. Sire v. Berkshire, (1911) 185 Fed. 967; Ladaux v. Berkshire, (1911) 185 Fed. 971.

Constitutionality. The provision of the Immigration Act declaring that an alien woman who subsequent to landing commits a specified offense shall be deported is a proper exercise of police power, but the provision that the cost of her deportation shall be imposed on another person who had nothing to do with the commission of such offense is not an exercise of such power. U. S. v. North German Lloyd Steamship Co., (1911) 185 Fed. 158.

Review by court. After an order of deportation has been entered in deportation proceedings against an alleged undesirable alien, the only issue reviewable on a writ of habeas corpus is whether the alien had been given a fair hearing by executive officers on an order to show cause why she should not be deported, and it is therefore error to refer the proceeding to a commissioner to take testimony on a new issue as to the alien's alleged marriage and whether her husband was a citizen. De Bruler v. Gallo, (C. C. A. 1191) 184 Fed. 566.

Chinese Exclusion Act. - See under this title, 1909 Supp., p. 170, sec. 20.