1909 Supp., p. 260, sec. 2.

Contract for special facilities. A shipper cannot, under a special contract with a carrier, claim special facilities in transportation, such as that the freight be transferred in a single covered express wagon by itself, so that, in an action by a shipper based on such special contract, the express company could show as a defense that the tariff rates applicable did not provide for such special privileges. Winn v. American Express Co., (Ia. 1910) 128 N. W. 663.

Question of fact. What is an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage given by a carrier of goods to a shipper within the inhibition of this section is a question of fact. State v. Adams Express Co., (1908) 171 Ind. 138, 85 N. E. 337.

Discrimination against localities. - Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by this section, forbidding carriers to give any unreasonable preference or advantage to any shipper or locality, a carrier cannot lawfully make rates so as to overcome the natural advantage of one locality over another, or so as to build up one place at the expense of another. State v. Adams Express Co., (1908) 171 Ind. 138, 85 N. E. 337.

Filing rates. In a prosecution against certain interstate carriers for shipping certain freight at a ten cent rate when the published and filed rate was fifteen cents per hundred weight, evidence that the ten cent rate had been published by defendant's connections, and sent "broadcast," though not filed, was held to be inadmissible as a matter of defense, since the charging of a rate less than the filed rates constitutes a concession to the shipper, in violation of the Act, as a matter of law. U. S. v. Merchants', etc., Transp. Co., (1911) 187 Fed. 363.

Presumption as to compliance. There is no presumption that interstate carriers sued for overcharge for icing cars had filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a schedule of freight rates, including icing charges, and that such rates were promulgated as required by the Act, in the absence of allegations to that effect, so as to defeat the jurisdiction of a state court. N. H. Blitch Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (1910) 87 S. C. 107, 69 S. E. 16.

Knowledge. In a prosecution of an interstate carrier for shipping freight at a rate less than that filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, it was held that defendant could not be heard to say that it did not know of the filed rate, which it had established in accordance with the law, as a justification for its departure therefrom. U. S. v. Merchants', etc., Transp. Co., (1911) 187 Fed. 363.

Compensation for transportation. — A carrier engaged in interstate commerce cannot lawfully charge, collect, or receive anything but money for transportation on its road since the enactment of this section, prohibiting any carrier from demanding, collecting, or receiving "a greater or less or different compensation" for the transportation of persons or property, or for any service in con

nection therewith, than that specified in its published schedule of rates, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, (1911) 219 U. S. 467, 31 S. Ct. 265, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 297, reversing (1909) 133 Ky. 652, 118 S. W. 982.

Effect of Act on contracts for transportation. The interstate commerce law abrogated the right of the carrier and shipper to fix the freight rate by contract; the law fixing the rate. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. New Albany Box, etc., Co., (Ind. 1911) 94 N. E. 906.

Where carriers have filed and published schedules of joint through rates, it is the right of a shipper to have his property transported upon the lines joining in such schedules and at the rates therein specified, and the carrier receiving it cannot avoid its obligation by any contract inserted in its bill of lading. Dickerson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1910) 187 Fed. 874.

66

Release of damage claims. An interstate carrier cannot make a valid contract to issue annual passes for life in consideration of a release of a claim for damages, since the enactment of this section expressly prohibiting any carrier from demanding, collecting, or receiving a greater or less or different compensation" for the transportation of persons or property, or for any service in connection therewith, than that specified in its published schedule of rates. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, (1911) 219 U. S. 467, 31 S. Ct. 265, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 297, reversing (1909) 133 Ky. 652, 118 S. W. 982.

The constitutional liberty of the citizen to make contracts was not infringed by the enactment by Congress, in the exercise of its power over commerce, of the provisions of this section, which rendered unenforceable a prior contract, valid when made, by which an interstate carrier agreed to issue annual passes for life in consideration of a release of a claim for damages. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, (1911) 219 U. S. 467, 31 S. Ct. 265, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 297, reversing (1909) 133 Ky. 652, 118 S. W. 982. See also under this title, vol, 3, p. 827, sec. 6.

Damages for failure to post freight rates. - Where a railroad company failed to post a schedule of tariff rates, and a shipper in ignorance of such schedule, relying upon a schedule previously in force, contracted for shipment of grain, to his damage, it was held that he could recover of the railroad company therefor at common law. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co., (1910) 138 Ky. 220, 127 S. W. 779.

Time rate takes effect. The tariff of rates is established and put in force when the schedules have been published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and approved and promulgated by it, the posting of the schedules in the carrier's office or stations not being a condition to the taking effect of the rate. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. New Albany Box, etc., Co., (Ind. 1911) 94 N. E. 906. Separating terminal charges. Carriers separately state the terminal charges for delivering live stock beyond their own lines to

the Union Stockyards in Chicago, as required by this section, where their tariff schedules inform shippers that the live stock rates to Chicago apply only to deliveries at the carriers' own yards, and that for transportation to the Union Stockyards a stated additional charge will be made, the amount of

1909 Supp., p. 265, sec. 4.

Constitutionality of delegation.-The power delegated by Congress to the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe railroad rates for the future is legislative in its nature, and, since it concerns the administrative affairs of the government, which by reason of variable conditions cannot be covered in detail by direct legislation, its delegation is not in violation of the Constitution, and it may be as fully exercised by the commission as Congress might have exercised it, subject to any limitations imposed by Congress itself. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1910) 184 Fed. 118. See also (1905) 25 Op. Atty.-Gen. 422.

Extent of power of commission. This section places no restrictions on the commission in respect to the matters which it may take into consideration, or the weight it shall give to every of such matters in informing itself what opinion it ought to give, except that it shall not abuse its authority and proceed arbitrarily without regard to the justice of the case, or give a judgment not fairly within its power. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1910) 184 Fed. 118.

Establishing through routes and joint rates. -In Interstate Commerce Commission r. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 538, 30 S. Ct. 417, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 608, it was held that the personal preferences of many travelers for a southern route between eastern points and points on the Northern Pacific Railway between Portland and Seattle do not make the through route via the Northern Pacific Railway unreasonable or unsatisfactory, so as to justify the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the exercise of its power under this section to establish through routes and joint rates where "no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists," in ordering the establishment of through rates and joint rates between those points ria the Union Pacific Railway, so as to put the latter road on an equal footing with the Northern Pacific Railway Company in the use for through travel of the road belonging to the latter be tween Portland and Seattle.

Regulation of distribution of railway cars. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission commanding a railway company to desist from its practice not to take into account the companys fuel cars in the daily distribution of coal cars in time of car shortage to the bituminous coal mines on its line, and requiring it for a future period of two years to count such cars against the share of the mine receiving them, is within the authority delegated by this section, upon complaint duly made, to declare a rate or practice affecting

such charge being entered, not upon the general freight charges of the companies, but as a separate item. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, (1909) 215 U. S. 98, 30 S. Ct. 66, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 112, affirming (1908) 164 Fed. 638.

rates illegal, and to determine and prescribe for a term not exceeding two years what will be a just and reasonable rate, and what regulation or practice in respect to transportation is just, fair, and reasonable thereafter to be followed. Interstate Commerce Commis sion v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 280.

Allowance of elevator charges. The Interstate Commerce Commission cannot make the allowance by a carrier to the owner of an elevator of the cost of the elevation in transit of grain in which he has an interest, conditioned upon his failure to use the opportunity afforded during the process of elevation to treat, weigh, inspect, or mix the grain, since such allowance cannot be deemed an undue preference or discrimination forbidden by the Act to regulate commerce, in view of the provisions of this section, recognizing that services in transportation, rendered by an owner of the property transported, are to be paid for by the carrier. Interstate Commerce Commission r. Diffenbauch, (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct. 22, modifying and affirming 176 Fed. 409.

Procedure. The procedure prescribed by section 13 of the Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 842. requiring a statement of charges against a carrier filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission to be forwarded to such common carrier," who shall be required to answer the same, which procedure is required to be followed in case of hearings for the prescribing of rates under section 4, is analogous to that in all legal controversies, and sufficient, and it is no objection to the validity of an order of the commission prescribing rates to be charged by a carrier between certain localities that it will affect the rates of other carriers, not before the commission, who may be in the succession of all or any interstate transportation which includes that in question. Louisville, etc.. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. (1910) 184 Fed. 118.

Validity of order. It is no objection to the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission determining and prescribing rates to be charged by a carrier, that it would derange the schedule of rates on other routes. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1910) 184 Fed. 118.

Effect upon power of courts to pass on reasonableness of rates. The courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin the filing, publication, or enforcement of a proposed rate alleged to be unreasonable, in advance of action thereon by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is by said Acts vested with exclusive

jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates in the first instance. Columbus Iron, etc., Co. v. Kanawha, etc., R. Co., (1909) 171 Fed. 713, affirmed (1910) 178 Fed. 261, 101 C. C. A. 621. See also Houston Coal, etc., Co. v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (1909) 171 Fed. 723, affirmed (1910) 178 Fed. 266, 101 C. C. A. 626; Wickwire Steel Co. r. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1910) 181 Fed. 316; Mitchell Coal, etc., Co. r. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1911) 183 Fed. 908.

The original jurisdiction of the federal courts under section 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. L. 379, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 833) has not been entirely destroyed, and they still may redress such wrongs as can consistently with the Act be redressed without previous action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and, when one sues for discrimination by a carrier, it is necessary in the first instance to determine whether the wrong can be redressed by the courts. Langdon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1911) 186 Fed. 237.

As to the authority of the courts to enjoin a proposed rate as unjust and unreasonable, see also, supra, this title, p. 1191, vol. 3, p. 851, sec. 22, Equity Jurisdiction.

Review by courts. A court having no constitutional power to regulate commerce or to fix rates to be charged by a carrier cannot suspend or vacate an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing rates un

1909 Supp., p. 268, sec. 5.

Powers of commission. — A reduction in that part of the through rates in Atlantic seaboard shipments to Missouri river cities which applies to the haul between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers is not beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission as introducing a new system of ratemaking by artificially apportioning the country into zones tributary to given trade centres, in order to build up or protect certain distributive centres at the expense of others, where the commission, by its order, intended only to correct through rates which it found upon complaint were unreasonable in themselves, by substituting therefor reasonable rates. Interstate Commerce Commission r. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 88, 30 S. Ct. 651, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 946, reversing (1909) 171 Fed. 680.

Conclusiveness of findings of commission. — Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission that certain through rates are unreasonable in themselves carry with them a presumption of correctness. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 88, 30 S. Ct. 651, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 946, reversing (1909) 171 Fed. 680. Parties. Parties injuriously affected by the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission may lawfully institute suits in the Circuit Courts to enjoin, suspend, or annul such orders, although they were not parties to the proceeding before the commission on which the orders are based. Parties similarly situated may intervene in such suits.

der the power conferred by section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Act June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, sec. 4, except on the ground that in making such order the commission transcended its power or exercised such power without due regard to law and in violation of some legal, constitutional, or natural right of the carriers affected. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1909) 174 Fed. 687.

The courts may review the determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon the question whether "no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists" within the meaning of this section, conditioning the authority of the commission to establish through routes and joint rates upon the nonexistence of such route. Interstate Commerce Commission r. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 538, 30 S. Ct. 417, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 608.

But the courts cannot, under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission within the scope of the power delegated to such commissioner, upon the ground that such power was unwisely or inexpediently exercised. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 452, 30 S. Ct. 155, 54 U. S. (L. ed.) 280, reversing (1908) 173 Fed. 930.

Peavey v. Union Pac. R. Co., (1910) 176 Fed. 409, affirmed 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct. 22. Judicial inquiry concerning rates fixed by commission. The wisdom or expediency of the lawful discharge of the administrative duties of the Interstate Commerce Commission is not reviewable by the courts. But the courts may relieve from orders of the commission which deprive complainants of their property without due process of law, or take it without just compensation, from those which are beyond the delegated power of the commission, and from those which evidence so unreasonable an exercise of its power as to be substantially without though formally within it. Peavey r. Union Pac. R. Co., (1910) 176 Fed. 409, affirmed 222 U. S. 42, 32 S. Ct. 22; Louisville, etc., R. Co. r. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1910) 184 Fed. 118.

Complaint. — Under the provision that all complaints for damages shall be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, a letter to the commission setting out the facts and containing a substantial prayer for relief by way of damages is a sufficient complaint, no formal pleadings being required by the Act. Dickerson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1910) 187 Fed. 875.

Necessity for fixing reasonable rate as condition precedent to recovery of overcharge. In a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission to recover damages on a complaint by a shipper that the amount collected by the carrier at the lawfully estab

lished rate had been excessive because that rate was unreasonable, the finding and prescription by the commission of a reasonable maximum rate to be observed in the future and an order by the commission forbidding the use of a rate in excess thereof are conditions precedent to its exercise of its power to order reparation. Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co., (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 485.

Limitation of action. Under the proviso in this section that claims accrued prior to the passage of this Act may be presented within one year, it was held that a claim which accrued prior to the passage of the Act may be presented at any time within two years after the date of its accrual, although complaint is not filed until more than a year after the passage of the Act. Dickerson r. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1910) 187 Fed. 874.

1909 Supp., p. 271, sec. 7.

Liability of carrier beyond own line. Under this amended section the liability of an initial carrier is the same whether its contract as issued reads to the end of its own line or to a destination over the lines of connecting carriers. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, (Tex. 1911) 133 S. W. 725.

The initial carrier is liable for damage caused by the wrongful diversion of an interstate shipment by a connecting carrier in another state. Kemendo . Fruit Dispatch Co., (Tex. 1910) 131 S. W. 73.

Constitutionality. To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note, see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, (1911) 219 U. S. 186, 31 S. Ct. 164, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 167, affirming (1909) 168 Fed. 987, cited in the original note; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Heyser, (1910) 95 Ark. 412, 130 S. W. 562; Fry r. Southern Pac. Co., (1911) 247 Ill. 564, 93 N. E. 906; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Scott, (1909) 133 Ky. 724, 118 S. W. 990; Dodge v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1910) 111 Minn. 123, 126 N. W. 627; Reid t. Southern R. Co., (1910) 153 N. C. 490, 69 S. E. 618; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, (Tex. 1909) 117 S. W. 169; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harriman, (Tex. 1910) 128 S. W. 932; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, (Tex. 1910) 129 S. W. 594; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, (Tex. 1911) 133 S. W. 725; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., (1911) 111 Va. 813, 69 S. E. 1106.

Effect. To the same effect as the original note, see Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, (1910) 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, (1909) 91 Ark. 97, 121 S. W. 932.

Under this section an initial carrier is liable for its own negligence or that of connecting carriers resulting in delay in the transportation of cattle by reason of which they failed to reach their destination within a reasonable time, whether they were shipped under an oral or under a written contract attempting to limit the carrier's liability for its own acts or delays occurring on its own line. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Miles, (1909) 92 Ark. 573, 123 S. W. 775, 124 S. W. 1043. Jurisdiction of courts. - To the same effect as the first paragraph of the original note. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, (1910) 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Heyser, (1910) 95 Ark. 412, 130 S. W. 562; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Warfield, (1909) 6 Ga. App. 550, 65 S. E. 309, following Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, (1909) 5 Ga. App. 675, 63 S. E. 865; Louisville, etc., R. Co.

v. Scott, (1909) 133 Ky. 724, 118 S. W. 990; Gibson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (S. C. 1911) 70 S. E. 1030; Houston, etc., R. Co. r. Lewis, (Tex. 1910) 129 S. E. 594.

To the same effect as the second paragraph of the original note, see Fry v. Southern Pac. Co., (1911) 247 Ill. 564, 93 N. E. 907.

Under the provision of this amendment that initial carriers issuing receipts or bills of lading shall be liable for loss caused by connecting carriers, the state courts have jurisdiction of actions against an initial carrier for the negligence of connecting carriers, despite sections 8 and 9 of the original Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 3 Fed. Stat. Annot. 833, which, respectively, make carriers subject to the provisions of the Act liable for damages caused by the doing of certain things, and provide that any person claiming such damages may complain to the Interstate Commerce Commission or bring suit in the federal courts, for the above sections relate only to the original Act. Gibson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., (S. C. 1911) 70 S. E. 1030.

State laws. The proviso of this section, "that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he had under existing law," leaves a shipper free to resort to the laws of the state applicable to his contract. Latta v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1909) 172 Fed. 850, 97 C. C. A. 198.

In Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Rodgers, (N. M. 1911) 113 Pac. 805, it was held that this section did not displace a previously existing state statute restricting the right of a common carrier to limit liability upon interstate shipments.

A state rule that a carrier cannot contract for exemption from or limitation of its liability arising from its negligence, or that of its servants, is not affected by this section. Wright v. Adams Express Co., (Pa. 1911) 79 Atl. 760.

Prior to the enactment of this section each of several connecting carriers was responsible only for loss occurring on its own line. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Chicago Varnish Co., (1910) 169 Ala. 287, 53 So. 832.

As to interstate through shipments made by an initial carrier before the amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act forbidding the limitation by an initial carrier of its liability as insurer where it contracts to carry through, it could limit its liability as insurer for a consideration such as a reduced rate of freight. Blackmer, ete., Pipe Co. v. Mobile,

etc., R. Co., (1909) 137 Mo. App. 479, 119 S. W. 1.

Notice of damage. A provision of a transportation contract, requiring notice of loss or damage and of an intent to claim damages within thirty hours after arrival of the goods at destination, was not invalidated by this section. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. t. Keller, (1909) 90 Ark. 308, 119 S. W. 254. Loss by fire. The statute does not prohibit carriers from placing any limitation whatever upon their common-law liabilities, but merely forbids them from limiting their liability as to damages caused by the respective carriers, for which damage a carrier is liable, irrespective of negligence, if it is responsible for the cause thereof, so that, where the contract of carriage exempted the carrier from liability for loss by fire, it could show that the fire occurred from causes beyond its control. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Ray, (Tex. 1910) 127 S. W. 281.

Termination of liability. Where a connecting carrier's liability as a carrier for an interstate shipment had terminated when it sold the goods for freight charges, the initial carrier would not be liable for the value of the goods under this section. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Stuart's Draft Milling Co., (1909) 109 Va. 184, 63 S. E. 415.

Limitation of amount of liability. The purpose of this section is to render the initial carrier of interstate shipments over connect. ing lines liable to the holder of the bill of lading for any loss to the property, whether occurring on its line or not, and to prevent interstate carriers from exempting themselves from liability for the loss of property after it has passed into the hands of another carrier for transportation, but it does not abrogate the right of the carriers to regulate their charges for carriage by the value of the goods or to agree with the shipper on valuation of the property carried, and a contract limiting the carrier's liability to a specified sum in consideration of the rate charged regulated by the value of the goods is not invalid. Bernard v. Adams Express Co., (1910) 205 Mass. 254, 91 N. E. 325; McElvain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1910) 151'Mo. App. 126, 131 S. W. 736; Travis v. Wells, (1909) 79 N. J. L. 83, 74 Atl. 444; Greenwald v. Barrett, (1910) 199 N. Y. 170, 92 N. E. 218; Larsen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., (Utah 1910) 110 Pac. 983.

Arbitrary limitations of value and preadjustments of the damage in contracts of carriage are invalid under this section. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Warfield, (1909) 6 Ga. App. 550, 65 S. E. 309.

Liability for negligence.

This Act does

not in any manner supersede or amend the rule at common law with reference to the liability of a common carrier for its negli gence in the transportation of property by interstate shipments. Miller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1909) 85 Neb. 458, 123 N. W. 449. Who may question validity. - Under the rule that one not within a class affected by a statute may not attack its constitutionality, an initial carrier in an action against it, based on section 7, making the initial carrier

liable for loss of or injury to interstate shipments caused by any connecting carrier, may not question the validity of the provision permitting it to recover from the connecting carrier for the loss sustained by it. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, (1910) 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826.

-

A bill of

Contract for through shipment. lading dated in one state, showing a destination in another, and containing stipulations governing the entire transportation, specifying rights, duties, or limitations relating not only to the parties, but also to subsequent carriers, is a "contract for a through shipment" within this section. Southern Pac. Co. v. Meadors, (Tex. 1910) 129 S. W. 170. Judgment as evidence against connecting carrier. The provision in this section, making the initial carrier of an interstate shipment liable for loss of or injury thereto caused by a connecting carrier, and permitting the initial carrier to recover from the connecting carrier causing the loss or injury the amount it may be required to pay to the owner of the property, as evidenced by any receipt or judgment, makes a judgment against the initial carrier only prima facie evidence against the connecting carrier, and it is not invalid as depriving the connecting carrier of its property without due process of law. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, (1910) 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826.

Failure to divert shipment as desired. — An initial carrier, which was under no obligation, by contract or otherwise, to notify a connecting carrier that the shipper desired a diversion of the shipment at a point on the connecting carrier's line, having delivered the shipment to the connecting carrier, was not liable for failure of the connecting carrier to make the diversion, as no fault was attributable to the connecting carrier. Patton v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (Tex. 1911) 137 S. W. 721.

Enforcement of contracts limiting liability. - A bill of lading of an interstate shipment, which contains clauses repugnant to this section, is not thereby entirely vitiated, but the holder thereof may recover for a failure to safely transport the goods. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Sims, (1910) 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826.

The word "caused," as used in this section, implies not only active misconduct and deeds of commission, but also passive neglect and deeds of omission, and failure to exercise duties faithfully. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Warfield, (1909) 6 Ga. App. 550, 65 S. E. 308.

The word "state," as used in the part of this section regarding the limitation of liability, is used in its limited sense to represent and include only the states of the federal Union, and such section has no application to a shipment of cotton from a point in Texas to a foreign country. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Inman, (Tex. 1911) 134 S. W. 275.

Delivery to interstate railroad. — Delivery of an interstate shipment of freight to an interstate railroad under a through bill of lading and a guaranty of a through rate is a through shipment, and is governed by this