A complaint alleging that plaintiff employed defendant to locate him on a half section of government land, which he entered under the Homestead and Timber Acts, for which service he paid defendant $200, and seeking to recover damages for false and fraudulent representations as to the quantity and quality of timber on such land, does not state a cause of action for the recovery of damages beyond the amount paid defendant, if there can be any recovery, and the action is not within the jurisdiction of a federal court, although the damages are laid in a sum exceeding the jurisdictional amount. Wines . Cobb Real Estate Co., (1904) 128 Fed. 198.

In an action of ejectment, where no special acts of damage are averred in the declaration, the damages recoverable are nominal only, and the amount of damages laid in the ad damnum clause cannot avail to give a federal court jurisdiction where the value of the land is insufficient. Way r. Clay, (1904) 140 Fed. 352.

A complaint for injunction alleging that complainant's trade name is worth in excess of $5,000; that defendant's acts are calculated to deceive and mislead intending purchasers of complainant's product, to its "great loss, injury, and damage," and that unless defendant's acts are checked the reputation of complainant will still further suffer great and irreparable damage, does not show jurisdiction in the federal court, as it cannot be assumed that the trade name will be destroyed, or that complainant's damages are in excess of $2,000. Winchester Repeating Arms Co. v. Butler, (1904) 128 Fed. 976.

IV. SUITS ARISING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS, OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES. State courts may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, unless exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly or by necessary implication conferred on the federal courts. Ex p. Martin, (1910) 180 Fed. 209; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. r. Hesterly, (Ark. 1911) 135 S. W. 874.

Case arising under the laws of the United States Generally. An action to enforce a right, the existence of which depends upon an Act of Congress, necessarily involves the construction and application of the federal statute, and is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Calhoun r. Central of Georgia R. Co., (1910) 7 Ga. App. 528, 67 S. E. 274. A federal Circuit Court, having properly obtained jurisdiction of a suit by reason of the federal questions set up by the bill, has the right to decide all questions in the case, even though it decides the federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omits to decide them at all, but decides the case on local or state questions only. Siler v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 175, 29 S. Ct. 451, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 753; Siler v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 199, 29 S. Ct. 458, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 760.

Suit involving taxation of federal bonds.— A federal court has jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin an assessment where the question in volved is the right of the taxpayer to an exemption on account of United States bonds owned by him, regardless of the citizenship of the parties; and, having such jurisdiction, it may adjudicate other questions involved in the case, although it decides the federal question adversely to complainant. People's Sav. Bank v. Layman, (1905) 134 Fed. 635.

Suit to enjoin the enforcement of schedule of freight rates pending decision by interstate commerce commission. — A suit in equity against a railroad company to enjoin the enforcement of a schedule of freight rates which has been filed by defendant with the interstate commerce commission, and which is alleged to be unjust and unreasonable, until the legality of such rates can be passed upon by the commission, is one arising under the laws of the United States and for the enforcement of such laws, of which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Kalispell Lumber Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., (1907) 157 Fed. 845.

Right of way under federal statute. — A bill by a railroad company, alleging that it acquired a right of way for its road over government lands under a federal statute, and is proceeding to construct its road thereon, but did not complete the same within the time limited by the Act, and that defendant, claiming that its rights have thereby been forfeited, has taken possession of a portion of such right of way, presents a question under the laws of the United States. Columbia' Valley R. Co. v. Portland, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1908) 162 Fed. 603.

The federal Employer's Liability Act (Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, sec. 2, 35 Stat. L. 65, 66, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 584, which makes common carriers by railroad within the territories of the United States liable for injuries to employees as therein stated, supersedes the common law in the territories with respect to such liability, and any cause of action within its terms is necessarily one arising under a law of the United States, and on that ground within the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court, where the requisite amount is involved. Cound v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1909) 173 Fed. 527; Clark r. Southern Pac. Co., (1909) 175 Fed. 122.

Water privileges. One who has acquired a right to the use of water from a stream flowing through public land for domestic or irrigation purposes, in accordance with the laws of the state, is protected therein by R. S. secs. 2339, 2340, 7 Fed. Stat. Annot. 1090, 1096, and the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine the conflicting rights of parties is not affected by the fact that their lands, and their points of diversion of the water, are in different states. Anderson ɛ. Bassman, (1905) 140 Fed. 14.

Title to allotments to Indians. — State courts were not given jurisdiction of controversies necessarily involving a determination of the title, and incidentally of the right to the possession, of Indian allotments while the same were held in trust by the United

States, by the provision of Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290. 28 Stat. L. 286, delegating to the federal Circuit Courts the power to determine such questions, since the purpose of that Act to continue the exclusive federal control over disputes concerning allotments which, prior to that Act, could only have been decided by the secretary of the interior, is manifested by its provision that a judg ment or decree in any such controversy shall be certified by the court to the secretary of the interior, and by the provision of Act of Feb. 6, 1901, ch. 217, 31 Stat. L. 760, that in such suits "the parties thereto shall be the claimant as plaintiff and the United States as party defendant." McKay v. Kalyton, (1907) 204 U. S. 458, 27 S. Ct. 346, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 566, reversing (1904) 45 Ore. 116, 74 Pac. 491, 78 Pac. 332.

The laws enacted by a territory subject to disapproval by Congress are not laws of the United States, and a suit arising under them, as where a corporation organized under them is a party to the suit, does not arise under the laws of the United States, and a federal court has no jurisdiction on that ground. Maxwell. Federal Gold, etc., Co., (C. C. A. 1907) 155 Fed, 110.

Suit under state laws. - A suit by citizens and taxpayers of Kansas, under a state law, to enjoin the alleged illegal expenditure of public money by officers of the state, which will increase the burden of taxation, cannot be maintained in a federal court, where the alleged illegality does not arise under any law of the United States. Larabee v. DoÏley, (1909) 175 Fed. 365.

Division of state into congressional districts. While the power to fix the number of representatives in Congress and to apportion them among the several states is vested in Congress, the power to divide a state into congressional districts for the election of representatives resides in the legislature of the state, and the question whether a county is lawfully included in a congressional distriet, where it was placed by an act of the legislature, does not depend on the construction of any law of the United States, so as to give a federal court jurisdiction of a suit for its determination, but upon the validity of the act of the legislature, which is a question for determination by the state courts. Anthony v. Burrow, (1904) 129 Fed. 783.

In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of city ordinances, federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an allegation that in passing the ordinances the city exceeded its charter powers; such question being one for the determination of the state courts. Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, (1905) 138 Fed.

Action for false imprisonment. A complaint which alleges that defendants entered into a conspiracy by unlawful means to deprive plaintiff of his liberty and property, and that they unlawfully, forcibly, and without due process of law caused his arrest and confinement in a state insane asylum, states a cause of action for false imprisonment, not involving any federal question, and which it is the province of the state and not the federal courts to redress. Marten v. Holbrook, (1907) 157 Fed. 716.

Generally.

Suit against state No suit can be maintained in the courts of the United States against the officers of a state, when the state, though not named in the pleadings, is the real party against whom the relief is asked, and against whom the judgment will operate. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Andrews, (1907) 154 Fed. 95.

Where a state statute provides that suits to recover penalties for its violation shall be brought in the name of the state by direction of the governor, the governor acts thereunder officially as executive officer of the state having a discretionary power, and a suit to enjoin him from exercising such power is one against the state, of which a federal court is without jurisdiction under the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. McLendon, (1907) 157 Fed. 961.

No waiver by the state of its constitutional immunity from a suit in a federal court to set aside the title of the state to lands sold for unpaid taxes can be gathered from the provision of a statute which makes the auditor-general a party defendant to all actions or proceedings to set aside a sale for delinquent taxes on lands held as state tax lands, or which have been sold as such, or which have been sold at annual tax sales, since the statute makes such requirements with reference to procedure and costs as to indicate that the legislature had in mind only proceedings in the state courts. Chandler v. Dix, (1904) 194 U. S. 590, 24 S. Ct. 766, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1129.

A suit by a corporation to restrain the state attorney-general from instituting a suit in the name of the state to forfeit the corporation's charter is in effect a suit against the state, and is not, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Morenci Copper Co. v. Freer, (1903) 127 Fed. 199.

A state board of equalization which is required to "adjust and equalize the valuation of real and personal property among the several counties in the state," is a tribunal charged with duties as an agency of the state, in the performance of which judgment must be exercised by its members, and a suit against them to compel them to raise the valuation of the property in a county is one against the state, within the meaning of the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, of which a federal court is without jurisdiction. U. S. v. Hadley, (1909) 171 Fed. 118.

Where the valuation of a corporation's franchise has been made by a state board, and the auditor has given final notice thereof before suit was brought against him in his official capacity to restrain the collection of

such tax, a bill is not maintainable as to the part of the tax due the state, since as to it the bill would be in effect against the state, which is not subject to suit without its consent. Coulter v. Weir, (1904) 127 Fed. 897, 62 C. C. A. 429.

A suit in equity against officers of a state to restrain them from instituting judicial proceedings in the courts of the state to enforce a statute alleged to be unconstitutional is in fact a suit against the state, which a federal court is prohibited from entertaining by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Hutchinson v. Smith, (1905) 140 Fed. 982.

The existing relation of debtor and creditor between the state of South Carolina and the vendors of liquor under the state dispensary Acts was not so altered by the winding-up Act of Feb. 16, 1907, providing for the appointment of a commission to close out the statc dispensary business and turn over to the state treasury the surplus funds remaining after liquidating and paying claims out of the state assets, as to enable a federal Circuit Court to take jurisdiction of a bill filed by such vendors, which seeks to enjoin the commission from disposing of the fund until their claims are paid, and asks for the appointment of a receiver, on the theory that, by such statute, the assets of the dispensary were placed in the hands of the commission as a trust fund for the benefit of all creditors having valid claims against such fund, which they are entitled to enforce by judicial action against the commission, without the presence of the state as a necessary party. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 151, 29 S. Ct. 458, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 742, reversing (C. C. A. 1908) 164 Fed. 1.

But a municipal corporation is not an agency of the state in such sense that a suit against it is one against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, excluding such suits from federal jurisdiction. Camden Interstate R. Co. v. Catlettsburg, (1904) 129 Fed. 421.

A federal Circuit Court should not dismiss on its own motion, for want of jurisdiction, a suit against the dairy and food commissioner of a state, on the ground that such suit is one against the state, but such question should be raised by demurrer or other pleading. Scully v. Bird, (1908) 209 U. S. 481, 28 S. Ct. 597, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 899.

Suits involving validity of state law under Federal Constitution. A federal court may enjoin the attorney-general of a state, whose general duty is to enforce the state statutes, from proceeding to enforce against persons affected a state statute which violates the Federal Constitution. Ex p. Young, (1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 714.

A suit against state officers, charged with the enforcement of a statute of the state, to enjoin the enforcement of such statute on the ground that it is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, is not a suit against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Julian, (1909) 169 Fed. 166.

A suit is maintainable in the federal courts against a state officer, claiming under an unconstitutional state statute, where he holds possession or is about to take possession or commit a trespass on property belonging to or in plaintiff's possession. Western Union Tel. Co. r. Andrews, (1907) 154 Fed. 95; Consolidated Gas Co. v. New York, (1907) 157 Fed. 849; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. r. Cross, (1909) 171 Fed. 480; Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, (1909) 172 Fed. 545.

A suit against an individual to prevent him from effecting the destruction of property or the impairment of property rights under color of an unconstitutional law is not a suit against the state. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. r. Alabama R. Commission, (1907) 155 Fed. 792; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Alabama R. Commission, (1908) 161 Fed. 925.

The North Carolina corporation commission and the attorney-general being specially charged with the enforcement of certain laws, a suit against the attorney-general and the members of the commission to restrain the enforcement thereof, and other similar laws, because of alleged unconstitutionality, is not a suit against the state. Southern R. Co. v. McNeill, (1907) 155 Fed. 756.

A suit in a federal court to restrain the secretary of state from enforcing a statute which requires him to cancel the license of any foreign railroad corporation to do business in Missouri in case it removed an action brought against it to the federal court, and providing, in addition, a penalty for each offense, with disability to again do business within the state for five years, on the ground that such act was unconstitutional, is not a suit against the state. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swanger, (1908) 157 Fed. 783.

But under a state law which provided that foreign corporations shall not do business in the state until they have complied with the Act, which requires the filing of a copy of the articles of incorporation, with the consent that service of process may be had on the secretary of state, and that it will not remove any action against it to any federal court without consent of the other party, requires payment of certain specified fees, and declares that any foreign corporation failing to comply and doing business in the state shall be subject to a fine of not less than $1,000, to be recovered in suits to be brought in the name of the state by the prosecuting attorneys for the benefit of the county in which the suit is brought, and paid into the county's general revenue, one-fourth of the recovery to belong to the prosecuting attorney as a part of his compensation, it was held that a suit by a foreign telegraph company, having failed to comply with such Act, against the prosecuting attorneys of the judicial circuits of the state, to restrain them from instituting any proceeding to recover penalties against complainant for its refusal to comply with the Act on the ground that it was unconstitutional, was an action against the defendants merely in their capacity as attorneys for the state, and was in effect a

suit against the state.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Andrews, (1907) 154 Fed. 95.

A court of admiralty is not deprived of jurisdiction of a suit to recover possession of a vessel duly licensed and enrolled, under the navigation laws of the United States, by the appearance of officers of the state claiming to hold the vessel under process issued by a state court for violation of a state fishery law, where the constitutionality of such law is seriously attacked by the libelant, since such appearance does not render the suit one against the state, within the meaning of the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, and the question is one which it is competent for the libelant to raise, and for the court to determine. The W. J. Hingston, (1906) 144 Fed. 560.

Suits dealing with questions of taxation. An action by a university, whose lands are exempt from taxation, against officers charged with the duty of levying and collecting taxes, to restrain such officers from enforcing taxes on improvements erected by lessees on such exempt lands, is not a suit against the state, so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the federal courts. University of the South v. Jetton, (1907) 155 Fed. 182.

Mandamus to compel county auditors and county treasurers to levy a tax to pay a judgment on township bonds is not a suit against the state, within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution, because such officers have been forbidden by the state legislature to exercise any such power. Graham v. Folsom, (1906) 200 U. S. 248, 26 S. Ct. 245, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 464, affirming (1904) 131 Fed. 496. Interference with interstate commerce. A suit against a state corporation commission to enjoin the enforcement of an order alleged to be void as an interference with interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Constitution and laws is not one against the state, and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court. McNeill v. Southern R. Co., (1906) 202 U. S. 543, 26 S. Ct. 722, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 1142, affirming as modified (1904) 134 Fed. 82.

A state constitutional provision which prohibits the bringing of a suit against a state by a citizen of another state, cannot be construed to nullify the power conferred on Congress to regulate the commerce among the several states, nor prevent an, action to restrain a state railroad commission from enforcing an order injuriously affecting interstate commerce. Mississippi R. Commission r. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (1906) 203 U. S. 335, 27 S. Ct. 90, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 209, affirming (1905) 138 Fed. 327, 70 C. C. A. 617.

Suit to enjoin enforcement of railroad rates. A suit against the attorney-general and board of railroad commissioners of a state to enjoin them from enforcing state statutes regulating railroad rates, on the ground that they are confiscatory and unconstitutional, is not one against the state of which a federal court is denied jurisdiction by the Eleventh Constitutional Amendment. Louisiana R. Commission v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1906) 144 Fed. 68, 75 C. C. A. 226; Poor v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., (1907) 155 Fed.

226; Perkins v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1907) 155 Fed. 445; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama R. Commission, (1907) 157 Fed. 944; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, (1908) 161 Fed. 419; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, (1910) 181 Fed. 710.

Where, under the state constitution, any railroad company has the right to maintain proceedings in a state court against the state railroad commission to contest the validity of any decision, rule, or order of the commission, a company which is a citizen of another state may maintain a suit for the same purpose in a federal court, where the amount involved is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. Louisiana R. Commission v. Texas, etc., R. Co., (1906) 144 Fed. 68, 75 C. C. A. 226.

Substantial dispute as to construction of constitution, law, or treaty essential. -- If it appears from a bill filed in a federal court that in any aspect which the case may assume the right to relief may depend upon the construction of a provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such claim is not merely colorable, but rests upon a reasonable foundation, the court has jurisdiction of the cause. St. Louis, etc., R.

Co. v. Davis, (1904) 132 Fed. 629.

The assertion in a suit to enjoin municipal construction of an underground railway that complainants had a prior exclusive right to the use of the city streets for that purpose does not bring the cause within the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court as really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy respecting the Federal Constitution, where such contention is based upon the effect claimed for the filing of a map and profile of the proposed route and for the payment of an incorporation tax, and involves the unfounded assumption that the determination by the rapid transit board created by Laws N. Y. 1891, ch. 4, to construct an underground railway, together with the consent of the municipal authorities and abutting owners to the municipal construction of such road, was the equivalent of the requisite consent to the construction of com plainant's proposed road, which had never been obtained. Underground R. Co. v. New York, (1904) 193 U. S. 416, 24 S. Ct. 494, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 733, affirming (1902) 116 Fed. 952.

The averment in a bill that the property of a water company was taken without due process of law by a local statute enabling it to sell its property to a municipality to defeat municipal construction of a water supply system, because such statute was construed by the highest state court as not entitling the company to compensation for its franchise and other incorporated rights, and the averment that the obligation of the company's contract with the city to furnish water for fire protection was impaired by the failure to value future profits arising from such contract, are so devoid of merit, where the water company's charter was not exclusive, and was subject to repeal, alteration, and amendment, as to be insufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the

United States on the theory that the case arose under the Federal Constitution. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, (1904) 193 U. S. 561, 24 S. Ct. 553, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 795; Gloucester Water Supply Co. v. Glouces ter, (1904) 193 U. S. 580, 24 S. Ct. 557, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 801.

The assertion, in a bill filed by a water company against a municipality and its common council, that the obligation of the municipality's rental contract with the company was impaired by an ordinance which, while denying the validity of the contract, allowed a claim for rentals, is too clearly unfounded to present a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, of which a federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction without regard to the diversity of citizenship. Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, (1903) 191 U. S. 184, 24 S. Ct. 63, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 140.

Where, in a suit by a private person against state judges of general jurisdiction. the statement of plaintiff's claim did not show diverse citizenship, or that the action involved a federal question, a mere allegation that defendants were liable under R. S. secs. 1979, 1980, 1 Fed. Stat. Annot. 795, 796, prohibiting the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, etc., was insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction, in the absence of an allegation of facts showing a substantial dispute as to the effect or construction of the Constitution, or of some law of the United States on the determination of which the recovery depended. U. S. v. Bell, (1905) 135 Fed. 336, 68 C. C. A. 144, affirming (1904) 127 Fed. 1002.

The claim that grazing cattle crned by a Jesuit society are exempt from state taxation, based either upon the theory that because the income of the society was devoted to the charitable work of improving and educating the Indians on the Flathead reservation, in Montana, the entire beneficial use or ownership of the property taxed was in tribal Indians, or upon the ground that the federal government, by permitting and approving the work of the society, and by aiding it from time to time by making appropriations in its behalf, had constituted it one of the agencies to carry out its obligation to the Indians, is too clearly lacking in merit to confer jurisdiction on a federal Circuit Court. Montana Catholic Missions r. Missoula County, (1906) 200 U. S. 118, 26 S. Ct. 197, 50 Ú. S. (L. ed.) 398.

Seattle Electric Co. r. Seattle, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1911) 185 Fed. 365.

To confer jurisdiction of a suit between citizens of the same state upon a federal court on the ground that legislation of a state which it is sought to have declared invalid impairs the obligation of a contract or deprives complainant of his property without due process of law, and that, therefore, the questions involved arise under the Constitution of the United States, it must appear from complainant's pleading that there is a legal contract subject to impairment, or that complainant has become vested with property rights in the particular thing of which he is alleged to have been deprived. Underground R. Co. r. New York, (1902) 116 Fed. 952, affirmed (1904) 193 U. S. 416, 24 S. Ct. 494, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 733.

Where, in an action against an interstate carrier for death of a servant, the complaint alleged that defendant was engaged in transporting both freight and passengers, and of interstate and foreign commerce, such averment did not allege that defendant was engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers "in" interstate and foreign commerce, and must therefore be taken as an averment of the transportation of freight and passengers in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Troxell v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1910) 180 Fed. 871.

A street railroad company which has acquired a franchise to construct its line has a property right therein of which it cannot be deprived without due process of law, and also contract rights which cannot be impaired by the state by subsequent legislation; but be fore it can invoke the provisions of the Constitution of the United States for the protection of such rights by a suit in a federal court, it must show that it has done all the things required under the laws of the state to vest it with the contract and property rights which it seeks to protect. Underground R. Co. r. New York, (1902) 116 Fed. 952, affirmed (1904) 193 U. S. 416, 24 S. Ct. 494, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 733.

Must so appear from plaintiff's statement — Generally. - When the jurisdiction of a federal court depends upon the case being one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the facts necessary to make such a case must be plainly shown upon the record, and it is not enough that such question may arise. Louisville . Cumberland Telephone, etc., Co., (C. C. A. 1907) 155 Fed. 725, 12 Ann. Cas. 500; American Nat. Bank v Tappan, (1909) 174 Fed. 431; Larabee r. Dolley, (1909) 175 Fed. 365; Earnhart v. Switzler, (C. C. A. 1910) 179 Fed. 832; Hare v. Birkenfield, (C. C. A. 1910) 181 Fed. 825;

But it is not necessary to allege in pleading matters of which the court is bound to take judicial notice or matters which the law presumes, and a bill in a federal court which seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a city or dinance, and invokes the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that such enforcement will deprive complainant of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment, need not allege that the ordinance was enacted under state authority where there is a statute of the state which confers authority on the city to enact such an ordinance, since the court is required to take judicial notice of such statute, and must presume that the city acted thereunder. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, (1907) 151 Fed. 120. Sufficient allegation. A substantial controversy respecting rights under the Federal Constitution, presented by the averments of the bill, is sufficient to support the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court, irrespective of the actual sufficiency of the facts alleged