to justify the relief sought, or of the facts as they may subsequently turn out. Pacific Electric R. Co. v. Los Angeles, (1904) 194 U. S. 112, 24 S. Ct. 586, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 896, affirming (1902) 118 Fed, 746.

A Circuit Court has jurisdiction of a suit on the ground that it arises under the Constitution of the United States, where it appears from the allegations of the bill that the claim is made in good faith that an Act of the legislature under which defendants are proceeding to do the acts sought to be enjoined is in violation of the Federal Constitution, although other grounds of invalidity are also alleged, and where it is further alleged that complainant will sustain damages, direct and consequential, by reason of the threatened action, in excess of $2,000. Manigault v. Ward, (1903) 123 Fed. 707, affirmed (1905) 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 274.

A federal court has jurisdiction of a suit to restrain the collection of taxes levied under provisions of the constitution and statutes of a state, which the bill, in good faith, alleges are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and where it is also alleged that the defendant, as a state officer, by his acts under said state constitution and statute, is about to deprive complainants of their property without due process of law. Michigan R. Tax Cases, (1905) 138 Fed. 223, affirmed (1906) 201 U. S. 245, 26 S. Ct. 450, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 744.

An allegation in a bill that a municipal ordinance providing for the summary seizure and destruction of food in cold storage when unfit for human consumption violates Const. U. S. Amend. 14, because it provides neither for notice nor for an opportunity to be heard before such seizure and destruction, presents, although unfounded, a constitutional question within the original jurisdiction of the federal Circuit Court. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, (1908) 211 U. S. 306, 15 Ann. Cas. 276, 29 S. Ct. 101, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 195.

Where a petition in an action against an interstate carrier for injuries to a brakeman in one of the territories of the United States alleged injury to plaintiff by the negligence of a carrier while plaintiff was in the performance of his duty, it sufficiently showed that the action was based on the federal Employers' Liability Act, though it did not so allege in terms. Clark v. Southern Pac. Co., (1909) 175 Fed. 122.

Insufficient allegation. An allegation in a complaint in ejectment that defendant is in possession of the property by direction of the United States, which is not required under the statute to state plaintiff's cause of action, is mere surplusage, and cannot give a federal court jurisdiction on the ground that the action is one arising under the Constitution of the United States, by making it appear that defendant holds under a law which plaintiff claims to be unconstitutional. Filhiol v. Torney, (1903) 119 Fed. 974, affirmed (1904) 194 U. S. 356, 24 S. Ct. 698, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1914.

An allegation in a complaint that full faith

and credit will not be given to the Public Acts of Minnesota if a New Jersey corporation organized for the purpose of acquiring the control of two competing interstate railway companies engaged in business in Minnesota is allowed to carry out the object of its incorporation, does not present a cause arising under the Federal Constitution, of which a Circuit Court of the United States can take jurisdiction. Minnesota r. Northern Securities Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 48, 24 S. Ct. 598, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 870, reversing (1903) 123 Fed. 692.

Averments in a complaint in ejectment, that defendant's possession rests upon an infraction by the United States of its treaty obligations, and upon a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, do not bring the case within the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court, where the averments respecting plaintiff's title disclose no case within the jurisdiction of that court. Filhiol r. Torney, (1904) 194 U. S. 356, 24 S. Ct. 698, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1014, affirming (1903) 119 Fed, 974.

A suit to compel the specific performance by a carrier of its agreement to issue free passes annually to the complainants is not brought within the original jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court as one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, by allegations in the bill that the refusal to comply with the contract is based upon the provisions of Act Cong. June 29, 1906, 1903 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 255, and that such Act does not prohibit the giving of passes under the circumstances of the case, and, if construed as having such effect, violates Const. Amend. 5, by denying due process of law. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, (1908) 211 U. S. 149, 29 S. Ct. 42, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 126, reversing (1907) 150 Fed. 406.

A bill by a railroad company to enjoin suits at law for damages, or in equity to restrain its removal of a division point, on the ground, among others, that the enforcement of an alleged contract to maintain the railroad's shops, roundhouses, etc., at the point in question would interfere with interstate commerce, and prevent complainant's compliance with Act Cong. March 4, 1907, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. L. 1415, 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 581, known as the "Hours of Service Law," does not show federal jurisdiction as involving a federal question, under the rule that to give the federal Circuit Court jurisdiction for that reason the federal question must appear necessarily in the statement of the cause of action, and not as mere allegations of a defense pleaded. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Quigley, (1910) 181 Fed. 190.

An action by a shipper against a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce, to recover damages because of an alleged discrimination in exacting a charge from one class of shippers which is not required from another class, although the service is the same in both cases, is not within the jurisdiction of a federal court, as one arising under the interstate commerce law, where it is not alleged that the charge is not in accordance

with a schedule of rates duly published and filed with the interstate commerce commission, nor that any application has been made to the commission to correct such alleged discrimination. Clement t. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1907) 153 Fed. 979.

A suit against a city and certain of its officers to enjoin the commission of acts by them under the claimed authority of a city ordinance, which it is alleged will deprive complainant of its property without due process of law in violation of the Federal Constitution, does not involve any constitutional question which will give a federal court jurisdiction with respect to acts which it clearly appears are not authorized by the ordinance, set out in the bill, and which, if committed, will be without authority of law and mere private trespasses. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, (1907) 151 Fed. 120.

Statement of defense. Jurisdiction of a federal court cannot be invoked by averments in plaintiff's pleadings anticipatory of the defense and allegations that such defense is based on the Constitution or laws of the United States. People's U. S. Bank v. Goodwin, (1908) 160 Fed. 727.

Suits arising under Constitution involving due process of law. A suit to enjoin the enforcement of state enactments regulating railroad rates, on the ground that the same are confiscatory and would deprive the railroad companies of their property without due process of law and deny them the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment, is one arising under the Constitution of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction on that ground. Ex p. Young, (1908) 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 714; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, (1907) 155 Fed. 220; Perkins r. Northern Pac. R. Co., (1907) 155 Fed. 445.

Allegations in a bill to enjoin the enforcement, as in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, of an order of a state railroad commission, that such commission was not vested with power to make that order, do not defeat the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court because, in such case, the action of the commission is not that of the state, where the bill sets up several entirely separate federal questions, some of which are directed to the invalidity, on various constitutional grounds, of the state statute under the supposed authority of which the order was made, and some of which are founded upon the terms of the order. Siler v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 175, 29 S. Ct. 451, 53 U. S. (L. ed.) 753.

A bill by a telephone company to enjoin the enforcement of a city ordinance fixing maximum rates of charge for telephone service, which alleges that the ordinance was passed in the exercise of power to fix rates conferred upon the city by an act of the legislature, and that if enforced complainant cannot make any net earnings whatever on its large capital invested in the business, nor sufficient to pay its necessary expenses, and will be deprived of its property without due

process of law, states a cause of action arising under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction, although it is further averred, as a legal conclusion, that the ordinance is also in violation of the state constitution, prohibiting the impairment of the freedom of contract. Ozark-Bell Telephone Co. v. Springfield, (1905) 140 Fed. 666.

Under the Federal Constitution, a munici pal corporation, although having power to regulate the rates to be charged by a telephone company, may not reduce such rates below a rate which will pay operating expenses, maintain the plant, and pay a fair return on the capital actually invested, and a bill to restrain the enforcement of a rate alleged to be confiscatory presents a federal question and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court. Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone, etc., Co., (C. C. A. 1909) 174 Fed. 739.

The question whether rates fixed by a municipal body to be charged by a water company are just and reasonable, or confiscatory and unconstitutional, is a judicial one, for the determination of which the company has the right to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. Spring Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, (1908) 165 Fed. 667.

A suit by a domestic corporation to restrain the collection of taxes imposed by the state on personal property alleged in the bill to have its situs for purposes of taxation in another state involves a federal question and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, since the taxation by a state of property. without its jurisdiction amounts to a taking of the property of the owner without due process of law. Central of Georgia R. Co. t. Wright, (1908) 166 Fed. 153.

A suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance requiring a street railroad company to carry without pay passengers holding transfers from other car lines is cognizable in equity on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, where the invalidity of the ordinance is alleged on the ground that it deprives the company of its property without due process of law in violation of the Federal Constitution. Chicago City R. Co. r. Chicago, (1905) 142 Fed. 844.

Where a municipal corporation without statutory authority was attempting to take a portion of complainant's right of way for a street, and to deprive complainant of its property without due process of law, a federal court had jurisdiction of a suit to restrain such action. Portland R., etc., Co. v. Portland, (1910) 181 Fed. 632.

The owners of property fronting on a street may maintain a suit in equity in a federal court against the city and a street railroad company, both of which are corporations of the state, to enjoin the laying of tracks in the street under a void enactment by the city council purporting to authorize such act, where irreparable injury will result to their property, as a taking of property under color of authority from the state with

out due process of law.

Savannah v. Holst, (1904) 132 Fed. 901, 65 C. C. A. 449, reversing 131 Fed. 931.

A suit to enjoin officers or agents of a state from exercising powers conferred on them by a state statute, on the ground that their action is in violation of the property rights of complainant under the Constitution of the United States, is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, without regard to the citizenship of the parties, where the requisite amount is involved. Douglas Park Jockey Club v. Grainger, (1906) 146 Fed. 414.

A city given by the state the power to contract for a supply of water for extinguishment of fires, and to tax property in the city to pay therefor, made and continued a contract which was unreasonable, and provided for an excessive compensation to the water company. The state itself had not approved or sanctioned the contract by its legislative, executive, or judicial authority. It was held that any illegal act of the city under the contract was done without the authority of or contrary to the state law, and persons who had paid the taxes could not seek equitable relief in the federal court, on the ground of deprivation of property without due process of law. Risley v. Utica, (1910) 179 Fed. 875.

The exercise by a city council of the taxing power delegated to it by the legislature is the act of the state, within the Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment, and a person who is thereby deprived of property without due process of law may invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court on the ground of a violation of such amendment; but, where such action is without the authority of or contrary to state law, no question arises under the Constitution which gives such court jurisdiction. Risley v. Utica, (1909) 173 Fed. 502.

A state statute which asserts the ownership by the state of the beds and shores of all navigable waters therein, but expressly provides that it shall not be construed so as to debar any person from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state, is not in violation of the Federal Constitution, as depriving riparian owners under previous grants from the United States of their property without due process of law, nor does a suit by such owners to enjoin officers of the state from selling shore lands under a statute enacted pursuant to such provision involve any constitutional question which gives a federal court jurisdiction thereof. McGilvra r. Ross, (C. C. A. 1908) 164 Fed. 604, affirming (1907) 161 Fed. 398.

The averment in a bill to enjoin the construction of a rapid transit railroad tunnel under a city street that, by such construction, complainant, as an abutting owner, is deprived of his property without due process of law, does not bring the case within the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court, where the bill, on its face, proceeds on the theory that the action sought to be enjoined was not only unauthorized, but was forbidden by state legislation. Barney v. New York, (1904) 193 U. S. 430, 24 S. Ct. 502, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 737; Huntington v. New York,

(1904) 193 U. S. 441, 24 S. Ct. 505, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 741.

A municipal ordinance not passed in accordance with legislative authority is not a law of the state within the meaning of the prohibitions of the Constitution of the United States, and a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance alleged to have been passed in violation of the requirements of the state law presents no question arising under the Constitution, which confers jurisdiction on a federal court, on the ground that the enforcement of the ordinance will deprive complainants of property without due process of law. Savannah v. Holst, (1904) 132 Fed. 901, 65 C. C. A. 449, reversing 131 Fed. 931.

A suit to enjoin the diversion or intended diversion by a municipality of certain funds which, under legislative sanction, it had collected from taxpayers for a specific public object, but which were not applied to that object, on the theory that such failure of duty on the part of the municipality may ultimately cause increased taxation, and thereby deprive the taxpayers of their property without the due process of law guaranteed by Const. U. S. Amend. 14, if the full amount originally intended to be applied to the particular object named by the legislature is to be collected, is not one arising under the Constitution of the United States, of which a federal Circuit Court has original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Owensboro Waterworks Co. v. Owensboro, (1906) 200 U. S. 38, 26 S. Ct. 249, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 361.

The averment that if a temporary injunction granted by an inferior state court, restraining the future payment of rentals accruing under the alleged contract of a municipality with a water company because of the invalidity of the contract, should ultimately be made perpetual, such company would thereby be deprived of its property without due process of law, does not justify a federal Circuit Court in assuming jurisdiction of a suit by the water company to restrain the municipality from attempting to annul the rental contract, as being a case arising under the Federal Constitution or laws. Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, (1903) 191 U. S. 184, 24 S. Ct. 63, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 140.

The contention that a state court, in admitting a nuncupative will to probate without giving the statutory notice to the next of kin, violated the due process of law clause of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, is too lacking in merit to afford a basis for the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court of a suit to set aside the probate, even assuming that such notice is essential to the preliminary probate, where the bill proceeds on the theory, which finds support in the law of the state, that, despite the mere preliminary admission to probate, there remained a right to assail the existence of the will and its probate, which was not lost by the failure to give notice. O'Callaghan v. O'Brien, (1905) 199 U. S. 89, 25 S. Ct. 727, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 101, affirming (1903) 125 Fed. 657, 60 C. C. A. 347, and reversing (1902) 116 Fed. 934.

Since the only statute recognizing the right of an entryman to settle on unsurveyed lands of the United States is Act May 14, 1880, ch. 89, 21 Stat. L. 140, 6 Fed. Stat. Annot. 300, 301, providing that a homestead settler, on public land surveyed or unsurveyed shall be allowed the same time to file his application and perfect his original entry as is allowed to settlers under the pre-emption laws, a suit by a homestead settler on unsurveyed public land to protect his possessory right as against an adverse claimant does not involve a construction of the Constitution of the United States so as to sustain federal jurisdiction on that ground. Earnhart v. Switzler, (C. Ç. A. 1910) 179 Fed. 832.

Where the validity of a city ordinance regulating the sale of nonintoxicating beverages depends wholly on state statutes, no federal question can be injected into a prosecution for violating the ordinance unless it be that accused is being held contrary to the inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Kroschel v. Munkers, (1910) 179 Fed. 961.

A suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance is not within the jurisdiction of a federal court as involving the construction of the Federal Constitution, where the ordinance, if in violation of the Constitution, is equally in violation of the constitution of the state. Seattle Electric Co. v. Seattle, etc., R. Co., (C. C. A. 1911) 185 Fed. 365.

A case arising under the Federal Constitution and laws, of which a federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction without diversity of citizenship, is not presented by a bill which asserts the invalidity, under the Federal Constitution, of certain statutes and ordinances alleged to constitute a cloud on title, which the bill seeks to remove. Devine v. Los Angeles, (1906) 202 U. S. 313, 26 S. Ct. 652, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 1046.

In a suit in a federal court by a nonresident of a state to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance, adopted in a local option district of such state, prohibiting the sale of liquors therein except for certain purposes, the only questions which can be considered are those affecting the rights of complainant under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In questions relating to the validity and effect of the law, or the regu larity of the election, complainant has no legal interest, except as they may affect such rights. Busch r. Webb, (1903) 122 Fed.

655.

An objection that local legislation prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, etc., and making a violation thereof a misdemeanor, was violative of complainants' rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, is available as a defense to a prosecution in the state courts for violation of the Act, which could finally be determined by the United States Supreme Court on writ of error from the highest court of the state, and therefore is not ground of federal jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the Act. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co. v. Hill, (1908) 166 Fed, 140,

Impairing obligation of contracts. — Where jurisdiction of a federal court is predicated on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired by a state, the questions to be considered are (1) the existence or not of the contract, (2) the obligation arising under it, and (3) whether there has been state legislation impairing the contract obligation. American Telephone, etc., Co. r. New Decatur, (1910) 176 Fed. 133.

It is not essential to the jurisdiction of a federal court of a suit based on an alleged impairment of a contract by a state in violation of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution, that there should be a valid contract, or that the impairment complained of should in fact be effected, but it is sufficient, for jurisdictional purposes, if the plaintiff claims the existence of such contract, and its impairment, in good faith. Riverside, etc., R. Co. v. Riverside, (1902) 118 Fed. 736; Pacific Electric Co. r. Los Angeles, (1902) 118 Fed. 746. affirmed (1904) 194 U. S. 112, 24 S. Ct. 586, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 896.

That a state constitution contains a provision prohibiting the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts does not deprive a litigant of the right to invoke the similar provision of the Federal Constitution in a suit which involves the question of its violation. Des Moines City R. Co. r. Des Moines, (1907) 151 Fed. 854.

A federal court of equity may grant relief by injunction against a city ordinance which impairs the contract rights of complainant, or deprives him of his property without due process of law. Cleveland City R. Co. v. Cleveland, (1899) 94 Fed. 385, affirmed Cleveland r. Cleveland City R. Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 517, 24 S. Ct. 756, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1102.

A suit to restrain the passage of a municipal ordinance repealing a prior ordinance granting a franchise to a street railroad company, which had been accepted by the company, is one involving the question of the impairment of the obligation of a contract in violation of the constitutional rights of the company, and is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Olathe, (1907) 156 Fed. 624.

The formal repudiation by a municipality of its contract with a waterworks company, and its refusal to perform its obligations under it, cannot give rise to a suit under the Federal Constitution, of which a Federal Cir cuit Court can take jurisdiction without ref erence to the citizenship of the parties. Daw son r. Columbia Ave. Sav. Fund, etc., Co., (1905) 197 U. S. 178, 25 S. Ct. 420, 49 U. S. (L. ed.) 713.

Jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a munici pal ordinance reducing street railway rates cannot be defeated on the theory that a lack of delegated power to adopt the ordinance withdrew from the case any question as to the impairment of contract obligations, where the municipality's defense is that certain other ordinances asserted as contracts did not deprive it of its continued power to ex

ert authority over such rates, because the state law prevented it from abrogating, by subsequent contracts, the right of regulation expressly reserved in a prior ordinance. Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 517, 24 S. Ct. 756, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1102; Cleveland r. Cleveland Electric R. Co., (1904) 194 U. S. 538, 24 S. Ct. 764, 48 U. S. (L. ed.) 1109.

A case arising under the Constitution of the United States, of which a federal Circuit Court has original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties, is made by a bill filed by a water company to restrain the municipal construction of a waterworks system on the ground that it had a contract with the municipality giving it exclusive privileges, the obligations of which, it insists, would be impaired by the establishment of municipal waterworks under the authority of subsequent legislation. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, (1906) 200 U. S. 22, 26 S. Ct. 224, 50 U. S. (L. ed.) 353.

A municipal ordinance legislative in character, in the exercise of delegated authority to make laws which the legislature might have made, has the force of a state law within the contract clause of the constitution, and, where such ordinance impairs the obligation of a prior contract made by the city, a suit to enjoin its enforcement involves a question arising under the Constitution of the United States, of which the federal courts have jurisdiction, where the requisite amount is involved, without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Nelson r. Murfreesboro, (1909) 179 Fed. 905.

A suit to enjoin municipal officers from violating its contract with a drainage company presents no federal question as to impairment of contract obligations or taking of property without due process of law. Shawnee Sewerage, etc., Co. v. Stearns, (1911) 220 U. S. 462, 31 S. Ct. 452, 55 U. S. (L. ed.) 544.

A resolution of a city council, ordering a railroad company to open and put in condition for public travel a street through its station yards, previously vacated by an or dinance which constituted a contract with the company, where disobedience of such order subjected the railroad company to a penalty under the laws of the state, is a legislative act which impairs the obligation of the contract and entitles the company to relief by injunction in a federal court of equity. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Shawnee, (C. C. A. 1910) 183 Fed. 85.

A federal court is without jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance, on the ground that it impairs the obligation of a contract or deprives complainant of property without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, when the bill alleges that no power had been granted to the municipality by the constitution or legislature of the state to pass such ordinance; the prohibition of the Federal Constitution being against state action only. Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone, etc., Co., (C. C. A, 1907) 155 Fed. 725, 12 Ann, Cas. 500,

A federal court has jurisdiction of a suit by a landowner to restrain revenue officers of a state from prosecuting proceedings expressly based on a state statute to enforce the collection of taxes against such lands, on the ground that such statute as applied to complainant's lands impairs the obligation of a contract with the state exempting such lands from taxation. University of the South v. Jetton, (1907) 155 Fed. 182.

A case arising under the Federal Constitution, of which a federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction without diversity of citizenship, is presented by a bill which alleges a contract exemption from taxation which the state is, by subsequent legislation, attempting to destroy. Jetton v. University of the South, (1908) 208 U. S. 489, 28 S. Ct. 375, 52 U. S. (L. ed.) 584.

A bill by a stockholder in a banking corporation to enjoin the acceptance by the bank of the provisions of the state bank guaranty law, on the ground that such Act is unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of the contracts of complainant and others as stockholders, by taking their property for the payment of debts which neither they nor the bank have contracted, presents a controversy arising under the constitution, which is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Larabee . Dolley, (1909) 175 Fed. 365.

A controversy arising under the Federal Constitution, of which a federal Circuit Court has original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties, is presented by a bill which asserts that the obligation of a contract for the exclusive privilege of supplying water to a city and its inhabitants is impaired by a subsequent municipal ordinance and a legislative enactment under which the municipality is proceeding to issue and market its bonds for the purpose of constructing its own waterworks system. Mercantile Trust, etc., Co. v. Columbus, (1906) 203 U. S. 311, 27 S. Ct. 83, 51 U. S. (L. ed.) 198.

The trustee in a mortgage given by a corporation to secure its bonds may maintain a suit in a federal court to protect rights arising out of contracts pledged by the mortgage from impairment by legislation of the state or by its authority regardless of the citizenship of the mortgagor. Denver v. New York Trust Co., (C. C. A. 1911) 187 Fed. 890.

A suit by a street railway company claiming in good faith to have a contract with a city giving it a perpetual right to operate its cars in the streets of the city, to enjoin the city from impairing such contract by enforcing an enactment of its council treating the company as a trespasser and requir ing the removal of its tracks from the streets, is a suit arising under the Constitution of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Des Moines City R. Co. v. Des Moines, (1907) 151 Fed. 854.

A bill alleging that complainant leased a certain oyster bed from the state for a term of years pursuant to a state law, and planted the same, but that by a subsequent act of