III. A miracle becomes a proof of the character or mission of him by whom it was wrought, by being professedly wrought for the confirmation of either. A miracle is the testimony of God. From the perfect veracity of him, who is the Supreme Being, it irresistibly results that he never can give, nor rationally be supposed to give his testimony to any thing but truth. When, therefore, a miracle is wrought in confirmation of any thing, or as evidence of any thing, we know that that thing is true, because God has given to it his testimony. The miracles of Moses and of Christ were wrought to prove, that their mission and doctrine were from God: therefore they certainly were from God.

To this it has been objected,' first, that believers in the Bible argue in a circle, and that they prove the doctrine by the miracle, and the miracle by the doctrine; and, secondly, that miracles are asserted by the Scriptures themselves to have been wrought in confirmation of falsehood.

1. The triumph of the adversaries of Christianity would indeed be complete, if we asserted that a doctrine can be proved to be reasonable and worthy of God, only by miracles, and should then make use of the doctrine to prove that the miracles come from God. But this is not the case. Miracles alone cannot directly prove the truth or falsehood, the reasonableness or absurdity, of any doctrine. As miracles are appeals to our senses, so are doctrines to our reason. They are properly credentials and testimonials, which, when a man can produce openly and fairly, if he teaches nothing absurd, much more if his doctrines and precepts appear to be good and beneficial, he ought to be obeyed.

--

The opposers of revelation are greatly mistaken when they assert that Christians argue in a circle, in proving the doctrines first by miracles, and then the miracles again by the doctrines: and the mistake lies in this, that men do not distinguish between the doctrines which we prove by miracles, and the doctrines by which we try miracles, for they are not the same doctrines. The great doctrines of natural religion have for their evidence the works of nature, and want not the support of miracles. God never wrought miracles to prove the difference between good and evil and if any man were asked how he proves temperance or chastity to be duties, or murder or adultery to be sins, he would not recur to miracles for an argument. Though these and similar duties are enforced in the gospel, they were always truths and duties before the coming of Christ; and we are in possession of them, without the help of miracles or revelation. And these are the doctrines by which we try the miracles. But when any new doctrine is published to the world, of which nature has given no notice, it is of necessity that such new doctrines should be established by new proofs. Now the doctrines, which are to be proved by miracles, are the new revealed doctrines of Christianity, which neither were nor could be known to the reason of man: - Such are the doc

1 By Rousseau and others, whose objections have been re-echoed by more recent opposers of revelation.

trines of salvation and redemption by Christ, of sanctification and regeneration by the Spirit of God; and who ever brought these doctrines to prove the truth or divine original of the miracles?

2. But, secondly, it has been objected that miracles are asserted, by the Scriptures themselves, to have been wrought in confirmation of falsehood; as for example, by the magicians in Egypt, the witch of Endor, and by Satan in the time of Christ's temptation.

If, however, the magicians of Egypt did work miracles, they were wrought by the permission of God, with a view to make the final triumph of his own cause, in the hands of Moses, more the object of public attention, and more striking to the view of mankind. This was done, when the magicians themselves were put to silence, and forced to confess that the works of Moses were accomplished by the finger of God. (Exod. viii. 19.) But the truth is, the magicians did not perform any miracles. All that they did (as the narrative of Moses expressly states,) was to busy themselves in their enchantments by which, every man now knows, that, although the weak and credulous may be deceived, miracles cannot possibly be accomplished.1

The witch of Endor neither wrought nor expected to work any miracle. (1 Sam. xxviii. 7-25.) This is clearly evident from her astonishment and alarm at the appearance of Samuel. Saul, who expected a miracle, beheld Samuel without any peculiar surprise: she, who expected none, with amazement and terror. Indeed, it does not appear from the narrative, neither is it to be supposed, that this woman had power to call up Samuel, whom Saul wished to consult. But, before the sorceress could prepare her enchantments for the purpose of soothing and flattering Saul, the prophet Samuel, commissioned by God, appeared, to her astonishment and consternation, and denounced the judgment of death upon Saul. We are certain that, in this case, Samuel was sent by God himself; because the message he delivered respected a future event, and it is the prerogative of God alone to declare what shall happen."

Satan is said by the evangelists to have taken Jesus Christ up into an exceeding high mountain, and to have shown him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them, in a moment of time, (Matt. iv. 8. Luke iv. 5.) which transaction, a late scoffing antagonist of the Scriptures has termed 'the most extraordinary of all the things called miracles.' But the truth is, that this transaction is not one of the 'things called miracles' it is not mentioned as effected by supernatural means, or without Christ's free consent. Neither were all the kingdoms of the world exhibited to him. The Greek word orxous, οικουμένης, here translated world, very frequently signifies land or country, and

1 Dr. Dwight's System of Theology, vol. ii. p. 508. That the Egyptian magi. cians did not work miracles, has been proved at considerable length by the late Dr. Farmer, in his Dissertation on Miracles, a work now of very rare occurrence. See an extract from it (for the argument does not admit of abridgment,) infra, in the Appendix, No. II.

On this subject the reader will find a well-written and satisfactory communication in the London Christian Instructor for 1818. Vol. i. pp. 641-648.

ought to have been thus rendered in the passage just cited; the meaning being no other, than that Satan showed to Jesus Christ all the four tetrarchies or kingdoms comprised in the land of Judæa. In this transaction it will not be pretended that there was any thing miraculous.

The proper effect, therefore, of miracles is to mark clearly the divine interposition: and the Scriptures intimate this to be their design, for both Moses and the prophets, and Jesus Christ and his apostles, appealed to them in proof of their divine mission. Hence we draw this consequence, that he who performs a miracle, performs it in the name of God, and on his behalf; that is to say, in proof of a divine

mission.

IV. Wherever miracles are wrought they are matters of fact, and are capable of being proved by proper evidence, as other facts are. To those who beheld the miracles wrought by Moses and Jesus Christ, as well as by his apostles, the seeing of those miracles performed was sufficient evidence of the divine inspiration of Moses and Jesus Christ. The witnesses, however, must be supposed to be acquainted with the course of nature, so as to be able to judge that the event in question was contrary to it. With respect to the miracles recorded in the Scriptures, this cannot be doubted: for no man of ordinary understanding could be incapable of ascertaining that the event was contrary to the course of nature, when the Israelites passed through the Red Sea, and afterwards over the river Jordan, the waters being stayed in their current on either side; when diseases were healed by a word; when sight was imparted to the blind, hearing to the deaf, and the powers of speech to the dumb, merely at command, and without the use of any other means: especially when a corpse, that had begun to putrefy, was restored to life by the speaking of a word.

But to other men, miracles, like other events, admit of the evidence of testimony. Now, as we cannot doubt the competency of witnesses to ascertain facts, their credibility is the only point to be considered; and this must be determined upon the principles on which the credibility of testimony, in general, depends. As this topic has been dexterously seized by the advocates of infidelity, in order to decry the credibility of the miracles recorded in the Bible, the following hints on the value of human testimony may be found useful in enabling the student to investigate and explain them.

For estimating the value of single evidences the two following plain rules have been laid down :-" Any thing, capable of being proved by mere testimony, is credible in proportion to the opportunity which the witness had of being well informed concerning it himself, and his freedom from any bias that might make him wish to impose upon others. If the person, who gives us information, appears to be a competent judge of it, and to have been in a situation in which he had the best opportunity of being rightly informed, and if there be no ap

1 That the above is the proper rendering of oikovμevn, is fully proved by Dr. Lardner. Works, vol. i. pp. 241. 255, 256. 8vo.; or vol. i. pp. 132. 139, 140. 4to.

pearance of its being his interest to deceive us, we give our assent; but we hesitate in proportion to the doubts we entertain on either of

these heads.

"The more persons there are who relate the same transaction, of which they are equally credible witnesses, the stronger is the evidence for it. But, the more persons there are, through whose hands the same narration is conveyed to us, the weaker is the evidence. In this latter case, the witnesses are called dependent ones; but, in the former, they are said to be independent. Whatever imperfection there may be in any one of a number of independent witnesses, it is in part removed by the testimony of others; but every imperfection is increased in proportion to the number of dependent witnesses, through whose hands the same story is transmitted."

The proper mark or criterion of a story being related by a number of independent witnesses, of full credit, is their complete agreement in the principal arguments, and their disagreement with respect to things of less consequence, or at least, variety, or diversity, in their manner of relating the same story.

"The reason of this is, that to things of principal importance they will all equally attend, and therefore they will have their minds equally impressed with the ideas of them; but that to things of less consequence they will not give the same attention, and therefore they will be apt to conceive differently concerning them.

"If a number of persons agree very minutely with respect to all the facts of any narrative, general and particular, and also in the order and manner of their narration, it will amount to a proof that they have agreed together to tell the same story; and in this they will be supposed to have been influenced by some motive not favourable to the value of their testimony; and besides, having learned circumstances one of another, they cannot be considered as independent of one another. All the histories which have been written by persons in every respect equally credible, agree in the main things, but they are as certainly found to differ with regard to things of less consequence. "We likewise distinguish with respect to the nature of the fact to which our assent is required; for we expect more numerous, more express, and, in all points, more unexceptionable evidence, according to the degree of its previous improbability, arising from its want of analogy to other facts already known: and in this there is a gradation from things which are antecedently highly probable, and therefore require but little positive evidence, to things which are utterly incredible, being so contrary to what we already know of the course of nature and the author of it, that no evidence could convince us of it."

For instance, "if my servant should tell me that, as he was passing through a certain place, he saw a friend of mine, who (he knew) had business in that neighbourhood, and the character of my servant was such, that I had never known him tell me a wanton lie, I should readily believe him; and, if I had any thing to do in the case, I should, without hesitation, act upon the supposition that what he told me was true. But, if the same servant should say that, coming through the

same place, he saw another of my friends, whom I knew to have been dead, I should not believe him, though the thing in itself was not naturally impossible; and if ten or a dozen persons of our common acquaintance, persons of knowledge and curiosity, should, independently of one another, seriously inform me that they were present themselves, and had no doubt of the fact, I might believe it." It follows, however, from this observation, that miracles require a much stronger testimony than common facts: and such testimony, it will be seen in the following pages, they really have.

2

The greatest part of our knowledge, whether scientific or historical, has no other foundation than testimony. How many facts in chemistry, in physics, or other departments of science, do we receive without having seen them, only because they are attested to us: though they may seem contrary not only to our personal experience, but also to common experience! For instance, I am informed that the fresh-water polype, when cut into pieces, is re-produced in each piece; that the pieces of this insect, when put end to end, intergraft and unite together; that this same insect may be turned inside out like a glove; and that it lives, grows, and multiplies, in this new state, as well as in its natural state. These are strange facts, and yet I admit them upon credible testimony. Again, a man who has never been out of Great Britain, is, by testimony alone, as fully convinced of the existence of foreign countries as he is of the existence of the country in which he lives. No person, who has read history, has any more doubt of there being such a city as Rome or Paris, or that there formerly existed such persons as Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, than he has of the truth of the proposition that two and two make four, or that queen Elizabeth some time since reigned in this island, or that George the fourth is, at present, sovereign of the British empire. The truth of these events is conveyed to us by the general and concurrent testimony of history, by which it is so firmly established, that, were a set of learned men now to arise, and, without being able to produce any antient contradictory statements, to endeavour, by specious reasonings, to destroy our belief of it, it would argue the greatest folly and weakness to be moved by them. The truth of other facts is substantiated in the same manner, and upon such evidence almost the whole business and intercourse of human life is conducted. But, however applicable this reasoning may be to the ordinary affairs of human life, it has been laid down by some persons as a maxim, that no human testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle. This assertion was first made by a late celebrated philosopher, whose notions have been adopted by all later deists, and whose argument in substance is this:-"Experience, which in some things is variable, in others is uniform, is our

1 Dr. Priestley's Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, vol. i. pp. 274278. On the subject of the credibility of testimony, Mr. Gambier's Moral Evidence may be very advantageously consulted.

2 The curious reader will find accounts of numerous experiments on these extraordinary animals in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, vols. 42, 43, 44 and 49.

VOL. I.

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