these two days enables him to invest the garrison a little closer. Holmes and Taylor west of the Mississippi, and Johnston at the east, make fruitless demonstrations to relieve the besieged fortresses. Fresh reinforcements have doubled Grant's army, which, in addition to its siege-labors, has constructed a line of fortifications intended to put a stop to Johnston's attack. Finally, on the 4th of July, Pemberton capitulates, and three days later Gardner surrenders the works at Port Hudson to Banks.

Since the 1st of May, Grant's army had taken 42,059 prisoners, and that of Banks 10,584 from the time it took the field in the middle of April. Grant had bought his victory at the cost of 1243 killed, 7095 wounded, and 535 prisoners, or 8873 men in all;* Banks had lost three or four thousand. But the number of killed and wounded in the armies that were opposed to them amounted to nearly twelve or thirteen thousand; which number, being added to the prisoners taken by these two generals, gives a total of sixty-five thousand combatants taken from the Confederate ranks in the course of three months-a loss still more difficult to be repaired than that of the fortresses and provinces which the sacrifices made by these soldiers were unable to

save.

*A revised statement of casualties during the operations against Vicksburg, from May 1 to July 4, 1863, prepared in the office of the adjutant-general of the army, shows 1511 killed, 7396 wounded, and 453 captured or missing—a total of 9360.-ED.

BOOK III.—-PENNSYLVANIA.

WE

CHAPTER I.

LEGISLATION.

E have reached the most critical period of the war, and a collective glance at the situation of the two sections of the American people armed against each other is necessary to an understanding of the importance of the military events we are about to narrate in this book. The war has been progressing for the last two years, and its continuation has destroyed those illusions with which both parties had begun the struggle. The South, encouraged by its early successes, had arrived at the conclusion that the North, unable to undergo heavy sacrifices for any length of time, would consent to the dismemberment of the federation of States or to the formation of a new government guaranteeing the maintenance and expansion of slavery. The North had imagined that it had only a simple insurrection to deal with, and was in hope that a single victory would suffice to restore the Union without effecting any change in the Federal status, and without touching the social question which had just shaken this status to its very foundation. We have shown how the battle-ground had been gradually widened, how the deepseated causes of the antagonism between the North and the South had been developed with irresistible force, in spite of the constitutional euphemisms which had hitherto concealed them. In issuing his proclamation emancipating the slaves, Mr. Lincoln had been influenced much more by the provocations of slaveholders than by the pressure of abolitionists. At the beginning of the year 1863 the question was therefore clearly drawn between the two hostile governments of Washington and Richmond. It was a struggle between two social conditions thenceforth incompatible under the same laws. The original quarrel regarding

State Sovereignty was forgotten. After having cleverly turned it to account, the iron hand of Jefferson Davis had crushed out this pretended sovereignty in the network of a centralized despotism a thousand times more powerful than the authority exercised by his opponent. All the advantages of the military and political position were in favor of the Confederates. During the last two years they had been inured to the hardships of war and the voids made in their ranks had been promptly filled. Notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of the free States, they had held their numerous soldiers in check everywhere. The year 1862 was brought to a close in the West by Sherman's disaster before Vicksburg and Grant's retreat; in the centre, by the indecisive battle of Murfreesborough; and in the East, by Burnside's disaster in front of Fredericksburg. The Confederates, forming one compact state notwithstanding the extent of their territory, remained masters of Richmond and the Mississippi; they had not, therefore, been seriously damaged. They had only to maintain this position to accomplish the object they had in view— the recognition of their independence. Time was on their side, whether the war should be prolonged without any decisive success for either party, until the North should herself acknowledge her weakness, or whether some unforeseen incident should occur to alter the course of events and make a diversion in their favor, as had nearly happened in regard to the Trent affair. It was for this reason that they clamored so persistently for recognition by Europe. This diplomatic act in itself would have made no change in their military condition, in the blockade which fettered their movements, or in the privileges enjoyed by their ships of war as belligerents; but it would have caused much irritation in the North, and perhaps finally involved it in a war with some of the powers of the Old World. The political situation of the free States at this period seemed to encourage the hopes of those who thought that the South was indebted for success to the weariness of the war felt by the North. The restoration of the Union pure and simple, without touching the question of slavery, had been the common programme which united men of the most opposite views in a patriotic effort to sustain Mr. Lincoln. It having been demonstrated that this programme was impracticable,

each party had resumed its own view of affairs, taking advantage of the proclamation abolishing slavery to put it in circulation. All Republicans had joined the abolitionists in support of the President. The latter had seen arrayed in opposition to him, with the same differences as were exhibited two years before, the two parties which we have already mentioned as having in 1861 taken the names of War Democrats and Peace Democrats. The former party, still pretending to fight for the restoration of the Union, was resorting to all sorts of expedients to conciliate the ' South while waging war against her, and debating the question of slavery without attempting a radical solution of it, ready to accept the most opposite propositions in order to encompass this end-from gradual emancipation extending to some remote, undefined period to the adoption of all the compromise measures which had vainly been proposed two years previously. The latter party, which had been silent during these two years, was no longer afraid to speak. The War Democrats taunted Mr. Lincoln with having been beaten, and the Peace Democrats taunted him for making war. The latter, to whom their adversaries had given the name of "Copperheads," were suspected, very naturally, to be the accomplices of the South. A large number of them, in fact, as the sequel will show, were included in that category. In a war between two nations, citizens may counsel peace while serving their government loyally, and without their fidelity being called into question; in a civil war, when one of the two contending parties finds in the ranks of its opponents men ready to approve and to support verbally the demands the enemy is resolved to make at the point of the sword, the position of such men is, to say the least, a very false and dangerous one so far as their honor is concerned. At the beginning of 1863 we find, then, a "peace party," to which every new check, every new tax, and every new levy, imparts more strength and assurance-to which the stringent measures adopted by the government at Washington against some of its political adversaries, the burden of military rule in certain sections, financial disturbance, and disappointed ambition, bring each day some new recruits. The orators of this party are those who in 1861 defended the right of holding public meetings, the men of action whom physical force alone had prevented at that period from making

common cause with the insurgents. But, whilst opposition to the Republican party and the President's policy is gaining strength with the public, it has as yet exercised no direct influence upon Congress, where it is only represented by a weak minority. The composition of this body, in fact, cannot be modified until the electors shall be called upon to choose the Thirty-eighth Congress. The Thirty-seventh, whose labors we have followed since the extra session of July, 1861, began, as we have seen, its third and last session on December 1, 1862; it came to a close, together with its powers, on the 4th of March, 1863. The principal measures which characterized this session, inspired by the policy which had guided its action since the day of its first meeting, must be briefly enumerated here, for they exercised a powerful influence over the situation we have to describe.

In our first volume we explained the state of legislation in regard to questions relating to slaves, the army, the finances, and individual liberty at the opening of the session. The President's message was almost exclusively devoted to the first of these questions. It was natural for Mr. Lincoln to desire to connect the legislative power with the abolition policy which he had adopted. Up to this period the acts of Congress had no object in view except the treatment of slaves coming from the States at war with the Union. The Presidential proclamation of September 22d also aimed at this class of slaves exclusively: these various acts and proclamations were simply war-measures justified by the insurrectionary condition of certain States, but utterly inapplicable to the Union collectively.

We have mentioned elsewhere the fruitless efforts made by Mr. Lincoln to induce those of the slave States that had remained loyal to the Federal cause to enact some laws guaranteeing gradual emancipation. Fully convinced of the importance of such legislation, he asked Congress to make it the subject of a constitutional amendment. But this sage advice was not listened to. The fate of war must be the arbiter: it was imperative that the victorious Union troops should destroy slavery, together with the armies enlisted under its banner, before its defenders in the North could be prevailed upon to abandon the institution. All