far as the Emmettsburg road. Sickles, having been summoned to head-quarters, has left the command of his troops to Birney. But at the very moment when the generals are about to assemble, the cannon's voice, which is heard on the left, calls each of them to his post. Sickles has had no time to dismount from his horse. Meade on this occasion does not hesitate to follow him. It is half-past three o'clock: the battle is at last about to commence.

The interminable preparations of the Confederates are therefore completed. We have seen how much precious time has been lost up to noon. At this hour Law joins Hood and McLaws, who have stacked arms and are waiting for him on the right bank of Willoughby Run, between the roads to Chambersburg and Hagerstown, fronting the battlefield of the previous day. The two divisions take up the line of march. McLaws at the head, under the lead of Colonel Johnston of the general staff, proceeds toward the schoolhouse of Willoughby Run. Thence a road winding through the woods will lead him to the Emmettsburg road beyond the orchard, thus enabling him to surround the Federal left. But, having reached a halfway point, the Confederates perceive the summit of the Little Round Top between two hills, as also the flags that are being waved by the Federals on the lookout who occupy it. As Lee has given formal instructions to disguise the march of the First corps, McLaws is brought to a halt while waiting for orders; finally, the column makes a retrograde movement in the direction of the Hagerstown road, to follow it as far as the Black Horse Tavern, and there to take the Millerstown road, in order to reach the schoolhouse by a deviation of about five miles.*

* Longstreet has blamed Colonel Johnston for having caused his first division to make this long and useless détour. McLaws and Johnston assert, on the contrary, that the direction of the Black Horse Tavern was given by Longstreet himself. We cannot reconcile these different allegations; but we will observe that, in either case, the responsibility belongs to the commander of the First corps, who should have been near the head of his column in order to direct its movements. Johnston adds that the détour imposed upon McLaws' division was an insignificant one, which did not cause him to lose much time. An examination of the map is sufficient to prove that this assertion is inadmissible. But the consequences of the delay in Longstreet's attack were so serious that we have not desired to withhold any of the excuses alleged by the various interested parties.

This countermarch causes McLaws to lose more than two hours. Lee, who for the last hour has been expecting to see him emerge every moment, does not understand the cause for this delay, and becomes impatient to no purpose. On his own part, Ewell, who receives no instructions, wishing to make the most of his time, plants his artillery upon Benner's Hill, fires a few shots against Culp's Hill, and sends forward reconnoissances to feel the Federal positions. Longstreet, who has proceeded by a more direct road with his columns to the spot where they are to form, finally shares this impatience on the part of his chief, and repairs to the front of his troops in order to accelerate their march. He can cause McLaws to turn back from the road which he has so unfortunately taken, but he still finds Hood at the point where the latter has been brought to a halt. The commander of the First corps, finding that there is no longer any reason for concealing his march, inasmuch as the whole column must have been signalled a long time since from the summit of the Little Round Top, orders Hood to strike the Emmettsburg road direct by passing behind the Warfield ridge. Hood thus precedes McLaws along this road, and by taking his right wing he may begin the attack even before the latter has fallen into line. Lee, to whom Longstreet has hastened to announce his speedy entrance into line, has caused Ewell to be told to hold himself in readiness to support him about four o'clock. Hood, on his own part, leaving on his left the wood which Wilcox occupies in front of the orchard, where McLaws will have to form, has drawn up his four brigades in line of battle west of the Emmettsburg road, Law on the right, with Benning behind him; Robertson on the left in the first line, with Anderson in the second line. At three o'clock he receives the order to attack in conformity with Lee's instructions; that is to say, by keeping his left near the road. But the reports of his skirmishers make known to Hood the difficulties of the road he has been directed to follow. It is known, in fact, that the left of the Federals, instead of terminating, as the Southern general-in-chief had thought, in the neighborhood of the orchard, was prolonged in return from this point as far as Plum Run, thus forming a convex line of great strength and difficult of access. More to the south the open fields which extend from the Emmettsburg road,

by winding around the rocky base of the Round Tops as far as the Taneytown road, where the enemy's supply-trains are parked, seemed to invite the Confederates to surround the extremity of the Union line on that side. The ground is favorable for a flank movement of this limited character, which would not compromise the whole army into making a flank march. Hood has been asking from his immediate chief permission to make the attempt. But Lee's order is peremptory: the plan of battle cannot be changed without his consent; and Longstreet has already lost so much time that he dares not assume the responsibility of further delay. Although it is not within the conditions foreseen by Lee, he applies himself to cause the instructions given by the latter to be executed literally, and comes to show Hood the direction he is to follow. The objective point is the Devil's Den hill, and the task of attacking the orchard both in front and in flank falls again upon McLaws. At half-past three o'clock the four brigades of the former take up the line of march by descending toward Plum Run, their right extending in the direction of the road connecting the Slyder house with the Emmettsburg road. The two armies facing each other are about coming to blows at last.

VOL. III.-39

THE

CHAPTER IV.

GETTYSBURG.

THE importance of the battle of Gettysburg has compelled us to divide its narrative into two chapters, but this second part is only a continuation of the first. The great struggle has been going on since the morning of the 1st of July, notwithstanding the temporary cessation which occurred during the earlier part of the 2d. The movements of Longstreet's corps which we have just described have been noticed by the Federals posted at the orchard; their artillery opens fire upon the adjoining woods of Warfield; several batteries of Longstreet's which have taken position near this farm reply to them; Wilcox on one side, Graham on the other, cause skirmishers to advance, and the musketry-fire becomes rapidly intense. It is at this moment that Meade, accompanied by Sickles, reaches the new line which the latter has caused his troops to occupy. Struck with its extension, he sees that a single corps is not sufficient to defend it; he prepares at once to reinforce it, and sends General Warren, whose quickness of perception inspires him with the utmost confidence, to select the points which stand most in need of assistance. Sickles, finding that his chief does not approve of his recent movement, proposes to fall back. But Meade, showing him the woods on their left, answers that it is too late: in fact, while the artillery-fire against the orchard is increasing, the volleys of musketry announce that more to eastward Hood has opened the fight. The latter was to have caused his front to make a half-wheel to the left in order to attack that portion of the Federal line occupied by De Trobriand and Ward; but while advancing beyond the Emmettsburg road he has at once recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and, directing Law to bear no longer to the left, but to the right, he orders

him toward this point. Robertson, perceiving this movement, imitates it at once in order not to break up the line, and, crossing the tributary of Plum Run in front of the western part of the Devil's Den, he dashes forward to attack this position a few minutes before four o'clock, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. The Federals, who have seen on the opposite slopes the serried lines of the assailants advancing with their flags flying and shouting their war-cry, are ready to receive them. Ward waits for their attack in good positions and without flinching, but as he has sent Berdan with the Third Maine to the orchard, his brigade is reduced to five regiments. A desperate struggle takes place along the rocky slopes which the Confederates are beginning to climb fortunately for Ward, Robertson, in extending his left for the purpose of surrounding him, exposes his flank to De Trobriand, and on this side his soldiers begin to fall back. He is obliged to take the remainder of his force to their assistance, and Ward, thus freed, recovers the ground he has just lost. The First Texas, which was trying to seize the nearest guns of Smith's battery, redeems the combat on the left, but the Federal guns, being thenceforth free, inflict severe losses upon the assailants, who are trying in vain to capture them. During this time, Anderson, who was to support Robertson, has not followed his movement on the right, and is about to strike the centre of De Trobriand's line, which is its strongest part. Being obliged to cross the ravine under the enemy's fire, he has been repulsed with great loss. Besides, two regiments having become separated from Robertson's brigade, and continuing to march with Law's troops, this brigade would find itself isolated and in a most critical position but for the timely arrival of Benning. This general, having, like Anderson, adhered to his original direction, thus finds himself in the rear of Robertson. These three brigades at the same time renew the attack. De Trobriand and Ward offer the most desperate resistance; Smith's and Winslow's batteries support them as much as the nature of the ground will allow. The woods, the rocks, and the slopes give the defenders great advantage, but they are much weaker numerically than the Southerners, who rush to the attack with desperate energy; consequently, their losses follow in quick succession, and their line is speedily