In re Jackson. Several cases have been cited as controlling the case at bar, holding certain things only are essential to be shown to render it the duty of the executive on whom the demand is made to remand, and that inasmuch as evidence that the party has fled from justice is not stated to be one of the essential matters, therefore it is claimed not necessary either to show such fact or to recite in the warrant any conclusion by the executive as to the fact. Those cases were decided on the questions raised therein and are authority only as to those questions. Courts not unfrequently lay down general rules not necessary to the decision of the case being considered, and which therefore often fail to stand the test when a different question, not anticipated or considered, is presented. The relator must be discharged. We do not suppose his discharge will have the necessary effect to defeat his extradition, if in fact he has fled from justice. Doubtless the executive, upon a renewed application, can reconsider the case and issue a second warrant, for which there is precedent. But certainly unless it is shown. that the relator was in Massachusetts at or about the time when the offense is charged to have been committed and has since that time departed that State, there would be no just or legal ground for saying he had fled from justice in Massachusetts. The State of Massachusetts enacts that no person should be surrendered to the authority of another State unless there is sworn evidence "that the party charged is a fugitive from justice." In Pennsylvania it is said the practice is to issue the warrant of surrender whenever a requisition is supported by indictment, etc., "and by an affidavit that the defendant has fled from such State into one where the warrant is demanded" 6 Penn. Law Journal, 412; see, also, Hurd on Habeas Corpus, page 606, where it is said "there must be an actual In re Jackson. fleeing from justice, and of this the governor of the State of whom the demand is made should be satisfied." See, also, Ex parte Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 121. The importance of adhering to the views expressed could be made apparent by referring to many cases where indictments have been found in one State upon no evidence or upon wholly insufficient evidence, and where the indictment subserved no end of justice. We have in mind an indictment found in a neighboring State against a citizen of Michigan upon wholly insufficient evidence inspired by revenge and black-mailing purposes. It was said a late governor of Michigan inquired into the facts and refused to issue a warWe noticed in the papers of an adjoining State, not long since, that one or more indictments had been found by a grand jury without any evidence whatever, on request of a prosecuting officer. rant. Such cases, considering the facility with which indictments. are sometimes obtained, afford sufficient justification not only to the executive of a State on whom a demand for extradition is made, but to the courts to see that the case falls within the laws. Jones v. Clifton. JONES, ASSIGNEE V. CLIFTON. CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY JULY, 1878. SETTLEMENT ON WIFE BY HUSBAND. 1. POWER OF REVOCATION.-If a husband, not contemplating bankruptcy, but wholly free from debt, convey lands to his wife, to her separate use free from his control, the deeds reserving to the husband a power of revocation in whole or in part, and a power of appointment by deed or will to any uses or persons he may designate, and he become bankrupt three years afterwards-such settlement will be upheld against the assignee in bankruptcy. 2. If it be omitted to insert a power of revocation in a voluntary settlement, this will be regarded in a court of equity as a suspicious circumstance. 3. A court of equity will protect a wife in a settlement made by a husband, when free of debt and not thereto induced by fraudulent motive, if it confer any benefit on her. And notwithstanding the deed may not contain every provision that a chancellor might direct to be inserted in a settlement ordered by himself, and, moreover, has in it reservations which impair the full benefit of the provision in favor of the wife, it will be sustained if any substantial benefit is conferred on her so long as she is in the actual enjoyment of the same. 4. SUCH POWERS AS DO NOT PASS UNDER THE BANKRUPT ACT TO THE ASSIGNEE.-Under sections 5044 and 5046 powers of revocation and appointment to be exercised by the bankrupt do not pass to the assignee. Only the power to sell, manage, dispose of, sue for and recover, or defend the property and rights, passes. The facts are stated in the opinion. B. H. Bristow and Jas. A. Beattie, for plaintiff. Bijur & Davie, for defendants. BALLARD, J.-On the 3d of October, 1872, the defendant, Chas. H. Clifton, being then free from debt, and with a Jones v. Clifton. fortune probably exceeding two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, conveyed to his wife, without the intervention of a trustee, a small parcel of land, worth about seven hundred dollars, and assigned to her five policies of insurance on his life, each for ten thousand dollars, but at the time not worth more in the aggregate than twelve thousand dollars. On the 1st of April, 1873, being still free from debt, and with his fortune very little diminished, he made another conveyance to his wife, also without the intervention of a trustee, of two parcels of land, one situated in the city of Louisville and the other in the county of Jefferson. The first parcel was, at the time of this conveyance, and still is, incumbered by mortgage to probably its full value. The other parcel was the homestead of the ancestors of the grantor, and was estimated to be worth eighteen thousand dollars. On this parcel he afterwards erected a dwelling-house which cost eight thousand five hundred dollars. By both deeds, and substantially in the same terins, the property was conveyed "to the said Nannie to hold to her and her heirs forever as her own separate estate, free from the control, use, and benefit of her husband." By both deeds, and substantially in the same terms, power and authority were conferred on the grantee to appoint the parcels of land and each or all of them, or part or parts of each, as often as she might choose to exercise the same, to such uses as she might designate by joint deed with her husband, or by a writing in the form of and to take effect as a devise under the statute of wills of Kentucky; and by both deeds, in substantially the same terms, the grantor expressly reserved to himself power to revoke the grants in whole or in part, and to appoint to any such uses or persons as he might designate either by deed or last will. In default of appointment, or to the extent that the grantor might fail to appoint, each of said parcels of land was to remain to the Jones v. Clifton. grantee and her heirs forever as her separate estate, with the powers conferred upon her as above stated. On the 4th of December, 1875, Clifton filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and was adjudged bankrupt thereon, and the complainant, Stephen E. Jones, was appointed his assignee. In October, 1876, the assignee brought this suit in equity, in which he seeks to have both of the above-mentioned deeds declared void, and thus the clouds removed from his alleged title to the parcels of land and policies of insurance mentioned therein. The bill proceeds on three grounds, all more or less connected, but still so distinct as to require a separate statement: First That the making of the two instruments was a contrivance and scheme on the part of Chas. H. Clifton to cheat, hinder and defraud his future creditors. Second-That the conveyances having been made by the husband to the wife, without the intervention of a trustee, are, because of this, and because of the reservations contained therein, especially the absolute power of revocation, void, and so passed no title or interest to the nominal grantee. Third-That by operation of the bankruptcy act the property described in the instruments, or, at least, the powers of revocation therein reserved, passed to the complainant as assignee in bankruptcy. I shall examine each of these grounds separately. The complainant has offered no testimony whatever of the alleged fraudulent intent. He does not even allege that the grantor at the time the conveyances were executed owed anything. The uncontroverted proof is that he was then free from debt; that he was not then engaged in trade; that he did not contemplate engaging in trade or contracting debts; that he was an indiscreet young man, who, though possessed of a large fortune, might squander the whole in reckless gaming and dissipation; that the settlements were made at |