Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer. provisions; that the cause of action was not founded upon contract, but was an action for a tort, and that in such cases interest is only recoverable from the date of the judgment. I think the Supreme Court of Ohio in Haag et al. v. Zanesville Canal Co., 5 Ohio, 416, settled the doctrine that interest may be allowed as well in actions of tort as in those upon contracts. In that case, it is said that a jury may calculate interest upon the amount of damage actually sustained, and add it to their verdict. If the jury in fixing the amount due from the defendant to plaintiff, may give to him interest, certainly the law should give him interest upon the sum which they have returned in his favor, from the date of their verdict. And the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Lewis v. Arnold, 13 Grattan, 464, hold that in regard to interest upon the verdict there is no difference, in principle, between verdicts in actions for torts and upon contracts. Upon the question of the right of the plaintiff to interest upon the verdict, I can see no difference between a verdict. in an action for tort, and a verdict in actions sounding in contract-the verdict in either case fixed the amount due at the time of its rendition, and that amount the party is entitled to have paid him as of that date and if the payment is delayed him by the act of the defendant, he ought to have interest. Such has been the practice of this court, and such seems to be the current of authority. In Sprant v. Cutter, Wright, 157, interest was allowed upon an award from its date, and the court say: "And if it were the verdict of a jury, and judgment had been. delayed, we should allow interest if asked." By the statute of Maine in relation to occupying claimants, it is provided that the court shall render for the sum estimated by the jury, but the Supreme Court of the State, in Winthrop v. Curtis, 4 Greenleaf, 297, held that the party was entitled to interest from the date of the verdict. The statute of New Hamp Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer. shire, as ours, allows interest upon judgments without distinction as to the nature of the action in which the judgment is rendered; and the Supreme Court of that State, in Johnston v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence R. R. Co., 43 N. II. 410, say: "No solid reason can be given for withholding interest between the finding of the jury and the rendering of the judgment," but inasmuch as the court below had refused interest, and no exception had been taken to the ruling, the writ of review was dismissed. The rule of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in relation to motion for new trials, is, in substance, that where execution is stayed by reason of reserving a cause on motion for new trial, if judgment be not reversed, interest shall be added to the judgment from the time of the stay. 18 Conn. 575. In Weed v. Weed, 25 Conn. 494, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $745.85. A motion for a new trial was made by the defendant. Sometime afterward the court granted the motion unless plaintiff would remit $117. Plaintiff remitted and the court rendered judgment upon the verdict for the balance, including interest from the date of the verdict. The case was taken to the Supreme Court, and the judgment was affirmed. In Bull v. Ketchum, 2 Denio, 188, the court recognize the doctrine that at common law the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the verdict where delay of the entry of the judgment was occasioned by the defendant. The same doctrine is held in Vredenberg v. Hallet & Bowne, 1 Johnson's Cases, 27; People v. Gaines, 1 Johns. R. 343; Lord v. Mayor of N. Y., 3 Hill, 430. In Rheims v. Robbins, 20 Iowa, 41, the court held that the interest should have been computed upon the verdict from the time when judgment should have been rendered, thus recognizing the right to interest before.judgment. In Renther v. The State, 3 Ind. 86, the court say that judgment upon an award may properly include interest from the date of the award to the Gibson v. Cincinnati Enquirer. date of the judgment. In Buchanan v. Davis, 28 Penn. St. 211, the award was filed May 17, 1856, judgment was rendered upon it at the December term, 1856, and execution. issued for judgment with interest from date of filing the award. The court say, "The award made pursuant to the submission, would, like a verdict, draw interest from the date of filing its entry, and is, therefore, no objection to the fi. fa." I am aware that a different doctrine was announced by that court in Felsey v. Murphy, 30 Penn St. 340, but Judge STRONG, in delivering the opinion of the court in the subsequent case of Irvin et al. v. Hazelton, 37 Penn. St. 465, reviews the decision of the court in Felsey v. Murphy, and says that it decides nothing more than that "a judgment entered generally operated from the day of its entry, so as to carry interest only from that time," and holds in the case before the court that there was not error in the court below in entering judgment with interest from the date of the verdict. In North Carolina, in Devereux v. Burgwin, 11 Iredell, 491, it was held that interest was not allowable on an award; and in Louisiana, in Burner v. Copley, 15 La. Ann. 504, it was held that in actions for damages, interest could not be allowed either upon verdicts or judgments. But these cases are certainly against the weight of authority; and I think, both upon principle and authority, that whenever judgment upon the verdict has been delayed by the action of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of the verdict. The judgment, however, in this case is wrong in this, that it is for interest from the first day of the term, when it should have been only from the day of the rendition of the verdict. It is true that for many purposes the term is regarded as but one day, and in all actions sounding in con Phillips v. The City of Detroit. tract, interest, in this court, is computed to the first day of the term only, so that it is entirely proper that the verdicts and the judgments should draw interest from the first day of the term. But in actions of tort, such as the present, where the jury were not directed to compute the amount which they should find in favor of the plaintiff as of the first day of the term, the judgment should have been for the amount of the verdict with interest from the date of its rendition. The judgment will be modified in accordance with this opinion. PHILLIPS ET AL. V. THE CITY OF DETROIT. CIRCUIT COURT-EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN-NOVEM BER 6, 1877. 1. INJUNCTION-CORPORATION-NOTICE.-The members of the Board of Public Works of a city are bound by an injunction against the city, of which they have notice, notwithstanding they are not parties to the suit nor the writ, and the same is not actually served upon them. 2. SAME-PATENT CASE.-It is no excuse for the violation of a preliminary injunction in a patent case that the patent is invalid or the writ improvidently granted. If the court has jurisdiction to issue the writ it must be obeyed until it is dissolved. 3. INFRINGEMENT.-A wooden pavement patented is infringed by the use of blocks cut from trees or saplings in their natural form, though a narrow segment is cut off from one side of each block. 4. SAME PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.-Where a preliminary injunc tion in a patent case is violated the respondents will not be required to pay the patentee the amount of his royalty where they were acting in an official capacity, deriving no personal benefit from the infringe. ment, especially if there be any reason to believe they acted in good faith 5. Practice-Estoppel. Phillips v. The City of Detroit. George H. Lothrop, for complainants. D. C. Holbrook, city counselor, for defendants. BROWN, J.-The defense that the members of the Board of Public Works were not parties to this bill, and were not served with the writ, was disposed of adversely to them upon the preliminary argument of this motion. We then held, and such we understand to be the law, that an injunction against a corporation is binding upon all persons acting for A or on behalf of the corporation who have notice of the writ and of its contents, whether they be actually served with it or not. In Wellesley v. The Earl of Mornington, 11 Beav. 180, 181, an injunction was issued against the defendant, but it did not extend in terms to "his servants and agents." motion having been made to commit his agent for a breach of the injunction, it was held irregular; but it was afterward decided that if he had knowledge of the writ he might be committed for the contempt, although not for the breach of the injunction. See, also, The People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263, 267; The Bank Commissioners v. The City Bank of Buffalo, 1 Barb. Ch. Practice, 633; High on Injunctions, Secs. 853, 854, 862, 863; Safford v. The People, 5 Central Law Jour. 384. As respondents in the first allegation of their affidavit admit they had notice of the injunction, I think they are bound to obedience of the writ, and it only remains to determine whether they have been guilty of a violation. The authorities are full and conclusive to the point, and, indeed, it was admitted upon the argument that respondents were not entitled to claim in defense that the patent was invalid or the writ improvidently granted. People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263; Sullivan v. Judah, 4 Paige, 444; Russell v. Railway Co., 1 E. L. & E. 101; High, Sec. 873. The pat |