tiff. The Bailment, what constitutes-Agreement by purchaser of personal property at sheriff's sale, to leave the property with defendants in the execution for specified purposes. A. and B. confessed a judgment to C., a creditor, for himself and other creditors, and, under an execution thereon, C. purchased the personal property of the debtors, as trustee. C., subsequently, by an agreement with A. and B., left the property in their possession, for the purpose of sale and payment of the proceeds to the creditors. The property being subsequently taken in execution un der another judgment, as the property of A. and B.: Held, that C., having obtained an undisputed title by the sheriff's sale, as trustee, had a clear right to leave the proThe defendants in the execution became the agents of the agreement, which constituted a bailment, and not a sale. trustee, and no title passed to them under the agreement which could be affected by a subsequent execution against them. May 3, 1880. THE COURT. The Court below rejected the offer of evidence embraced in the first assignment upon the ground that no notice had been given of special matter. The offer was made under the plea of non assumpsit, and no other objection was made to its admis-perty with the defendants in the execution, under the sion. The evidence was clearly relevant, and required no notice of special matter. It referred to matters growing out of the dealings of the parties, and was part of the res gesta. The defendant stood charged with a certain number of Error to the Common Pleas of Perry County. mowers and reapers sent to him by the plaintiff for sale upon commission. The defence was, Feigned issue, wherein Catharine Miller, Mary that all of the machines not sold and accounted Miller, and Elizabeth Miller were plaintiffs, and for had been reshipped upon the order of plain- J. H. Irvine, cashier, was defendant, to try the This was a good defence if made out, and title to certain personal property levied on by the rejected evidence tended to prove it. We the sheriff as the property of Michael and Theothink it was admissible under the plea of non philus Miller, the defendants in the execution, assumpsit. This is a very broad plea, and by it and claimed by the plaintiffs. The jury found a the defendant puts his antagonist upon proving special verdict, by which the following facts aphis whole case, and entitles himself to give in peared: evidence anything which shows that, at the time the action was commenced, the plaintiff, ex æquo et bono, ought not to recover. (Gaw v. Wolcott, 10 Barr, 43; Beals v. See, 10 Ibid. 56.) Nor do we think it material that the offer referred to one machine that had been reshipped since the commencement of the suit. It appears by the statement of the plaintiff that upon the trial a credit was given for certain machines shipped since suit brought, and no objection was made below to the admission of the evidence upon this ground. The evidence referred to in the second and third assignments was properly rejected. It would have been competent to show the articles were shipped. But the evidence offered did not amount to such proof. The mere production of the book of the railroad company, with the shipper's receipts, did not prove a shipment. They might have been made evidence if the shipping clerk or other proper person had been called for that purpose. But standing alone, and unsupported and unexplained, they were not of themselves competent to affect third parties. Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded. Opinion by PAXSON, J. Michael Miller and Theophilus Miller were the owners of certain real estate upon which were erected the necessary buildings and machinery for the manufacture of stone and earthenware, which business they carried on as partners. They became involved, and judgments were entered against them to the full value of their real estate, and they were indebted to others who had no judgments. In order to save their estate from being sold at a sacrifice, and that they might satisfy their creditors as far as possible, they conveyed their real estate on the 22d December, 1877, by deed duly executed and recorded on said day, to Henry Markel, who immediately took possession thereof, for the consideration of $3500, payable by his assumption of the liens against said real estate, and the further sum of one dollar to them in hand paid. On the On the same day after delivery of said deed, they confessed a judgment to David Kline in trust for himself and other creditors, among whom were the plaintiffs, being the mother and respective wives of said defendants. same day a fi. fa. was issued on said judgment by virtue of which on the 31st Dec., 1877, the sheriff sold defendant's personal property for $1602.32, which after payment of costs left $1573-94 to be applied to the writ. Most of the property was bought in at the sale | ecution is equally clear. (Myers v. Harvey, 2 by Kline, the plaintiff in the execution, who P. & W. 478; Craig's Appeal, 27 P. F. S. shortly afterwards entered into the following 448, and Maynes v. Atwater, 7 Norris, 496.) agreement with the Miller Bros.: "It was agreed The judgment upon which the property was sold that the Miller Bros. should keep possession of was confessed to Kline to secure his own debt, the property, sell it, and pay in full the sum of and sundry other debts due by the Miller Bros., $800 to Kline; next pay $100 to or for Hort- the defendants in said judgment. Kline bought ing, and what balance remained to be taken for the property to protect himself and the others. the mother and the wives of the Miller Bros. ; As to them he was a trustee. that is to say Kline was to be paid in full, Horting was to be paid in full, and the mother and wives would take the residue." The jury further found that afterwards ware came down some and they (the mother and wives) agreed with the Miller Bros. to take the rest in property; if it was sold for gain, it was their gain, and if there was a loss it was their loss." The special verdict concluded as follows:"Under these facts, we are ignorant whether the arrangement made between Kline the purchaser of the property and the Miller Bros. was in law a bailment, which would protect the same from levy and sale on a subsequent execution, or a sale which re-invested the Miller Bros. with the title thereto, and thus made it liable to subsequent levy and sale; if a bailment, we find for the plaintiff; and if a sale, we find for the defendant.” After argument the Court entered judgment for defendant, whereupon the plaintiffs took this writ, assigning as error the entering of judgment for defendant. Charles A. Barnett (with him A. M. Markel), for plaintiffs in error. The article of agreement passed no title to Miller Bros. There was no sale but a simple transfer to them as bailees. Maynes v. Atwater, 7 Norris, 496. Wait's Actions and Defences, vol. 5, 527. McCullough v. Porter, 4 W. & S. 177. A bailment is always the subject of return or under the direction and control of the bailor. Crist v. Kleber, 29 P. F. Smith, 290. Dick v. Cooper, 12 Harris, 217. There was no such arrangement here. After selling a part of the property he moved out of the county, and left the remainder in the hands of the Miller Bros., under an agreement that they should sell the same and apply the proceeds first to the payment of Kline's claim, second to the claim of Horting, and lastly to the claims of the mother and the wives of Miller Bros. The special verdict finds the further fact "that afterwards ware came down some and they (the mother and wives) agreed with the Miller Bros. to take the rest in property; if it was sold for gain it was their gain, and if there was a loss it was their loss.' The effect of this arrangement was to make Miller Bros. the agents of Kline, the trustee, to sell the property and apply the proceeds in accordance with the trust. It passed no title to Miller Bros. They could sell and deliver, and in doing so make good title, but it was the title of Kline, the trustee for whom they acted as agents. There was no interest or profit reserved to them in the transaction, in which respect the case differs essentially from Dick v. Cooper (12 Harris, 217), relied upon by the Court below. Nor is Heitzman v. Divil (1 Jones, 264), in point. There property of a perishable character was left with the defendant in the execution for his consumption, to be returned in kind and not the same property. Here no portion of the property was to be retained by Miller Bros. They had no interest in it whatever. The balance, after paying the claims of Kline and Horting, was to go to the mother and wives. We need not discuss the position assumed by the Court below that Miller Bros. could not sell the property to their wives, for the reason that such a transaction would be against public policy. No such point is involved in the case. The property in controversy did not belong to them, but to Kline, the trustee. A right to demand the goods is no title to the As his agent Miller Bros. had the right to turn goods themselves. Heitzman v. Divil, 1 Jones, 264. June 19, 1880. THE COURT. The single assignment of error here is that the Court below erred in entering judgment for the defendant upon the special verdict. It is not disputed that the sheriff's sale passed a good title to the personal property in controversy to Kline the purchaser at said sale. His right to leave it with the defendants in the ex over the property to their wives as creditors under the trust. We are of the opinion that the agreement between Kline and Miller Bros. was a bailment, and that it was error to enter judgment below for the defendant. The judgment is reversed, and judgment is now entered for the plaintiffs upon the special verdict. Opinion by PAXSON, J. SHARSWOOD, C. J., and GREEN, J., absent. Bender v. Ryan. Affidavit of defence law-Particularity required Practice-Judgment for want of a plea-Com-tiff to defendant, dated April 2, 1879, for two The copy filed was that of a lease from plain mon appearance-Striking off judgment. Rule to strike of judgment for want of a plea. The following is a copy of the docket entries: D. B. Meany 275 D. B. Meany "Common appear ance" 8\7\ 80. Frederick Bender บ. John Ryan Dec. 30, 1879. Aff. to hold to bail. Capias Trespass Aug. 7, 1880, Narr. and rule to plead filed. years at $40 per month, payable in advance. It was accompanied by a claim "for rent due under the above lease, the sum of $160, being the amount due and unpaid upon the second day of June, 1880." The affidavit of defence set forth that "before any part of the rent sued for became due the said plaintiff, on or about the 14th day of April, 1880, with force and arms entered into and upon said Sept. 14, 1880. Affidavit of service of narr. and rule to premises and then ejected, put out and removed plead filed. Sept. 14, 1880. Judgment for want of a plea. Sept. 16, 1880. Writ of inquiry to assess damages. Oct. 1, 1880. Rule to strike off judgment, etc. Plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit that he had served on defendant's attorney of record a copy of the declaration and rule to plead in eight days, on Aug. 7, 1880. On the hearing of the rule defendant by his attorney presented his deposition, that he with his wife and his family had resided at No. 1512 Warwick St., continuously from Nov. 5, 1879; that he never authorized D. B. Meany, or any one else to appear or act as counsel for him in this case that he never had any notice of any proceeding in the matter from the time of his arrest until he received notice of the assessment of damages by a sheriff's jury, and that he never committed the alleged assault and battery. That he was arrested and charged with the same, but the bill of indictment was ignored by the grand jury. W. F. Harrity, for the rule. The right to enter a common appearance for the defendant was first given by 12 George I. c. 29, which provides that "in case the defendant shall not appear, the plaintiff upon making and filing an affidavit of the personal service of such writ or process, may enter a common appearance for the defendant, and proceed thereon, etc." In the present case no such affidavit was filed. Before the practice of entering a common appearance can be resorted to it must appear that the defendant has removed from the jurisdiction, or that he cannot be found to serve him with a rule to plead. Troubat & Haly's Prac. Sec. 277. Besides, when such an appearance is entered the defendant should be ruled to plead on or before the quarto die post of the next term and not in eight days. Troubat & Haly's Prac. supra. the defendants therefrom and from the possession thereof." Pennypacker, for the rule. Defendant has sworn only to the words of a narr. and to a conclusion of law. He must set An entry "with force and forth the facts. arms" means nothing, and the ejection whether actual or constructive must be described. Fletcher, contra. but we think it contains enough to prevent THE COURT. This is a very defective affidavit judgment. Rule discharged. C. P. No. 3. Sept. 20, 1880. Shaffer v. Green, Owner and Contractor. Mechanics' claim-Practice-Bill of particulars. Rule to strike off a mechanic's claim from the record. The claim was filed against certain premises situate on the west side of Eighth Street in the city of Philadelphia, and was for the payment of the sum of $115 being a debt contracted for materials and work and labor furnished for and about the repair, alteration, and addition to said premises. The bill of particulars annexed was Ex parte Steinman and Hensel. Attorney and Court-Rights of attorney-Dis- Court, and also why they should not be disbarred for misbehavior in their offices as attorneys of said Court. The facts of this case were as follows: On Jan. 20, 1880, the Court (PATTERSON, A. L. J.) sent for respondents and inquired of them whether they were the editors of the "Lancaster Daily Intelligencer." They answered in the affirmative, and the Court then inquired of them whether they were the authors of the following article, which had appeared in that journal, on Jan. 20, 1880, in reference to a case lately tried before the Court: "Michael Snyder is acquitted, not because he had not violated the law, but because he had already been acquitted acquittal was accomplished, as has been shown, by J. W. J., of the offence laid in the present indictment. That first ex-chairman, J. H. B., ex-chairman, and District-Attorney E., chairman of the Republican county committee, by false representations to the Court, made for the corrupt consideration that the Snyders were the best Republican workers in the Eighth Ward. Logically, the last acquittal, like the first, was secured by a prostitution of the machinery of justice to serve the exigencies of the Republican A. and B., members of the bar of Lancaster county, were party. But as all the parties implicated, as well as the also editors of a daily newspaper; after the trial and acquittal Judges, belong to that party, the Court is unanimous-for of a certain defendant in the Quarter Sessions, they pub-once-that it need take no cognizance of the imposition lished in their journal an article severely reflecting on the practised upon it, and the disgrace attaching to it.-EDS. conduct of the Court in the said trial, intimating that the acquittal had been corruptly obtained for partisan purposes. The Court sent for them the next day, and they refused to disclose who was the author of the article, but admitted their lability as editors. The Court thereupon entered rules on them to show cause why they should not be disbarred, which rules were subsequently made absolute: Held, to be error. There may be cases of misconduct not strictly professional, which would clearly show a person not to be fit to be an attorney, e. g., theft or forgery; but an attorney Cannot, even in such a case, be summarily disbarred without a formal indictment and trial. PER SHARSWOOD, C. J. The office of an attorney is his property, and he cannot be deprived of it unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. To deprive him of it summarily for the publication of a libel on a man in a public capacity, or where the matter was proper for public investigation, would be an infraction of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the 7th section of the first Article of the Constitution of 1874. PER SHARSWOOD, C. J. We entertain no doubt that a Court has jurisdiction, without any formal complaint or petition, upon its own motion, to strike the name of an attorney from the roll in a proper case, provided he is afforded an opportunity to be heard in his own defence. Quare, how far the provisions of the Act of May 19, 1879, that this Court shall hear new testimony and decide the case de novo, is consistent with that Article of the Constitution, which prohibits the Supreme Court from the exercise of original jurisdiction, except in a few specified cases. INTELLIGENCER. "" The respondents answered that they were the editors, and responsible as such, but declined to say whether they were the authors or not. The Court thereupon entered separate rules on respondents to show cause why they should not appear, etc. The respondents filed separate answers, setting forth, inter alia, (1) That the proceedings were irregular and the rules improvidently granted, because they were not entered upon a complaint, supported by affidavit, but were entered by the Court of its own motion for matters not occurring in the presence of the Court, and of which the Court had no judicial knowledge; (2) That the publication was made in good faith, without malice, and for the public good, of and concerning a case of great public importance, which had been, before the writing of said publication, fully ended, and in which the respondents had no interest as attorneys; (4) The publication complained of was not made by respondents within the presence of the Court, or while acting as attorneys or officers of the Court, or of or concerning any case pending and undetermined in said Court, but was made by them solely in their capacity as publishers of a newspaper. The Court, after hearing argument on behalf of respondents, discharged the first rules, and Writs of error to the Quarter Sessions of Lan-made absolute in both cases the rules to show caster County. cause why the respondents should not be disThe Court below entered rules on A. J. Stein- barred. (See report of the case in the Court man and W. U. Hensel to show cause why they below, with opinion of PATTERSON, A. L. J., 8 should not appear and answer for contempt of WEEKLY NOTES, 296.) VOL. IX.-10 The respondents took these writs, assigning for | paired. Law with us is an abstraction. It if error the entry of the rules to disbar by the Court, personified in the Courts as its ministers, but its of its own motion, for acts not committed in its efficacy depends upon the moral convictions os presence and of which it had no judicial knowl- the people. When confidence in the Courts is edge, without a complaint having been made, gone, respect for the law itself will speedily disapsupported by affidavit; the requiring respondents pear, and society will become the prey of fraud, to answer for the publication of an article which, violence, and crime.” if false and malicious, was a libel, before they had been indicted and convicted; and the making absolute of said rules, and disbarring respond ents. A. K. McClure, J. E. Gowen, and R. E. Shapley, for plaintiffs in error, argued the case substantially as it had been argued in the Court below. (See 8 WEEKLY NOTES, 296.) H. W. Palmer, J. B. McPherson, and S. H. Reynolds, amici curiæ. Oct. 4, 1880. THE COURT. The record before us has been brought up by a writ of error, under the Act of Assembly, approved May 19, 1879 (P. L. 66), entited "An Act regulating proceedings against attorneys at law in this Commonwealth." It provides, That in all cases of any proceedings in any Court of this Commonwealth against any attorney of said Court for unprofessional conduct as an officer of such The appellants are convicted by their own Court, said attorney shall be entitled to a writ of confession in the Court below of a false, malicious, error from the Supreme Court of this Commonand defamatory libel on the Court, and the wealth, as in civil cases, to said Court, from any opinion of the Court below clearly establishes judgment, order, or decree of said Court against its right to punish therefor. (8 WEEKLY NOTES, him as such officer, which writ of error shall re296.) The Court had personal knowledge of the move the record and all the proceedings therein publication of the libel, and sent for and ques-to the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth; tioned plaintiffs in error, who did not deny the authorship. This was sufficient. Rice v. Comm., 18 B. Mon. 472. Crawford's Case, 66 E. C. L. R. 612. and it shall be the duty of said Court to review the same de novo, and the complainant shall have the right to offer new testimony by deposition or otherwise, as said Supreme Court may direct, and, upon hearing, said Court may modify, reverse, or affirm said judgment, order, or decree of the Court below, as the justice of the case may require." Other provisions are added as to Blackstone divides contempts into two classes, the hearing of the cause in any district, and givdirect and consequential, and among the latter ing it a preference over all other than homicide enumerates "speaking or writing contemptuously cases, and as to the costs—all of which, to say of the Court or Judges acting in their judicial the least, are unusual. The remedy by writ of capacity, and by anything that demonstrates a error, which properly requires two parties, is cergross want of that regard and respect which, tainly not the best which could have been dewhen once Courts are deprived of their author-vised; and what is meant by reviewing the case ity, is entirely lost among people. 4 Black. Comm. 285-6. In the case of Thos. Passmore, the Supreme Court imposed a fine of $50, and 30 days' imprisonment, for a publication concerning a determined case; articles of impeachment were preferred, and they were acquitted. Peck's Trial, p. 341. See, also, Oswald's Case, 1 A similar authority has been frequently exercised by the Courts, and is necessary to their self-preservation. Freer's Case, 1 Caines, 518. de novo is not very intelligible, unless it be, from what follows, that the Court is to hear any new testimony which may be offered by the complainant, but not by the Court below or any other parties, if there can be any other. On the whole, it is a curious piece of legislative patchwork. How far the provision that this Court shall hear new testimony and decide the case as if it was a new one is consistent with that article of the Constitution which prohibits the Supreme Court from the exercise of any original jurisdiction, except in a few specified cases, is a question which does not arise, as the controversy here is presented fully on the record, and we are not asked to look out of it. In re T. H. Greevy, 4 WEEKLY NOTES, 308. In Austin's case (5 Rawle, 191) Chief Justice The complainants were members of the bar of GIBSON recognizes the right. He says: "The Lancaster County, and were also the editors of a power of the judiciary in this country rests upon newspaper published there. They printed in the faith of the people in its integrity. Take their paper an article very severely reflecting away this faith, and the moral influence of the upon the conduct of the Court in a certain proseCourts is gone, and popular respect for law im-cution in the Quarter Sessions, in which the de |