Senator MILLER. May not some or all of that be due to the fact that in 1870 gold was at a premium and in 1880 it was at par?

Mr. NORRIS. That would probably account for a greater part if it were not so that in the State of Pennsylvania, in 1870, the proportion of the farmers to the whole workers was one-fourth, so that each farmer had three other workers' families to provide for, while in 1880 the farmer had four other families to provide for, the non-agricultural population having increased from 75 per cent., in 1870, to 80 per cent., in 1880. Another evidence of that is the fact that taking the gold measure the agricultural production of the State of Pennsylvania in 1880 was $22,000,000 less on a gold basis than in 1870; that is, assuming that in 1870 gold was at a premium of 25 per cent. and in 1880 it was at par. There is hardly a State in the Union which is better adapted for agricultural development than the State of Pennsylvania. It has been so cited in the reports of the Department of Agriculture, and for the reason of the large non-agricultural population which provided a home market for all of the domestic production.

The figures of our State board of agriculture indicate that in the single item of wheat the State of Pennsylvania consumes 4,500,000 bushels of wheat more than it produces, and yet our production of wheat is falling off, although our acreage of improved land has increased, and while I will concede that to the non-agricultural population cheap bread in so far as it reduces the cost of living is a public benefaction, yet in the State of Pennsylvania that does not amount to more than five hundred and odd thousand dollars a year. I figure it up, on the statements which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the State board of agriculture had prepared, that in the item of grain we were saved $522,000 a year, while to reimburse the railroad companies for their low charges on Western products which are sent to Europe we pay in the East, not Pennsylvania merely, but in the Eastern States, about $17,000,000 a year, which is levied upon the local traffic to reimburse the railroad companies for losses on through traffic; and the tax which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company imposes on us accordng to my computation is $4,800,000.

That illustrates very conclusively the effect upon the country of the railroad system and of the system of a higher price for a shorter distance than a longer one. Under the operation of the competition which has rendered that necessary, Pennsylvania has been discriminated against and the value of lands depreciated, the agricultural production diminished, and the agricultural population transferred farther west to the point of arbitrary competition. If that be the effect of any system it is a great power, a power which extends to the destruction of commercial values and to the arbitrary destruction of all the agricultural and commercial interests of a community.

How shall it be remedied? The bill declares, first, that there shall be no unjust charges; that is to say, no extravagant or unreasonable charges. It then provides that there shall be no discrimination in respect to persons as to charges, no advantages to one over another, and no discrimination in reference to opportunities, no preference of one person over another.

It then establishes as the principle and the means by which these ends shall be attained that there shall be no higher charge for a shorter distance than a longer one from the point of departure. It therefore assumes the power to regulate the charges. It declares that Congress has power to say how much a road shall charge for one distance or another.

This covers the whole subject, but the manner in which it does it is by providing that the system complained of in the testimony of Mr. Norris shall take effect, and that there shall be selected a point of competition, a point of departure, and that from that point, wherever it may be, all charges shall be subject to this rule that no more shall be charged for the shorter distance than for the longer one, no matter how much longer; it may be a thousand miles and the other may be but 1 mile.

Now, the Senator from West Virginia proposes to make that universal, and he proposes to say that it shall not be from the point of

original departure, but that everywhere there shall be a principle that there shall be no more charged upon that line for a shorter distance than for a longer one, but that you may charge as much. This does not reach the evil; it is perhaps not in the direction of reaching it. It does, however, destroy the proposition that there shall be one favored point of original departure, and that upon that line this principle shall apply everywhere. Certainly it does not injure the people who live at the intermediate points that outside of their business there shall accrue to that road a revenue from some other source; it does not injure them that a line of road whatever may be the charges to them shall derive a revenue, an income from other sources of business than those which the local trade supplies. On the contrary, it reduces the aggregate expenses and enables the transporting line to do the local business at cheaper rates. There is no question about that.

But then it has been found that whatever may be the advantage in that respect the result did not happen that when in the power of the corporation its interest led it to exact from the local business the utmost charge that it would bear, and it is for the restraint of power that this law is intended. If corporations always did exactly that which was best for the people, leaving to themselves a reasonable profit, there would be no necessity for any law regulating interstate commerce.

The proposition made by the Senator from Wisconsin that this is depriving the extreme West or the extreme South, or any other point where there is competition of natural advantages, is untenable, for the reason that within the line of a longer and a shorter distance the margin is so great that you touch the point where there is no compensation at all to a railroad company. If they can not make a profit by applying the principle that you shall not charge more for a shorter than a longer distance they can not make a profit at all; they reach a point where no business can be done except at a loss, and when doing business at a loss of course there is no ground or possibility of competition with others.

Then, again, this is not a natural advantage; it is an arbitrary and an artificial one. If you apply the principle of allowing natural advantages you will establish a pro rata amount according to the distance anywhere along the line, and that would give to the points of greatest contiguity or proximity the natural advantage of shorter distance and of the smaller expense which those elements would demand.

Therefore it is not a question which can be regulated by natural advantages; it is a question which must be regulated upon other elements altogether, which are not contained in this bill. While I shall support the bill and commend it as a step in the direction which legislation must assume, that of regulating upon a reasonable basis in the interests of the railroad corporations themselves and of the people by allowing to them a reasonable compensation upon the necessary, the proper economical cost of construction of their property, upon the principle of strictly regulating the compensation to be derived from the business of their road by measuring it by this standard; while it is a step in that direction, acknowledging the power of Congress in respect to interstate commerce to regulate the rates of transportation, it fails, I think, in recognizing the principle that upon every railroad line, differing as they do in their connection, in the amount of their business, in the capacities of transportation which they may have, and in the costs of construction and operating expenses, the only just and compensating rate to all interests is to be ascertained by considerations based upon

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the amount of business and the cost of operation and construction. How far this is practicable, and by what means it may be effected, is the great question which is forced upon our consideration by the public necessities.

It should be allowed to the road to do all the business it can, whether it be from a distance or from its local business. However, the only just and equitable rate to be imposed upon that business is one which is measured by the revenues and by the gross and net earnings of the company as measured by its proper cost, leaving out of view that great evil which more than everything else places now one million of unemployed people upon this country, which more than anything else causes the terrible troubles of labor and the dissatisfaction between the laboring men and the employer, this fictitious stock, this watered bonded indebtedness, this unnatural value which has been placed on the railroads of the country in the shape of public securities to be paid by taxes upon the labor of the country in the shape of improper costs of transportation, of unnecessary and extravagant charges. It is very clear that the power of imposing a tax or charge on the production and business of a great country such as ours granted to railroad corporations is a franchise which may be made as oppressive and ruinous to the people as the most severe exercise of the power of taxation by the Government.

It is quite obvious to me that this is a step in the right direction, but it is only a step. It is quite clear that in the bill it is provided that no charge shall be unreasonable or unjust which is within the limit, that it shall not be greater for a shorter than it is for a longer distance. That is the standard provided in the bill, and the section which provides that charges shall be just and reasonable is in reference to this standard. That is what the bill says is just and equitable, that the charge shall not be greater for a shorter than for a longer distance. That is the measure of justice and equity, but yet, as I said, it is quite manifest to me from reading the provision here that this system of fixing a point of departure and requiring that there shall be no greater charge for a longer distance from that point, as is stated by Mr. Norris, is just the one that may work and will work to the injury of all intermediate points. It is a discrimination in favor of the point of departure; it is a fixing of a lower rate for that point than for any other; it leaves the intermediate route as was done in this case entirely within the control of the corporation. If we shall endeavor to equalize all parts of the country in respect to cost of transportation we shall find it an impossible task. We should find that other inequalities existed in respect of climate, soil, habits of labor, and other causes. Yet it remains true that in respect of transportation it is not right that intermediate communities should be made to pay the cost of transporting the productions of the terminal points at prices which enable them to undersell their own products.

For these reasons I shall support the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. CAMDEN] on which the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. MCMILLAN. Let the amendment be read.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be stated. The CHIEF CLERK. In section 4, line 5, after the word "direction" it is proposed to strike out the words "and from the same original point of departure."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will call the roll on agreeing to the amendment.

The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COCKRELL (when his name was called). I paired yesterday with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. HAWLEY], who was compelled to be absent to-day. I do not know how he would vote on this question. I should vote "yea" if I were not paired. I leave it to his colleague to say how he would vote.

Mr. PLATT. I think my colleague would vote "nay."

Mr. COCKRELL. Then I shall not vote, but simply announce that I should vote "yea" if I were not paired.

Mr. COLQUITT (when his name was called). I am paired generally with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. CHACE], who is absent. I understand that the pair has been transferred and I am therefore at liberty to vote. I vote "yea."

Mr. FAIR (when his name was called). I am paired with my colleague [Mr. JONES, of Nevada].

Mr. HEARST (when his name was called). I am paired with my colleague [Mr. STANFORD].

Mr. JONES, of Arkansas (when his name was called). The Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARRISON] was called away from the Chamber for a short time and I am paired with him. As I do not know how he would vote on this question I withhold my vote. If he were present I should vote "yea."

The roll-call was concluded.
Mr. GEORGE.

My colleague [Mr. WALTHALL] is paired on this question with the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. SPOONER]. If my colleague were here he would vote yea."

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Mr. ALDRICH. My colleague [Mr. CHACE] is absent from the Senate and is paired with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. COLQUITT]. If my colleague were present he would vote "nay."

Mr. KENNA. I desire to add to the statement of the Senator from Rhode Island the further statement that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HAMPTON] was paired with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MITCHELL]. As the Senator from Oregon desired to vote on this question the pair was transferred to the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. CHACE], so that the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Rhode Island are paired on this question.

Mr. BOWEN. I understand that my pair with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HAMPTON] has been transferred, and in that case I am at liberty to vote. I votenay."

Mr. SPOONER (after having voted in the negative). I should like to ask the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. GEORGE] if he knows how his colleague [Mr. WALTHALL] would vote on this question. Mr. GEORGE. He would vote "yea" on this proposition. told me he was paired with you and would vote "yea "if present.

Then I withdraw my vote.

He

Mr. SPOONER. Mr. CULLOM. The Senator from Maine [Mr. HALE] left the Chamber awhile ago and announced to me that he was paired with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BECK] and that he would vote against the amendment if present.

Mr. BECK (after having voted in the affirmative). I thought the Senator from Maine was here. I asked him to pair with me when I left the Senate a little while ago to go to the other House. If he is not here I withdraw my vote; I am paired. I should vote "yea" and he would vote "nay" if he were present.

The result was announced-yeas 29, nays 24; as follows:

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. I desire to offer an amendment.

Mr. CAMERON. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

Mr. CULLOM. I hope the Senator will withdraw that motion for half an hour at least.

Mr. CAMERON. I think I shall have to insist on the motion.

So the motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After one hour spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 5 o'clock and 40 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, May 6, at 12 o'clock m.

THURSDAY, MAY 6, 1886.

Mr. CULLOM. I move that the Senate proceed to consider the unfinished business of yesterday.

Mr. FRYE. I move to amend by substituting therefor Senate bill 121, known as the Staten Island Sound or the Arthur Kill bridge bill. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The motion to amend is not in order. Mr. FRYE. I took the opportunity to give notice of what I desire, and I ask unanimous consent to say that the understanding to which reference has been made was that what is ordinarily called the morning hour shall not be interfered with by bills which are assigned rights after the morning hour; and I think the Senator from Illinois is asking too much.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate by unanimous consent ordered the interstate-commerce bill to be taken up at the conclusion of the morning business.

Mr. FRYE. For yesterday morning only.

Mr. CULLOM. No, until it is finished.