above the ford, and captured the troops defending it, together with a large number of the Thirtieth North Carolina, who refused to leave the shelter of the houses.

It was not intended by General Lee to attack the enemy until he should have advanced from the river, where it was hoped, that by holding in check the force at the bridge, we would be able to concentrate upon the other. With this view, General Johnson's division was ordered to reinforce General Rodes.

In the mean time a large force was displayed in our front, at the bridge, upon receiving information of which, General A. P. Hill was ordered to get his corps in readiness, and Anderson's division was advanced to the river, on the left of the railroad. The artillery was also ordered to move to the front. General Early put his division in motion towards the bridge, and hastened thither in person. The enemy's skirmishers advanced in strong force, with heavy supports, and ours were slowly withdrawn into the trenches.

Hoke's brigade, of Early's division, under Colonel Godwin (General Hoke being absent with one regiment on detached service), reinforced General Hayes, whose brigade occupied the north bank. No other troops were sent over, the two brigades mentioned being considered sufficient to man the works, and though inferior to the enemy in numbers, the nature of the position was such, that he could not attack with a front more extended than our own.

It was not known whether the demonstration of the enemy was intended as a serious attack, or only to cover the movement of the force that had crossed at Kelley's ford, but the lateness of the hour and the increasing darkness induced the belief that nothing would be attempted until morning. It was believed that our troops on the north side would be able to maintain their position if attacked, and that, in any case, they could withdraw under cover of the guns on the north, the location of the pontoon bridge being beyond the reach of a direct fire from any position occupied by the enemy.

As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his movements, the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers against our rifle-trenches. It was a simultaneous advance, under cover of the darkness, of the entire force of the enemy. The first line of the enemy was broken and shattered by our

fire, but the second and third lines continued to advance at a double-quick, arms at a trail, and a column formed by compapanies, moving down the railroad, was hurled upon our right, which, after a severe struggle, was forced back, leaving the battery in the hands of the enemy. General Hayes ordered a charge of the Ninth Louisiana regiment, for the purpose of retaking the guns; but his centre having been broken, and the two forces opposed to his right and centre having joined, rendered the execution of his purpose impracticable. Forming a new line after this junction, facing up the river, the enemy advanced, moving behind our works, towards our left, while a line which he had formed in a ravine, above our extreme left, moved down the stream, thus enclosing Hoke's brigade, and the Seventh and Fifth Louisiana regiments, in a manner that rendered escape impossible. Nothing remained but surrender. Many of our men effected their escape in the confusion-some by swimming the river, and others by making their way to the bridge, amidst the enemy, and passing over under a shower of balls. General Hayes owed his escape to the fact, that after he was completely surrounded, and was a prisoner, his horse took fright and ran off, and as the enemy commenced firing on him, he concluded to make the effort to escape across the bridge, and was successful.

Unfortunately no information of this attack was received on the south side of the river until too late for the artillery, there stationed, to aid in repelling it. Indeed, the darkness of the night, and the fear of injuring our own men who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using artillery.

Colonel Godwin's efforts to extricate his command, were made with a gallant desperation, that has adorned with glory this disaster. He continued to struggle, forming successive lines as he was pushed back, and did not for a moment dream of surrendering; but, on the contrary, when his men had dwindled to sixty or seventy, the rest having been captured, killed, wounded, or lost in the darkness, and he was completely surrounded by the enemy, who were, in fact, mixed up with his men, some one cried out that Colonel Godwin's order was for them to surrender. He immediately called for the man who made the declaration, and threatened to blow his brains. out if he could find him, declaring his purpose to fight to the

last moment, and calling upon his men to stand by him. He was literally overpowered, by mere force of numbers, and was taken with his arms in his hands.

Of this unfortunate surprise, which cost us the greater portion of two brigades, there is to be found some excuse in the circumstances that the enemy was aided by a valley in our front in concealing his advance from view, and that a very high wind effectually prevented his movements from being heard. General Lee declared, with characteristic generosity, that "the courage and good conduct of the troops engaged had been too often tried to admit of question." Our loss in prisoners was very considerable. General Rodes reported three hundred of his men missing. General Early's loss in prisoners was sixteen hundred and twenty-nine.

The loss of the position at Rappahannock Bridge made it necessary for General Lee to abandon the design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelley's ford; and his army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between Culpepper Court-house and the Rappahannock, where it remained during the succeeding day. The position not being regarded as favorable, it returned the night following to the south side of the Rapidan.

THE AFFAIR OF GERMANIA FORD.

We shall complete here the record of General Lee's army for 1863 with a brief account of another affair which occurred at Germania ford, on the Rapidan, on the 27th of November.

This affair appears to have been an attempt by Meade of a flank movement on General Lee's position, his immediate object being to get in the rear of Major-general Johnson's division. This division was composed of the Stonewall brigade, under Brigadier-general J. A. Walker, and Stuart's, J. M. Jones's, and Stafford's brigades, with four pieces of Anderson's artillery. These were the only troops engaged in the affair on our side. Opposed to them were Major-general French's corps (the Third), and one division of the Fifth corps. The enemy were in position, and opened the attack before our forces knew of their presence. Their object was to make a sudden attack from their concealed position upon our flank, disperse the

troops and capture our wagon train. They not only failed of their object, but were driven from the field with considerable slaughter. Our loss in killed and wounded was about four hundred and fifty; that of the enemy was certainly double.

If Meade had designed a general battle-and the fact that, before this movement, his army had supplied itself with eight, days' rations argues such design-this repulse and the heavy rains appear to have damped his ardor; and the "on-toRichmond" was reserved for another year.

CHAPTER VII.

The Chattanooga Lines.--Grant's Command.-The Military Division of the Mississippi.-Scarcity of Supplies in Chattanooga.-Wheeler's Raid.--Grant's Plans.-He Opens the Communications of Chattanooga.-THE AFFAIR OF LOOKOUT Valley.— Relief of Chattanooga.-THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.-Bragg's Unfortunate Detachment of Longstreet's Force.-His Evacuation of Lookout Mountain.-The Attack on Missionary Ridge. -Hardee's Gallant Resistance.-Rout and Panic of the Confederates.-President Davis's First Reproof of the Confederate Troops.--Bragg's Retreat to Dalton.--Cleburne's Gallant Affair.-LONGSTREET'S EXPEDITION AGAINST KNOXVILLE.-More of Bragg's Mismanagement.-Insufficiency of Longstreet's Force. -Difficulty in Obtaining Supplies.-His Investment of Knoxville.-An Incident of Personal Gallantry.--Daring of an English Volunteer.-Longstreet's Plans Disconcerted.--The Assault on Fort Sanders.-Devotion of Longstreet's Veterans.--The Yankee "Wire-net."-The Fatal Ditch.--Longstreet's Masterly Retreat.-His Position in Northeastern Tennessee.-He Winters his Army there.--THE AFFAIR OF SABINE PASS, TEXAS.--THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.-Franklin's Expedition Defeated.-The Upper Portions of the Trans-Mississippi.-The Missouri "Guerillas."--Quantrell.--Romantic Incidents.-THE VIRGINIA-TENNESSEE FRONTIER.-Operations of General Sam Jones.-An Engagement near Warm Springs.-The Affair of Rogersville.-BATTLE OF DROOP MOUNTAIN.-The Enemy Baffled.-Averill's Great December Raid.-The Pursuit.--THE NORTH CAROLINA SWAMPS.--The Negro Banditti in the Swamps.-Wild, Butler's "Jackal."-His Murder of Daniel Bright.-Confederate Women in Irons.-Cowardice and Ferocity of the Yankees.

WE left Rosecrans in Chattanooga and General Bragg hopefully essaying the investment of that place. The defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga had, despite all his attempts to qualify it, cost him his command, and added him to the long list of the victims of popular disappointment.*

* In an official statement on the Tennessee campaign, the Yankee commanderin-chief, General Halleck, attributed the defeat of Chickamauga to a disobedience of his orders. He stated that Burnside was ordered to connect his right with Rosecrans' left, and, if possible, to occupy Dalton and the passes into Georgia and North Carolina, so that the two armies might act as one body, and support each other. Rosecrans was not to advance into Georgia or Alabama at that time, but to fortify his position and connect with Burnside. If his weak point-his right and the communications with Nashville-were threatened, he was to hand over Chattanooga to Burnside, and swing round to cover that flank. At the same time forces were ordered up from Memphis and other quarters to guard that side, as well as his long line of communications. General Burnside, as alleged by Halleck, entirely disobeyed or neglected his orders, and did not connect with the Army of the Cumberland, leaving a great gap be