every part of the complex naval instruments of war human and material alike with a sure

and inspiring touch. His one weakness as a leader was his generous inclination to give subordinates the chance of distinguishing themselves when they could have done more useful service in a less conspicuous position.

Farragut's base at Ship Island was about a hundred miles east from the Confederate Forts Jackson and St. Philip. These forts guarded the entrance to the Mississippi. Ninety miles above them stood New Orleans, to which they gave protection and from which they drew all their supplies. The result of a conference at Washington was an order from Welles to "reduce the defenses which guard the approaches to New Orleans." But Farragut's own infinitely better plan was to run past the forts and take New Orleans first. By doing this he would save the extra loss required for reducing the forts and would take the weak defenses of New Orleans entirely by surprise. Then, when New Orleans fell, the forts, cut off from all supplies, would have to surrender without the firing of another shot. Everything depended on whether Farragut could run past without too much loss. Profoundly versed in all the factors of the problem,

every part of the con

al instruments of

war-human and tri alike

with a sure

and inspiring 'cuch. Is one weakness as a leader was his g***** .* .oclination to give subordinates stinguishing themselves when

the

dore more useful service in a less

on.

at Ship Island was about a hunfrom the Confederate Forts JackThese forts guarded the enTOLASKA DIA miles above yber yd dqz1gotodhich they gave prothey drew all their supplies. rence at Washington was an 10 "reduce the defenses vich ues to New Orleans." But FatBely better plan was to run past ne New Orleans first. By doing ave the extra loss required for rete and would take the weak defenses Retir

prise. Then, when ut off from all supwithout the firing of

ided on whether ut too much loss. tors of the problem,