tions of the nervous system it is an important part. It is our duty to keep ourselves alive to the possibilities of adapting the results of our special investigations to the needs of Nature Study courses.

Furthermore, it is to our interest and for the good of our sciences that we make as much of our material available for the purposes of elementary training as possible, and that immediately, for thus will be implanted in the lives of those who are to advance scientific knowledge in the future a love of animals and a desire to know the truth that will lead them to constant and patient research.

When we thus in a journal devoted to pure science call attention to an apparently unrelated aspect of educational work and to a journal which is practical and pedagogical in its aims, it is not to be supposed that we are hopeful of direct contributions from Nature Study to pure science, but rather that we believe the introduction of the intelligent study of animals and plants into our elementary schools will indirectly and ultimately affect our scientific work importantly. What we are concerned about is that this shall be a desirable influence. That it will be desirable in many senses is guaranteed at present by the fact that men who know science in its research as well as its educational aspects are leading the Nature Study movement.

ROBERT M. YERKES.

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BODY-MIND CON

VERSY.1

The present article does not attempt to review with any degree of completeness the field indicated by the title. Comprehensive digests have been given in the works by Professors STRONG and BUSSE quoted below and, to avoid misunderstanding, the writer desires to avow his purpose in advance, viz. 1) to submit to somewhat careful analysis the original view expressed in Dr. STRONG'S book; 2) to bring into effective contrast therewith those statements of recent writers which may prove illuminating, and 3) to attempt a critical and constructive statement of the solution of this general problem offered by Dynamic Realism. By this frank avowal the reader may be prepared to excuse the anomaly that this paper may seem as much a pleading as a review.

At the outset we can do no less than express our hearty recognition of the merit of Dr. STRONG's work, which, for clearness of presentation, thoroughness of research, as well as candor and courage of treatment, is entirely admirable. Its usefulness will be especially apparent to those who find greatest difficulty in agreeing with all of the conclusions. It is assumed that the reader of these lines will also peruse the book and thus absolve us from the obligation of making a comprehensive digest of the contents, which consist so largely of the statement of conflicting theories as to leave too small space for a con

1 C. A. STRONG. Why the Mind Has a Body. New York, Macmillan, 1903.

LUDWIG BUSSE. Geist und Körper. Leipzig, 1903.

J. MARK BALDWIN. Mind and Body from the Genetic Point of View. Princeton Contributions, III, 2, Dec., 1903.

H. HEATH BAWDEN. The Functional Theory of Parallelism. Philos. Rev., XII, 3, 1903.

Necessity from Standpoint of Scientific Method of a Reconstruction of the Ideas of Psychical and Physical. Journ. Philos. Psych. Sci. Methods, I, 3, 1904.

HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER. The Concept of Consciousness. Journ. Philos. Psych. Sci. Methods, I, 5.

WILLIAM JAMES. Human Immortality, 1900.

W. OSTWALD. The Philosophical Meaning of Energy. Internat. Quart., VII, 2, 1903.

nected statement of the author's own position, which must, therefore, be assembled to a large extent from the critical portion of the work. Professor STRONG classifies the theories, in so far as they are empirical, into

I. Interactionism: Psychophysical dualism and Psychophysical phenomenalism (interactionist type).

II. Automatism: Psychophysical materialism and Psychophysical phenomenalism (automatist type).

III. Parallelism: Psychophysical monism and Psychophysical idealism (the last being the author's position).

By the title chosen the author intentionally prepares his reader for the panpsychist view advocated, as he explains in the preface. For his theory he claims that "its difficulties are of the nature of obscurities, not of contradictions. Hence I think that panpsychists are justified in maintaining that with their principles they are able to explain the connection of mind and body." The author hopefully proposes "a settlement of the controversy between the parallelists and the interactionists," a hope which we fear few of his readers will be able to share.

The problem for the author, resolves itself into an "issue between interactionism and automatism, the former regarding the brain as an instrument used by the mind in dealing with the external world, while the latter conceives of brain-process as the physical basis or condition of consciousness, which simply accompanies the brain-process without exerting any influence upon it." One may argue with HUXLEY that consciousness is an effect of the brain-process, or with CLIFFORD that the two processes are parallel, the brain being no more responsible for consciousness than consciousness is for what happens in the brain.

In the introduction Professor STRONG effectively sets forth the results of the denial of casual relations which seems to be involved in any of these views. "Parallelism involves the denial of the physical efficiency of mind, and automatism the denial of its general efficiency." "Thus a whole series of scientific and philosophical conceptions of the first order-the principle of the conservation of energy, the mechanical theory of life, the biological doctrine of evolution, the philosophical conceptions of mechanism, efficiency, free will-all converge and come to a focus in the problem of the relation of mind and body. Not only so, but every one of these conceptions is vitally engaged, and will be found to stand or fall or suffer total transformation, according as we espouse interactionism, automatism, or parallelism."

We may reassure ourselves sotto voce that the case is not so bad as

it appears. We cannot agree that these are the only possible solutions of the problem, and we may add that any form of parallelism, sensu stricto, is simply an evasion of the issue. To say that brain-event and mind-event are cotemporaneous or consecutive is to offer no explanation of a fact of observation. It produces no scientific conviction that the next brain-event will be accompanied by a mind-event. It is no sense a theory-it is but a denial of the possibility of a theory. Many things that pass as parallelistic theories really go further and produce or assume a real tie between the two series, perhaps via some other element. This is especially true of functional theories. In the approach of the discussion of causation, which is evidently crucial in this connection, the necessity of determining what is meant by matter is encountered and frankly met: "For if at the present day there is a point on which philosophers show some approach to agreement it is that matter does not exist, in any such sense as the plain man supposes; that it has no existence independently of the mind." We think that this statement is true only as to the first clause, or that the second statement is at least misleading. There are very few philosophers who would deny the existence independent of the mind of something corresponding to the concept of matter in the mind; certainly the author himself does not consistently do so and yet he will not carry all philosophers with him to the extreme of identifying the thing back of matter with mind as such. What philosophy and modern science tend so generally to agree upon is that the matter concept as such is erroneous in so far as it sets up a category of creation incongruous with all else in the universe and places it outside of the sphere of experience.

After spending forty-five pages in discussing "The Facts," the author confesses that "In the course of this study, nothing has been established to the advantage or detriment of any particular casual theory. We carry away from it a single positive result: the law of psychophysical correlation." This law states that consciousness as a whole never occurs except in connection with a brain-process, and that particular mental states never occur except in connection with particular brain-events. It would seem that important limitations may be necessary even in the application of this "law." Brain processes must be taken in a very wide sense and the "mental states" of course refer to those of human experience and would not prejudice the possibility of "psychic modes" corresponding to other types of what may be called intrinsic aspects of other physical processes.

"Any view which ascribes physical action to the mind, no matter

what that action, can be reconciled with the principle of conservation of energy on the hypothesis that the mind is itself a form of energy.” "The interactionist who shrinks from making consciousness a form of energy has, therefore, a single course left: to attack the universality of the principle of conservation directly." Here it is to be feared exists an unhappy confusion between consciousness and the extrinsic form of energy variously called "soul" or even "experience" (ALEXANDER) though Professor STRONG expressly says "the existence of consciousness is our existence. The soul is a dark and mysterious source from which consciousness in some unintelligible manner flows" though "insensibly we are drawn to picture it by the aid of that illegitimate notion of matter existing with all its materiality apart from consciousness-in short, as a mind-atom." What then are we to do with the whole infra-conscious part of life as well as the past unremembered stream of consciousness which we are wont to believe, with more reason than any other fact whatever, accounts for and makes intelligible the present consciousness? Such exclusion shuts us out from the teleology which alone accounts for our individuality upon the confession of idealists themselves. The idealist indeed holds "that we can have immediate knowledge only of our mental states;" to which the realist replies that this statement does violence to a fundamental dictum of science that with action there must be reaction. A purely spontaneous activity or energic manifestation is impossible in a created universe (it would be a miracle and there are no miracles in philosophy, however it may be in theology). To say that my mind created reality out of nothing as a spontaneous fiat is to misapprehend the nature of reality. The fact that I experience a phenomenal universe demands something other than the simple subject of experience. For, as we like to say, reality is the affirmation of attribute and involves subject and object, energy and limitation, action and reaction, and so is ipse facto proof of extraneous somewhat. This reality does not necessarily vindicate our interpretation of it as object but it implies something to be interpreted. The author himself, however, provides a corrective in various places and admits that "the need in question (i. e., of explaining perceived events by means of preceding events not perceived) can only be met by some form of realism." "Though the objects themselves we percive cannot continue to exist when we no longer perceive them, it is consistent with idealism that they should have extramental causes which continue to exist and of which the perceived objects are symbolic." Now if this be idealism it is idealism in terms of realism—an idealism with the sting extracted so that it is harmless