Columbia Law Times: A Monthly Review Devoted to Law and Political Science

EDITORS' TABLE.

IN the Green Bag for December we find very interesting articles on "Nathan Dane," and also "Causes Cèlébres," which reads like a thrilling detective story, probably intended for the youth of the bar.

WE learn from the Chicago Legal News the sad fact that Counsellor Jones recently fell and broke his leg, and hence materially injured his standing in court. We do not see why this need be so since justice is blind.

It is the policy of some law journals published by the students of various law schools to confine themselves to articles and reviews written by their faculty or alumni. Others, however, give the students an opportunity to prepare legal essays, and the result shows that the work of the students compares very favorably with that of their older brethren. The Yale Law Four

nal as well as the COLUMBIA LAW TIMES offers this advantage to students. In the December number of the former there is a well written review of "The Power to Com

pel Physical Examination in Case of Injury to the Person," by Edward G. Buckland. In the same number appears an article on "Incorporation in one State for Business to be Done in Another," by Mr. Thomas Thacher, and the views therein set forth have since been held by the New York Court of Appeals in Demarest vs. Grant, 28 N. E. R., 645.

UNDER the head of "Light Reading for Lawyers" in the Law Bulletin of the Iowa University appears a very elaborate list of books and articles, presumably for the idle hours of an attorney. The author intends only to "give a few of the most obvious," and then proceeds with a library running from Dickens' "Pickwick" to Montes

quieu's "Spirit of Laws," incidentally taking in Ram's "Science of Legal Judgment," and closing with the solemn remark that "no educated lawyer can be content to be wholly ignorant of the light literature of the profession." We suggest that he add to the list Myer's "Federal Decisions" and Keener's "Quasi Contracts."

A lawyer's commentary upon the famous case of Shylock vs. Antonio, by James M. American Law Review. We make a few Love, appears in the last number of the selections from this extremely interesting article. You will find the case reported by one William Shakespeare in his far-famed work, "The Merchant of Venice." The action was founded upon a bond which the defendant executed to the ducats borrowed by the defendant from plaintiff for the sum of three thousand the plaintiff. The condition of the bond was that if Antonio failed to pay the money in three months from date of the instrument Shylock should have the right to cut and take a pound of flesh from Antonio's body nearest his heart. This is the way Mr. Love introduces the fair Portia. "With a marvellous exhibition of brass which assures us that with little practice she would have made a successful practitioner, she at once assumed the whole conduct of the

trial, acting as both judge and advocate." Proceeding he says: "If we consider the trial scene in the 'Merchant of Venice' as an example of dramatic art, it is perhaps. a masterpiece. If we regard it in a legal point of view it is from end to end a tissue of absurdities. If the bond upon which Shylock counted against his adversary was a lawful contract, and if he was entitled to judgment upon it as such, by what

'conjuration and what mighty magic' could it be made to appear that the law would condemn him to death for making such a contract? That any contract, the end and aim of which is a violation of the law of the land, is illegal and absolutely void, must be a fundamental doctrine of universal law. * * * Portia, I know, is a very charming little pettifogger, but we must not suffer her charms and her brilliant parts to blind our eyes to legal truth. Doubtless Shylock's bond was utterly null and void; but if, as Portia affirmed, it was a valid and binding instrument and the Jew had a perfect right to enforce it, how could he be made responsible, civilly or criminally, for the unavoidable consequences of its legal execution? It is a fundamental principle of the law of contracts that every stipulation must receive a reasonable construction and not such a construction as would render its provisions absurd and impracticable. It is therefore a settled principle that whatever is incidental to the execution of a contract is implied in its terms. The truth is that Portia's practice before the Venetian court was a piece of sublime pettifogging. It was a tissue of quibbles which would be contemptible if were not for the art and eloquence of the chief actor. Nor was there any necessity for this malpractice; since even, assuming that Shylock's bond was not illegal and utterly void, Antonio had a good defence against it on the ground of fraud. Antonio was induced to execute the bond by the fraudulent pretences and arguments of Shylock. Again I am persuaded that Shakespeare intended in the 'Merchant of Venice' to hold up to reprobation the law of England as it was in his

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day in relation to penal bonds. A penal code was by the common law of that time in principle exactly what Shylock claimed his bond to be. If such was his purpose he succeeded admirably, for to this day a creditor who makes extreme demands, according to strict law, of his debtor is called a Shylock claiming his pound of flesh. Finally, young gentlemen, I trust that when you shall leave these halls and enter the great temple of human justice, to aid in the performance of its rites, it will be your constant aim to mitigate the rigor of the law with equity and mercy! Be just and fear not! Let no mere legal or technical advantage which you may at any time have over your adversary tempt you to a violation of the sacred principles of right and justice. Never under any circumstances allow yourselves to play the part of Shylock-never demand the pound of flesh. Imitate not the little doctor of laws in her tricks, her quibbles, her sharp practice. But, nevertheless, let the memorable words that she uttered sink deep into your heart of hearts that

"Earthly power dost then show likest God's When mercy seasons justice.""

We note with amusement the various and inconsistent comments on Judge Love's review of this famous case. The Albany Law Journal regards it as "the best of the kind that we have ever seen," and gives a long extract which affords it especial delight." The Chicago Legal News for the other side: "We do not admire the style of the late Judge Love, and it must be a bold man who would seek to set aside this verdict of mankind, and detract from the fame of Portia."

BOOK REVIEWS.

A DIGEST OF NEW YORK STATUTES AND REPORTS FROM JANUARY 1, 1890, TO JANUARY 1, 1891. By Austin Abbott. New York: Diossy Law Book Company.

For ready and useful reference and rapid review we can recommend no more valuable book to either student or practitioner.

LEADING CASES SIMPLIFIED: A COLLECTION OF CASES OF COMMON LAW, EQUITY, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND CRIMINAL LAW. By Prof. John D. Lawson. San Francisco: Bancroft, Whitney & Co., 1892.

In this book we recognize a perfect jewel for the lawyer and student. The selected cases are systematically grouped and the kernel of each opinion taken out and presented to the reader. Many of the cases are familiar to every law student, and we recognize very old friends in Hadley vs. Buxendale, Swift vs. Tyson, Coggs vs. Bernards, Spencer's case, etc. Each case is allowed about one page by the editor, and the selection ranges over the whole field of the law.

THE AMERICAN STATE REPORTER. Vol. XXI. Edited by A. C. Freeman. San Francisco Bancroft-Whitney Company, 1891.

These Reports are too well known to need extended review. It is enough to say that the present volume maintains the high standard of the series. Among the cases reported is Pearsall vs. W. U. Tel. Co., a New York case holding that a telegraph company may limit its liability by contract, but not by mere notice. To this case is appended a note by the editor citing many cases on the liability of telegraph companies.

This volume treats of cases in California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania.

MYER'S FEDERAL DECISIONS: CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME, CIRCUIT, AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. Arranged by William G. Myer, Esq. Published by the Gilbert Book Company, St. Louis, Mo. 1884.

Myer's Federal Decisions needs no introduction to our readers. Since the adoption by Prof. George C. Cumings, of Vol. X. as a text-book for a very popular course of study, namely, Corporations, the students have never failed to appreciate his choice. William G. Myer brought to the work of compilation an expert knowledge in indexing and arrangement, and the cases contained in the reports evidence a most discriminating selection, the result, no doubt, of a careful reading and judicious estimate of their value. Want of space, however, prevents an extended review, but a few explanatory remarks as to Vol. X. may convey some idea of the scope and value of the work. The volume referred to is devoted exclusively to the subject of corporations. The cases, instead of being chronologically arranged, are grouped in subjects. The assignment of them is first made to general heads of the law, then follows a division and subdivision of each subject, and, for convenience of arrangement, with head-notes or table of contents preceding each, as in any ordinary digest. The form of each individual case is likewise deserving of notice, for the arranger, aiming at briefness, has eliminated everything not necessary to a proper understanding of the

cases.

Benj. Vaughan Abbott, in a criticism of the selected cases for the tenth volume, writes: "Mr. Myer's manuscript bears abundant evidence that the cases have been carefully read, and their value deliberately and judiciously estimated." Commendation from such a source is generally deserved, so we may safely say that "Myer's Federal Decisions” is of immense value to the student as a text-book and the lawyer as a digest.

ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS. By Melville M. Bigelow, Ph.D. Fourth edition. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1891.

Mr. Bigelow defines a tort as "a breach of duty fixed by municipal law, for which a suit for damages can be maintained," and adopts the following classification: "One class of cases, a tort is (so far) a breach of duty effected by fraud or by malice; a second class, a tort is a breach of duty absolute, regardless of fraud, malice, intention, or negligence; third class, a tort is a breach of duty effected by negligence. These divisions of the breach of duty will be found to cover all cases of tort in the law as it now exists." This method of dealing with the subject seems artificial and somewhat strained, the different torts refusing to arrange themselves in their respective classes with the same naturalness and readiness as in the old division of wrongs to person, property, and reputation. The treatment of the specific torts by Mr. Bigelow is singularly concise yet comprehensive, and the large number of cases cited in this volume renders it valuable to the student for ready reference.

THE AMERICAN STATE REPORTS. Vol. xx. San Francisco: Bancroft, Whitney, & Co. 1891.