One limitation is to be observed herei. e., an officer cannot certify his own checks, and a check so certified would carry notice of irregularity on its face.' We take up now

THE EFFECT OF CERTIFICATION.

In general, this is designed to give, and does give, to the paper the value of money, and enables it to circulate as such, and under this character it is taxed by the U. S. government. It possesses the qualities of ordinary commercial paper, passes by endorsement, and confers upon holder or endorser a right of action as upon any other chose in action.'

It imports that the bank guarantees the signature of the drawer, that he has funds sufficient to meet it, and positively engages to hold such funds for this purpose, even against the wishes and orders of the drawer. It does not, as a rule, cover the body of the check nor import any guaranty as to payee or amount.' Justice Miller, in 18 Wall. 620, speaks in the following terms of the import of certification: "In the absence of anything tending to direct his attention to other matters, the bank officer had a right to suppose that information was desired of him only in regard to the signature of the drawers and the state of their account. These were material facts which both common sense and common law presumed to be within his knowledge. The answer that the check was ' good,' or 'all right,' must be supposed to be responsive only to these two points. He was under no moral or legal obligation to give an opinion on other points, but if he

had any reason to believe that information was sought on these points, and he vouchsafed the information, the bank might be held by estoppel. If there was an intent and purpose to attach value of money for a circulating medium to check their certification with the stamps of the bank might be held to include everything." Here in an entirely different phase of the question we see a tendency to introduce the equitable principles of estoppel; but though in one extreme case the Louisiana court has held the certification to cover the entire check in the hands of an innocent holder for value, even though it had been altered before certification, yet the prevailing and sound rule' limits the warrant of certification as above indicated. If, however, the bank have any peculiar knowledge beyond these two points, it is under an obligation to disclose it, when the omission to do so would cause injury to the party seeking information, who evidently intends to act in the reply of the bank; and in this case the estoppel would lie.

8

So

simply disregard any countermand.' far as the drawer is concerned, certification is precisely the same as if bank had paid the check, and drawer has no further claim or right against it for this amount. If the check prove to be a forgery, as in the case of payment of a forged check, the bank must be the loser, and cannot charge the drawer.

(b) A check after certification becomes. payment, and drawer is absolutely discharged from liability to payee. The law will not permit a check to be thus presented and the money left in the bank, without discharging the drawer. The payee is authorized to demand payment, and if he elect, for his own convenience, to accept certification and leave the money in the bank, it is at his own risk.

(c) The bank by certification or acceptance becomes the primary and only debtor of the payee, on the instrument, and holds the amount subject to his order by endorsement in same manner as though he were an original depositor, except that he must draw in solido. It engages absolutely to hold the money for payment of the check whenever presented, and is not discharged by any laches or delay of the payee or his endorsees in presenting for payment."

The certification is not a demand, and the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run until demand.'

Though the drawer desire to revoke the check and notify the bank to this effect, yet the bank after certification is bound to pay; also, whether or not it had funds of the drawer at the time of certification, for the certification admitted funds and acts as

II. When drawer procures his own check to be certified before issue.

(a) As between drawer and bank : Certification does not discharge the deposit account, but depositor can return the check and sue on the deposit."

(b) As between drawer and payee or holder:

The certified check is not payment, and our accepting it in the ordinary course of business does not assume risk of the insolvency of the bank on which it is drawn, and in this event may still look to the drawer for payment."

(c) As between bank and holder:

Bank can pay only subject to condition imposed by drawer in procuring certification of his own check, i. e., endorsement."

3 52 N. Y. 350; 7 Bissel 197.

4

39 Pa. St. 92; 91 N. Y. 106.

5

7 L. R. A. 442.

6

25 N. Y. 146; 31 Vt. 101.

12

157 N. Y. 159.

After due issue by the drawer any subsequent bona-fide holder has same rights against the bank as though certification had been at his own request.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the effect differs in two important pointswhen certification is before or after issue. In the former case the certified check is not payment, and drawer is not discharged, and debt of bank to drawer still remains until it has notice of issue. In the latter

case the effects are just the reverse, and on this distinction an apparent conflict may be reconciled. The courts of Illinois' and Tennessee' have seemed to maintain, contrary to weight of authority, that bank is not discharged from liability to drawer, while as to payee or holder a secondary liability still rested on the drawer; but, upon examination, it is found that in these cases the certification was before issue.

19 Heisk. 171, 211, but see 4 Bastor 401.

We take pleasure in introducing to our readers the new faculty of Columbia Law School. Professor Keener we welcome as an old friend, the others come to us as strangers, known only by reputation. We present a brief sketch of each of the law professors, which may perhaps serve to make us better acquainted.

Professor William A. Keener, Dean of the Law School was born in Augusta, Ga., March 10, 1856. He attended Emory College, at Oxford, Ga., where he graduated in 1874. Entering Harvard Law School in the fall of 1875, he graduated in 1877, and subsequently took a post-graduate of one year at Cambridge. In the fall of 1878 he came to New York City to practice, entering the office of Scudder and Carter. Here he remained one year, when he became a member of the firm of Ashley and Keener, and continued to practice until the fall of 1883, when he was offered and accepted an assistant professorship in the Harvard Law School. In 1888 he was elected Story professor of law at Harvard, which position he resigned in the fall of 1890 to accept a professorship in Columbia Law School. When Dr. Dwight resigned last June, the office of warden was abolished and that of dean established, Professor Keener being elected to that position. He lectures on Contracts, Quasi-Contracts, and Equity, and is also the editor of two very useful legal works, 66 Selections on Contracts" and "Cases on Quasi-Contracts."

Professor Francis M. Burdick was born at De Ruyter, N. Y., and was educated at Hamilton College, graduating in the class of 1869. He read law in the office of the Hon. Charles Mason, at the same time doing editorial work on the Utica Morning Herald. He received his degree from Hamilton Col

lege Law School in 1872, and shortly after began the practice of his profession in the city of Utica. In 1882 he was the successful candidate for Mayor of Utica. He resigned the office of Mayor in the succeeding fall to accept a professorship in Hamilton College Law School. When the School of Law at Cornell University was established in 1887, Professor Burdick was elected to the chair of Elementary Law and Contracts. He remained at Cornell until last June, when he was offered a professorship at Columbia. He is the associate of the dean in the University Council. He is the author of a selection of cases on Torts. Professor Burdick's lectures at Columbia College are on Torts, Criminal Law, Negotiable Paper, Sales of Personal Property, and Partnership, and Agency.

Professor George W. Kirchwey was born at Detroit, Michigan, July 3, 1855. He attended school in Chicago, and entered Yale in 1875. Graduating in 1879, he began the study of law in the office of Stedman and Shepard, meanwhile attending Albany Law School. He was admitted to the bar in 1882, and began to practice at Albany as a member of the firm of Eaton and Kirchwey. In the spring of 1889 he was elected dean of the Albany Law School, to succeed the Hon. Horace E. Smith, which position he held when called to a professorship at Columbia. Professor Kirchwey has charge of the classes in Mortgages, Real Estate, Evidence, Bailments, Evidence, Bailments, Admiralty and

Shipping.

Professor George M. Cumming was born in Pennsylvania, October 4, 1854. After preparatory courses in Phillips' Exeter Academy and the Lehigh University, he entered Harvard University, graduating

in the class of 1876. He studied law at Harvard and Columbia, and afterward at Göttingen and Strasburg. Admitted to the bar in 1881, he has since been engaged in active practice in New York and in several of the Western States. For several years he has been connected with the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific rail

roads. He resigned the position of assistant general manager of the St. Joseph and Grand Island Railroad to accept a chair at Columbia. During the ensuing year Professor Cumming will lecture on Corporations, Wills, Domestic Relations, Common Law and Equity Pleading, and the New York Code.