and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

It will be perceived that according to its preamble the Constitution was ordained and established "for the United States of America" and not for any other part of the habitable globe. How, then, can it be extended beyond our boundaries unless it be so amended as to allow that to be done, even if that be possible? And as the Government instituted by it rests upon the consent of the governed, having only such powers as they have granted thereto, how can any qther people be made subject to it without their consent also? But even if this could be done consistently with the body of the Constitution, the question would arise whether or not a colonial system is. consistent with the purposes thereof as specified in the preamble thereto. It certainly cannot be reasonably contended that to govern any people without their consent and against their protests is "to form a more perfect Union " or " to establish justice." Neither can it be truthfully said that to do so is "to insure domestic tranquillity," "to provide for the common defence" or "to promote the general welfare." "To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" does not mean to secure those blessings to the people of other countries however desirable that may be; and still less does it justify us in depriving them of "the blessings of liberty." The purposes for which the Constitution was ordained and established, therefore, cannot be fulfilled by the establishment of a colonial system; and consequently, it is clearly unconstitutional; and for that reason, if for no other, the policy to which the President is now endeavoring to commit the citizens of the United States ought to be immediately abandoned.

But admitting for the purpose of this argument that a colonial system is not inconsistent with the preamble to the Constitution, let us next inquire whether or not there is any clause thereof which provides for or authorizes it. The words of that instrument which are usually referred to by those persons who contend that Congress possesses sovereign power over the Territories are contained in Clause 2 of Section 3 of Article IV., which reads as follows :—

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State."

The first power therein conferred upon Congress is "to dispose of the territory or other property belonging to the United States." What do these words signify^? When speaking of territory or of land which cannot be destroyed, they must mean to give away, to cede, to sell or to lease; and no other meaning can properly be attached to them. The second power therein granted to Congress is "to make all needful rules and regulations " respecting said territory or or other property. It is a well-established rule that in construing a constitutional provision or a statute its words must always have the same meaning which they had at the time when they were used therein. Applying that rule to the construction of this clause, we are compelled to conclude v \ that it had reference only to the land then owned by the Federal Government and not to those political communities which are now called "Territories," because at that time there were no such political communities claimed to be under our jurisdiction; and therefore, the word "territory " could not then have had the additional meaning which since has been and now is ascribed to it by those persons who contend that the clause confers upon Congress the power of instituting territorial governments over, or of legislating for, the inhabitants of the public domain. If the members of the Constitutional Convention had intended to apply this word to such Territories as might thereafter be established, they certainly would have used it in the plural instead of in the singular number, thereby removing all doubt as to the meaning which they intended to convey. On this point the Supreme Court has expressed its opinion in the case of United States v. Gratiot et al., 14 Peters, 526, 537, in which it said:—

"The terra 'territory," as here used, is merely descriptive of one kind of property and is equivalent to the word 'lands.'"

That the word " territory," as used in this clause means land only is made perfectly clear when the three following words "or other property" are considered, as they manifestly refer merely to one kind of property; and no one will seriously contend that the people who resided on the public domain at the time when the Constitution was adopted were "property belonging to the United States "; for if they had been so, Congress would have had the power "to dispose of" them, which means to give them away, to sell them into slavery, to banish them or to exterminate them; and it is unreasonable to believe that such a power as this is was intended to be conferred by the Constitutional Convention upon Congress. So to construe the clause is equivalent to saying that all of those people were then neither more nor less than slaves owned by the Federal Government which was not the case; although there were a few slaves who were the private property of certain citizens of some of the States in the Union. A construction of a constitutional provision which is so manifestly absurd as this is cannot be the correct one. But even if the convention had intended to establish and could have established the institution of slavery on the public domain, the. Constitution as it now reads does not recognize but actually prohibits property in human beings and abolishes every form of slavery and involuntary servitude within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.*

It is true that here is a provision for " needful rules and regulations"; but these words cannot apply to persons but are limited to "the territory or other property belonging to the United States "; and therefore, they cannot authorize either civil or criminal legislation for the. inhabitants of the Territories. Rules and regulations respecting property cannot include laws for people; and all that Congressman rightfully do under this clause in reference to the public land is to provide for surveying, improving, cultivating or leasing it; * and these rules and regulations can have force only while this territory belongs to the United States. Whenever it is sold it ceases to be property belonging to the United States; it becomes property belonging to individuals. It ceases to be public property; it becomes private property; and Congress, whenever it sells this territory, parts with its jurisdiction over it.f

The territory is here spoken of as property "belonging to" the United States; but that does not imply that it is necessarily apart of the United States unless it be within the boundaries of the States in the Union. This being true, that portion of the public domain which is without those boundaries constitutes no part of the nation but is merely its property; and all legislation by Congress relating to it must treat it only as such property; while all political jurisdiction over the people who reside on public land within the Union which has not been ceded to the Federal Government by the Legislatures of the States wherein it is situated, is vested in the Governments of those States, as will now be proven.

Having shown that this clause relates to property only, it does not justify the United States Government in assuming jurisdiction over the people who occupy the public land; for if it did, that jurisdiction would extend to all the land within as well as without the boundaries of the States which is the property of the United States. But it has been held by the Supreme Court in Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, that the Federal Government has no jurisdiction over people dwelling- upon this land unless that has been expressly ceded to it by the Legislatures of the States in which it is located.\ If the words "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States " confer upon Congress the power to legislate for residents upon public land, these words must apply to all of this land wherever is its location; and as the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the Union, the power of legislation thus conferred, if Congress should choose to exercise it, would supersede the jurisdiction of every State in which there is territory belonging to the United States over the people who occupy it. But according to the decision of the Supreme Court just cited, the mere ownership of land in the States by the Federal Government does not deprive these States of their jurisdiction over these people, thus establishing the proposition for which the writer contends,— that the authority of the United States over its citizens does not arise from the mere possession of the territory upon which they reside, and that the words in question do not grant to Congress the power of legislation for the inhabitants of the Territories.

Additional light is thrown upon the meaning of the words already considered by the latter part of the clause, which reads as follows: "and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State." These words refer only to the conflicting claims of the Federal and the State Governments of the Union to certain land included in the cessions made by the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain and have no relation to political jurisdiction over the people who then resided or might thereafter reside upon that land. It is evident that the whole clause relates to property and to nothing else; and it was not intended to and does not grant to Congress authority to organize governments over, or to legislate for, the people of the Territories. How, then, can colonies be established or maintained by virtue of this constitutional provision?

That this construction of the clause under consideration is the correct one is made evident when the words thereof are contrasted with those of Clause 17 of Section 8 of Article I., which reads as follows : —

"The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not ex