great influence at Madrid; and asked him to employ that influence in a pacific mediation between Spain and the new American states. The philanthropic Clay appealed through his minister to the humanitarian instincts of the great Alexander. The latter was reminded of the great length of the conflict; of its inevitableness sooner or later had it not occurred when it did; of the fact that there was absolutely no hope that Spain would ever be able to recover control on the continent; and of the further fact that she was in imminent danger of losing her remaining possessions in the Antilles. It would be well worth while for Spain to sacrifice her pride and make peace in order to save these valuable islands. He was also reminded of the great international importance of and interest in Cuba, and was told that, "If peace should be longer deferred, and the war should take the probable direction which has been supposed, during its further progress other powers not now parties may be collaterally drawn into it. From much less considerable causes the peace of the world has been often disturbed. From the vicinity of Cuba to the United States, its valuable commerce, and the nature of its population, their government cannot be indifferent to any political change to which that island may be destined. Great Britain and France also have deep interests in its fortunes, which must keep them wide awake to all those changes. In short, what European state has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be it what it may, of the most valuable of the West India islands?

The reflection and the experience of the Emperor on the vicissitudes of war must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges by every precaution with which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of states.

"Such is the view of the war between Spain and the new republics which the President desires you most earnestly, but respectfully, to present to his Imperial Majesty. From this view it is evident that it is not so much for the new states themselves as for Spain that peace has become absolutely necessary. Their independence of her, whatever intestine divisions may, if intestine divisions shall, yet unhappily await them, is fixed and irrevocable. She may, indeed, by a blind and fatal protraction of the war, yet lose more: gain, for her, is impossible. In becoming the advocate for peace one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests, there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose, without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of those islands, now open to the commerce and en

terprise of their citizens. They desire for themselves no political change in them. If Cuba were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population_render it improbable that it could maintain its independence.

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Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring island was the afflicting theatre. There could be no effectual preventive of those scenes, but in the guaranty, and in a large resident force, of foreign powers. The terms of such guaranty, and the quotas which each should contribute of such force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment; to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation. In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very foreign powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European power. And if the new republics, or either of them, were to conquer them, their maritime force as it now is, or for a long time to come is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. Nor is it believed that the new states desire, or will attempt, the acquisition, unless they shall be compelled in their own defence, to make it, by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Acting on the policy which is here unfolded, the government of the United States, although they would have been justified to have seized

Cuba and Porto Rico, in the just protection of the lives and the commerce of their citizens, which have been a prey to infamous pirates finding succor and refuge in Spanish territory, have signally displayed their patience and moderation by a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of Spain, who was herself bound, but has utterly failed, to repress those enormities.

"Finally the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of an useless waste of human life." This remarkable despatch contained more than three thousand words. The above quotation includes about one fourth of it. Middleton was authorized to communicate it all at once or a little at a time as his judgment should dictate.28

The sentiments of the Russian government were not unknown to Clay and Adams. Many communications

28 Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825, MS., Department of State, Instructions, X, 331; MS., Relaciones Exteriores; American State Papers, Foreign, V, 846; British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 403.

"To guard against any accident which might befall the original," a copy of this instruction of May 10 was mailed by separate conveyance a little more than a fortnight later. See Brent to Middleton, May 26, 1825, MS., Department of State, Instructions, X, 365.

The careful editor of the very interesting correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818 to 1825, states incorrectly that this despatch is not in the American State Papers. See American Historical Review, XVIII, 561.

had passed between the two governments during the years immediately preceding.20 The Russian minister, to whom Middleton's instructions were shown a few days after they were written, "spoke in terms of high commendation of this measure, and said, without being able to anticipate what the Emperor's determination upon it may be, he is quite sure that it will be

29 See Adams, Memoirs, VI, 191-222, passim; and "Correspondence of the Russian Minister in Washington, 1818–1825," American Historical Review, XVIII, 309–345, and 537-562. On November 9/21, 1818, ibid., 317, Nesselrode wrote from Aixla-chapelle to Poletica in Washington: "Si donc, à Votre arrivée à Washington, le gouvernement Américain n'a point encore resolu la reconnaissance des Colonies Espagnoles insurgées, il Vous est trés-expressément recommandé de chercher à dissuader le Cabinet de Washington de cet acte d'hostilité envers l'Espagne."

On July 13/25, 1822, ibid., 342, Nesselrode wrote Baron Tuyll in Washington: "Si la connaissance du désir qu'aurait l'Empereur de voir cet état de paix se prolonger, pouvoit porter le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis à ne modifier en rien les dispositions qu'il a manifestées envers l'Espagne et à ne pas s'armer contre elle dans le lutte que soutiennent ses provinces d'Outre-mer, vous n'hésiteriez point à exprimer les voeux de Sa Majesté Impériale."

On December 2/14, 1822, ibid., 540, Nesselrode again wrote Tuyll: "Nous ne prétendons pas arrêter la marche de l'avenir; l'affranchisement de l'Amérique Méridionale est probable, il est imminent peut-être, mais, je le répète, c'était une raison de plus aux yeux de l'Empereur, pour souhaiter que Son Ministre engageât le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à suivre un système inoffensif à l'égard de l'Espagne." These communications show a desire to maintain peace, although in other respects they differ radically from the position of the United States. It is safe to assume that their spirit, at least, was made known to the government at Washington.