CHAPTER IV

CUBA SAVED TO SPAIN

Before the Mexican cabinet changes had occurred which displaced English influence in Mexico by that of the United States, a serious international question had arisen which vitally affected the relations between the United States and Mexico, and the relations of each of these governments with England. It also influenced the relations of all three of these powers with other governments of both America and Europe. That question was, what would become of Cuba and Porto Rico in case Spain should lose her feeble hold on them, which seemed certain to occur.

All of the possessions of Spain on the continents of North and South America were irrevocably lost. Every one expected a change of some kind in the relations between Spain and her only remaining American possessions, these two important West India islands. Each government concerned feared that the change might be adverse to its interests. The following are some of the questions that were in the minds of statesmen concerning the islands: Would they be ceded to France in return for French support of Spanish absolutism? Would they be given to England to purchase that government's assistance in freeing Spain from French domination? Would they be revolution

ized and annexed by Colombia or Mexico, or held in joint control by them? Would the combined SpanishAmerican states soon to assemble in the conference at Panama unite in freeing them to become members of the federated states of the new world? Would they attempt to free themselves by their own unaided efforts? If so, could they remain free? If not, to whom would they appeal for assistance, to their sister SpanishAmerican states, to the United States, or to England? Would the price of such assistance be absorption by the power which gave it?

"In 1825 the London Courier described Cuba as the 'Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to her fall, and kept from falling by those who contend for the right of catching her in her descent.'"1 The uncertainty and the wide-spread interest in the subject furnished an occasion for Clay just after he had taken charge of the State Department to engage in one of the most far-reaching and most interesting diplomatic games ever played by an American secretary of state. In order to appreciate fully the situation when he took control it is necessary to study briefly some of the

1 Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, 140.

Temperley says: "Cuba has well been termed the 'Turkey of transatlantic politics,' for the destiny of Cuba was the problem which engaged the attention of all the diplomats of the age. . . . Thus arose a strange kind of triangular duel, France suspecting England and the United States, the United States suspecting England and France, England suspecting France and the United States." Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning," American Historical Review, XI, 789. And see Latané, United States and Spanish America, 89.

communications concerning Cuba that had passed in the two or three years preceding.

American statesmen had for some time been looking forward with confident expectancy to a time when Cuba should belong to the United States; but how and when the acquisition should be brought about no one attempted to foretell. The recent acquisition of Florida after more than a decade of agitation and negotiation made the addition of Cuba seem the next logical step. As early as 1809, when Napoleon seeming to be firmly established in Spain was expected to attempt to extend his system to the Spanish colonies, Jefferson, who had just retired from the presidency, wrote to Madison, his successor, that Napoleon would have to acquiesce in our seizure of the Floridas if we wished to take them, and would also, he thought, "consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces." Similar sentiments were frequently expressed by many American public men during the following years of SpanishAmerican confusion.

In the autumn of 1822 the advisability of the early annexation of Cuba was discussed in the cabinet. A secret agent from Havana had tried to get assurance that Cuba would be admitted to the union in case she should declare her independence, as was contemplated, and should ask admission. "Calhoun expressed great anxiety to get Cuba as a part of the United States in

2 Chadwick, United States and Spain, Diplomacy, 216; Latané, United States and Spanish America, 90-93.

order to avert the danger of its revolution by negroes, and its possession by the English-but as we were not then ready to risk a war with England, which the annexation of Cuba might have occasioned, he advised that the Havana overtures should be answered by persuading them for the present to adhere to Spain. He thought, however, that there could be no more objection to the acquisition of Cuba than to the purchase of Louisiana, and suggested that the matter should be made the subject of a communication to Congress." Adams, then secretary of state, opposed Calhoun's policy because of the danger of complications with England, which would probably result in British possession of Cuba. He "thought it best to advise nothing, but simply to say that the Executive was not competent to promise the Cubans admission into the Union, and that our relations to Spain would not allow us to encourage such a proposal-at the same time mentioning our friendly sentiments to Cuba, and the 'common interests which point to intimate connections between Cuba and the United States."" The policy of Adams was adopted. Early in the following year the

3 Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, 124; Adams, Memoirs, VI, 70–72.

Forsyth to Adams, Madrid, November 20, 1822, told of fears that the Spanish government entertained of a Cuban independence movement being fostered in the United States. Same to same, December 13, 1822, told of Spanish reinforcements having been sent to the West Indies. Adams to Forsyth, December 17, 1822, told of suspicions that England was treating with Spain for Cuba, and asked him to obtain correct information on the subject, and if he should find it true to

Mexican minister, lately arrived at Washington, reported to his government that Cubans were in the United States to promote a union with this country, and that the proposition was very pleasing to the people of the republic.*

In returning from the visit which he had made to Mexico in the autumn of 1822, Poinsett spent a few days in Cuba in January, 1823. He gave a glowing report of the picturesqueness, fertility, and resources of the island. He said he had never seen so much shipping and such an appearance of business, in any port in the United States, except New York." He enlarged on the danger to the interests of the United States if any great maritime power should obtain possession of the island, saying it would tend to provoke a war with that power and at the same time give such power an advantage. He continued, "Cuba is not only the key to the Gulf of Mexico, but of all the maritime frontier south of Savannah, and some of our highest interests, political and commercial, are involved in its fate. We ought to be satisfied that it should remain dependent on Spain; or in good time be entirely independent of every foreign nation."5

declare that the United States wished Cuba to remain in its connection with Spain. House Executive Documents, 32 Congress, I session, number 121, pages 3-5.

4 Zozaya to Secretario, 11 de enero de 1823, La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 105.

5 Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 209-223. He gives statistics concerning the population showing the proportion of whites, free colored, and slaves; and discusses the fear of a servile revolt. He speculates on the probability of a revolution