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wagon bearing the band-such are the purposes of the skillful directors, who hope thereby to sway the feeble-minded. It is an amusing and not wholly absurd custom. No serious harm can ensue unless but mark you this-unless we "deceive ourselves". Therein lies peril. To underrate an adversary is no less foolish in politics than in war.

The simple truth is that never before in our history have there been fewer sound bases, either in popular psychology or in trustworthy information, upon which to rest an intelligent forecast of the result of the coming election.

A useful purpose, nevertheless, may be served, for reasons which shall be made manifest, by dispassionate examination of the situation as it exists today.

What would be the result if the election were to take place next week? To our mind the answer is plain. Neither Mr. Davis nor Mr. La Follette could be expected to win. Assuming that Mr. Davis's minimum of 139 electoral votes from the South were increased by 8 from West Virginia, 3 from Delaware, 8 from Maryland, 18 from Missouri, 8 from Nebraska, 3 from Nevada, 10 from Oklahoma, 15 from Indiana, 24 from Ohio and 13 from California-an incredible supposition-he would still lack a majority.

Mr. La Follette, whose highest hope is to reach second place, admittedly would have no chance of attaining to first.

The only question is, Could Mr. Coolidge obtain a clear majority over the two combined? Let us see. Conceding to him, as one might do safely at the present time, New England, the Middle States, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Utah and Oregon, he would secure 218 electoral votes. He would require, for a majority, 48 additional from the following aggregation of States:

Could Mr. Coolidge, next week, obtain 48 votes from this group of States? We doubt it.

In any case, whether our misgiving be correct or not, one fact stands forth as clear as the noonday sun. This campaign has resolved into a contest, not between the Republican party and the Democratic party, not between Coolidge and Davis, but between Coolidge and No Election.

That is the sole practical issue. A vote for Coolidge would be a vote for a President to be elected by the people. A vote for either Davis or La Follette would be (1) a vote for a President to be selected by a House of Representatives chosen two years ago; or (2) for a President to be designated first as Vice President by a Senate, of whose members thirty-two were elected six years ago; or (3) by a Secretary of State, for whom not a single vote for President would have been cast. Which of these three would actually be installed in the White House, in the event of no election, is a problem, which finds no solution in precedent and none that is clear in the Constitution and statutes.

The method of procedure, in the event of no candidate receiving a clear majority of electoral votes, is provided by the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution, which reads as follows:

The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons toted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of

choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of the Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.

Two instances of no choice by electors are recorded. The first was in 1800, three years before the Twelfth Amendment was adopted, and the second was in 1824. In each case the House of Representatives finally chose a President by a majority vote. Neither, therefore, affords a precedent for the prospective situation, which involves a virtual certainty that no one of the three candidates could obtain a clear majority of votes by States in the present House of Representatives, which would be called upon to make a choice.

Each State, as provided by the Twelfth Amendment quoted, would have one vote, and twenty-five would be requisite to a choice of one of the three candidates who had received the largest number of votes by electors.

The ballots in the House of Representatives as now constituted, making no allowance for possible deaths or resignations of members, would be as follows:

Totals: Coolidge, 22; Davis, 20; La Follette, 1; not counting, under the precedents established in 1800 and 1824, 5.

Mr. Coolidge would lack three of a majority, Mr. Davis five and Mr. La Follette twenty-four. The suggestion of a transfer, by the Farm bloc, of Wisconsin and four additional States from Mr. Coolidge to Mr. Davis, thus giving the latter the requisite twenty-five, may be disregarded. If the Democratic party had nominated a Radical for President, such transference would have been within the range of conjecture, but the fact that Mr. Davis, whom Mr. La Follette and his followers depict as "the Wall Street candidate," is vastly more offensive in their eyes than Mr. Coolidge, definitely eliminates the possibility. Nor is it conceivable that the Democrats would join with the recalcitrant Republicans in voting for Mr. La Follette.

Clearly, there could be no election of a President by the House of Representatives.

Simultaneously, that is to say, on February 11 next, as provided by the Statutes,-while the House of Representatives would be balloting in vain for a President, the Senate would be

engaged in electing or trying to elect a Vice President. Under the Twelfth Amendment quoted, their selection, assuming Mr. Wheeler to have polled the fewest votes, would be restricted to a choice between Mr. Dawes and Mr. Bryan, and the votes would be cast, not by States, as in the House for President, but by individual Senators.

Forty-nine are required for an election.

The Senate now comprises nominally 51 Republicans, 43 Democrats and 2 Farmer-Labor members. Assuming further, as must be assumed, that the two Farmer-Labor members, Senators Shipstead and Magnus Johnson, would not vote for Mr. Dawes, a loss of three nominal Republicans would prevent his election. Of these Senator Norris might be one, but in any case Senators La Follette, Brookhart, Frazier and Ladd could not be expected to vote for Mr. Dawes for Vice President, likely to become President.

A combination of six out of the seven-Senators La Follette, Brookhart, Frazier, Ladd, Norris, Shipstead and Magnus Johnson -would control the situation.

They could (1) furnish the six additional votes required by the Democrats for the election of Mr. Bryan, or, (2) by absenting themselves, they could prevent the election of either Mr. Dawes or Mr. Bryan, the only eligible persons.

The probability is that they would accept the first alternative and elect Mr. Bryan, who is not only akin to themselves in populistic and pacifistic doctrines but is committed irrevocably to all of the variegated notions conceived and espoused, during the past thirty years, by his more versatile elder brother, who unquestionably would continue to act as his guide and counsellor. That Senator La Follette would be able to obtain whatever pledges he might see fit to exact from the two brothers may be taken for granted.

Presumptively, then, Mr. Bryan, at noon on March 4, 1925, would become President of the United States for a period of four years.

Not only presumptively, but probably; although at this stage there enters a question of interpretation of fundamental law.

The Constitution (Article II, section 6) provides specifically