CHAPTER XXI

CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE

THIS experiment of the United States in colonial government was far from a failure, and perhaps equally far from an unqualified success. Much was accomplished which will be of lasting benefit to the Island of Cuba. The mistakes that were made were, in the main, individual. A fundamental error undoubtedly lay in the manner in which state-building was entrusted to hands untrained in the work and imperfectly qualified for it. Yet, in spite of all that lies open to criticism or to condemnation, it is entirely beyond question that, when it withdrew on May 20, 1902, the United States left in Cuba an immeasurably better and surer foundation for a Cuban Republic than any upon which the Cubans could have built had they succeeded, without American aid, in expelling the Government of Spain.

This book would be incomplete without a brief comment on the structure which the Cubans have erected on the foundation thus laid. At the time of the withdrawal, there were many predictions of Cuban disaster and an early return of American authority, to assume a permanent control over a people incapable of proper conduct of their own affairs. There were even predictions of anarchy to come before the topmasts of the homeward-bound American transports had sunk below the horizon line.

Of Cuba's experience during the elapsed period, now somewhat more than two years, it may be said that it has,

in its success, surpassed the expectations of her most ardent friends, and that it has completely refuted the arguments of critics and doubters. The Cuban Government has not been ideal, and there has been much in its processes which is open to criticism and even to censure. But precisely the same is to be said of any and all governments, past or present. The histories of Rome, France, England, or the United States are by no means so clean that they are unassailable. Cuba has done well, wonderfully well, and her officials and her people are alike deserving of high commendation.

Peace and order have prevailed in the Island with perhaps even less of interruption than during the Intervention. This is due in part to the fact that the Cubans are a peace-loving and orderly people, indisposed to turbulence, and in part to their attention to that police protection which is a necessary institution in all communities. The sanitary work established during the Intervention has been so continued and maintained that the mortality list rivals in its low percentage the records of the most healthful lands. The school system, although a heavy financial burden, has shown no decadence.

In the Department of Public Works, even American energy has been outstripped. The report of the secretary of that department, for Cuba's first full fiscal year, shows that the American authorities, during the entire term of the Intervention, constructed sixty miles of new country roads. During their first year, the Cubans built forty-nine miles, with forty miles more in process of construction. The Americans built thirty-nine bridges of all classes during their occupation. During her first year, Cuba built twenty bridges, and prepared plans for twenty-five more. The records of the Island show that the work done has been done more economically than similar work was done under Ameri

can direction, and that it has been done quite as effectively. Two factors have prevented an even wider achievement. These are lack of money, and shortage in the labor supply. A consideration of Cuba's financial situation and policies presents many difficulties because of seeming incongruities. I refer above to a lack of money. Yet out of a total revenue only a little exceeding $35,000,000, for two years, Cuba stored up in her national cash box several millions of dollars. Her Congress has manifested no disposition to plunge into extravagant expenditure, and no effort has been made to raid the Treasury. The general economy of administration, and the treasury accumulation, are attributable in large measure to the personal ideas and the personal opinions of President Palma. It was his belief that Cuba's general credit would be strengthened by a surplus on hand. He believed also in the wisdom of a comfortable balance for use in case of an emergency.

The national credit was a matter of moment. A considerable sum was wanted for the discharge of certain special obligations. These were in the form of bonds issued by the revolutionary government, and an agreement made by that government to pay the soldiers of the revolution for their time and services. These bonds, known as the '96 bonds, with accrued interest, represented an obligation of about $3,000,000. The obligation to her soldiery has not yet reached a full determination.

When General Gomez decreed the industrial paralysis of the Island, thousands of laborers were deprived of all means of livelihood. It was then proposed and agreed that all who joined the insurgent ranks should receive payment for their services at a rate corresponding to the daily wage rate for labor on the plantations. This was set at one dollar per day. Our own experience in the various wars in which we

have been engaged leaves us in no position to reflect on the purchased patriotism of the Cuban warriors. An agreement had been made to pay them, and they wanted their money. Many of them were in great need of it. One of the first matters given important consideration by the Cuban Congress was the question of the pay of the army from the proceeds of a national loan. But there was much confusion regarding the number entitled to such pay, and the amount rightfully due the claimants. The original proposition was a total sum of about $23,000,000 which should constitute a full and final discharge of all obligations.

A commission was appointed to review and revise the army lists, and to determine the amount rightfully due the individual claimants. Gen. Maximo Gomez was appointed as the head of this commission. It can only be regarded as a national misfortune and a most serious error that the commission should have departed from the terms of the original proposal to make the sum of about $23,000,000 cover all claims in full. This was generally regarded as ample and even liberal. It had been accepted as satisfactory by the claimants themselves. The returns, as submitted by the Gomez commission, showed a gross indebtedness of about $57,000,000, based on a payment of one dollar per day to privates, and an almost extravagant payment to officers. The claims were, moreover, computed in American gold. This was utterly without justification. The terms of the original agreement involved a payment in Spanish silver, worth, at a fair estimate, seventy cents on the dollar in American gold. Upon that basis, the value of the claims would have approximated $39,000,000 in American gold. Cupidity was excited, and the idea of dividing the sum originally proposed disappeared entirely.

A national loan of $35,000,000 had been under considera

tion for many months, and taxes to meet the interest and to provide for the gradual payment of the body of the loan were imposed before the loan was made. It was also decided to use the entire proceeds of the loan for the partial payment of the soldiers' claims. On Feb. 12, 1904, the banking house of Speyer & Co. contracted for the $35,000,000 loan, the price paid being ninety and one half, the interest rate being five per cent. The proceeds of this are, at the time when this is written, in process of distribution as a partial payment, and the method of extinguishing the unadjusted balance is under consideration.

Cuba's financial position may be briefly summarized. She has paid her bills; accumulated a very considerable treasury surplus; and has incurred no national debt beyond her power of ready provision for it.

For her economic development, it may be said that there has been steady and gradual improvement. The key to this is found in a comment by Señor Rafael Montoro, Cuba's Minister to England, in an article published over his signature in Harper's Weekly for June 20, 1903. He there said: "The producing classes are striving zealously to overcome adverse conditions of the market. Throughout the country there prevails an earnest purpose to reconquer wealth despite all these adverse conditions." Cuban success in this direction is perhaps best indicated by a table of the production of raw sugar, the most important crop of the Island. Her largest crops, prior to the revolution, were those of 1894 and 1895. The output of those and the succeeding years stand as follows: