Sect. 11. Married Women Traders as Partners.-It has been said that a married woman trading in equity with her equitable separate property, may enter into partnership (Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 512); but this statement must be taken with limitations. For the normal contract of partnership is a personal contract involving a personal capacity (Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 576; 43 Am. Rep. 790), which a married woman does not have in equity or under mere separate property acts. Accordingly, it is settled that statutes securing to married women their property with the rents, profits, increase, etc., do not enable them to enter into partnership: Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23; Mayer v. Soyster, 30 Id. 403; Howard v. Stephens, 52 Miss. 239, 244; Bradford v. Johnson, 44 Tex. 381, 383; Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 576; 43 Am. Rep. 790. At common law, when a female partner married the partnership was dissolved (Bassett v. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3; Alexander v. Morgan, 31 Ohio St. 546, 550); and now she cannot be a partner if she has no capacity to trade personally (see Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St. 87, 95; Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 574, 575; 43 Am. Rep. 790), or if she is expressly prohibited by the statute enabling her to trade (see Todd v. Clapp, 118 Mass. 495, 496), or so far as she is thereby partially prohibited (see Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal. 105, 109), as she is in some states. But as she has, under statutes giving her the capacity to trade generally, the personal capacity to trade as if sole and the power to pursue all the usual methods of trade, by the weight of authority, she may under such acts, trade in partnership (Kinkead, 3 Biss. 405, 410; Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 564, 565; Francis v. Dickel, 68 Ga. 255, 258; Preusser v. Henshaw, 49 Iowa 41, 44; Westphal v. Henney, 49 Id. 542, 543; Plumer v. Lord, 5 Allen 460, 462; Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 532, 534; Newman v. Morris, 52 Miss. 402, 406; Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 13; 8 Daly 311; Bitter v. Rathman, 61 N. Y. 512, 513; Scott v. Conway, 58 Id. 619; Graff v. Kennedy, 31 Alb. L. J. 2; Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn. St. 448, 449; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 217; Horneffer v. Duress, 13 Id. 603, 605)—she may even be a secret partner: see Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 534; Scott v. Conway, 58 N. Y. 619; Bitter v. Rathman, 61 Id. 512, 513. Still in a few cases and on different grounds this capacity to be a partner has been denied: Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 389, 396; Montgomery v. Sprankle, 31 Id. 113, 115; Maghee v. Baker,

15 Id. 254, 257; Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Md. 19, 23; Cruzen v. McKaig, 57 Id. 454, 462; Carey v. Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 576; 43 Am. Rep. 790. So also as she is a feme sole in her trade, and may therein employ general or special agents, and may employ her husband as such there seems to be no reason why she should not be able, when she can be partner at all, to be the partner of her husband, and accordingly many cases hold (In re Kinkead, 3 Biss. 405, 410; Francis v. Dickel, 68 Ga. 255, 258; Newman v. Morris, 52 Miss. 402, 406; Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 13; Graff v. Kennedy, 31 Alb. L. J. 2), while others assume (see Camden v. Mullen, 29 Cal. 554, 565; Westphal v. Henney, 69 Iowa 542, 543; Parshall v. Fisher, 43 Mich. 529, 532, 534; Silveus v. Porter, 74 Penn. St. 448, 449; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 217; Horneffer v. Duress, 13 Id. 603, 604), that she can. But this has been strenuously denied, on the ground that even where a married woman may contract, she cannot, at law, without express authority, contract with her husband, and that the particular statute enables her to trade on her " separate" account: Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen 127, 129; Edwards v. Stevens, Id. 315; Plumer v. Lord, 5 Id. 460, 462; Allen v. Johnson, 48 Miss. 413, 419. See Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 389. To this it may be replied that if a wife may employ her husband as her agent, as all admit she can, it is not consistent to say that she cannot contract with him at all, and that the word "separate," in the statutes, refers to the wife's status; not to the manner in which she shall trade: Zimmerman v. Erhard, 58 How. Pr. 11, 13, 14.

In such cases as she cannot be a partner, and therefore could not be held liable as partner on a note not signed by her (Carey v Burruss, 20 W. Va. 571, 582; 43 Am. Rep. 790; Plumer v. Lord, 7 Allen 481, 485), she may, nevertheless, be liable for her individual acts: Cruzen v. McKaig, 57 Md. 454, 462; and she does not in such cases lose her property put into the firm business: Maghee v. Baker, 15 Ind. 254, 257. So, even when she cannot join a firm of which her husband is a member (Plumer v. Lord, 7 Allen 481, 484), she may, after his retirement, go in, and on a new consideration become liable for pre-existing partnership debts: see Preusser v. Henshaw, 49 Iowa 41, 44. So, though she cannot be a partner, she may jointly lease and share the profits of joint property (Allen v. Johnson, 48 Miss. 413, 419), and be bound by her husband's acts as her agent with respect thereto : Reiman v. Ham

ilton, 111 Mass. 245, 247. In a few cases, without speaking of husband and wife as partners, equity has decreed an apportionment of the profits of a business carried on by them jointly: see Glidden v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509, 522; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 513.

Sect. 12. Married Women as Corporators, Stockholders, &c.—Very nearly the same questions arise in considering a married woman's capacity to be an incorporator as those which are involved in her right to be a partner: Plummer v. Lord, 5 Allen 460, 462. Corporators enter into a mutual and personal contract, which is concluded by the act of incorporation (Taylor, Corporations, sect. 31); and therefore without personal capacity to contract a married woman could not be an incorporator. But, as business is very commonly carried on by corporations, a married woman with a general capacity to trade would, it seems, have by implication the capacity to be an incorporator. The fact that the corporation laws provide that "any person" may be an incorporator, would not give such capacity to a married woman under disabilities, for such general laws apply only to persons sui juris: see rule discussed, Md. Law Record, March 1st 1884. But a married woman may be a stockholder, holding her stock as any other chose in action; and it has been held that when her choses in action are her separate property she is liable as any other stockholder for assessments, &c.: Anderson v. Line, 14 Fed. Rep. 405, 406; The Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y.

9, 15.

It is of course difficult to state with certainty the law on so complicated a subject as that discussed in this article, and many of the points touched upon would bear much elaboration; but we have endeavored simply to collect the cases relating to the trade of married women and to give in a few words the law as it appears therein.

Baltimore.

DAVID STEWart.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

Court of Appeal.

BRUNSDEN v. HUMPHREY.

Damage to goods and injury to the person, although they have been occasioned by one and the same wrongful act, are infringements of different rights and give rise to distinct causes of action; and therefore the recovery in an action of compensation for the damage to the goods, is no bar to an action subsequently commenced for the injury to the person.

So held by BRETT, M. R., and BOWEN, L. J., Lord COLERIDGE, C. J., dissenting.

The plaintiff brought an action in a county court for damage to his cab, occasioned by the negligence of the defendant's servant, and having recovered the amount claimed, afterwards brought an action in the High Court of Justice against the defendant, claiming damages for personal injury sustained by the plaintiff through the same negligence. Held, by BRETT, M. R., and BOWEN, L. J., Lord COLERIDGE, C. J., dissenting, that the action in the high court was maintainable, and was not barred by the previous proceedings in the county court.

Judgment of the Queen's Bench Division (L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 712,) reversed. APPEAL of the plaintiff against an order of the Queen's Bench Division making absolute a rule to enter judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff, whilst he was driving his cab, came into collision with a van of the defendant through the negligence of the defendant's servant, whereby he sustained bodily injury and his cab was damaged. The plaintiff, before the present action, sued the defendant for damage to his cab in a county court, and the defendant paid into court a small sum which was accepted, and thereupon the action in the county court was discontinued. Upon these facts the Queen's Bench Division entered judgment for the defendant: (L. R., 11 Q. B. Div. 712).

Waldy, Q. C., and Crispe, for plaintiff.

Murphy, Q. C., and J. C. Hannen, for defendant.

BRETT, M. R.—This case was heard before POLLOCK, B., and LOPES, J. The plaintiff was a cabman driving in his vehicle when he was run into by the defendant's vehicle. The collision was caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant. In the case in which the present appeal is brought, the plaintiff has sued the defendant for injury done to his person. The jury have found a verdict for 3501., showing clearly that the personal injuries were serious. Before this the plaintiff had brought an action in the

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county court for damage to his cab, by which he recovered a certain amount. In this second action it was urged that the plaintiff could not succeed, because no person can sue twice for one and the same cause of action. On the other side it was contended that there were two distinct causes of action, and that there was no law to prevent two actions; that it might be sometimes oppressive to bring two actions, but that in that event the court might summarily stay one of them, and that in the present case the two actions were not oppressive. The question is whether there are two causes of action, or whether there is only one; and if there is but one cause of action the present suit is not maintainable. For the defendant, reliance has, in effect, been placed upon the maxim, interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium: and it has been contended that it enunciates an admirable rule of law. When that rule is applied to damages which are patent, it is a good rule; but where damages are afterwards developed, it is not a rule to be commended. It is a rule which sometimes produces a harsh result, and if it were now for the first time put forward, I could not assent to its being pushed to the length to which it has sometimes been carried; in fact it is never wanted except when injury, undeveloped at the time of action brought, is afterwards developed. However, the maxim exists, and it must receive a proper application. But, in order to apply it, we must often suppose what is not the case. It is to be assumed that the subsequent damage was in the contemplation of the person injured. The question, however, remains whether the cause of action is the same. In this case the injury was occasioned by the negligent driving of the defendant's servant. Suppose that by the negligent driving of the defendant's servant the van had run against the plaintiff's cab, and had injured him without doing any damage to the cab, an action would have lain, and any apparent bodily injury which the plaintiff might have sustained would be a cause of action. Suppose that the defendant's servant, by his negligent driving, had damaged the plaintiff's cab without injuring him personally; under circumstances of that kind the cause of action would be a damage to the plaintiff's property. The owner of property has a right to have it kept free from damage. The plaintiff has brought the present action on the ground that he has been injured in his person. He has the right to be unmolested in all his bodily powers. The collision with the defendant's van did not give rise to only one cause of action: