Note-Ninety-Days Clause-Interest.-If a declaration on a policy of life insurance refers to the policy without annexing a copy, and does not set up any contract inconsistent with the policy, an objection, taken when the policy is offered in evidence, that there is a variance between the policy and the declaration, cannot be maintained; Pierce v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 138 Mass.

If a declaration on a policy of life insurance, which refers to the policy, is not demurred to, it is no ground of exception to the admission of the policy in evidence, that the declaration construed in connection with the policy is ambiguous: Id.

A declaration on a policy of life insurance need not allege facts which defeat a part of the plaintiff's claim under special provisions of the policy: Id.

A policy of life insurance on the life of A. was payable on his death to his wife and children, and their assigns; and, if he survived a certain day, was payable to him: Held, that he had an assignable interest in the policy: Id.

A policy of life insurance provided that, if assigned, written notice should be given to the insurer. An assignment was made, notice was given, and the insurer acknowledged notice thereof: Held, that this did not amount to a promise, on the part of the insurer, to pay the assignee, and that he could not maintain an action on the policy in his own name : Id.

A policy of insurance, in consideration of the payment of an annual premium, insured the life of A. in a certain sum, or after the due payment of premium for two or more years, if default shall be made in the payment of any subsequent premium, for as many tenth parts of the original sum insured as there shall have been complete annual premiums paid." In the margin of the policy were words and figures denoting that one-half the annual premium was payable in cash, and one-half by note: Held, that these words and figures formed part of the policy, and that, if annual premiums were paid one-half in cash and one-half by note, "complete annual premiums" were paid: Id.

In an action at law on a policy of life insurance payable at a day named in the policy, evidence is inadmissible, in defence, to show that a different day should have been written: Id.

In an action on a policy of life insurance, payable if the person whose life is insured survives a certain day, the plaintiff can recover interest only from the date of the writ, unless in his declaration he alleges a demand before that time: Id.

If a policy of life insurance is payable ninety days after due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of the person whose life is insured, or, if he survives a certain day, is then payable to him, the ninety-days clause has no application to the latter contingency, and interest is not payable except as damages for wrongfully withholding the money: Id.

Mutual Benevolent Association-Death Assessment-Forfeiture of Membership-Notice-Sickness as an Excuse for Default-Waiver.—Ÿ. was a member of a Mutual Benevolent Association, whose object was to provide and maintain a fund for the benefit of the widows and orphans of deceased members. By one of its articles it was provided that upon the death of a member of the association, the secretary should notify each

member, and thereupon each member should "within thirty days from the date of said notice pay to the secretary the sum of one dollar and ten cents, and in case he neglect or refuse to pay the same, his name shall be erased from the roll of members, and he shall forfeit all claims upon the association; nevertheless any member may be reinstated by giving such excuse himself or through his representative, for failing to pay his assessment as may be satisfactory to the board of directors." It was further provided that "a notice directed and sent to the post-office address or to the residence of a member as recorded in the books of the secretary, shall be deemed a legal notice." On the 29th of August 1882, a notice of that date of assessments for and in respect of the death of two members, was directed and sent to the post-office address of Y., requiring him to pay said assessments within thirty days from the date of such notice. No payment or tender of the assessment was made, and Y. died two days after the expiration of the thirty days from the date of the notice. He was taken sick on the 13th of September 1882, and was for the most of the time between that date and the time of his death, in a state of delirium, and entirely incapable of attending to business. In an action against the association, brought by the widow of Y., it was held: 1st. That the obligation to pay the death assessment was personal to the member, and the payment was to be made by him as such, and in case of his default he ceased to be a member, and forfeited all claim upon the association. 2d. That the notice directed to Y. having been duly mailed on the day of its date, there was no necessity for proving its actual receipt by him. 3d. That the full thirty days having expired without payment, and the party having died two days thereafter, he was not a member at the time when he died, having by his default lost his membership and all the benefits appertaining thereto. 4th. That the fact that he was part of the time sick and wholly unable to attend to business, constituted no sufficient legal excuse for the default whereby this consequence was produced. 5th. That there was nothing in the case that could be fairly construed to operate as a waiver on the part of the association, of its right to insist upon the forfeiture under said article: Yoe v. Benjamin C. Howard Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass., 63 Md.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

False Imprisonment-Improper Motive-Lawful Warrant.--A person who has procured the arrest and imprisonment of another on a lawful warrant is not liable to an action for false imprisonment, although his object in making the complaint upon which the warrant was issued was to enforce the payment of a debt: Mullen v. Brown, 138 Mass.

MASTER AND SERVANT. See Corporation.

MECHANICS' LIEN.

What required to give a Lien on Property of a Railroad Company. -Ordinary lien laws giving to mechanics and laborers a lien on buildings, including the lot upon which they stand, or a lien upon a lot or farm or other property for work done thereon, or for materials furnished in the construction or repair of buildings, should not be interpreted as giving a lien upon the roadway, bridges, or other property of a railroad

company, that may be essential in the operation and maintenance of its road for the public purposes for which it was established: Buncombe County Commissioners v. Tommey, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.

MORTGAGE.

Account between Mortgagor and Mortgagee-Adverse Possession by Mortgagee. As between mortgagor and mortgagee, where the latter is in possession in the acknowledged character of mortgagee, the principles are plain and well defined, and are applied for the mutual benefit of both parties. But where the possession is held adversely to the mortgagor, with denial of the right of redemption, the principles of the account are quite different, and are applied with more or less rigor against the wrongdoer, according to the circumstances of the case: Booth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 63 Md.

Purchase by Mortgagee-Merger-Foreclosure of subsequent Mortgage. If the owner of land, who holds it subject to two mortgages made by his predecessors in title, conveys it, reserving an easement therein, to the first mortgagee, by a warranty deed, in which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay both mortgages and to hold the grantor harmless therefrom, the first mortgage is extinguished; a foreclosure of that mortgage by a sale under a power contained therein, is invalid; and the second mortgagee may maintain a writ of entry against the first mortgagee to foreclose the second mortgage: Kneeland v. Moore, 138 Mass.

NEGLIGENCE. See Common Carrier; Corporation.

OFFICER. See Corporation.

PARTITION.

Right to Discretion of Court.-Where a case is fairly brought within the law authorizing a partition, the right to partition is imperative, and absolutely binding upon courts of equity. They are not clothed with such discretion as that, under a given state of facts, they may grant the relief or refuse it, and yet commit no error. To invoke this equitable remedy is a matter of right, and not of mere grace: Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill.

In the event that a partition could be effected only through the instrumentality of a sale of the premises and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale among the several parties in interest, the mere fact that difficulties may arise in the adjustment of the distribution, or inconveniences, or even possible losses result from the change in the relations of the parties to the estate, by reason of a sale, will in nowise affect the absolute right to have partition. Id.

PARTNERSHIP. See Agent.

Notice of Dissolution-Evidence In an action ugainst the members of a partnership upon a promissory note, and on an account annexed for goods sold and delivered, if one of the issues is whether the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution of the partnership, a notice of such dissolution published in a newspaper is competent, in conuection with other evidence tending to show that the plaintiff saw and read the notice: Smith v. Jackman, 138 Mass.

In an action against the members of a partnership upon a promissory note, and on an account annexed for goods sold and delivered, one of the issues was whether the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution of the partnership. He testified that he had no knowledge of such dissolution until after the bringing of the action. One of the partners, who alone defended the action, was allowed to put in evidence certain bills or statements of account for goods sold and delivered to him personally by the plaintiff at various times after the cause of action had accrued. Held, that the plaintiff had no ground of exception: Id.

PATENT.

Re-issue-Delay in applying for—Decision of Patent Office- General Demurrer.-The bill set out the grant of the original letters patent and their invalidity by reason of an insufficiency or defect in the specificatien which had arisen through inadvertence, accident or mistake; their surrender and the granting of re-issued letters, after a decision by the patent office board of appeal that the delay in the application for the reissue (more than five years) had been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained, and that there was not in the renewed application any attempt to enlarge the scope of the invention beyond what was originally disclosed. On general demurrer, held that the question whether the delay had been reasonable or unreasonable was for the court to determine, that the decision of the patent office could not avail the complainant, and that no special circumstances having been shown to account for and excuse the delay the re-issue must be considered void and the bill dismissed: Wallersak v. Reihrer, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.

POSSESSION.

Adverse Possession by Fraudulent Grantor as against Grantee-Evidence-Assessment of Taxes.-If A. is entitled to a conveyance of land, and, by an agreement between A. and B., in order to defraud A.'s creditors, the land is conveyed to B., a title to the land by adverse possession of more than twenty years may be acquired by A. against B., although A. is without means to pay his debts during such possession, if B. knows that A. is holding the land adversely and under a claim of right during his possession: Elwell v. Hinckley, 138 Mass.

At the trial of a writ of entry, if the demandant relies upon a title acquired by his grantor by adverse possession, the books of the assessors of taxes of the town in which the land lies are admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing that the land was assessed to the demandant's grantor during the period of the alleged adverse possession: Id.

RAILROAD. See Agent; Common Carrier; Mechanics' Lien.
RECEIVER. See Corporation.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Separate Controversy-Contest over Ownership of Stock-The Corporation a Necessary Party-A suit in equity brought by C., a citizen of one state, against the corporation of the same state, and T., a citizen of another state, and W., to obtain a decree that C. owns shares of the stock of the corporation standing in the name of W., but sold by him to T., and that the corporation cancel on its books the shares standing

in the name of W., and issue to C. certificates therefor, cannot be removed by T. into the Circuit Court of the United States, under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 St. 479); because the corporation is an indispensable party to the suit, and is a citizen of the same state with C. Crump v. Thurber, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.

Corporations Created by the United States-Suits arising under the Laws thereof-Such corporations as the Union Pacific Railway Company and the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, created by and organized under Acts of Congress, are entitled, under the act of March 3d 1875, to remove suits brought against them in the state courts, into the United States Circuit Courts, on the ground that such suits are suits "arising under the laws of the United States:" Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, S. C. U. S. Oct., Term 1884.

Separate Controversy-Actions in Tort against several Defendants who file separate Answers.—An action for damages for the malicious prosecution of a previous action, which had been commenced by a writ of attachment brought in a state court against several defendants who separate in their answers, cannot be removed under the second clause of §2 of the act of March 3, 1875, into the United States Circuit Court by one party of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs and themselves are citizens of different states and that there is in the cause a controversy wholly between them: Pirie v. Toedt, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884. See Bank.

SUBROGATION.

UNITED STATES.

Pre-emption Land-Patent therefor-Impeachment of It is the duty of the land department, of which the secretary of the interior is the head, to determine whether land patented to a settler is of the class subject to settlement under the pre-emption laws, and his judgment as to this fact is not open to contest by a mere intruder without title, in an action at law brought by the patentee to recover possession : Ehrhardt v. Hogaboon, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.

Jurisdiction-Citizenship-Creditor's Sale-Addition as Plaintiffs of Citizens of the same State as Defendants.-A United States Court having obtained jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship of a creditor's bill, will not lose it because others are added as plaintiffs, and it does not thereafter appear that the controversy is wholly between citizens of different states. Other creditors coming in under such a bill can either become co-complainants, or appear before the master under a decree ordering a reference to prove the claims of all persons entitled to the benefit of the decree: Stewart v. Dunham, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.

WITNESS.

Prochein Ami-Husband and Wife.-A prochein ami is not a party to the suit within the meaning of the clause of the Evidence Act, which declares that where an original party to a contract or cause of action is dead, or where an executor or administrator is a party to the suit, neither party shall be admitted to testify on his own offer, or upon the call of his co-complainant or co-defendant otherwise than now by law allowed, unless a nominal party merely: Trahern v. Colburn, 63 Md.