CRIMINAL LAW.
V. Carrying weapon.
20. Not necessary to prove that pistol was loaded. State v. Wardlaw, 76. VI. Gambling.
21. Selling of pools on horse races, and keeping of rooms where such pools are sold, do not constitute offence within statute prohibiting keeping of gaming table or other place of gambling, and which declares that all games, devices and contrivances at which money or any other thing shall be bet or wagered, shall be deemed a gaming table. James v. State, 745.
VII. Larceny. See DURESS, 2.
22. Possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient to sustain conviction. It must appear that property was recently stolen; possession must be unex- plained, and in some form involve assertion of property in possessor. herd v. State, 416.
23. At common law there are three cases in which conviction for larceny may be sustained when apparent possession is in accused: 1st. Where accused has mere custody of property, as contradistinguished from possession, as in case of servants, guests and the like: 2d. Where he obtained custody and apparent possession by means of fraud, or with purpose to steal property; and 3d. Where one has acquired possession by valid contract of bailment, which is afterwards terminated by some tortious act of bailee, or otherwise, whereby possession reverts to owner, leaving custody merely with former, and he felo- niously converts property to his own use. Johnson v. People, 745.
24. Where owner intends to part both with title and possession, and pro- perty is delivered in pursuance of such intention, person receiving it cannot be convicted of larceny, although transfer was induced by fraud of latter, and with a purpose to steal it. Id.
25. To constitute manslaughter, where there is no evil intent, it is sufficient if the killing is result of reckless or foolhardy presumption, judged by standard of what would be reckless in man of ordinary prudence under same circum- stances. Rule applied where woman died from treatment administered with her consent, of one who publicly practised as physician. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 117, and note.
IX. Receiving Stolen Goods.
26. If pigeons are stolen from house in which they were confined by owner, and are found in possession of person who bought them of another about two weeks after larceny, latter may be convicted of such larceny if his possession of pigeons is not satisfactorily explained. Commonwealth v. Deegan, 544. DAMAGES. See AMENDMENT. BAILMENT, 4. COMMON CARRier, 16, 18, 25, 27. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1. CONTRACT, 5. CORPORATION, 19. EASE- MENT, 2. EQUITY, 17, 18. FORMER RECOVERY, 3. INSURANCE, 7. MA- LICIOUS PROSECUTION, 2. NEGLIGENCE, 11, 16, 40. PLEADING, 5, 6. RAILROAD, 2. TELEGRAPH, 2, 9.
1. In action for assault and battery where punitory damages are recover- able, financial condition of defendant may be shown by evidence of his re- puted wealth. Draper v. Baker, 142. See infra, 5.
2. Verdict of $1200 for assault and battery by spitting in plaintiff's face, is not so large as to induce court to believe that jury were actuated by passion, prejudice, or other improper motive. Id.
3. Measure of, for breach of contract to assign insurance policy to pur- chaser of insured property is only the amount necessary to procure policy for remainder of time it had to run. Dodd v. Jones, 34, and note.
4. Measure of, for breach of contract generally, especially in margin trans- actions. Id., note.
5. On trial of action of trespass for assault and battery, plaintiff may give in evidence pecuniary circumstances of defendant to enhance his damages, and defendant may then give counter evidence; but unless such evidence is given by plaintiff defendant has no right to introduce proof on that subject, even in mitigation of damages. Mullin v. Stangerberg, 544.
6. For death of any person are limited by statute to such as arise from pecuniary injury to widow and next of kin. Injury received by some of next of kin, by dissolution of partnership relation between them and deceased, is not within statute. Injury claimed to arise by deprivation of such services and counsel as father might probably give to his children, must be limited to such services and counsel, as would be of pecuniary advantage. Demarest v. Little, 746.
7. Where injury claimed is deprivation of probability of receiving such probable accumulations as deceased might have made if he had continued in life, income derivable from funds invested, and which next of kin have received, should not be taken into account, and due weight must be given to contingencies which might diminish probable accumulations or divert them from next of kin. Id.
8. In action of trespass against railroad for running cars over ground, title to which, owing to failure to comply with certain statutory requisites, never vested in railroad, held, that plaintiff should be confined to damages caused by running cars over the ground. Railroad v. Boyd, 797.
DEATH. See ACTION, 2, 3.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. EXEMPTION. PAYMENT, 1.
See ACTION, 15. ASSIGNMENT, 11. ESCAPE. SALE, 8, 9.
1. Property sold conditionally and delivered, without legal record of lien, passes to assignee of vendee under Vermont insolvent law. Collender Co. v. Marshall, 620.
2. Contract by which vendee of billiard tables agrees to pay in monthly instalments in one year entire value of tables, and if he so paid property was to be his, and if not, vendor's, is a conditional sale and not a lease. Id.
3. Where one in Vermont orders goods from party in New York on certain terms, as to payment, &c., but they are shipped, consigned to vendor, and accepted on different terms, Held, that contract was made in Vermont. Id. 4. Purchaser of real estate at execution sale may in equity avoid conveyances previously made by judgment-debtor in fraud of his creditors. Belcher v. Arnold, 416.
5. Right to recover property conveyed in fraud of creditors by debtor subse- quently adjudicated bankrupt, is vested in assignee alone, and cannot be exer- cised by creditors in case of assignee's failure to bring action within time limited. McCartin v. Perry, 416.
6. Complainant recovered judgment at law against defendant's brother for false imprisonment, and afterwards filed creditor's bill to set aside, as fraudu- lent, two conveyances of land by brother to defendant. Evidence showed that lands in fact belonged to defendant, although legal title had been in name of brother. Held, that there was, against defendant, no ground of estoppel. Lillis v. Gallagher, 416.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See EQUITY, 19, 20. EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
DEED. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT. GIFT, 3. INFANT, 2, 3. NOTICE, 2. TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 3.
1. Mother was induced by son, while she was in feeble state of mind, to execute deed to him for her land, including her homestead, under assurance and belief that it would not take effect until recorded, and grantee agreed not to procure same to be recorded during life of grantor. Held, deed would not take effect as to grantee, and grantor might destroy same at pleasure. Sands v. Sands, 544.
2. B., being owner in fee of tract of land conveyed to his mother an undi- vided third part of it during her widowhood. Subsequently B. and his wife conveyed same land to W. by deed, granting clause of which states that gran- tors conveyed unto W. "all their estate," &c., in "the following described parts of tracts or parcels of land. *** It is understood by the parties herein mentioned, that the interest herein conveyed is the two-thirds of the above VOL. XXXIII-104
described land." Held, that this deed only conveyed to W. a two-thirds inter est in the land described. Zittle v. Weller, 747.
3. Rule that of two contradictory or repugnant clauses in deed first shall prevail, docs not apply to supposed contradiction between parts of same clause. Id.
DELIVERY. See BAILMENT, 1, 2, 4. GIFT.
DEMURRER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 18. PLEADING, 5, 6.
1. At common law, bastard has no right of inheritance. In Illinois, bastard may, under statute, inherit from its mother, but not from its father, unless he shall have married the mother and acknowledge child as his own. Stoltz v.
2. Descent and heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by laws of country within which property is actually situated. Id.
DOMICILE. See ATTACHMENT, 1. HUSBAND and Wife, 3, 11, 14. PArent AND CHILD, 2.
1. Presence and intention to remain in place only while a student, do not confer domicile. Presumption is against student's right to vote. Sanders v. Getchel, 76.
2. Grandfather or grandmother of infant, when next of kin, is guardian by nature of such infant; and infants having domicile in one state, who after death of parents take up residence at home of paternal grandmother and next of kin in another state, acquire her domicile. Lamar v. Micou, 481.
DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. See GIFT, 1, 2.
1. Note and mortgage given by mother to son's employer, from whom he had embezzled, with protection of son from exposure and prosecution as controlling motive, will be cancelled. Foley v. Greene, 416.
2. No action can be maintained upon promissory note, given by person under arrest on complaint for larceny of property, exceeding in value $100, to owner of property alleged to have been stolen, under agreement that complaint shall be placed on file, plaintiff having received note with notice of circumstances; question of guilt or innocence of accused not open in such action. Gorham v. Keyes, 482.
1. Burden of proof is on defendant who sets up prescriptive right to have water flow on plaintiff's land from roof of his artificial structure; not sufficient to show that structure had been in same condition for more than twenty years. Hooten v. Barnard, 76.
2. Plaintiff proving an invasion of his rights by defendant is entitled to at least nominal damages. Id.
EJECTMENT. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 11. TRESPASS, 2. UNITED STATES, 2.
1. Where land is forfeited to state for non-payment of taxes, and state fails to convey title to purchaser for reason of illegality in its sale, original owner has better title than purchaser. Chandler v. Wilson, 798.
2. Person having for over twenty years a recorded deed of township of mainly wild land, during the time lumbering on some portions of it and cul- tivating others, does not thereby divest true owner of his title of certain lots within township, such lots not having been occupied during that period of time. Id.
3. Person who obtains title of three of five heirs of owner of land, deceased, can recover only three undivided fifths of the land of a person in possession, although latter person does not occupy under other heirs. Id.
ELECTIONS. See DOMICILE, 1.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, III. CORPORATION, 23. EQUITY. See ASSIGNMENT, 7, 8. BANK, 3. BILLS AND NOTES, 19. CORPO- RATION, 9, 10, 14-16, 28. ERRORS AND APPEALS, 3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 5. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 4, 12. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20, 25, 27. NOTICE, 4. PARENT AND CHILD, 3. PARTITION, 2. PART- NERSHIP, 10, 14. RAILROAD, 5-7. SALE, 5. SET OFF, 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
1. Dismissal of bill on demurrer carries cross-bill with it. Johnamensen v. Tauer, 143.
2. Where person seeks to reform instrument on ground of mistake, the mis- take and exact form intention of parties requires instrument to assume, must be indubitably shown. Keedy v. Nally, 798.
3. The application for relief must be made with due diligence, and time runs from discovery of mistake. Id.
4. Will not interfere to remove cloud upon title in favor of party out of possession, claiming under legal title, against antagonist who is in possession under written title. Weaver v. Arnold, 682.
5. Motion by defendant in bill, to set aside interlocutory decrec, and for leave to file new answer, is addressed to discretion of court, with which higher court will not interfere, unless discretion has been abused. Schmidt v. Braley, 482. 6. Proper practice in case defendant desires to file new answer, is to prepare and submit it with motion for leave to file. Id.
7. In action to reform contract and for relief thereunder, after same is reformed, court may specifically enforce same, or give adequate compensation for its non-performance. Railroad v. Steinfield, 482.
8. On trial of action to reform and enforce or rescind written contract, there may be given in evidence the original writing made by same parties, and also the subsequent acts done or procured to be done by party charged with fraud, and which tend to prove fraud or mistake. Id.
9. On such trial it is error to order contract set aside if party complaining neither pays back nor offers to return money received by him under con- tract. Id.
10. By practice of United States Supreme Court, decree pro confesso is not a decree as, of course, according to prayer of bill, nor merely such as complainant chooses to make it, but is made according to what is proper to be decreed upon statements of bill assumed to be true. Thompson v. Wooster, 417.
11. Defendants cannot allege anything in derogation of such decree, uure- voked, or question its correctness on appeal, unless on face of bill it appears manifest that it was improperly granted. Id.
12. Delay of fourteen years in application for re-issue of patent is strongly presumed to be unreasonable, but court cannot say, as matter of law, that it is not susceptible of explanation; and this defence cannot be set up after decree pro confesso. Id.
13. Where trustees of corporation gave bond, secured by mortgage on corpo- rate property, which, in strict legal effect, bound them individually, court of equity will enjoin action at law against them thereon, if it appears that there was no intention on their part to become personally liable. Maps v. Cooper, 343. 14. Policy of insurauce issued in name of agent of owner of vessel, instead of in name of principal, through mistake of insurance company's agent in pre- paring application, without any representation or mistake of owner or applicant, may be rectified after loss of vessel, although agent signed application with his own name "for applicant." Hill v. Insurance Co., 416.
15. After decree disposing of issues and in accordance with prayer of bill, it is not competent for one of parties without service of new process or appear- ance, to institute further proceedings on new issues and for new objects, although connected with subject-matter of original litigation, by merely giving new proceedings title of original cause. Smith v. Woolfolk, 682.
16. If one complainant can, under any circumstances, have decree against another upon supplemental or amended bill, it must be upon notice to latter. Id. 17. Court of, has no inherent power to ascertain damages by reason of tor-
tious acts unattended by profit to wrongdoer. There must be some joint in- terest of parties in the property for court of equity to assess the damages. In case of trespass where no such relation exists equity will follow the rule of law as to the damages. Atlantic Co. v. Maryland Co., 211.
18. The right to maintain action of quare clausum fregit exists in Maryland, whether defendant committed the trespass unwillingly or wilfully. If adjoining owner has made mistake as to his title or boundaries in mining coal, lowest measure of damages is value of coal immediately upon conversion, without abatement of cost of severance. Equity cannot change this measure. Id.
19. It appearing that two sons had worked their father's farms, under agree- ment that they should do so until they had accumulated for him a fund of $12,000, and then they should have the farms free of rent during his life, and that specified sum had been gathered about a year before father's death, and thereafter sons had enjoyed use of farms free until father died; Held, that sons had no reason to complain, on appeal, that chancellor had made too small an allowance to them for services rendered under that contract. Larison v. Pol- hemus, 343.
20. Parties who in pleadings and proofs, have insisted that they were not accountable to him for rental value of land of which ancestor died seised, because they were in possession as equitable owners, cannot, at hearing, shift their ground, and claim that they were tenants of ancestor's widow, who might have been entitled to hold the land until her dower was assigned, but who has disclaimed such right. Id.
21. Favorite son induced mother to make conveyance of all her estate to him, upon assurance that it would not take effect in her lifetime. Mother was 73 and greatly weakened in body and mind from disease and sickness, so as to be incapable of transacting business, and proof showed deed was not intended by her to have effect before her death, but was handed to son to be placed with her papers, and upon her recovery she destroyed deed. Held, that trial court erred in decreeing that mother execute another deed in place of one destroyed, and in dismissing her cross-bill to have conveyance made set aside. Sands v. Sands, 544.
22. Statements by defendant who was subsequently arrested on a ne exeat, made to complainant's lawyer, that if suits should be begun against him, and he should be likely to get the worst of it, or if any order should be made against him by any court, his lawyer would find it out beforehand and would let him know, so that he could and would leave the state before they could do anything with him, accompanied by other statements, that complainant and her father were poor, and that he would law them both to death if they attempted any suits against him, and that he had put all his property out of his hands, but still had the benefit of it, are sufficient, on application for discharge, to hold him in cus- tody under the ne exeat. Cary v. Cary, 417.
See ADMIRALTY, 2. PRACTICE, 1, 2.
CRIMINAL LAW, 15. INFANT, 7.
1. Opinion of lower court not part of record in United States Supreme Court. England v. Gebhard, 211.
2. Supreme Court United States, upon dismissing writ of error for want of jurisdiction, can adjudge to defendant in error costs incident to motion to dis- miss, but no others. Bradstreet Co. v. Higgins, 482.
3. Decrees in favor of complainants in creditor's bill, for certain sums of money, are several, and one whose decree is for less than $5000 cannot appeal to Supreme Court United States. Stewart v. Dunham, 682.
4. Judgment of State Supreme Court was, that judgment of State District Court be reversed with costs, with directions to County Court to enter judgment upon findings for plaintiff as prayed for in his complaint. Held, final for pur- poses of writ of error to United States Supreme Court. Mower v. Fletcher, 417. ESCAPE.
1. Ancient rule that debtor in execution, by voluntary escape became dis- charged both from imprisonment and debt, leaving creditor to look to sheriff alone for debt, is no longer in force, and upon such escape he may be re-arrested and imprisoned. People v. Hanchett, 274.
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