SLANDER AND LIBEL.

tains thereto is legitimate subject for discussion and comment, which must, how-
ever, be confined to truth, or what, in good faith and upon probable cause, is
believed to be true. Expresss Co. v. Copeland, 640, and note.

2. In suits for libel, when defendant has asserted several inconsistent pleas in
his answer, inter alia, one justifying by asserting truth of alleged libellous matter,
failure to establish such plea is not to be taken as tending to establish malice,
and to aggravate injury done defendant.
Id.

3. In action of slander petition charged defendant with having spoken certain
false, malicious, and defamatory words concerning plaintiff, while giving his
testimony before court having jurisdiction of subject-matter then on trial, in
answer to interrogatories put to him. Upon demurrer, held, 1st. That court will
presume, in absence of averment to contrary, that answers of witness were
within scope of inquiry pertinent to issue on trial, and that they were believed
by witness to be true. 24. That upon statements of petition and presumptions
arising therefrom, witness was absolutely privileged. Liles v. Gaston, 351.

4. Certain citizens presented to their town council request that K. might be
removed from office of constable because, "firstly, said K. is a man utterly devoid
of principle, and uses his office more for the purpose of wreaking his personal
spite than for the peace and harmony of the community; secondly, said K. is
wholly ignorant of the duties of his office; thirdly, said K. has at various times
heretofore maliciously and wickedly assaulted and arrested sundry persons who
were entirely innocent of the charges against them." Held, that statements
were not such as, if proved untrue, to imply actual malice. Kent v. Borgartz,

683.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 7, 8.

1. When, on decree for, defendant is in contempt for refusal to perform,
court may establish contract as if it had been executed, and enjoin and restrain
defendant from denying its execution and delivery. Wharton v. Stoutenburgh,

351.

2. Such decree may be without notice, but defendant has right of appeal. Id.
3. Decreed against vendor's sole devisee in case of parol contract for sale of
land, when vendee, with assent of vendor, took open, actual possession of
premises in pursuance of agreement, made permanent erections thereon, promptly
paid taxes assessed thereon to him by direction of vendor and substantially per-
formed his agreement. Woodbury v. Gardiner, 804.

STATUTE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 10, 29, 32. EVIDENCE, 22.

1. May be repealed by implication by subsequent act covering whole ground,
Bracker v. Smith, 422.

2. In construing statute, punctuation may aid, but does not control, unless
other means fail, and may be changed or disregarded. Albright v. Payne, 351.
3. It is duty of courts to take judicial cognisance of public local laws,
within sphere of their operation, equally with public general laws. Slyner v.
Maryland, 351.

4. " May means "shall" wherever rights of public or third persons
depend upon exercise of power, or performance of duty to which it refers.
James v. Dexter, 624.

STOCK. See CORPORATION, 1, 2, 11, 14-17, 29. TAX AND TAXATION, 2, 3.
STREET. See ACTION, 16, 17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19-21.

ETC. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4. NEGLIGence, 9, 10.

SUBROGATION. See BANK, 3. MORTGAGE, 19.

HIGHWAYS,

1. Where land owner, to save his land, pays note secured by deed of trust
executed by former owner, upon which he is not legally liable, he is subrogated
to rights of holder as against maker. Allen v. Dermott, 216.

2. Rule that where one of two joint sureties holds collateral other is entitled
to share in it, does not apply where sureties are on separate bonds to secure
faithful discharge of principal's duty in different capacities, first as guardian
of insane ward, and then on ward's death, as administrator of her estate,
when collateral was not given as security for signing bond, but for signing as
surety certain bank-notes; although after it was claimed that principal was

SUBROGATION.

in default, sureties entered into written agreement to join in defence and share
equally in liability; and defendant realized more out of collaterals than he was
compelled to pay on said notes. Sowers v. Johnson, 751.

SUNDAY. See COMMON CARRIER, 24, 25. HIGHWAYS, ETC., 5.

1. Contracts made on Sunday are not void on moral grounds, but because
of the penalty inflicted by statute. Swann v. Swann, 378, and note.

2. When by laws of state, large class of citizens may lawfully labor, etc.,
on Sunday, it is not, in legal sense, against public policy of such state, nor
shocking to moral sense of its people, for its courts to enforce contract made
on that day in another state, and valid by law of that state. Id.

3. Such contract will be enforced by courts of state, by laws of which it
would be void.

Id.

4. The only admissible evidence of public policy of state are its constitu-
tion, laws and judicial decisions. Id.

5. Publication of ordinances with respect to street improvement, in news-
paper of general circulation, in accordance with statute, is valid, although
such newspaper is only published on Sunday. Hastings v. City, 352.

6. Contract of sale made on Sunday is void; but parties may, on subse-
quent week day, affirm or adopt its terms, as by payment and receipt of
purchase-money, and so become bound by them. Demand of payment on
week day would compel purchaser to adopt contract or insist on its invalidity.
McKinney v. Denby, 422.

SURETY. See GUARANTY, 1. INTEREST, 1. MORTGAGE, 6. SUBROGATION,
2. USURY, 3.

1. Extension for definite time given on principal note, to which the note on
which sureties are liable is collateral, without their consent, discharges them.
Slagle v. Pow, 624.

2. Of receiver in chancery concluded in suit at law on bond, by amount
found due on account taken in chancery, he having by due notice had oppor-
tunity to intervene in taking of such account. Ball v. Chancellor, 687.

3. On official bond of city clerk, who by city charter is also ex officio register
of licenses of city, liable for embezzlement by him of license fees. Van Valken-
bergh v. Mayor, 687.

4. Orators were sureties on note, and defendant payee. Principal attempted
to induce payee to accept his own note secured by mortgage on lot of land
owned by him in lieu of said note; and payee took mortgage into his possession,
and agreed to exchange, if on examination he should find title clear of encum-
brance. On being informed by town clerk that there was undischarged mort-
gage on land, he refused to exchange, and returned mortgage to principal,
although surety requested him to hold it. It turned out afterwards that land was
clear. Held, that surety was not released. Adams v. Dutton, 751.

ment.

5. Wise needed money. Willard agreed to endorse his note to S. for $2700,
at four months, if Wise and wife would make to him their note for $3000, at
four months, secured by mortgage on wife's land; he to hold and use said
mortgage to protect himself against loss and expense because of said endorse-
Neither note was paid at maturity. Mortgage note was never extended,
but other note was renewed by agreement of parties to it for valuable consider-
ation. It remained unpaid, and Willard sued Wise and wife on mortgage note.
She set up extension of $2700 note as release of her property. Held, as Wil-
lard made no extension of mortgage note, he did not lose his right to enforce
mortgage. Wise v. Willard, 624.

TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 14, 15, 22, 23, 27,
28, 30, 33. CORPORATION, 20. EJECTMENT, 1. INJUNCTION, 3. MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATION, 1, 2, 15. NATIONAL BANK. POSSESSION, 3.

1. Exemption from, granted to railroad, is personal privilege, incapable of
transfer, and does not pass to purchaser of road under mortgage. Lost in this
case by consolidation. Railroad Co. v. Berry, 422.

2. Under Vermont statute stock of non-resident stockholders of corporation
located in that state may be legally set in list of town in which corporation has

TAX AND TAXATION.

its principal place of business; and corporation compelled by mandamus to pay
taxes assessed upon such stock. St. Albans v. Nat. Car Co., 624.

3. Statute authorizing such taxation, and allowing corporation to deduct
taxes thus paid from dividends, is constitutional. Id.

4. When charter is taken subject to future legislation, it may be modified not
only by special amendments, but also by general law. Id.

5. Only those individuals who can use city sewers should be specially taxed
for their construction or maintenance, and each in proportion to the benefits he
might individually receive. Gilmore v. Hertig, 279.

6. In such cases, before special taxes can be made a fixed and permanent
charge upon property of such individuals, they must have notice, with oppor-
tunity to contest validity and fairness of such taxes; but notice need not be
personally served or given before taxes are levied, nor need the proceeding be
judicial. Id.

TELEGRAPH. See CONTRACT, 2, 3.

1. Company liable for loss naturally following failure to transmit message
promptly and correctly, although it was in cipher or otherwise unintelligible.
Hart v. Telegraph Co., 320, and note. But see same case, 604.

2. Stipulation in telegraph blank that company shall not be liable for mis-
takes or delays in transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any unre-
peated message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise,
beyond amount received for sending same, is void for want of consideration.
ld. Reversed, 604. See also Clement v. Telegraph Co., 328, and note.

3. Company cannot stipulate against liability for its own negligence; it is
exempt only for errors arising from causes beyond its control, and burden
of showing such exemption rests upon it. Hart v. Telegraph Co., 320, and
note. Reversed, 604.

4. Although telegraph blank is not used, if sender is aware of company's
conditions, he is bound thereby. Clement v. Telegraph Co., 328, and note.

5. In suit for damages for not delivering cable message within reasonable
time, copy message written by operator at point of destination and eventually
delivered, was admissible, without producing original, there being no claim that
message delivered differed from what was sent. Tel. Co. v. Fatman, 149.

6. Where ship broker, whose office was near that of telegraph company, had
sent other messages by cable through such company, and cipher message from
Liverpool was sent to him, there was enough to put company on notice that it
was a matter of important commercial business, and required reasonable and
ordinary despatch in delivery; and party injured by failure to use such despatch
would not be limited to nominal damages.

Id.

7. Telegraph companies and common carriers are not identical as regards
notice, or notice of value of despatch. Id.

8. If company receives cipher despatch, and undertakes to deliver it for
money paid, it is their duty to make such delivery within reasonable time; where
message by cable was received at 10.24 and not delivered until 11.55 to office,
within five minutes walk, jury were warranted in finding unreasonable delay.
Id.

9. Where by reason of failure to deliver message, ship broker, to whom mes-
sage was directed, lost contract, recovery of his commissions was proper.
ld.

1. Is a common carrier and must furnish equal facilities to all; may be com-
pelled so to do by mandamus. State v. Telephone Co., 262.

2. Having removed telephone because of a disputed bill which subscriber
refused to pay, company cannot afterwards, on that account, refuse to admit
alleged delinquent as subscriber.

Id.

3. A., Massachusetts corporation, and owner of patent on telephone, licensed
B., Missouri corporation, to do telephone business of St. Louis, upon condition
that B. should not connect with any telegraph company unless specially author-
ized by A. A. permitted B. to establish connection with Western Union Tele-
graph Co.
Thereafter B. &. O. Tel. Co. applied for mandamus to compel B.

TELEPHONE.

to permit telephonic communication between it and petitioner. made a party. Held, that petitioner was entitled to relief asked. v. Bell Co., 573, and note.

TENANTS IN COMMON. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3, 4.

A. was not B. & O. Co.

1. One tenant in common is not entitled to recover from his co-tenant contribution in respect of repairs, although reasonable and necessary, done to the common property. Proper remedy is by partition suit, in which court will take into account all proper expenditure upon the property. Leigh v. Dickeson, 499,

and note.

2. Defendant was assignee of lease granted by plaintiff of undivided threefourths of certain premises to which plaintiff was entitled as tenant in common with another. During lease the defendant purchased the one-fourth interest of plaintiff's co-tenant. On expiration of lease defendant continued in occupation of above three-fourths as tenant at sufferance to plaintiff. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover in respect of use and occupation by defendant of undivided three-fourths. Id.

TORT. See ACTION, 16.
TUTIONAL LAW, 32.

ASSIGNMENT, 1. CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1. CONSTICORPORATION, 3, 21, 27. FORMER RECOVERY, 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 28. PLEADING, 5, 6. SET-OFF, 2.

1. Any one owning or keeping an animal that he knows to be of ferocious disposition, accustomed to attack or bite mankind, is bound to restrain such animal at his peril. Twigg v. Ryland, 191, and note.

2. Allowing dog to be kept on his premises does not render owner liable for injuries inflicted by dog away from premises, if such owner did not own or have control of dog. Id.

3. To charge defendant he must be shown to have knowledge that the animal is inclined to do the particular kind of mischief that has been done. Onus is on plaintiff to prove knowledge of vicious propensities if animal be of domestic nature, but otherwise if it is of a wild nature. Id.

4. Knowledge of servant or wife is not knowledge of owner or keeper, unless it be a servant who has general charge of the animal. Id.

5. J., who was injured by negligence of defendant railroad company, assigned his claim for damages to V., who executed agreement in which, in consideration of the assignment, he agreed to dispose of amount realized on claim as follows: To retain for himself $50 and his advances; next, to pay the fees of attorneys and agents employed to prosecute said claim, and to pay the balance to J. Held, that the cause of action was assignable; that assignment and agreement did not constitute barratry, champerty or maintenance; and that V. was entitled to maintain the action in his own name. Vimont v. Railway Co., 724, and note. See also Gates v. Railroad, 743.

6. In such action, even if it should appear that assignment was colorable and fraudulent, assignor need not be made party to action.

TRADE. See CONTRACT, 7.

TREATY. See INTERNATIONAL LAW.

TRESPASS. See ACTION, 1.

Id.

DAMAGES, 8. EQUITY, 17. FIXTURES, 2.

NEGLIGENCE, 38. TROVER, 5, 6.

1. Landlord cannot maintain, for injury to premises let done by tenant during tenancy. His remedy is trespass on the case. Carroll v. Rigney, 804.

2. Entry upon premises by railway company and construction of railroad over same, which is no injury to inheritance, under verbal license of life tenant, is not a trespass or unlawful entry. Remainderman cannot bring trespass or ejectment. Railroad v. Goodwin, 280.

1. In action for personal injuries court may at trial direct plaintiff to submit to personal examination by defendants' physicians. White v. Railroad Co., 150. 2. Jury are to find what words were used and their meaning, when oral bargain is made. But court may inform jury what interpretations of language used would be permissible. Connor v. Giles, 80.

TRIAL.

3. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence to take case to jury. Connor v. Giles, 80.

4. Instruction authorizing jury, in determining issue, to infer what was the fact from the evidence," or from such personal knowledge as you may have in relation to matters of this kind," is erroneous. Douglass v. Trask, 804.

5. Sealed verdict is not final but within control of jury until actually rendered in court and recorded, and up to that time any juryman may withdraw his consent. It should be presented by full jury in open court, so that jury may be polted. Bishop v. Mugler, 280.

6. It is in discretion of court to limit time to be occupied by counsel in addressing jury, and unless discretion is so exercised as practically to deny to accused constitutional right to have assistance of counsel, it is not error. Sullivan v. State, 687.

TROVER. See BAILMENT, 4, 5. BANKRUPTCY. BILL OF LADING. SALE, 5. 1. Title to property does not pass when possession is obtained by fraud. McCrillis v. Allen, 752.

2. Refusal to deliver prima facie evidence of conversion. Singer Co. v. King, 48, and note. See also, State v. Stevenson, 80.

3. Bailee or servant entitled to reasonable time to ascertain ownership; but his acting on order of principal and having no personal interest, will not further protect him. Id.

4. Bees are animals feræ naturæ, and until reclaimed are owned ratione soli. Rexroth v. Coon, 687.

5. Trespasser obtaining possession of animals feræ naturæ, gains no title. Id.

6. A., without B.'s permission, put upon tree on B.'s land empty box for bees to hive in. Box remained there more than two years, when C. took box down, took out swarm of bees and replaced box. A., after demand upon C., brought trover for value of bees, honey and honey-comb. Held, that action could not be maintained. Id.

CORPORA

TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See ACTION, 10. ASSIGNMENT, 10.
TION, 15.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1. GUARANTY, 2. POWER.
RAILROAD, 6, 7. WILL, 7, 8.

1. Orphans' Court has power to open decree settling intermediate account of trustees, in which it appears that commissions were allowed in excess of sum fixed by statute. Jackson v. Reynolds, 352.

2. When trust property is to be managed according to "best judgment" of trustees, their discretion and not that of the court has been confided in; court can only interfere when it is not exercised in good faith. Veazie v. Forsaith, 80. 3. S., wife of B., joined with him in deed to H. of land of B., in trust for use of S. during life, and at any time to convey to such person as S. might request in writing, with written consent of B. Afterwards B. made deed of land to W., in which H. did not join, and in which B. was only grantor, and S. was not described as party, but which was signed, sealed and acknowledged by S. Held, that this deed did not convey legal title, and was not made in execution of power reserved to S. Batchelor v. Brereton, 150.

4. EMPLOYEES AS FIDUCIARIES OF THEIR EMPLOYERS, 425.

ULTRA VIRES. See CORPORATION, 3.

UNDUE INFLUENCE. See EQUITY, 21.

WILL, 4.

UNITED STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 26. NEGOTIABLE INSTRU

MENT.

1. Value of foreign coins, as ascertained by director of mint, and proclaimed by secretary of treasury, on January 1st in each year, in accordance with Sect. 3564 Rev. Stat. U. S., is conclusive upon custom-house officers and importers. Hadden v. Merritt, 688.

2. It is duty of land department, of which secretary of interior is head, to determine whether land patented to settler is of class subject to settlement under pre-emption laws, and his judgment is not open to contest by mere intruder without title, in action at law brought by patentee to recover possession. Ehrhardt v. Hogaboon, 550.