to interfere with him. Leary, Strenging and the appellant and other witnesses to the assault thereupon went to the station house, whereupon Leary made and had entered on the blotter a charge against Strenging of disorderly conduct, and a like charge against appellant for interfering with him as an officer and advising the prisoner to resist arrest and for using threatening language towards him, and then had them both locked in cells and their witnesses driven from the station house. Later in the day Leary arraigned them before the magistrate and verified before him a formal complaint charging appellant with having been guilty of insulting and abusive language with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and whereby a breach of the peace might be occasioned, and with having interfered with him while he had a prisoner in his custody. The appellant pleaded not guilty and was placed on trial. Leary also verified a formal complaint against Strenging and both defendants were placed on trial together without objection. The testimony of Leary and the defendant was then taken. Part of the testimony has already been stated. Leary further testified that he informed the appellant, when the latter remonstrated with him, that he was an officer and says that appellant stated that he intended to place him under arrest for slapping the peddler, and that appellant interfered with him by causing a crowd to collect, blocking the sidewalk, and then attempting to place him under arrest.

It is quite evident that Leary did not properly disclose his identity or act properly in attempting to place Strenging under arrest, for he admits that while they were on the way to the station house the appellant or Strenging called a traffic policeman and that he thought the policeman did not recognize him and that he did not inform the officer who he was. There is no evidence that the appellant was guilty of any improper conduct or that he in any manner interfered with Leary in the performance of his duty as an officer. The conduct of Leary

at the time did not indicate that he was an officer or who he was, or that he had placed or was attempting to place Strenging under The appellant merely did what any citizen had a right to do, namely, remonstrated against an apparently unwarranted assault.

arrest.

The only statutory provisions which it is claimed warranted the conviction of the appellant are sections 1458 and 1459 of the Consolidation Act (Laws of 1882, ch. 410). Those provisions define disorderly conduct that tends to a breach of the peace, as threatening, abusive or insulting behavior in a thoroughfare or public place with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned; and before a conviction is authorized the magistrate must find that the accused has been guilty of disorderly conduct and that it tended to a breach of the peace. (People v. Mansi, 129 App. Div. 386, 23 N. Y. Crim. 126; Cohen v. Warden of Workhouse, 150 N. Y. Supp. 596.) The officer did not attempt to place the appellant under arrest on the street and it is evident that the charge made against him at the station house was an afterthought.

The appellant in his points quotes from the brief filed in behalf of the district attorney on the hearing of the appeal in the Court of General Sessions, to the effect that in the opinion of the district attorney the evidence did not sustain the charge against the appellant and that it was, therefore, respectfully suggested that his conviction be reversed. It is evident that the magistrate did not believe that the officer disclosed his identity, for the record shows that in suspending sentence he stated that he believed that the appellant did not know that Leary was a police officer.

The appellant should have been discharged by the magistrate and his conviction should have been reversed by the Court of General Sessions.

It follows that the conviction should be reversed and the defendant discharged.

CLARKE, P. J., PAGE, SHEARN and MERRELL, JJ., concurred.

Judgment reversed and defendant discharged. Order to be settled on notice.

ATTORNEYS-PRACTICE AT LAW IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 270 OF PENAL LAW -NOTARY DOES NOT VIOLATE STATUTE BY DRAWING CONVEYANCES, BILLS OF SALE, ETC.

A notary public cannot be punished under section 280 of the Penal Law for taking pay for drawing up ordinary conveyances, mortgages, bills of sale and even wills at charges similar in amount to those customarily charged by notaries.

Said statute refers primarily to appearing in courts of record and to such appearances in courts not of record in New York city.

JAYCOX, J., dissented.

APPEAL by the defendant, Henry Alfani, from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, Part II, rendered against him on the 3d day of May, 1918, convicting him of practising or appearing as an attorney at law, without being admitted or registered, in violation of section 270 of the Penal Law.

Sentence, however, was suspended.

The information charged as follows:

"The defendant, on December 27, 1917, and for a long time prior thereto, in the county of Kings, held himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law and assumed to be an attorney and counselor at law and assumed, used and advertised the title of lawyer and attorney and counselor at law, and attorney at law and counselor at law and attorney and counselor in such a manner as to convey the impression that he is a legal practitioner of law, and advertised that he owned,

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conducted and maintained a law office, and office for the practice of law, without being first duly and regularly admitted and licensed to practice law in the courts of record of this State, and without having taken the constitutional oath, and without having subscribed and taken the oath or affirmation required by section four hundred and sixty-eight of the Judiciary Law, and filed the same in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, as required by said section." The testimony of one Gallo, an investigator of the State Industrial Commission, showed that a sign on defendant's office at 475 Park avenue had the words: "Redaction of all Legal Papers." The photograph of the entire sign described appellant as an insurance agent, real estate operator, and notary public.

Mr. Gallo, who gave the name of Lecas, personated an owner of a soda water stand. The other detective, one Geannelis, passed for the buyer of such stand. They called at defendant's office on December 27, 1917. Gallo proceeded to give Alfani details, from which Alfani drew a bill of sale, with a chattel mortgage back. Geannelis likewise signed and verified an affidavit that there were no liens on the articles mortgaged. Gallo paid for drawing these papers four dollars. Some conflict of testimony appears about a mention of future difficulties. Gallo said he had asked appellant whether in case of trouble he could come back for legal advice, and that Alfani said, "Yes." Alfani's version was that Gallo said, Suppose this man will not pay me; what should I do?' 'Well,' I said, then you go to the marshal or you go to a lawyer and then he will tell you what to do." " Alfani proved that since 1888 he had been a notary public; that he lived in the house over his office, which was in the basement. He admitted drawing the papers. sign or cards never had the word "lawyer." He said the word "redaction" (no doubt as used on his sign) signified the drawing of legal papers.

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His