When his Excellency the Baron de Perron communicated to the Undersigned, on the 6th instant, the contemplated measures of the Sardinian Government, the latter at once expressed to his Excellency the various reasons which in his opinion rendered the course which the Cabinet of Turin was inclined to follow both dangerous and impolitic.

The Undersigned did not for a moment attempt to excuse the conduct of the Austrian General in withholding, contrary to the positive stipulations of the armistice of the 9th August, the Sardinian artillery and stores, for such conduct was evidently contrary to all principle of good faith, and could not therefore be defended by any justifiable argument, but he pointed out to the attention and consideration of his Excellency the Baron de Perron, that the course which he and his colleagues were about to follow, might easily give the impression that Sardinia had for a second time given rise to the calamities of war; that it would seriously impede if not altogether destroy the action of the mediating Powers; that if war resulted from the step which they were about to take, and that they had to trust, as might possibly be the case, to their own resources only for a successful conduct and termination of it, they might again find that their strength was unequal to the task, and that they had involved their country in difficulties from which under such circumstances it would not be easy either for them or their friends to extricate her; that proof had already been given of the little reliance that could be placed upon the energy of the rest of the Italians to assist in accomplishing their own independence, though he did not dispute the existence of the hatred felt throughout Italy to Austrian rule, which kept up a state of ferment in the country though it did not quite assume that character of strong determination necessary to secure success without the aid of foreign force; and that he could not implicitly believe that the feeling in this, country was so uncompromisingly strong in favour of war, as to render the renewal of hostilities popular with the masses.

To the arguments adduced by his Excellency the Baron de Perron in the course of the same conversation, that Austria was evidently endeavouring to gain time; that the present state of armed peace was as ruinous to the finances of the country as a state of war, without affording the favourable chances which war offers; that the suecessful termination of the joint mediation of England and of France had become doubtful, and that the continuance of a state of suspense became positively prejudicial; the Undersigned had the honour to reply that if such were the opinions of the Sardinian Government, they had better at once declare that they withdrew their acceptance of the joint mediation, and were prepared to encounter the vicissitudes of war; for that to profess to continue to invoke the assistance

of mediation when they were meditating the execution of an act calculated to render that mediation fruitless, was a mockery.

The observations and arguments which the Undersigned had the honour to make to his Excellency the Baron de Perron on the occasion above mentioned, were duly reported by him to Viscount Palmerston, and his Lordship has been pleased to notify to the Undersigned the approbation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government at the language he had held.

Her Majesty's Government do not deny that the refusal of Marshal Radetzky to give up the artillery which he had bound himself to surrender is an inexcusable breach of faith, but it is also an act which there can be no reason to expect will be sanctioned by the Government of Vienna, and therefore unless the Sardinian Government wants a pretence for war they ought to wait for the effect of the representations which the British and French Governments have already caused to he made at Vienna upon the subject, instead of taking precipitate steps which can scarcely fail to involve them in very disagreeable embarrassments.

In the conversation that took place between the Undersigned and his Excellency the Baron de Perron on the 10th instant, upon the subject of the contents of his note of the preceding day, the same arguments were used on each side. There was however this additional declaration made by the Baron de Perron upon that occasion, that he and his colleagues were fully aware of the possible consequences of the return of the Sardinian squadron before Venice, and that he and they were ready to accept the chances of war, even had this country to carry it on unaided by foreign support.

The Undersigned, intimately convinced of the dangers likely to result to this country from the adoption of such a course, and anxiously desiring, before it was too late, that no doubt should exist of the opinion which he felt sure would be entertained by Her Majesty's Government with regard to it, did not hesitate to renew in the strongest terms the arguments which he had already used against what he considered to be so unsafe and inopportune a system of policy.

In this opinion the Undersigned has not been deceived, for the above representations, which he reported to Lord Palmerston as having been made, have received the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and he has been further instructed to urge them again upon the consideration of the Sardinian Cabinet.

The Government of His Sardinian Majesty complain of the conduct of the Austrian General-in-chief in not complying with the terms of the armistice of Milan and delivering up the Sardinian artillery, and there is no doubt that this is an unjustifiable breach of faith; the letter of General Hess also is certainly offensive; but

both the contents of that letter and the conduct of Fie11-Marshal Radetzky alike bear the appearance of a desire to goad the Government of His Sardinian Majesty into some proceeding which may lead to a renewal of hostilities, and afford the Austrian troops an opportunity of carrying the war across the Ticino and into the dominions of His Sardinian Majesty.

The Undersigned is convinced that his Excellency the Baron de Perron will at once see how obviously unwise it would be for the Piedmontese Government to give into the trap thus laid for them, and by any act of their own unnecessarily to expose their country to all the losses and sufferings which cannot fail to be inflicted upon a country which becomes the theatre of war.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty have not delayed for a moment instructing Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna to represent as strongly as possible the bad effect which must be produced upon the character of Austria if the engagements entered into by the Austrian commander should continue to be violated; and the Undersigned cannot but observe to his Excellency the Baron de Perron, that it is not only for the interests of Sardinia, but also in furtherance of the object and principles of the joint mediation, that the Government of His Sardinian Majesty ought to wait to see the result of those representations.

His Excellency the Baron de Perron will perceive at once from the arguments and observations which the Undersigned has been instructed to urge upon the notice of the Sardinian Cabinet, how important Her Britannic Majesty's Government considers it to be that Sardinia should abstain from any act calculated to bring about a renewal of hostilities; and how anxiously Great Britain, as the old and attached ally of Sardinia, wishes to see her avoid voluntarily engaging in a course of policy so contrary to the true interests of this country, and which would not only expose her for a second time to the serious accusation of rekindling the flame of war, but which might in the most serious manner risk the welfare and even the existence of the State.

If the arguments already used were not sufficient to convince the Sardinian Government of the correctness of the view taken by Her Britannic Majesty's Government of the present position of Sardinia, it would not be difficult to bring forth others still stronger in - support of the opinion of Her Britannic Majesty's Government; but the Undersigned entertains a hope that his Excellency the Baron de Perron and his colleagues in the Cabinet will give that mature consideration to the representations of Her Britannic Majesty's Government which is due to those feelings of intimacy and of friendslip which have so long marked the relations between the two countries, and that the Cabinet of Turin will wisely pause before they

throw away the advantages of their present position, or render fruitless the negotiations of the mediation.

Baron de Perron.

RA. ABERCROMBY,

No.510.-The Hon. R. Abercromby to Visc'. Palmerston.-(Rec. Oct.30.)
MY LORD,
Turin, October 25, 1848.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship for your information, copies of various notes which have passed between his Excellency the Baron de Perron and my French colleague and myself, and between us and Field-Marshal Radetzky, relative to the portion of the Sardinian park of artillery unjustly detained by the Marshal at Peschiera.

Your Lordship will perceive by the Marshal's reply to my French colleague and myself, dated Milan, 23rd October, that he consents to restore the remainder of the Sardinian artillery and stores upon certain conditions, which conditions we have by our note to Baron de Perron of yesterday's date, applied to the Government of His Sardinian Majesty to furnish us with the means of fulfiiling, as desired by Field-Marshal Radetzky.

Your Lordship will also perceive that M. de Bois-le-Comte and myself have stated to the Sardinian Government our readiness to express to our respective Governments our hopes that measures would be taken by them to obtain from the Imperial Cabinet assurances that hostilities would not be renewed against Venice by the Austrian troops. I have, &c.,

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

RA. ABERCROMBY.

No. 515.-Viscount Palmerston to Lord Cowley.

(Extract.) Foreign Office, October 31, 1848. IT has lately been said that the Central Government intends to collect an army of 50,000 men somewhere in Bavaria, or in neighbouring parts, or to increase to that amount the body of troops thus assembled in that quarter, and that the purpose for which such force is to be there stationed is that it may make a demonstration in the Tyrol, or even actually march to Verona in support of the Austrian cause in Italy, if Field-Marshal Radetzky should be obliged in consequence of the state of things in Austria and Hungary to send into Germany any considerable part of the Austrian troops now in Italy. With regard to an advance of German troops in Verona, it is needless to say that it would be open to the same kind of objection as the advance of Russian troops to Cracow and Gallicia. For it would be the entrance of troops into a territory not belonging to the Power in whose service such troops were; such a move would justify other Powers, who

might be inclined to do so in sending troops also to the scene of operations in order to restore the balance, and thence would arise imminent danger of collision.

A concentration of German troops within the German frontier would certainly not be open to the same objection, and in point of right would be liable to no remark. As a question of prudence and expediency, it might indeed be doubtful, because it might, and probably would, lead to a corresponding measure on the part of another Power, and these reciprocal military preparations would more or less tend to disturb the confidence which the nations of Europe seem at present to place in the prospect of the maintenance of international peace.

To speak plainly on this matter, it must be obvious to the Central Government that any great augmentation of the forces now collected in Southern Germany would be looked upon in France as a demonstration intended to bear upon pending questions in Italy, and would lead to corresponding measures in the southeastern provinces of France, and that any advance of a German force into the Tyrol, or still more to Verona, might be the signal for an advance of French troops into Italy, and this can surely not be an event which the Central Government can have any wish to give an occasion for.

I have spoken on this subject, and to the same effect, to Baron Andrian, who says that the only object which the Central Power has in view is to prevent the Sardinian troops, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, from infringing upon the German territory in the Tyrol, as they did during the late campaign, but I remarked to him. that a very small force would be amply sufficient for that purpose; and that it would be time enough to take measures for such an object when the Sardinian Government had given notice of the termination of the armistice and of the resumption of hostilities, which as yet it had not done, and which Her Majesty's Government hope and trust it will not do.

The probability seems to be that this measure was really intended by the Central Power as a demonstration to assist Austria in regard to pending questions in Italy; and that the more moderate purpose put forward by Baron Andrian was the result of a very animated conversation which M. de Beaumont had with him on the subject, and in which M. de Beaumont plainly declared to the Baron the absolute necessity in which the French Government would find itself of taking step by step military measures corresponding with those which the Central Power might take in this matter. Your Lordship will avail yourself of an early opportunity of representing to the Central Power the view which Her Majesty's Government have taken of this matter, and of pointing out the inconveniences