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The Office of Pipeline Safety was created in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology on September 10, 1968, attachment No. 1. There was a press release out on the creation of that Office and the appointment of the Acting Director and Deputy Director.

Senator HARTKE. All right. That will be included as part of the record.

Mr. JENNINGS. On October 2, we held our first meeting with representatives of State and Federal Government agencies, the gas pipeline and related industries, industry associations, the trade press, and the general public to discuss the administration of the act. The general tone of that discussion is reflected in a recently issued policy statement, attachment No. 2, which I also offer for the record.

On November 12, we published the interim minimum Federal safety standards required by the act, attachment No. 3. I would like to provide that for the record. All of the staff work was done with detailed personnel. Since the act required that these standards be based on State standards, we collected and interpreted the standards of all the States. This required a considerable volume of correspondence, since the standards were written in a variety of formats and many could be interpreted only in the light of State administrative action. We found that the common denominator was the 1968 edition of the USAS B31.8 code, which we adopted for those States which did not already have standards.

We have a list of State laws which is referred to in the prepared statement as attachment 4.

Senator HARTKE. All right. All those exhibits will be made a part of the record.

Mr. JENNINGS. Many State standards provided less than full coverage by excepting interstate transmission facilities or publicly owned facilities from regulation. Believing that Congress did not intend for Federal standards to leave some facilities unregulated, we made the interim standards apply to all pipeline facilities in each State.

Enforcement of the interim Federal standards for interstate facilities posed a problem. As discussed above, the act provided for the States to enforce the standards for intrastate lines, if they wished to do so, but it made the interstate transmission facilities the sole responsibility of the Federal Government. The problem was that we did not have the staff to enforce the Federal standards. To provide enforcement, we authorized the States to act as agents of the Department for that purpose, to the extent that each State agency had enforcement authority under its own laws. This permitted each State to continue with respect to interstate transmission facilities whatever enforcement program it had in effect before we published the Federal standards. This is a voluntary action by each State with no Federal reimbursement.

As indicated above, the act provides for substantial participation by the States in the pipeline safety program. We intend to work closely with the States in all aspects of the program, seeking their advice and assistance even in those areas which are exclusively a Federal responsibility. On November 11-14, we met with State regulatory officials at the annual convention of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Since then, we have attended all of the NARUČ

regional meetings. We have discussed the interim Federal safety standards, explained the States' enforcement role, and established channels of communication.

Initial response from the States augurs well for a productive relationship, as is shown in attachment 5 of the prepared statement. Fortyfive States and the District of Columbia have submitted certificates or agreements under sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the act; other jurisdictions either lack statutory authority or are reviewing their authority. Twenty-one States have agreed to act as our agents in enforcing the standards for interstate transmission lines.

We are working with the States to determine the cost data for their enforcement programs for 1967-68 to be used as a basis for the initial grant-in-aid program authorized by section 5(c) of the act. We may request an appropriation for the grant-in-aid program in the fiscal year 1971 budget.

Information is necessary for a rational regulatory program-necessary for defining safety problems and for devising regulatory solu tions. One of the prime sources of information is a procedure for collecting, classifying, analyzing, storing, and retrieving information about pipeline system failures. Ideally, the information should include (i) the construction, maintenance, and operating history of the part of the system in which the failure occurred, (ii) an account of the failure including the immediate cause and surrounding circumstances. (iii) metallurgical analysis of the failed metal, (iv) the amount of gas which escaped and its behavior after escaping, and (v) damage resulting from the failure such as death and injury to people, damage to property, and interruption to community activities.

We started with little technical information pertinent to a regulatory program. We knew of the system failures which had made the newspaper headlines, of course, but they only indicated a need for regulation. There is a world of difference between the information which indicates a need for regulation and the information which defines what regulation is needed. A regulation is a solution to a defined problem. Therefore, the first step in a regulatory program is marshaling the facts which define safety problems. We must obtain detailed information about the causes of system failures accumulated through the systematic study of failures over a period of time. We could not find this information in any of the existing Government or industry programs.

Senator HARTKE. Let's stop at that point for a moment.

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator HARTKE. Now, this is a rather serious charge, that you are making here. What you are saying in substance is that there is not available in the industry or in any State or in any regulatory agency the type of information upon which a satisfactory regulation could be established. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is precisely what I am saying.

Senator HARTKE. Have you talked now to the entire industry fieldthat is both management and the union side? Have you requested all their information? Have you contacted other private sources?

Mr. JENNINGS. We have talked to the companies, the operating companies.

Senator HARTKE. The operating companies, yes.

Mr. JENNINGS. To the State regulatory agencies, to the Federal Power Commission. We have discussed this also with the Department of the Interior.

Senator HARTKE. Did you discuss it with any of the unions involved? Mr. JENNINGS. We did not discuss it with any of the unions involved. Senator HARTKE. Why not?

Mr. JENNINGS. I have no reason for not having done so.

Senator HARTKE. I am not saying that they have any information. All I am saying to you is that I think this is a serious charge that you are making here. In a way it is contrary to the information which was submitted in our hearings last year. At that time it was indicated that this information was available and that there was enough information and even that enough was being done in the regulatory field on a voluntary basis.

What you are saying in substance here is that there was not even enough information when you took over this operation to give you any lead as to which way to move?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct.

Senator HARTKE. Is that right?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct. May I address myself to your comments, Senator?

Senator HARTKE. Yes.

Mr. JENNINGS. I read the entire record of the history of this legislation, including the testimony supporting it. I have read the newspaper accounts insofar as I can find them. And all of these accounts recite and focus on what happened after the failure. They concerned themselves with the number of people who were killed, the number of people who were injured, the number of houses which were destroyed or damaged, the dollar value of property which was damaged, the days of interruption of service-all concerned with what happened after the accident. Our concern is with the cause of the accident in the first place. Until we know the cause of the accident, we really are not able to prescribe preventive measures. And we are interested in preventive measures.

Senator HARTKE. I am not being critical of your analysis. I am saying this is a very serious charge.

Mr. JENNINGS. Sir, I don't consider it a charge. I consider it a recital of what is simply so.

Senator HARTKE. Well, the recital of an absence of available information, is, in effect, a charge of a lack of diligence heretofore in this field.

Mr. JENNINGS. I think that-I agree with your last sentence.

Senator HARTKE. It only serves to underline the need for even greater urgency in this field. You may proceed.

Mr. JENNINGS. On December 13 we entered into a contract with a major engineering and research company to advise us on a system for gathering information about system failures. The contractor was required to (i) review reporting systems used by Federal and State agency, (ii) by working with representative operators, determine the information which gathering, transmitting, and distributing companies consider important about their system failures, (iii) develop a schematic reporting plan for companies to submit information, (iv) recommend a procedure for collecting, classifying, analyzing, storing, and retrieving information about pipeline system failures.

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This contract also called for the investigation of an actual pipeline system failure, so that the procedures could be tested and modified if necessary. Since a pipeline failure suitable for testing the proposed procedures did not occur during that phase of the contract, we modified the contract to require the contractor to develop comprehensive information on the use of various sealents to seal existing leaks in gas distribution systems. The use of sealents in reducing leaks in lowpressure distribution systems is an area which offers great potential for immediately increasing safety. This effort will tell us what sealents are available on the market today, the feasibility of their use, and procedures for their application. Actual tests of recommended sealents on an existing gas distribution system are required.

Based on the contractor's initial study, the initial part of the study, we developed forms for reporting system failures. I have signed the notice of proposed rulemaking requesting public comment on the forms. We hope to have the system in operation by the end of the year. On January 2, 1969, we established the 15-member Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee required by the act. That is attachment No. 6. This committee represents technical knowledge, gained through training and experience, in all aspects of pipeline construction, maintenance, and operation. The act requires us to seek the committee's advice on the technical feasibility, reasonableness, and practicability of proposed regulations. We intend to seek the committee's advice on all aspects of our administration of the act. Initially, we plan to meet with the committee four times a year. At the first meeting on January 30 the committee discussed the philosophy under which we should administer the act and the role of the committee. On April 29 and 30 the committee discussed the proposed system failure reporting system.

Senator HARTKE. Now, Mr. Jennings, on that point, who represents the public on this committee?

Mr. JENNINGS. The public members are Martin T. Bennett

Senator HARTKE. And is he associated in any way, directly or indirectly, with the pipeline industry?

Mr. JENNINGS. I know of no association with the pipeline industry, excepting at times in an adversary position, when he appears as a witness for the State.

Senator HARTKE. For what?

Mr. JENNINGS. In hearings. He appears sometimes as a witness in opposition to the pipeline positions in hearings before regulatory agencies. That is a connection with the industry, certainly.

Senator HARTKE. All right. Who else then? That is just one of the public members, right?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir. The second public member is Frederic A. Lang. The third public member is Harold J. Muckley.

Senator HARTKE. Now, Mr. Muckley is president of the Houston Contracting Co., right?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir.

Senator HARTKE. And what is their business?

Mr. JENNINGS. The Houston Contracting Co. builds pipelines for the pipeline operating industry.

Senator HARTKE. He has a connection then with the regulated industry itself, with the pipeline industry; is that right?

Mr. JENNINGS. He has a relationship with it, in that he is a contractor to it.

Senator HARTKE. Yes, all right.

Mr. JENNINGS. The next member is A. W. Peabody, who is supervising corrosion engineer, Ebasco Services, Inc. That is a consulting organization.

Senator HARTKE. And what do they do?

Mr. JENNINGS. They have a variety of clients and, in line with the previous questions, among those clients are operating companies in the pipeline business.

Senator HARTKE. So he has a connection also with the pipeline industry?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

The next public member is Allen F. Rhodes, who is vice president, research and engineering, of Rockwell Manufacturing Co.

Senator HARTKE. And he also has a connection with the pipeline industry; is that right?

Mr. JENNINGS. The Rockwell Manufacturing Co. manufactures valves for all of industry which uses valves, and among their purchasers are pipeline companies which use valves.

Senator HARTKE. Without any criticism of those three individuals wouldn't it be better to give recognition in the public sector to members who have no connection, directly or indirectly, with the pipeline industry? Public members should represent the public interest. There should be no question of whether or not they are in any position requiring their compromise nor should they feel the necessity to lean over backward to appear to be not compromising?

Mr. JENNINGS. Senator, I appreciate the import of your question, I wrestled with this same problem when I was preparing this list of nominees to submit to the Secretary.

I had the same feelings which your question indicates that you have. I would have preferred to have found people with these same skills, these same bodies of knowledge, who did not have contact with the pipeline industry. I am sorry I could not. And as between having someone who did not have the knowledge and someone who had the knowledge, I thought it more appropriate to have someone who can contribute knowledge to this function.

Senator HARTKE. I am not casting any reflection on the judgment of these people. You know that sometimes when people have an interest in, or in any way appear to be in a position in which they have a connection with an industry, they have a tendency perhaps to lean over backward in their efforts to be fair. And of course they are always open to criticism because of the fact that they may be in a position of taking care of their own problems or giving special consideration to them. And couldn't you have gone out possibly to some of the electric utility companies or to maybe the municipal water system people, chemical companies, mining companies? It would appear to me there should have been at least some people in these fields who would not have an interest in the industry. They would be free from suspicion of not representing the public interest as opposed to the Government interest. or to the interest of the pipelines themselves.

Mr. JENNINGS. A prime source of knowledge in this area is consulting firms, but they usually have clients in all of the areas which

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