jection was entered to every project by other interests tending to lessen Japanese influence or control in the Manchurian area.

Growing out of this situation, and the blocking by Japan (backed by Great Britain, France, and Russia) of various concessions granted to British and American capital for railway construction in Manchuria, the United States, through Secretary Knox, submitted a proposal in 1909 to Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Germany, and China for the "neutralization" of the Manchurian railways. This plan involved a loan to China for the repurchase of such lines, the participating powers to supervise operations during the loan period. The purpose, as stated by Mr. Knox, was:

to

secure an economic, scientific, and impartial administration of such lines, and to furnish the most effective way of preserving the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and of promoting the development of those provinces under a practical application of the Open Door and equality of opportunity policy.

Inasmuch as China already had the right to repurchase these lines in 1937, Mr. Knox's plan simply anticipated such an event under conditions which would eliminate further friction, insure just treatment for China, and impartially protect the interests of all concerned. China, who saw her sovereign rights in Manchuria being gradually undermined, heartily endorsed the arrangement. For the same reason it was rejected by Japan and Russia; in which stand they were supported by their allies, Great Britain and France. The net result was to preclude China from deciding the form of railway construction, and other development, in her own territory, and to shut tighter the door of equal opportunity in one of her greatest prov

inces. This happened notwithstanding the Russo-Japanese peace treaty provided that:

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

In 1912 the Manchu dynasty in China was overthrown and a republic established. The result, given the immensity of Chinese territory, lack of means of communication, and the utter inexperience of her people in matters political, was and is a transition period bordering on chaos. Semi-independent governments dominated by local military leaders were erected in many provinces; while the whole of South China subsequently broke away and established a separate republic under Sun Yat Sen. The central government at Peking, largely shorn of power and revenues, fell into the hands of officials concerned more in enhancing their private fortunes than in protecting the rights of their people. The waters were indeed sorely troubled and the fishing good.

On the heels of this portentous development in China came the World War, centring the attention and energies of European Powers upon problems far more vital than the vicissitudes or fate of this infant republic of the Far East. To them it became, at most, simply a pawn to play in their then deadly struggle for existence.

Japan, flushed with her victories over China and Russia, and completely subservient to an ambitious military caste, steadily pursued a policy having for its aim the dominance, if not the absorption, of the trade and political destiny of eastern Asia. Possession had already been acquired of Formosa, Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the southern half of Saghalien Island, with special rights

acknowledged in South Manchuria by Powers other than the United States. The European cataclysm furnished an unexpected opportunity to expedite and consolidate her ambitions, which she utilized to the utmost.

On August 15, 1914, two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, expiring August 23d, commanding her, among other things

To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochou, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

This ultimatum remaining unanswered, operations were undertaken against Tsingtao and its small German garrison, the city being captured early in November with but few casualties. Some twenty-thousand Japanese soldiers were engaged, assisted by a detachment of twelve hundred British and Sikh troops. China, though directly concerned, was not consulted, while her status as a neutral was violated through the invasion of Japanese troops across purely Chinese territory, the forcible requisition of labour and supplies, and other totally unwarranted usurpations of authority.

With the elimination of the isolated German garrison at Tsingtao, every "war purpose "war purpose" involved was accomplished and further aggression uncalled for. Japan, however, proceeded immediately to take possession of, garrison, and operate the German-built railway extending 256 miles westward to Tsinanfu, to exploit in her own interests the mining and other concessions held by Germany, to seize the archives and other property of the Chinese customs at Tsingtao, and to control in large

measure the government and economic resources of Shantung Province with its 40,000,000 inhabitants.

In the meantime both the Japanese Government and people reaped tremendous profits through the sale of munitions and supplies, through a virtual monopoly of shipping on the Pacific, and through an almost exclusive sale of Japanese products in markets theretofore shared by her allies. The bulk of these increased revenues was used in the progressive enlargement of her navy and the upbuilding of a powerful military establishment.

All doubts as to Japan's imperial designs upon Asia were dispelled in 1915. At a time when world attention was focussed upon Europe, and any concerted opposition unlikely, Japan boldly unmasked and through her "Twenty-one Demands" upon a helpless China, sought to entrench herself as overlord of that great country. In the letter of instructions by Baron Kato, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitting such demands to the Japanese Minister to China, this purpose is bluntly stated as follows:

Believing it absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern Asia as well as for the preservation of the general interest, to secure Chinese adherence to the foregoing proposals [demands], the Imperial Government are determined to attain this end by all means within their power.

As originally presented, the demands were divided into Five Groups. By the first four China became obligated: To abide by any agreement thereafter reached between Japan and Germany relative to German possessions in Shantung Province; not to cede or lease to a third Power any territory or island within such province or along its shores, with right in Japan to construct a railway from Chefoo or Lungkau to join the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu Rail

way; to extend the lease of Dalny and Port Arthur (expiring in 1923) to a period of ninety-nine years, with like extension of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railway leases; to grant Japanese subjects right to lease and own lands and to engage in business, manufacture, and mining in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia; not to grant permission to subjects of a third Power to construct a railway in such territory, or to pledge local taxes therein to a third Power as security for a loan without previous consent of the Japanese Government; not to employ political, military, or financial advisers in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia without first consulting Japan; to hand over to Japan the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway for a term of ninety-nine years; to operate jointly with Japan the Hanyehping Coal & Iron Company, adjacent to Hankow, and not to dispose of any of its rights or property, or operate adjacent mines, or undertake any work affecting the interests of such company, without the previous consent of Japan, and not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

By Group V of the demands, China obligated herself: To employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs; to grant Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China the right of owning lands; to have the police departments in important places in China administered jointly by Japanese and Chinese, or to have such police departments employ numerous Japanese; to purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (50 per cent. or more of the amount needed), or to agree that there be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal, and that Japanese technical experts be employed and Japanese material