has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. Inasmuch as both the United States and Japan were already pledged by the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 to maintain the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door, the storm centre of this new agreement naturally revolved about this ambiguous "special interest" paragraph. The note was given out by Japan in Tokio and Peking before our representatives at either point were advised of its contents, thus placing them at a tactical disadvantage. Both in the translation of the note into Chinese and in the publicity given it, Japan sought to have it believed that her paramount political interests in China had finally been recognized by the United States. While this construction was negatived by the American Legation at Peking, and its own translation circulated, the actual effect was seriously to embarrass the United States in China and to complicate an already difficult situation. Some two years later Secretary Lansing, testifying before a Senate committee as to what actually happened when such provision was discussed, stated: I suggested to Viscount Ishii that it would be well for the two governments to reaffirm the Open Door policy, on the ground that reports were being spread as to the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over Chinapolitical influence. Ishii replied that he would like to consider the matter, but that, of course, he felt that Japan had a special interest in China, and that that should be mentioned in any agreement that we had; and I replied that we, of course, recognized that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not political in nature, and that the danger of a statement of special interest was that it might be so construed, and therefore I objected to making such a statement. At another interview we discussed the phrase special "interests," 1 which the Japanese Government had been very insistent upon, and which, with the explanation I have made, I was not very strongly opposed to, thinking that the reaffirmation of the Open Door policy was the most essential thing that we could have at that time; and we discussed the phrase which appeared in the draft note, "special interest," and I told him that if it meant "paramount interest," I could not discuss it further; but if he meant "special interest" based upon geographical position, I would consider the insertion of it in the note. Then it was, during that same interview, that we mentioned “paramount interest" and he made a reference to the Monroe Doctrine, and rather a suggestion that there should be a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. And I told him that there seemed to be a misconception as to the underlying principles of the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not an assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign Powers from interfering with the separate rights of any nation in this hemisphere, and that the whole aim was to preserve to each. Republic the power of self development. I said further that so far as aiding in this development the United States claimed no special privilege over other countries. I told Viscount Ishii that I felt the same principle should be applied to China, and that no special privileges, and certainly no paramount interest, in that country should be claimed by any foreign Power. Viscount Ishii maintained silence. Despite his fears that the term "special interest" might be construed to mean a paramount or political interest, and his objection to it for that reason, Secretary Lansing nevertheless permitted its use and saw his fears abundantly realized. During the whole of this period the Government and press of Japan had industriously sought to magnify the California land and school questions and the attitude of the United States regarding Japanese immigration into a grave injustice against Japan. The principal object was doubtless to have Americans believe that Japanese in the United States were being harshly treated, and thus dispose our authorities to acquiesce, as an offset, to her policies in THE PHILIPPINES AND THE FAR EAST (Continued) FOLLOWING the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, Russia and Japan had agreed, by secret treaty, mutually to support their respective claims of interest in North and South Manchuria. This was supplemented in July, 1916, by another secret agreement having for its expressed object "the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever having hostile designs against Russia or Japan." It was provided therein that should war be declared by any third Power, as indicated, against one of the contracting parties, "the other party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid." By process of elimination it is fairly certain the "third Power" contemplated by this agreement was the United States. With the collapse of Russia in 1917, and the consequent welter of conflicting interests in her Asiatic possessions, opportunity was offered Japan to extend her influence and possible control into North Manchuria and Siberia. Excuse for such action, from a war standpoint, was supplied by the presence in Siberia of large numbers of German and Austrian prisoners and immense supplies of military stores. belonging to Russia. Suggestion was accordingly made by Japan that she be authorized to intervene in Siberia to protect the Allied interests. Great Britain and France were agreeable, but the United States refused its consent to such exclusive intervention, and Japan was compelled 22 |