This principle is asserted in Littleton (sec. | law language, be said to be "coupled" with it. 66.), by Lord Coke, in his commentary on that section (52 b.), and in Willes' Reports (105, note, and 565). The legal reason of the rule is a plain one. It seems founded on the presumption that the substitute acts by virtue of the authority of his principal, existing at the time the act is performed; and on the manner in which he must execute his authority, as stated in Coombes' case. In that case it was resolved that "when any has authority as attorney to do any act, he ought to do it in his name who gave the authority." The reason of this resolution is obvious. The title can, regularly, pass out of the person in whom it is vested, only by a conveyance in his own name; and this cannot be executed by another for him, when it could not, in law, be 203*] executed by himself. A *conveyance in the name of a person who was dead at the time, would be a manifest absurdity. This general doctrine, that a power must be executed in the name of a person who gives it, a doctrine founded on the nature of the transaction, is most usually engrafted in the power itself. Its usual language is, that the substitute shall do that which he is empowered to do in the name of his principal. He is put in the place and stead of his principal, and is to act in his name. This accustomed form is observ ed in the instrument under consideration. Hunt is constituted the attorney, and is authorized to make, and execute, a regular bill of sale in the name of Rousmanier. Now, as an authority must be pursued, in order to make the act of the substitute the act of the principal, it is necessary that this bill of sale should be in the name of Rousmanier; and it would be a gross absurdity that a deed should purport to be executed by him, even by attorney, after his death; for the attorney is in the place of the principal, capable of doing that alone which the principal might do. This general rule, that a power ceases with the life of the person giving it, admits of one exception. If a power be coupled with an "interest," it survives the person giving it, and may be executed after his death. As this proposition is laid down too positively in the books to be controverted, it becomes necessary to inquire what is meant by the expres: sion, "a power coupled with an interest.' Is it an interest in the subject on which the power 204*] is to be *exercised, or is it an interest in that which is produced by the exercise of the power? We hold it to be clear that the interest which can protect a power after the death of a person who creates it, must be an interest in the thing itself. In other words, the power must be engrafted on an estate in the thing. The words themselves would seem to import this meaning. "A power coupled with an interest" is a power which accompanies, or is connected with, an interest. The power and the interest are united in the same person. But if we are to understand by the word “interest,' an interest in that which is to be produced by the exercise of the power, then they are never united. The power, to produce the interest, must be exercised, and by its exercise, is extinguished. The power ceases when the interest commences, and, therefore, cannot, in accurate 2.-9 Co. 766. But the substantial basis of the opinion of the court on this point, is found in the legal reason of the principle. The interest or title in the thing being vested in the person who gives the power, remains in him, unless it be conveyed. with the power, and can pass out of him only by a regular act in his own name. The act of the substitute, therefore, which, in such a case, is the act of the principal, to be legally effectual, must be in his name, must be such an act as the principal himself would be capable of performing, and which would be valid if performed by him. Such a power necessarily ceases with the life of the person mak- [*205 ing it. But if the interest, or estate, passes with the power, and vests in the person by whom the power is to be exercised, such person acts in his own name. The estate, being in him, passes from him by a conveyance in his own name. He is no longer a substitute, acting in the place and name of another, but is a principal acting in his own name, in pursuance of powers which limit his estate. The legal reason which limits power to the life of the person giving it, exists no longer, and the rule ceases with the reason on which it is founded. The intention of the instrument may be effected without violating any legal principle. " This idea may be in some degree illustrated by examples of cases in which the law is clear, and which are incompatible with any other exposition of the term "power coupled with an interest.' If the word "interest," thus used, indicated a title to the proceeds of the sale, and not a title to the thing to be sold, then a power to A to sell for his own benefit, would be a power coupled with an interest; but a power to A to sell for the benefit of B, would be a naked power, which could be executed only in the life of the person who gave it. Yet, for this distinction, no legal reason can be assigned. Nor is there any reason for it in justice; for, a power to A, to sell for the benefit of B, may be as much a part of the contract on which B advances his money as if the power had been made to himself. If this were the true exposition of the term, then a power to A to sell for the use of B, inserted in a conveyance to A, of the thing to be sold, would not be a [*206 power coupled with an interest, and, consequently, could not be exercised after the death of the person making it; while a power to A to sell and pay a debt to himself, though not accompanied with any conveyance which might vest the title in him, would enable him to make the conveyance, and to pass a title not in him, even after the vivifying principle of the power had become extinct. But every day's experience teaches us that the law is not as the first case put would suppose. We know that a power to A to sell for the benefit of B, engrafted on an estate conveyed to A, may be exercised at any time, and is not affected by the death of the person who created it. It is, then, a power coupled with an interest, although the person to whom it is given has no interest in its exercise. His power is coupled with an interest in the thing which enables him to execute it in his own name, and is, therefore, not dependent on the life of the person who created it. The general rule, that a power of attorney, though irrevocable by the party during his life, is extinguished by his death, is not affected by the circumstance that testamentary powers are executed after the death of the testator. The law, in allowing a testamentary disposition of property, not only permits a will to be considered as a conveyance, but gives it an operation which is not allowed to deeds which have their effect during the life of the person who executes them. An estate given by will may take effect at a future time or on a future contingency, 207*] and, in the meantime, descends to the heir. The power is, necessarily, to be executed after the death of the person who makes it, and cannot exist during his life. It is the intention that it shall be executed after his death. The conveyance made by the person to whom it is given, takes effect by virtue of the will, and the purchaser holds his title under it. Every case of a power given in a will is considered in a court of chancery as a trust for the benefit of the person for whose use the power is made, and as a devise or bequest to that person. It is, then, deemed perfectly clear that the power given in this case is a naked power, not coupled with an interest, which, though irrevocable by Rousmanier himself, expired on his death. It remains to inquire, whether the appellant is entitled to the aid of this court, to give effect to the intention of the parties, to subject the interest of Rousmanier in the Nereus and Industry to the payment of the money advanced by the plaintiff on the credit of those vessels, the instrument taken for that purpose having totally failed to effect its object. This is the point on which the plaintiff most relies, and is that on which the court has felt most doubt. That the parties intended, the one to give and the other to receive, an effective security on the two vessels mentioned in the bill, is admitted; and the question is, whether the law of this court will enable it to carry this intent into execution, when the instrument relied on by both parties has failed to accomplish its object. The respondents insist that there is no defect 208*]*in the instrument itself; that it contains precisely what it was intended to contain, and is the instrument which was chosen by the parties deliberately, on the advice of counsel and intended to be the consummation of their agreement. That in such a case the written agreement cannot be varied by parol testimony. The counsel for the appellant contends, with great force, that the cases in which parol testimony has been rejected, are cases in which the agreement itself has been committed to writing; and one of the parties has sought to contradict, explain, or vary it, by parol evidence. That in this case the agreement is not reduced to writing. The power of attorney does not profess to be the agreement, but is a collateral instrument to enable the party to have the benefit of it, leaving the agreement, still in full force, in its original form. That this parol agreement not being within the statute of frauds, would be enforced by this court if the power of attorney had not been executed; and not being merged in the power, ought now to be executed. That the power being incompetent to its object, the court will enforce the agreement against general creditors. This argument is entitled to, and has received, very deliberate consideration. The first inquiry respects the fact. Does this power of attorney purport to be the agree ment? Is it an instrument collateral to the agreement? Or is it an execution of the agreement itself in the form intended by both the parties? The bill states an offer on the part of Rousmanier *to give a mortgage on the ves- [*209 sels, either in the usual form, or in the form of an absolute bill of sale, the vendor taking a defeasance; but does not state any agreement for that particular security. The agreement stated in the bill is generally, that the plaintiff, in addition to the notes of Rousmanier, should have specific security on the vessels; and it alleges that the parties applied to counsel for advice respecting the most desirable mode of taking this security. On a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of a mortgage, and an irrevocable power of attorney, counsel advised the latter instrument, and assigned reasons for his advice, the validity of which being admitted by the parties, the power of attorney was prepared and executed, and was received by the plaintiff as full security for his loans. This is the case made by the amended bill; and it appears to the court to be a case in which the notes and power of attorney are admitted to be a complete consummation of the agree ment. The thing stipulated was a collateral security on the Nereus and Industry. On advice of counsel, this power of attorney was selected, and given as that security. We think it a complete execution of that part of the agreement; as complete, though not as safe an execution of it, as a mortgage would have been. It is contended that the letter of attorney does not contain all the terms of the agreement. The Neither would a bill of sale, nor a deed of mortgage, contain them. Neither instrument constitutes the agreement itself, but is that for which the *agreement stipulated. The [*210 agreement consisted of a loan of money on the part of Hunt, and of notes for its repayment, and of a collateral security on the Nereus and Industry, on the part of Rousmanier. money was advanced, the notes were given, and this letter of attorney was, on advice of counsel, executed and received as the collateral security which Hunt required. The letter of attorney is as much an execution of that part of the agreement which stipulated a collateral security, as the notes are an execution of that part which stipulated that notes should be given. But this power, although a complete security during the life of Rousmanier, has been rendered inoperative by his death. The legal character of the security was misunderstood by the parties. They did not suppose that the power would, in law, expire with Rousmanier. The question for the consideration of the court is this: If money be advanced on a general stipulation to give security for its repayment on a specific article, and the parties deliberately, on advice of counsel, agree on a particular instrument, which is executed, but from a legal quality inherent in its nature, that was unknown to the parties, becomes extinct by the death of one of them, can a court of equity direct a new security of a different char acter to be given? or direct that to be done | mistake in drawing the bond. It was not until which the parties supposed would have been effected by the instrument agreed on between them? This question has been very elaborately argued and every case has been cited which could 211*] be *supposed to bear upon it. No one of these cases decides the very question now before the court. It must depend on the the principles to be collected from them. the case of Sumner v. Powell,3 that [*213 anything was said by the judge who determined the cause, from which it might be inferred that relief in these cases would be afforded on any other principle than mistake in fact. In that case, the court refused its aid, because there was no equity antecedent to the obligation. In delivering his judgment, the master of the rolls (Sir W. Grant) indicated very clearly an opinion that a prior equitable consideration, re It is a general rule, that an agreement in writing, or an instrument carrying an agree-ceived by the deceased, was indispensable to the ment into execution, shall not be varied by parol testimony, stating conversations or circumstances anterior to the written instrument. This rule is recognized in courts of equity as well as in courts of law; but courts of equity grant relief in cases of fraud and mistake, which cannot be obtained in courts of law. In such cases, a court of equity may carry the intention of the parties into execution, where the written agreement fails to express that intention. setting up of a joint obligation against his representatives; and added, "so, where a joint bond has, in equity, been considered as several, there has been a credit previously given to the different persons who have entered into the obligation." Had this case gone so far as to decide that "the credit previously given" was the sole ground on which a court of equity would consider a joint bond as several, it would have gone In this case, there is no ingredient of fraud. far to show that the equitable obligation reMistake is the sole ground on which the plaint-mained, and might be enforced, after the legal iff comes into court; and that mistake is in the obligation of the instrument had expired. But law. The fact is, in all respects, what it was the case does not go so far. It does not change supposed to be. The instrument taken is the the principle on which the court had uniformly instrument intended to be taken. But it is, proceeded, nor discard the idea that relief is to contrary to the expectation of the parties, be granted because the obligation was made extinguished by an event not foreseen nor ad- joint by a mistake in point of fact. The case verted to, and is, therefore, incapable of effect- only decides, that this mistake, in point of fact, ing the object for which it was given. Does a will not be presumed by the court in a case court of equity, in such a case, substitute a dif- where no equity existed antecedent to the obliferent instrument for that which has failed to gation, where no advantage was received effect its object? *by, and no credit given to, the person, [*214 against whose estate the instrument is to be set up. Yet the course of the court seems to be uniform, to presume a mistake in point of fact in every case where a joint obligation has been given, and a benefit has been received by the deceased obligor. No proof of actual mistake is required. The existence of an antecedent equity is sufficient. In cases attended by precisely the same circumstances, so far as respects mistake, relief will be given against the representatives of a deceased obligor, who had received the benefit of the obligation, and refused against the representatives of him who had not received it. Yet the legal obligation is as completely extinguished in the one case as in the other; and the facts stated, in some of the cases in which these decisions have been made, would rather conduce to the opinion that the bond was made joint from ignorance of the legal consequences of a joint obligation, than from any mistake in fact. In general, the mistakes against which a court of equity relieves, are mistakes in fact. The decisions on this subject, though not always very distinctly stated, appear to be founded on some misconception of fact. Yet some of 212*] them bear a considerable *analogy to that under consideration. Among these is that class of cases in which a joint obligation has been set up in equity against the representatives of a deceased obligor, who were discharged at law. If the principle of these decisions be that the bond was joint from a mere mistake of the law, and that the court will relieve against this mistake on the ground of the pre-existing equity arising from the advance of the money, it must be admitted that they have a strong bearing on the case at bar. But the judges in the courts of equity seem to have placed them on mistake in fact, arising from the ignorance of the draftsman. In Simpson v. Vaughan, the bond was drawn by the obligor himself, and under circumstance which induced the court to be of opinion, that it was intended to be joint The case of Landsdowne v. Landsdowne (reand several. In Underhill v. Howard, Lord ported in Mosely), if it be law, has no inconsidEldon, speaking of cases in which a joint bond erable bearing on this cause. The right of the has been set up against the representatives of a heir at law was contested by a younger memdeceased obligor, says: "The court has inferred ber of the family, and the arbitrator to whom from the nature of the condition, and the trans- the subject was referred decided against him. action, that it was made joint by mistake; that He executed a deed in compliance with this is, the instrument is not what the parties in-award, and was afterwards relieved against it, tended in fact. They intended a joint and several obligation; the scrivener has, by mistake, prepared a joint obligation." All the cases in which the court has sustained a joint bond against the representatives of the deceased obligor, have turned upon a supposed on the principle that he was ignorant of his title. The case does not suppose this fact, that he was the eldest son, to have been unknown to him; and, if he was ignorant of anything, it was of the law, *which gave him, as eldest [*215 son, the estate he had conveyed to a younger 3.-2 Meriv. 36. brother. Yet he was relieved in chancery against this conveyance. There are certain strong objections to this decision in other respects; but, as a case in which relief has been granted on a mistake in law, it cannot be entirely disregarded. Although we do not find the naked principle, that relief may be granted on account of ignorance of law, asserted in the books, we find no case in which it has been decided, that a plain and acknowledged mistake in law is beyond the reach of equity. In the case of Lord Irnham v. Child, application was made to the chancellor to establish a clause which had been, it was said, agreed upon, but which had been considered by the parties, and excluded from the written instrument by consent. It is true, they excluded the clause, from a mistaken opinion that it would make the contract usurious, but they did not believe that the legal effect of the contract was precisely the same as if the clause had been inserted. They weighed the consequences of inserting and omitting the clause, and preferred the latter. That, too, was a case to which the statute applied. Most of the cases which have been cited were within the statute of frauds, and it is not easy to say how much has been the influence of that statute on them. withdraw their demurrer, and to answer the bill of the complainants. See S. C. 2 Mason, 244, 353; 3 Mason. 294; 1 Pet. 1.. Cited-14 Pet. 206, 224; 5 How. 269, 272, 291; 15 Wall. 144; 1 Otto, 50; 8 Otto, 82, 90; 11 Otto, 584; 1 Sumn. 140; 2 Sumn. 393, 435; Bald. 489, 492; 2 Blatchf. 147; 5 Cranch, C. C. 161; 3 Mason, 301, 304: 9 Bnak. Reg. 172. 178; 13 Bank. Reg. 177; 1 Woods, 558, 568; Blatchf. & H.388, 389; Pat. O. Gaz. 1880, p.1516 [LOCAL LAW. COVENANT.] GOLDSBOROUGH, Plaintiff in Error, v. ORR. Defendant in Error. Where the acts stipulated to be done, are to be done at different times, the covenants are to be construed as independent of each other. Application of this principle to the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Under the act of assembly of Maryland of 1795, c. 56, if the defendant appears, and dissolves the attachment, a declaration and subsequent pleadings are not necessary, as in other actions, but the cause may be tried upon a short note. will not lie in a case ex contractu for unliquidated It seems, under the same act, that an attachment damages for the non-delivery of goods. But where the plaintiff is entitled to a stipulated sum of money, in lieu of a specific article to be delivered, an attachment will lie. THIS The case cited by the respondent's counsel from precedents in chancery, is not of this de216*] scription; *but it does not appear from that case, that the power of attorney was incause was argued at the last term by tended, or believed to be a lien. Mr. Lear for the plaintiff in error, and In this case, the fact of mistake is placed be- by Mr. Jones for the defendant. yond any controversy. It is averred in the bill, and admitted by the demurrer, that the powers of attorney were given by the said Rous-ion of the court: manier, and received by the said Hunt, under the belief that they were, and with the intention that they should create, a specific lien and security on the said vessels." We find no case which we think precisely in point; and are unwilling, where the effect of the instrument is acknowledged to have been entirely misunderstood by both parties, to say that a court of equity is incapable of affording relief. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed; but as this is a case in which creditors are concerned, the court, instead of giving a final decree on the demurrer in favor of the plaintiff, directs the cause to be remanded, that the Circuit Court may permit the defendants to withdraw their demurrer, and to answer to the bill. DECREE. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this court is of opinion that the said Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the defendants, and dismissing the bill of the complainant. It is therefore decreed and ordered that the decree 217*] of the said Circuit Court *in this case be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled. And it is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to permit the defendants to 1.-1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 91. *Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opin- [*218 This is a case originating under the attachment act of Maryland of 1795 (ch. 56), and brought to this court upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for Washington county. The suit was brought by Orr, the defendant in error, on what is 2. He cited 1 Jac. Law Dict. 160; 3 Harr. & M'Henr. Rep. 347; 1 Harr. & Johus. Rep. 491; 6 East's Rep. 614; 1 H. Bl. 363; 3 East's Rep. 93. 3. He cited 1 Com. Dig. 598, B. NOTE.-Independant covenants. Covenants may be wholly independent, although relating to the same subject, and made by the same parties, and included in the same instrument. In that case they are two separate contracts. Each party must then perform what he undertakes, without reference to the discharge of his obligation by the other party, and each party may have his action against the other for the non-performance of his agreement, whether he has performed his own or not. As to when covenants Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 319; Thorp v. Thorp, are independent, see Mod. 460; 1 Salk. 171; Peeters v. Opie, 2 Saund. 350; Wilks v. Smith, 10 Mees & W. 355; Eastern R. Co.v. Co., 4 Ell. & B. 397; North. G. L. Co. v. Parnell, 15. Philipson, 16 C. B. 2; Mayor of Norwich v. Railway B. 360; 29 E. L. &. E. 229; Underhill v. Saratoga R. Co., 20 Barb. 455; Edgar v. Boies, 11 S. & R. 445: Mehaffy, 10 Watts. 387; 2 Pars. on Cont. 528; Robb Stevenson v. Kleppinger, 5 Watts. 420; Lowry v. v. Montgomery, 20 John. 15; Cunningham v. Morrell, 10 John. 203; McClure v. Rush, 9 Dana. 64: Allen v. Saunders, 7 B. Mon. 593; Kettle v. Harvey. 21 Vt. 301; Lord v. Belkuap,1 Cush. 279; Thompkins v. Elliot, 5 Wend. 436; Grant v. Johnson, 5 Barb. 161; 6 Id. 337; 1 Seld. 240; Bean v. Atwater, 4 Conn. 8; Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172; Kane v. Hood, 13 Pick. 281; Dey v. Dox, 9 Wend. 129; Morris v. Silter, 1 Denio, 59; Rider v. Pond, 18 Barb. 179; technically called a short note, expressing the To balance due Benjamin G. Orr, true cause of action as follows: Errors excepted, 4th of June, 1819. 4,500 00 1,906 00 $10,906 00 7.986 11 $2,919 89 BENJAMIN G. ORR. payable in lumber, at usual BENJAMIN G. ORR, Washington, May 5, 1818. $2,071 67 *The agreement marked B, which is [*220 as follows, to wit: It is agreed between Benjamin G. Orr, of the city of Washington, and Howes Golbsborough, of the state of Maryland, as follows, to wit: The said Orr sells to said Goldsborough the three-story brick house adjoining the one now in the possession of Commodore Rodgers on P street south, with the coach-house and stable adjoining, and the lot on which they stand, being numbered three, and a lot numbered twenty-one, on O street south, for four thousand five hundred dollars. The said Orr also sells to said Goldsborough, lots Nos. 9 and 10, and part of 11, in the same 219*] *The original defendant, Goldsbor-square, with the water privilege thereto beough, appeared and dissolved the attachment by putting in special bail, and pleaded non assumpsit, upon which issue was joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff for the above balance of $2,919.89, with interest. A bill of exceptions was taken at the trial, in substance as follows: The plaintiff in this case, to support the is sue joined, on his part, offered in evidence the account marked A, which is as follows, to wit: Howes Goldsborough, Esq., Bo't of Benjamin G. Orr, May 5, 1818. The west house of four houses on P street south, between 4 street west and Water street, with four lots adjoining to the west, Cr. By his note, payable to A. J. Comstock, on the 1st of February, 1819, By do., payable to A. J. Comstock, on the 1st of August, 1819, $4,500 00 1,190 24 Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, note a; Fothergill v. Walton, 2 J. B. Moore, 630; Stavers v. Curling, 3 Bing. N. C. 355; Franklin v. Miller, 4 A. & E. 599; Fishmongers Co. v. Robertson, 5 Man. & G. 131; Storer v. Gordon, 3 M. & S. 308; Ritchie v. Atkinson, 10 East, 295; Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555; Jonassohn v. Railway Co., 10 Exch. 434; 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 481; Gould v. Webb, 4 Ellis & B. 933; 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 331; Mill-dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417; Tilleston v. Newell, 13 Mass. 406; Bennet v. Pixley, John. 249; Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159; Morrison v. Galloway, 2 Harris & J. 461: Todd v. Somers, 2 Gratt. 167; Lewis v. Weldon, 3 Rand. 71; McCullough v. Cox, 6 Barb. 386; Payne v. Bet tisworth, 2 A. K. Marsh, 427; Keenan v. Brown, 21 Vt. 86; Pepper v. Haight, 20 Barb. 429. Where the mutual covenants go to the whole consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions, and performance must be averred. Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, 1 H. black, 270; Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709; 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 552; Grey v. Frier, 4 Clark & F. 565; 26 Eng. L. & Eq. 27; Dakin v. Williams, 11 Wend. 67. Where two acts are to be done by the parties at longing, for twelve and a half cents for *I do hereby guaranty that H. Golds- [*221 borough shall deliver the lumber mentioned in the within contract, on condition that B. G. Orr, on his part, complies with the stipulation on his part, also mentioned in this said instrument of writing. JOHN RODGERS. the same time, neither party can maintain an action without showing performance, or offer to perform on his part, as where the vendor covenants to convey an estate, and the vendee covenants to pay the purchase money on the same day. Bk. of Col. v. Hagner,1 Pet. 455; Slater v. Emerson, 19 How. 224; Campbell v. Gittings, 19 Ohio, 347; Washington v. Ogden, 1 Black, 450; Williams v. Healey, 3 Denio. 363; Gazley v. Price, 16 John. 267; Dunham v. Pettee, 4 Seld. 508; Lester v. Jewett, 1 Kern. 453; Hyde v. Booraem, 16 Pet.1 69; Tilghman v. Tilghman,1 Baldw. 464. See also Slocum v. Despard, 8 Wend. 615; Northrup v. Northrup, 6 Cow. 296; Chainpion v. White, 5 Cow. 509; Robb v. Montgomery, 20 John. 130; Adams v Williams, 2 Watts. & S. 227; Halloway v. Davis, Wright, 129; Leonard v. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172. note; Kane v. Blood, 13 Pick. 281; McNamara v. Gaylord, 1 Bond, 302; Thompson v. Railway Co., 1 Bond, 152; Railway Co, v. Smith, 21 Wall. 255; Woodruff v. Hough, 1 Otto, 596; Phil. R. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 339; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 2 Woods. 272; Buckingham v. Jackson, 4 Biss. 295; Langdon v. Purdy, 1 McArthur, 23; Boody v. R. R. Co., 3 Blatchf. 25; S. C. 24 Vt. 660. |