1867 was likewise of a twofold character, one species of which was to be exercised by petition for review, and the other in the ordinary way, by appeal or writ of error. In an earlier case, decided in 1873 (Coit v. Robinson, 19 Wall. 274, 282, 22 L. Ed. 152), it was held, in substance, that when the district court exercised the second species of jurisdiction mentioned above, pursuant to authority conferred by the bankrupt act,-that is to say, when it entertained jurisdiction of a suit at law or in equity brought therein either by or against the assignee,-the action of the district court in such a case could not be reviewed by the circuit court by a petition for review under the first clause of the second section of the act of 1867, but could only be reviewed in the ordinary way by appeal or writ of error, under the provisions of the judiciary act regulating such proceedings. Substantially the same views were expressed by the supreme court in other cases, to wit: Sandusky v. Bank, 23 Wall. 289, 292; Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 65, 80, 20 L. Ed. 60; Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551, 555, 21 L. Ed. 481; and in the case of Kidder v. Horrobin, 72 N. Y. 159, 166, the court of appeals of that state held that a suit by an assignee in bankruptcy against a third party to recover the property of the bankrupt or debts due to the bankrupt was not "a proceeding in bankruptcy," and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal bankrupt court, but was an ordinary action, which could be maintained as well in the courts of the state. In view of these adjudications upon the bankrupt act of 1867, we feel constrained to hold that it is only some action taken or order made in the bankruptcy proceeding itself which can be reviewed by an original petition addressed to this court, under subdivision "b" of section 24 of the bankrupt act, and that the power thereby conferred "to superintend and revise" the action of the district court does not extend to suits brought in that court by the trustee in bankruptcy against third parties to collect the assets of the estate, or to suits brought by third parties against the trustee, whether such suits are rightfully or wrongfully brought in that court, as to which point we express no opinion at this time. Such suits as those last referred to, whether at law or in equity, are not proceedings in bankruptcy, or "controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings," within the meaning and intent of the law authorizing petitions for review, but they are suits which must be reviewed in the ordinary way, by appeal or writ of error, when they have reached a final determination in the court of first instance. We can discover nothing in the language or policy of the recent bankrupt act which would seem to require the various circuit courts of appeals to review every interlocutory order made or proceeding taken, in an ordinary action at law or in equity, in a suit between a trustee in bankruptcy and a third party, which happens to be brought in the district court, simply because the trustee's title to the property claimed, or his liability to be sued, is founded on the bankrupt act. Nor do we believe that such a construction of the act was within the contemplation of congress. The final decree which may be rendered by the district court in the case which we are asked to review can be brought to this court by appeal, in the usual way, for the consideration of every question which may be decided therein, or, on such final determination of the case, the question relating to the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the suit (the same being one of great moment, which ought to be speedily determined by the court of last resort) can be certified by the district court to the supreme court of the United States. McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118, 35 L. Ed. 893; Bardes v. Bank (decided by the supreme court of the United States, Dec. 22, 1899) 20 Sup. Ct. 196, Adv. S. U. S. 196, 44 L. Ed. — The petition for review is therefore dismissed, and this fact will be forthwith certified to the district court. (99 Fed. 552.) UNITED STATES v. ROESSLER & HASSLACHER CHEMICAL CO. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 6, 1900.) CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-ZINC DUST. Zinc dust, used in dyeing, is entitled to free entry, under paragraph 386 of the tariff act of 1894, as an article in a crude state, used in dyeing, not specially provided for, and is not dutiable under section 3, as a nonenumerated manufactured article, nor under paragraph 174 and section 4, as assimilated to zinc in pigs and blocks. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. This is an appeal from a decision of the circuit court, Southern district of New York, which reversed a decision of the board of general appraisers reversing a decision of the collector of the port of New York touching the assessment for duty of certain imported merchandise, which, under the tariff act of 1894, was zinc dust. The collector assessed duty thereon at 20 per centum ad valorem, under the provisions of section 3 of said act, as an "article manufactured, in whole or in part, not provided for," etc. The board of general appraisers held that under the similitude clause (section 4 of said act) it was dutiable at one cent a pound, as similar to “zine in blocks or pigs." Paragraph 174. In what respect the board found it to be similar does not appear. The finding reads, in the disjunctive: "It is similar in material, quality, or the use to which it may be applied to zinc in blocks or pigs." This statement does not indicate in which of the three named respects similarity was found to exist. The circuit court held that the article was free of duty, under paragraph 386,-“Articles in a crude state used in dyeing or tanning not specially provided for in this act." D. Frank Lloyd, for the United States. Before WALLACE, LACOMBF, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. We concur with the judge who tried the cause in the circuit court that this zine dust is an article in a crude state, used in dyeing, for the reasons given in his opinion. Coming thus within the enumeration of a paragraph on the free list, the provisions of sections 3 and 4 do not apply to it. (99 Fed. 555.) SCHIFF et al. v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. January 30, 1900.) No. 41. CUSTOMS DUTIES-STRAW BRAIDS-FREE LIST. "Gold straw braids" and "silver straw braids," composed mostly of hemp fiber, the remainder being metal, cotton, and glue, are not entitled to free entry, under Act Cong. Oct. 1, 1890, par. 518, which puts on the free list braids, plaits, laces, and similar manufactures, "composed of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, osier or rattan," suitable for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods, but are assessable under paragraph 215, as manufactures in part of metal, not specially provided for. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. This is an appeal from a decision of the circuit court, Southern district of New York, affirming a decision of the board of general appraisers which affirmed the classification of certain merchandise for customs duty by the collector of the port of New York. Albert Comstock, for appellant. Henry C. Platt, for the United States. Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The merchandise was imported under the tariff act of 1890. It consisted of goods invoiced as "gold straw braids" and "silver straw braids," composed of hemp fiber to the extent of from five-sixths to nine-tenths of their value, the remainder being metal, cotton, and glue. Duty was assessed on them at 45 per cent., under paragraph 215, as manufactures in part of metal, not specially provided for. The importers protested, claiming free entry, under paragraph 518. It will be well to note the earlier provisions of tariff acts touching the articles enumerated in this lastmentioned paragraph. The act of 1883 provided as follows: "Par. 448. Hats and so forth, materials for: Braids, plaits, flats, laces, trimmings, tissues, willow sheets and squares, used for making hats, bonnets and hoods, composed of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, hair, whalebone or any other substance or material not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, twenty per centum ad valorem." By a special act passed February 18, 1890, congress struck out the last-quoted paragraph, and inserted in place thereof the following: "Par. 448. Braids, plaits, flats, willow sheets and squares, fit only for use in making or ornamenting hats, bonnets and hoods, composed of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, hair, whalebone or any vegetable material, not specially enumerated or provided for, twenty per centum ad valorem." Next came the act of October 1, 1890, containing the paragraph under which the importers in the case at bar contend that their goods should be classified. It reads as follows, being part of the free list: "Par. 518. Braids, plaits, laces and similar manufactures, composed of straw, chips, grass, palm leaf, willow, osier or rattan, suitable for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets and hoods." It will be observed that the changes in the language used by congress have been in the direction of restricting the number of articles which the so-called "hat-material" paragraph should comprise. And that restriction is found to apply to the component materials. The braids of the hat-material paragraph of the act of 1883 might be composed, not only of straw, chip, or grass, but of "any other substance or material." By the amendatory act of 1890, these general words were changed to "any vegetable material," and in the act of October 1, 1890, the general phrase was wholly eliminated, and the braids included in the paragraph were reduced to such only as were "composed of straw, chips, grass," and the other specially enumerated vegetable substances. By this we do not mean to hold that the presence of any other material in admixture with one or more of the enumerated materials will take the braid out of this paragraph. Under the principle enunciated in Arthur's Ex'rs v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 70, 8 Sup. Ct. 714, 31 L. Ed. 643, and Herrman v. Robertson, 152 U. S. 521, 14 Sup. Ct. 686, 38 L. Ed. 538, we affirmed in U. S. v. Rheims, 33 C. C. A. 687, 89 Fed. 1020, a decision of the circuit court holding that certain braids, composed principally of straw, were within this paragraph, although they contained cotton, 28 per cent. in quantity, and 25 per cent. in value. But, in or der to come within the terms of the paragraph as now amended, it is necessary that the predominant and characteristic component shall be one of those specifically enumerated in the paragraph, and the words of enumeration should not be distorted so as to cover other vegetable substances, not fairly within the definition of those words in common acceptation. Hemp fiber seems not to be within the dictionary definitions of any of those words cited in appellant's brief, and it certainly would not, in common speech, be included in the phrase, "straw, chip or grass." We have here no question of commercial designation. The tariff act does not lay duty upon "straw braid," a term which might have a technical meaning in trade and commerce, but upon "braids composed of straw," etc., and there is no evidence that the words "straw," "chip," or "grass," when applied to the raw material, have any peculiar commercial meaning. The decision of the circuit court is affirmed. (99 Fed. 570.) UNITED STATES v. MORGAN. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. February 6, 1900.) No. 311. 1. SALVAGE ACTIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES - JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT. Act Cong. March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505), gives jurisdiction to the court of claims, inter alia, on any contract, express or implied, with the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law. equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable. Section 2 gives the federal district and circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims as to mat ters named in the preceding section, except that the district courts have jurisdiction not to exceed $1,000, and the circuit courts between $1.000 and $10,000. Held, that a claim against the United States for salvage in the sum of $10,000 is within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. 2. SAME-TOWAGE-AMOUNT. A lightship belonging to the United States government broke loose from her moorings, and was carried out into Chesapeake Bay. The sea was described by many as being the highest ever known in Hampton Roads. A tug sighted the lightship, which hoisted a signal for assistance, described as a signal for a tow. The tug immediately answered the signal, but, owing to the gale of wind and heavy sea prevailing, was unable to approach her in the usual manner from the leeward, and pass a hawser, but had to go to the windward side, and use a heaving line. Three efforts to cast the line were made before it was caught, the tug, in the meantime, being in the trough of the sea, with the seas breaking over the man casting the line. Some three hours later the lightship was brought to the wharf. Held, that $1,200 for salvage service, though on the border line of towage service, will not be disturbed as excessive. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. . This case comes up on appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia. The action below was brought by way of petition on the part of A. D. Morgan, master of steam tug Frank A. Lowe, against the United States. The cause of action is a claim for salvage of the lightship No. 49, the property of the United States. The form of pleading is in admiralty in personam. The amount claimed is $10,000. The court below considered it a case of salvage, and awarded $1,200 salvage. The case comes here on exceptions to the decree. The errors assigned are to the finding of the district court. This is an evident typographical mistake, the petition for allowance of appeal being to the circuit court. These alleged errors are: (1) That the petitioner was allowed to file his petition; (2) that the court erred in not sustaining an exception to the jurisdiction of the court; (3) that the court erred in requiring the respondent to answer the petition; (4, 5) that the court erred in holding it a case of salvage, and in allowing an award of $1,200. Edgar Allan, U. S. Atty. Floyd Hughes, for appellee. Before SIMONTON, Circuit Judge, and PAUL and BRAWLEY, District Judges. SIMONTON, Circuit Judge. The vital question in this case is, had the court jurisdiction? The action is against the United States. It is a claim for salvage. The proceeding to recover salvage is in the circuit court, not in the district court, and it is in form a libel. The United States, a sovereign, cannot be sued, except by its own consent, and in the mode prescribed by congress. Act Cong. March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505), gives jurisdiction to the court of claims of "all claims founded upon the constitution of the United States, or any act of congress, except for pensions or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law, equity or admiralty, if the United States were suable." By the second section of the act, the district and circuit courts of the United States are given concurrent jurisdiction with the court of |