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State v. Hawkins, 28 Mo. 366; Ely v. Harvey, 6 Bush, 620; Frazier v. Parks's Adm'rs, 56 Ala. 363; McDonald v. Todd, 1 Grant Cas. 17; Branch v. Burnly, 1 Call, 147; Rogers v. McKenzie, 81 N. C. 164; Yoakum v. Tilden, 3 W. Va. 167; Miller v. Scott, 21 Ark. 396; Erwin v. Blake, 8 Pet. 17, 26. The power of an attorney to receive payment does not, however, extend so far as to authorize him to release or discharge his client's claim or money judgment without actual pay. ment: Harrow v. Farrow's Heirs, 7 B. Mon. 126; S. C., 45 Am. Dec. 60; Gilliland v. Gasque, 6 S. C. 406; Chambers v. Miller, 7 Watts, 63; Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665; Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 Id. 528, 540; Doub v. Barnes, 1 Md. Ch. 127. Nor is he authorized to receive anything_but money in payment: Walker v. Scott, 13 Ark. 644; McCarver v. Nealey, 1 G. Greene, 360; Perkins v. Grant, 2 La. Ann. 328; Lord v. Burbank, 18 Me. 178; Lewis v. Woodruff, 15 How. Pr. 539; Commissioners v. Rose, 1 Desaus. Eq. 461, 469; Wright v. Daily, 26

Tex. 730.

Compromise. It may be regarded as the well-settled doctrine that an attorney has no power to compromise a claim, action, or judgment of his client: Robinson v. Murphy, 69 Ala. 543; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415; De Louis v. Meek, 2 G. Greene, 55; S. C., 50 Am. Dec. 491; Smith's Heirs v. Dixon, 3 Met. (Ky.) 438; Voorhies v. Harrison, 22 La. Ann. 85; Maddux v. Bevan, 39 Md. 485; Fitch v. Scott, 3 How. (Miss.) 314; S. C., 34 Am. Dec. 86; Davidson v. Rozier, 23 Mo. 387; Walden v. Bol ton, 55 Id. 405; Hamrick v. Combs, 14 Neb. 381; Shaw v. Kidder, 2 How. Pr. 244; Barrett v. Third Avenue R. R., 45 N. Y. 628; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa. St. 315; Isaacs v. Zugsmith, 103 Id. 77; Treasurers v. McDowell, 1 Hill (S. C.), 184; Adams's Assignee v. Roller, 35 Tex. 711; Vail v. Conant, 15 Vt. 314; Granger v. Batchelder, 54 Id. 248; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 846.

Assignment or transfer of claims or judgments. - An attorney to whom a note or other demand is given for collection has no power to assign or transfer the same to a third person: Russell v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216; Goodfellow v. Landis, 36 Mo. 168; White v. Hildreth, 13 N. H. 104; Card v. Walbridge, 18 Ohio, 411; Annely v. De Saussure, 12 S. C. 488; Penniman

v. Patchin, 5 Vt. 346; Terhune v. Colton, 10 N. J. Eq. 21; nor has he any authority to assign his client's judg ment: Boren v. McGehee, 6 Port. 432; S. C., 31 Am. Dec. 695; Walden v. Grant, 8 Martin, N. S., 565; Wilson v. Wadleigh, 36 Me. 496; Head v. Gervais, Walk. (Miss.) 431; S. C., 12 Am. Dec. 577, and note; Campbell's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 401; S. C., 72 Am. Dec. 641; Fassitt v. Middleton, 47 Pa. St. 214; Rowland v. Slate, 58 Id. 196; Noonan v. Gray's Ex'rs, 1 Bail. 437; Mayer v. Blease, 4 S. C. 10; Maxwell v. Owen, 7 Cold. 630. But the transfer or assignment may be ratified by the client; and the reception by the client of the money paid the attorney may amount to a ratification: Marshall v. Moore, 36 Ill. 321.

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Submission to arbitration. - It is generally held that an attorney has the power to submit his client's cause to a reference or arbitration: Lee v. Grimes, 4 Col. 185; Jones v. Horsey, 4 Md. 306; S. C., 59 Am. Dec. 81; Inhabitants of Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Jenkins v. Gillespie, 10 Smedes & M. 31; S. C., 48 Am. Dec. 732; Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410; Evars v. Kamphaus, 53 Pa. St. 379; Williams v. Tracey, 95 Id. 308, 310; Township of North Whitehall v. Keller, 100 Id. 105; S. C., 45 Am. Rep. 361; Tilton v. United States L. Ins. Co., 8 Daly, 84.

An

Liability of attorneys. attorney is liable for the want of such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise: Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542. The rule has been thus formulated in Wilson v. Russ, 20 Me. 421: "The attorney is bound to execute business in his profession with a reasonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch. If the client be injured by the gross fault, negligence, or ignorance of the attorney, the attorney is liable; but if he acts with good faith, to the best of his skill, and with an ordinary degree of attention, he will not be responsible." And this is the general rule: O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga. 195; Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51; Bowman v. Tallman, 27 How. Pr. 212; S. C., 2 Robt. 385; Stevens v. Walker, 55 Ill. 151. If an attorney has not the skill usual with practitioners in his particular department, he is chargeable with the consequences of the want thereof. The want of the

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Oct. 11, 1862, 1007.

Oct. 11, 1862, $1008.

Proceedings, when party alleges that an attorney appears for

skill, diligence, and prudence usually
possessed by lawyers fixes the liabil-
ity of the attorney: Chase v. Heaney,
70 Ill. 268; Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29
Ind. 435; Morrill v. Graham, 27 Tex.
646; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich.
14; see also note to Fitch v. Scott, 34
Am. Dec. 89.

An attorney is guilty of gross neg-
ligence who allows the time for an
appeal to expire without taking an
appeal when desired by the client:
Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121; or where
on motion for a new trial he fails to
have the statement certified, thereby

preventing the appellate court from looking into and reviewing the action of the court below on the motion: Gambert v. Hart, 44 Id. 542; or where he does not present a claim against a decedent's estate in time: Stevens v. Dexter, 55 Ill. 151. An attorney may accept as a correct exposition of the law the decision of his state's supreme court: Hastings v. Halleck, 13 Cal. 203. But the state decision must be in advance of any decision of the supreme court on that subject: Marsh v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178.

§ 1040. [1008.] If it be alleged, by a party for whom an attorney appears, that he does so without authority, and the allegation be verified by the affidavit of the party, the court may, if it find the allegation true, at any authorityout stage of the proceedings, relieve the party for whom the attorney has assumed to appear from the consequences of his acts.

authority.

Oct. 11, 1862, 1009.

Attorney for

when may be required to show his authority.

See the first subdivision of the note to the preceding section.

§ 1041. [1009.] The court or judge thereof may, on motion of either party, and on showing reasonable adverse party, grounds therefor, require the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of several adverse parties, to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and until he does so, may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of the party for whom he assumes to appear. See the first subdivision of the note to § 1039 [1007], ante.

Oct. 11, 1862, $1010.

Attorney, how changed.

16 Or. 2.

TITLE III.

OF THE CHANGE OF ATTORNEY, AND HIS LIEN.

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§ 1042. [1010.] The attorney in an action, suit, or proceeding may be changed at any time before judgment or decree, or final determination, as follows:

1. Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or entered upon the journal; or,

1010.

2. Upon the order of the court or judge thereof, on Oct. 11, 1862, the application of the client or the attorney, for sufficient

cause.

Ø 1011.
Notice of

§ 1043. [1011.] When an attorney is changed as pro- Oct. 11, 1862, vided in the last section, written notice of the change and of the substitution of a new attorney, or of the ap- change. pearance of the party in person, shall be given to the adverse party. Until then he is bound to recognize the former attorney.

Notice of substitution of attorney must be served upon the adverse party: Grant v. White, 6 Cal. 55; Withers v. Little, 56 Id. 370; Given v. Driggs, 3 Caines, 300; Hildreth v. Harvey, 3 Johns. Cas. 300; Dorlon v. Lewis, 7 How. Pr. 132. And upon such notice received it is improper to recognize any other than the substituted attorney: Preston v. E. A. Stone Co., 54 Cal. 198. Until such notice has been given, papers may be served upon the attorney of record: Grant v.

White, 6 Id. 55; Livermore v. Webb,
56 Id. 489.

The authority of an attorney to ap-
pear for the opposite party cannot be
questioned by counsel who stipulate
with him as such: McDonald v. Mc-
Conkey, 54 Cal. 143. Nor can the
authority of the substituted attorney
be inquired into by the adverse attor-
ney who accepts service of notice of
substitution: Withers v. Little, 56 Id.
370.

1012

§ 1044. [1012.] An attorney has a lien for his com- oct. 11, 1862, pensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied, as provided in this section.

1. Upon the papers of his client which have come into his possession in the course of his professional employment;

2. Upon money in his hands belonging to his client; 3. Upon money in the hands of the adverse party, in an action, suit, or proceeding in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien to that party;

4. Upon a judgment or decree to the extent of the costs included therein, or if there be a special agreement to the extent of the compensation specially agreed on, from the giving notice thereof to the party against whom the judgment or decree is given, and filing the original with the clerk where such judgment or decree is entered and docketed.

This lien is, however, subordinate to the rights exist. ing between the parties to the action, suit, or proceeding.

Lien of attorney.

Oct. 11, 1862, 1012.

Lien on papers. The lien attaches not only to papers which the attorney himself drew, but to all papers which come to his hands as attorney: Gist v. Hanley, 33 Ark. 233. Lien on judgment. -The lien does not extend beyond the amount of costs unless there is a special agreement: Ex parte Kyle, 1 Cal. 331. The lien does not attach until

after entry of judgment in favor of the attorney's client: Hobson v. Watson, 34 Me. 20; Shank v. Shoemaker, 18 N. Y. 489.

Waiver. The lien may be waived in various ways; for instance, over papers, by parting with them: Nichols v. Pool, 89 Ill. 491; and so it may be waived by taking security: Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 275.

Oct. 11, 1862, 1013.

Attorney,

how made,

and effect of.

TITLE IV.

OF THE RESIGNATION OF ATTORNEYS, AND EFFECT THEREOF. § 1045. Resignation, how made, and its effect.

§ 1046. Certified copy of, to be filed in supreme court; may be readmitted.

§ 1045. [1013.] An attorney may at any time file in the office of the county clerk of the county in which he resignation of, resides a written resignation; and after the filing thereof he is not entitled to the rights nor subject to the disabilities or prohibitions incident to that relation, except that he is still subject to the power of the court in respect to matters arising while he was an attorney.

Oct. 11, 1862, 1014.

Certified copy

to be filed

§ 1046. [1014.] The clerk of the county with whom such resignation is filed shall immediately forward a of resignation certified copy thereof to the clerk of the supreme court, who shall file the same in his office. An attorney who has resigned may, at any time thereafter, be readmitted to practice as such in the same manner as if he had never been so admitted.

in supreme court.

May be readmitted

TITLE V.

OF THE REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS, AND THE
SUMMARY PROOF OF COURT OVER.

§ 1047. By what court and for what causes an attorney may be removed or

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§ 1052. May demur to or controvert the accusation.

§ 1053. If demurrer not sustained must answer forthwith. Judgment for

want of answer or trial.

§ 1054. Accusation on knowledge of the court presumed to be true, but may be shown otherwise.

§ 1055. Circuit or county court may suspend attorneys until next term of supreme court.

§ 1056. Proceeding to compel an attorney to deliver over money or papers. § 1057. How court to proceed if attorney claim a lien.

$ 1015.

§ 1047. [1015.] An attorney may be removed or sus- Oct. 11, 1862, pended by the supreme court for either of the following causes, arising after his admission to practice:

1. Upon his being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in either of which cases the record of his conviction is conclusive evidence;

2. For a willful disobedience or violation of the order of a court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of his profession;

3. For being guilty of any willful deceit or misconduct in his profession;

4. For a willful violation of any of the provisions of section 1038 [1006].

Disbarring or suspending attorneys. Attorneys are liable to forfeit their license to practice for any one of the above causes. The manner of declaring the forfeiture, and the proceeding upon which such action is based, are prescribed in the succeeding sections of this chapter. These sections regulate the exercise of the power to strike an attorney's name from the roll, but do not create such power; it is inherent in the court: Weeks on Attorneys, sec. 80; People v. Twine, 1 Cal. 143. In the exercise of this power, the court ought to give counsel an opportunity to explain: Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Id. 427. It is improper to declare an attorney guilty of contempt and strike his name from the rolls without affording an opportunity for explanation: Id.

Attorneys have been disbarred for advising a client to verify a complaint which the attorney knew to be false, and which he led his client to suppose had been corrected before verification: People v. Pearson, 55 Cal. 472. The evidence held insufficient in In re Lowenthal, 2 West Coast Rep. 733, to

justify the removal or suspension
from the bar.

Whether an attorney can be re-
moved or suspended for causes other
than those mentioned in this section
was not decided, although raised, in
In re Treadwell, 4 West Coast Rep.
608. See the variety of instances in
Weeks on Attorneys, secs. 80 et seq.
For an interesting and valuable de-
cision upon the power of the court to
disbar attorneys, see Ex parte Wall,
107 U. S. 265.

Reinstatement. Where an attorney is improperly disbarred, mandamus has been issued to restore him: People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 190. Some decisions have held this to be the appriate remedy, while others declare that appeal or certiorari should be resorted to: See the cases pro and con, Weeks on Attorneys, secs. 142, 160, 161.

Court will not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction to disbar an attorney in a proper case merely because the offense charged is indictable, and the accused has not been convicted or prosecuted thereon: State v. Winton, 11 Or. 456.

By what court and for what causes an

attorney may

be removed

or suspended.

§ 1016.

§ 1048. [1016.] The proceeding to remove an attorney, Oct. 11, 1862, as provided in the last section, shall be taken by the

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