Statement of the Case.

20. as snown by the stipulated facts. the defenaant, Simeon Hallowell, an Omaha indian, is an allottee of lans ranted to him on the Cmana Indian Reservation, in Thurston County, State of Nebraska, which allotment was made to him under the provisions of the act of Congress of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat. 351), and the first patent was issued to him in the year 1884, and the twenty-five years' period of the trust limitation fixed by said act has not expired, and the fee title of the allotment so made to him is still held by the United States; and where 'the said Omaha Indian Reservation has been allotted practically in whole, and many of the allotments of deceased Omaha Indians have been sold to white people under the provisions of the act of Congress of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 275);' and within the original boundary limits of the Omaha Indian Reservation many tracts of land were hitherto sold under the provisions of said act to white persons, who are the sole owners thereof, and to whom the full title to such lands has passed to the purchaser, the same as if the final patent without restriction upon alienation had been issued to the allottee; and where all of the Omaha Indians, living in the year 1884, entitled to such allotments, have received the same; and where said Omaha Indian Reservation is within and a physical part of the organized territory of the State of Nebraska, as also the allotment hereinbefore referred to; and the said Omaha Indians, including the defendant, are citizens of the United States, and exercise the rights of citizenship, participating in the County and State governments extending over said Omaha Indian Reservation, and over the allotments aforesaid, the said defendant, Simeon Hallowell, having, on frequent occasions prior to 1905, held and exercised the office of Judge, and Justice of the Peace, and Assessor in said county, where said Omaha Indians have taken part in the State and the County government extending over the Reservation, and where the defendant is. self-supporting; is he liable to indictment and punishment under the act of Congress of January 30, 1897 (29 Stat. 506), for intro

ducing intoxicating liquor, as into an Indian country, where he procured one-half gallon of whiskey at a point outside of said reservation, on the first day of August, 1905, which he took into and upon his allotment, within the limits of the Omaha Indian Reservation, which allotment he inherited and which was made under the provisions of said act of August 7, 1882, the fee title to which is held by the Government, as the twenty-five years' trust period has not expired, the said whiskey having been so taken upon his allotment for the purpose of drinking and using the same himself, which he drank, giving some of it to his friends and visitors to drink?”

Mr. Thomas L. Sloan for Hallowell.

The Solicitor General for The United States.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Williams, 205 U. S. 444, 454, we had occasion to consider the scope and meaning of the sixth section of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, authorizing a Circuit Court of Appeals, in every case within its jurisdiction, to certify questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires instruction for the proper decision of the case. The court there reaffirmed the rule, announced in previous cases, that the authority to certify such questions could not be used for the purpose of sending to this court the whole case, with all its circumstances, for consideration and decision. Jewell v. McKnight, 123 U. S. 426; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U. S. 699; United States v. Rider, 163 U. S. 132; United States v. Union Pacific Railway, 168 U. S. 505. Upon a review of the adjudged cases we used this language in reference to the certificate of questions in that case: "The present certificate brings to us a question of mixed law and fact and, substantially, all the circumstances connected

with the issue to be determined. It does not present a distinct point of law, clearly stated, which can be decided without passing upon the weight or effect of all the evidence out of which the question arises. The question certified is rather a condensed, argumentative narrative of the facts upon which, in the opinion of the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals, depends the validity of the live-stock contract in suit. Thus, practically, the whole case is brought here by the certified question, and we are, in effect, asked to indicate what, under all the facts stated, should be the final judgment. It is, obviously, as if the court had been asked, generally, upon a statement of all the facts, to determine what, upon those facts, is the law of the case." 205 U. S. 444, 454.

The certificate in the present case is objectionable upon the ground that it does not set forth propositions of law, clearly stated, which may be answered without reference to all the facts, but mixed questions of law and fact which require us to construe various acts of Congress, and, in the light of all the testimony in the case, determine whether the accused could be held guilty of any offense legally punishable by the United States. It is as if the court were asked what, upon the whole case as sent up, should have been the verdict and judgment in the trial court. The certificate is defective and must be dismissed, because not in conformity to the statute.

It is so ordered.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 73. Argued April 16, 17, 1907.-Decided March 23, 1908.

Railroads are the private property of their owners, and while the public has the power to prescribe rules for securing faithful and efficient service and equality between shippers and communities, the public is in no proper sense a general manager. The companies may, subject to change of rates provided for in the Interstate Commerce Act, contract with shippers for single and successive transportations and in fixing their own rates may take into account competition, provided it is genuine and not a mere pretense.

There is no presumption of wrong arising from a change of rate made by a carrier. The presumption of good faith and integrity attends the action of carriers as it does the action of other corporations and individuals and those presumptions have not been overthrown by any legislation in respect to carriers.

A rate on the manufactured article resulting from genuine competition and natural conditions is not necessarily an undue and unreasonable discrimination against a manufacturing community because it is lower than the rate on the raw material; and, under the circumstances of this case, there was no undue and unreasonable discrimination against the Chicago packing-house industries on the part of the railroads in making, as the result of actual competition and conditions, a lower rate for manufactured packing-house products than for livestock from Missouri River points to Chicago.

141 Fed. Rep. 1003, affirmed.

CERTAIN proceedings were had before the Interstate Commerce Commission. They were commenced by the filing of a petition by the Chicago Live Stock Exchange in April, 1902, charging the defendants, who are now the appellees, with the violation of §§ 1 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887. The specific offense stated was that the defendants were charging higher rates of freight upon live stock shipped from Missouri River points, and other points

similarly situated, to Chicago, than upon dressed meats and the prepared products known as packing-house products. It was contended that this higher rate of freight was an unlawful discrimination against shippers of live stock to Chicago, and gave to shippers of packing-house products an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage over the former; that it subjected the Chicago Live Stock Exchange and its members, who were engaged in the business of selling live stock on commission, as well as the owners of live stock and the shippers thereof, to an unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage. The several defendants, with one or two exceptions, answered, denying the allegations of the complaint. After a hearing, the Interstate Commerce Commission, on January 7, 1905, filed its report and opinion, including findings of fact, and made an order, which is the foundation of this suit. The order is in these words:

"Order of Commission.

"This case being at issue upon complaint and answers on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Commission having, on the date hereof, made and filed a report and opinion containing its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which said report and opinion is hereby referred to and made a part of this order:

"It is ordered, that, in accordance with said report and opinion, the present relation of rates maintained and enforced by defendants [naming them all, eighteen in number], whereby their rates for transportation are higher upon live cattle and live hogs than upon the dressed or prepared products of cattle and hogs on shipments thereof to Chicago, in the State of Illinois, from points on the Missouri River, Sioux City, in the State of Iowa, to Kansas City, in the State of Missouri, inclusive, and from South St. Paul, in the State of Minnesota, or from points in the territory between the Missouri River or South St. Paul and Chicago, constitutes wrongful prejudice