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This provision, plaintiff in error contends, as applied by the courts of the State, separates criminal defendants into classes, to wit, those who are accused before the finding of the indictment and those who are accused afterwards,. giving to the first a privilege of challenge which is denied to the second. And, it is contended, that there is no substantial reason for the classification, and, therefore, the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, which secures to all persons the equal protection of the laws, is violated.

The Court of Errors and Appeals met this contention by denying that the statute made the classification asserted. The court observed that the contention rested "fundamentally upon the proposition that the right to have the grand jury discharged upon the statutory grounds stated in section 6 of the jury act is for the benefit or protection of a particular class of persons," whom, the court said, "to avoid constant paraphase," it would "call putative criminals." And "putative criminals," the court defined, to be all who actually committed crime before the grand jury had been sworn, or who were charged or suspected, or, being wholly innocent, were ignorant of the fact that they were suspected, as well as those who were charged with the crime during the sitting of the grand jury. But to none of these, the court said, was the protection of the statute addressed; that its purpose was the "furtherance of the due and efficient administration of justice for the protection of those against whom crimes might be committed as well as those who might be charged with the commission of such crimes." The object sought to be attained, it was further said, by the disabilities expressed in the statute, "was to secure an efficient and representative inay be summoned, it shall be good cause of challenge to any such juror, who shall be discharged upon such challenge being verified according to law, or on his own oath or affirmation in support thereof; provided, that no exception to any such juror on account of his citizenship or age, or any other legal disability, shall be allowed after he has been sworn or affirmed. Act of April 21, 1876, P. L. 360; 2 General Statutes of New Jersey, 1896, p. 1853, § 47.

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body of citizens to take part in the due administration of the law for the benefit of all who were entitled to its protection, and not specially or even primarily for the benefit of those charged with its violation."

This we accept as the proper construction of the statute, and see no unconstitutional discrimination in it. It is to the effect that certain qualifications have been deemed advisable in order to make the grand jury a more efficient instrument of justice-qualifications which have no relation to any particular defendant or class of defendants. And the practical is regarded. Objection may be taken before a jury is sworn, but not afterwards, and the statute uses for its purpose the Prosecutor of Pleas, those who stand accused of crime and even, the court says, an amicus curia. A grand jury thus secured will have all the statutory qualifications in most cases for all defendants; and besides the discrimination is very unsubstantial, as was pointed out in Gibbs et al. v. State, 16 Vroom, 382.

Counsel has not been able to point out what prejudice rcsults to defendants from the enforcement of the statute. He urges a verbal discrimination, and invokes the Fourteenth Amendment against it. The statute, he in effect says, fixes the limit of service at twenty-one and sixty-five years, and confesses the latter is "somewhat early," but seeks to sustain his contention as follows: "And though it may not be possible in any case to show that the fact of the juror being above the lawful age has worked injustice to the defendant, he is not required to show it. It is enough that a statute has been transgressed which was enacted, in some measure at least, for his benefit. The due observance of that statute is part of the protection of the laws, to which, equally with all others in like circumstances, he is entitled under the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."

But this proceeds upon a misconception of the purpose of the statute, as was pointed out by the Court of Errors and Appeals, and of the power of the State.

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Let it be granted, in deference to the argument of counsel, that the statute makes two classes-those who are accused of crime and those that may be accused-there is certainly no discrimination within the classes, and the only question can be whether, in view of the purpose of the statute, is the classification justified? In other words, whether the persons constituting the classes are in different relations to the purpose of the law. That they are we think is obvious; and, as we have said, the law neither offers or withholds substantial rights. It constitutes one of its instrumentalities of persons having certain qualifications which cannot affect essentially the charge against or the defense of any defendant. It is the conception of the State that a grand jury so constituted would be more efficient in the administration of justice than one not so constituted, but that there would be counteracting disadvantages if the right of challenge should be extended beyond the date of the empanelment of the jury. We think it is competent for the State to have so provided.

It will be observed that the provision of the statute is that no exception to a juror "on account of his citizenship or age or any other legal disability [italics ours] shall be allowed after he has been sworn." It is hence contended that "the principle of the decision" under review is not limited to the "statutory disqualifications." The court said, however, “whether the words of the statute, 'any other disability,' include the common law grounds of prejudice, malice and the like, and, if so, what would be the rights and remedies of an indicted person who had had no opportunity to challenge a given juror upon these personal grounds is not involved in the facts of the present case or in the line of reasoning upon which, in our judgment, its decision should be placed." In connection with. this comment see Lee v. State of New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67.

Judgment affirmed.

209 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY v. JERSEY CITY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 203. Argued April 15, 16, 1908.-Decided April 27, 1908.

"Jurisdiction" as generally used in compacts between States has a more limited sense than "sovereignty."

Under the agreement of 1833 between the States of New York and New Jersey, 4 Stats. 708, while exclusive jurisdiction is given to New York over the waters of the Hudson River west of the boundary line fixed by the agreement, the land under such waters remained subject to the sovereignty of New Jersey and the jurisdiction given to New York over the waters does not exclude the sovereign power of New Jersey to tax such land, nor does an exercise of that power deprive the owner of the land of his property without due process of law.

This court in construing a compact between States will hesitate to reach a conclusion different from that reached by the highest courts of both States. 43 Vroom, 311, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frank Bergen and Mr. William D. Edwards, with whom Mr. George Holmes was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Prior to the execution of the compact New Jersey did not have jurisdiction for any purpose over the land under the waters of Hudson River and New York Bay and has no jurisdiction now below low-water mark of the river and bay or over the property of the plaintiff in error except that conferred by the compact. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 371, cited and approved in State v. Davis, 25 N. J. Law, 387; Handley's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 13; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 345; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U. S. 592.

By the compact exclusive jurisdiction was granted or conceded to New York over the land of the plaintiff in error, sub

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

209 U.S.

ject only to the right of New Jersey to regulate fisheries in the waters covering the same, provided navigation be not obstructed. It is admitted that if any docks, wharves or improvements had been made on the property they would be subject to taxation by New Jersey and (in this instance) as part of the upland. There are, however, no improvements on the property. State v. Babcock, 1 Vroom, 29; Kiernan v. The Norma, 32 Fed. Rep. 411; Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459.

Authority to regulate fisheries in the waters covering the property of the plaintiff in error does not involve the power to tax it.

The word "jurisdiction" is used in the compact in its broad common sense; that is, the power to govern-to exercise executive, legislative and judicial authority. We think the word was not used for the limited purpose of conferring merely judicial authority or the right to exercise partial or indefinite police power. The term "exclusive jurisdiction" is repeatedly used, and whenever qualified the exceptions are specified as definitely as possible. United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60, 64, 91; Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.

Taxation cannot be imposed except by authority of a government having jurisdiction over the property assessed broad enough to include the power to tax. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 396; Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194; D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341; Ops. Mass. Justices, 1 Metc. 580; United States v. Ames, 1 Woodbridge & Minot, 76, 80; Mitchell v. Tibbets, 17 Pick. 298, and United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246.

New Jersey does not possess the power to tax the property of the plaintiff in error. That State has no jurisdiction below the low-water mark on its shore over Hudson River and New York Bay south of Spuyten Duyvil creek except over wharves, docks and improvements made and to be made thereon and over vessels aground thereon or fastened to any dock or wharf and the right to regulate fisheries; but even this measure of

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