1. Suit in equity proper method to determine constitutionality of state railroad rate statute.
While a common carrier sued at common law for penalties under, or on in- dictment for violation of, a state rate statute might interpose as a defense the unconstitutionality of the statute on account of the confis- catory character of the rates prescribed, a jury cannot intelligently pass upon such a matter; the proper method is to determine the constitution- ality of the statute in a court of equity in which the opinions of experts may be taken and the matter referred to a master to make the needed computations and to find the necessary facts on which the court may act. Ex parte Young, 123.
2. Suit by stockholders to enjoin corporation.
In this case a suit by a stockholder against a corporation to enjoin the direct- ors and officers from complying with the provisions of a state statute, alleged to be unconstitutional, was properly brought within Equity Rule 94 of this court. Ex parte Young, 123.
3. Suit against State; what constitutes within meaning of act of Tennessee of 1873.
A suit against state officers to enjoin them from enforcing a state statute which violates complainant's constitutional rights either by its terms or by the manner of its enforcement is not a suit against the State within the meaning of the statute of 1873 of Tennessee, denying jurisdiction to the courts of the State, of suits against the State. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 211.
4. Effect of bill in equity to set aside agreement of adjustment of a community— Necessary parties to such bill.
A bill in equity to set aside an agreement of adjustment of a community between the widow and children, brought after the death of the widow who had also left children by a second marriage, is a liquidation of the community and although the property was derived solely from the first husband the children of the second marriage are, as heirs of the mother, interested in her share and are necessary parties to the bill. Garzot v. de Rubio, 283.
See JURISDICTION, B 6, C;
PUBLIC LANDS, 2;
BANKRUPTCY, Act of July 1, 1898, § 60a (see Bankruptcy, 1): Richardson v. Shaw, 365.
CHINESE EXCLUSION, Acts of September 13, 1888, c. 1015, §13, and May 15, 1890, c. 60, § 3 (see Immigration, 1): Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 453. CIVIL SERVICE, Act of January 16, 1883, § 12 (see Criminal Law, 4): United States v. Thayer, 39.
COPYRIGHT Act as amended March 3, 1891 (see Copyright, 1): White-Smith Co. v. Apollo Co., 1. Amendment of § 4966, Rev. Stat. by the Act of January 6, 1897 (see Copyright, 3), Ib.
CRIMINAL LAW, Rev. Stat. §§ 711 and 5339 (see Jurisdiction, D 3): Battle v. United States, 36.
CUBA, Act of March 2, 1901, c. 803 and Platt Amendment (see Principal and Agent, 2): O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 45.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, Acts of February 24, 1905, c. 778, and August 13, 1894, c. 280 (see Statutes, A 2): U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 306.
HABEAS CORPUS, Rev. Stat. § 753 (see Habeas Corpus): Hunter v. Wood, 205. INJUNCTION BONDS, Rev. Stat. § 718 (see Injunction, 1): Hutchins v. Munn,
INSPECTION OF CATTLE, Acts of February 2, 1903 and March 3, 1903 (see Interstate Commerce, 13): Asbell v. Kansas, 251. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (see Interstate Commerce, 3): Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 56 (see Interstate Commerce 5): Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 108. Sherman Law (see Re- straint of Trade, 2): Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 423. Elkins Act of February 19, 1903 (see Criminal Law, 5): Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 56. Acts of March 2, 1889 and February 19, 1903 (see Interstate Commerce, 1): Ib. JUDICIARY Act of March 3, 1891, § 6 (see Jurisdiction, A 8): Hallowell v. United States, 101; § 5 (see Practice and Procedure, 7): Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 24. Act of April 7, 1874, § 2 (see Jurisdiction, A 6): Garzot v. de Rubio, 283. Rev. Stat. § 909 (see Jurisdiction, A 3): General Oil Co. v. Crain, 211 (see Jurisdiction, A 4): Thomas v. Iowa, 258. PORTO RICO, Act of May 1, 1900, § 33 (see Courts, 5): Garzot v. de Rubio, 283. PUBLIC LANDS, Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8 (see Public Lands, 2): United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 447.
TARIFF ACT of July 11, 1897, par. 296 (see Statutes, A 6): United States v. Hermanos y Compañia, 337.
ADMINISTRATION.
See JURISDICTION, C.
ADMISSION TO BAR.
See TREATIES, 1.
ALIGNMENT OF PARTIES.
See JURISDICTION, B 5.
1. Preferred creditors; customer of stock broker to whom is turned over stock carried on margin, as.
A broker who turns over to a customer, upon demand and payment of ad- vances, stock which he is carrying on margin for that customer, or certificates for an equal number of shares, does not make the customer a preferred creditor within the meaning of § 60a of the bankrupt law; in the absence of fraud or preferential transfer the broker has the right to continue to use his estate for the redemption of pledged stocks in order to comply with the valid demand of a customer for stocks carried for him on margin. Richardson v. Shaw, 365.
2. Preferred creditors; payment by broker to customer on account of excess margins not a preference.
A payment by the broker to a customer on account of excess margins to which the customer is entitled and which is taken into consideration when the account is finally closed, held, under the circumstances of this case, not to be a preferential payment within the meaning of § 60a of the bankrupt law. Ib.
3. Trustee's title no better than that of bankrupt.
If title to property is good as against the bankrupt or his creditors at the time the trustee's title accrues, title does not pass, and the owner of the property is entitled to have it restored to him, or, if it has been sold, the proceeds thereof. Thomas v. Taggart, 385.
4. Shares of stock held by a broker as collateral for the account of a customer held property of customer as against trustee in bankruptcy; effect of hy- pothecation.
Shares of stock held by a broker as collateral for the account of a customer, upon which the latter is not indebted to the broker, are the property of the customer, and, as the trustee has no better right thereto than the bankrupt, the customer is entitled to their possession; and this right is not affected by the fact that the broker had hypothecated the shares. In such case the customer is entitled to the shares, or their proceeds, when returned to the trustee if the loan has been paid by proceeds of other securities pledged therefor. Ib.
5. Proof of claim of customer against bankrupt broker not a waiver of right to recover possession of specific stocks.
Proof of claim of a customer against a broker, including value of securities deposited as collateral, does not amount to a waiver of his right to re- cover possession of the specific stocks, if found, where his claim specifi- cally states that he does not waive such right of possession. Ib.
BERNE COPYRIGHT CONVENTION.
BOUNDARIES.
See PROPERTY RIGHTS, 1;
PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
BROKERS.
1. Stockbroker as pledgee of stock carried on margin.
While a broker who carries stocks for a customer on margin may not be
strictly a pledgee at common law, he is essentially a pledgee and not the owner of the stock. Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, approved. Richardson v. Shaw, 365.
2. Stockbrokers; relation to customer.
Neither the right of the broker to repledge stock carried on margin for a customer, nor his right to sell such stock for his protection when the margin is exhausted, alters the relation of the parties, is inconsistent with the customer's ownership, or converts the broker into the owner of the stock. Ib.
3. Stockbrokers; change of certificate as change in property right held by broker for customer.
A certificate of stock is not the property itself but the evidence of the prop-
erty in the shares, and, as one share of stock is not different in kind or quality from every other share of the same issue and company, the re- turn of a different certificate, or the right to substitute one certificate for another of the same number of shares, is not a material change in the property right held by the broker for his customer. Ib.
4. Stockbroker as pledgee of stock carried on margin.
Richardson v. Shaw, ante, p. 365, followed to the effect that as a general rule the broker is the pledgee and the customer the owner and pledgor of stocks carried on margin. Thomas v. Taggart, 385.
5. Commissions of real estate brokers.
A broker employed to sell land subject to a requirement of the purchaser which the vendor declares will be complied with is entitled to his com- missions if the sale falls through solely because the vendor's representa- tions are inaccurate. Dotson v. Milliken, 237.
The fact that the particular portion of a tract of land for which a broker finds a purchaser in accordance with the vendor's offer cannot be identified does not defeat the broker's claim for commissions if the sale falls through entirely for other reasons for which the vendor was exclu- sively responsible. Ib.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1, 2, 4, 5.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
See ACTIONS, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, approved in Richardson v. Shaw, 365.
Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, distinguished in Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 405.
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, distinguished in Ib.
Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, explained in In re Moore, 490.
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