Argument for Petitioners. 209 U.S. plete in Kansas. See Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; In re Belknap, 96 Fed. Rep. 614, 616, 617; Davis v. United States, 43 C. C. A. 448; S. C., 104 Fed. Rep. 136, 138, 139; United States v. Fowkes, 3 C. C. A. 394; S. C., 53 Fed. Rep. 13, 16, 17. The purpose of § 2, Art. III, of the Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment, was to give to defendant the benefit of an indictment by, and a trial before, a jury of his neighbors, or of the community in which the offense was committed, and to protect him against a trial “as a stranger in a strange land” where he had never been and in which he had committed no act. Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U. S. 20; Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73, 83; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349, 350; West v. Gammon, 39 C. C. A. 271; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 304. The shipment being a through export shipment, was not within the Elkins Act, which is limited to "the interstate or foreign commerce" provided for in the original Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, and amendments thereto, 25 Stat. 855. Its terms have no application to a through export shipment and as such shipments are excluded from the scope of the act, 86, requiring the publication of schedules, can have no application thereto. The act covers only rail carriers, or those with a combined rail and water (inland) route. Independent inland water carriers are not included, nor water carriers under a common arrangement with each other for continuous shipment. With broadest interpretation of phrase, "common control," etc., it is only water (inland) carriers that make joint rates with a rail carrier that come within the act. All other carriers are excluded, wagon, express, telegraph, etc. Ocean carriers, whether acting independently or making common arrangement with rail carriers, are outside the act; because they do not carry the kind of commerce that is regulated by the act, that is, foreign commerce while it is outside port of transhipment or entry; nor do they come under description of carriers regulated. The act as construed by the Circuit Court of Appeals is in 209 U.S. Argument for Petitioners. conflict with Art. I, § 9, par. 5 of the Constitution, which prohibits the laying of any tax or duty on articles exported from any State or the giving of any preference by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another. This prohibition upon exported articles is a guaranty against any form of legislation which burdens exportation. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283. The act as construed also violates that portion of the section which prohibits any preference to the ports of one State over those of another, as it gives a distinct preference to those ports which are reached by water as against those which are reached only by land. See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 284, 420; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 294. The contract of the shippers with the Burlington Company was a valid one. A carrier can make a contract to carry for a fixed period at the then published rates, and such a contract is not subject to the right of the carrier, voluntarily and without the shipper's consent, to change it at any time, upon giving the statutory notice, by an amendment of the tariff. The right to make a change in the tariff is a privilege given to the carrier which it can waive. While it can make no contract that is not subject to a change in the rate by Congress or by finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it can for itself agree to carry for a given time at an existing published rate. See packing house contract case (Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. G. W. Ry. Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 1003); special milk shipper's contract (D., L. & W. R. Co., 147 Fed. Rep. 51, 61; certiorari denied, 203 U. S. 588). The statute does not in terms interfere with the contractual right of the carrier. Without prohibition by a statute, such a contract is undoubtedly valid. Cin. &c. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 184; Pond-Decker Lumber Co. v. Spencer, 30 C. C. A. 430; S. C., 86 Fed. Rep. 846, 848; 4 Elliott on Railroads, § 1560; Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Abell, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 191; S. C., 30 S. W. Rep. 658, 659; Baldwin v. Liverpool & G. W. Argument for Petitioners. 209 U.S. Ry. Co., 48 Hun, 496, 500; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Chicago &c. Coal Co., 79 Illinois, 121, 126; Atlanta, K. & N. R. Co. v. Horne, 106 Tennessee, 73; S. C., 59 S. W. Rep. 134, 135. Having made the contract in accordance with the schedule, it was the duty of the carrier to keep such schedule in force and to carry for all others at the same rate. Hence, there was no right to change the tariff during the life of the contract. Such was the effect of the contract. Laurel Cotton Mills v. Gulf &c. R. Co., 84 Mississippi, 339. The indictment was insufficient. The indictment omitted the statutory words, "whereby by any device property be transported at a less rate. Not only this, but it wholly failed to state how, in what manner, or by what means the concession was obtained, or of what it consisted. In a statutory offense, there cannot be any omission of any element of the offense as defined; and, the indictment must show the means by or the manner in which the offense was committed. Even in statutory offenses of the character in question, there is an exception to the general rule that it is sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute. United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Mann, 95 U. S. 583; United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584; United States v. Brazean, 78 Fed. Rep. 464, 465, and cases cited; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584; Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434; United States v. Britton, 107 U. S. 655, 669. The facts did not warrant a finding of any criminal guilt. Nothing in the record warrants any imputation of bad faith. It can well be contended that the element of willfulness in the former law must be extended to the Elkins Act. Another principle leads to exactly the same result. In the Federal courts even if a statute does not use the words "willfully or intentionally" or make scienter necessary, still the statute will be construed to mean that there must have been knowledge of wrongdoing and actual guilty intent, unless, possibly, 209 U. S. Argument for the United States. in cases where a specific act is unconditionally made an offense. So where the offense is uttering forged paper, United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; obstructing justice, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197; mailing obscene matter, United States v. Slenker, 32 Fed. Rep. 691, 694; obstructing Federal election officers, United States v. Taylor, 57 Fed. Rep. 391; adopting device prohibited by the Elkins Act, United States v. Milwaukee Transit Co., 142 Fed. Rep. 247, 252. This is a recognition of the general rule that criminality will not be imputed unless an act is done in bad faith, or with an intention of violating the law. The Attorney General, Mr. Milton D. Purdy, Assistant to the Attorney General, and Mr. A. S. Van Valkenburgh, United States Attorney, for the United States: The acts of the shippers in these cases in accepting and receiving a special rate or discrimination, whereby their goods were carried at a less rate than that charged others for the same service, constitutes a crime under the Elkins Act without regard to whether there was any secret device employed by them to obtain from the railroad company the concession of such. rebate, special rate or discrimination. The history of the prior acts in pari materia, as well as of the Elkins Act itself, shows this to be so. United States v. Tozer, 37 Fed. Rep. 635; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 148 Fed. Rep. 719; New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361; Harris v. Rosenberger, 145 Fed. Rep. 449; Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306. The court had jurisdiction of the alleged crime for the reason that the transportation was conducted through the district, and the transportation of the property is an essential element of the offense. The offense of giving or receiving rebates is susceptible of prosecution whenever the transportation has started by the delivery of the property to the carrier, and continues and is ever present until that transportation is completed. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; Heyman v. Southern Argument for the United States. 209 U. S. Ry. Co., 203 U. S. 270; United States v. Fowkes, 53 Fed. Rep. 13; In re Belknap, 96 Fed. Rep. 614; State v. Smith, 66 Missouri, 61; State v. McGraw, 87 Missouri, 161; State v. Hatch, 91 Missouri, 568; Commonwealth v. Parker, 165 Massachusetts, 526; State v. Bailey, 50 Ohio St. 636; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Massachusetts, 1, 6. In export shipments, the Elkins Act applies to interstate inland carriage from the point of origin within the United States to the port of transhipment. The Interstate Commerce Act (§ 1) plainly applies to commerce with a country not adjacent. It places that commerce entirely within the operation of the act, whether the same is between the point of origin and the port of transhipment or between the port of entry and the point of destination. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197. This act was designed primarily in the case of export shipments for the protection of the shipper; no one shipper, but shippers in the aggregate. Take away the necessity of published rates and of adherence to published rates, and there is little to prevent the carrier, by a complex and devious system of rate-making, from discriminating between various shippers similarly situated from the point of origin to the port of tran~ shipment, and of so skillfully concealing or excusing the same that punishment in any given case would be well-nigh impossible. This, Congress foresaw, and in order to prevent this greater evil it passed a law, which may possibly, as is the case with all laws conferring general benefits, work some temporary inconvenience in isolated cases. In any event, the discretion was with Congress, and with Congress alone, and the courts cannot do otherwise than enforce the plain provisions of the legislative act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 477 et seq.; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 145 U. S. 363. The act in question here is not unconstitutional as burdening export traffic nor as giving preference to the ports of one State over those of another. If it at all affects the traffic of any port |