July, 1872, and to pay to the heirs at law of said D. Fulford the amount of said bonds, together with accrued interest from July 1, 1872, to the date of the maturity of said bonds."

The bill further provides that the heirs to whom the payment is to be made shall execute and file with the Secretary of the Treasury a bond "conditioned to save harmless the United States from loss or liability on account of said bonds or the interest accrued thereon, and to contain such words as to cover any liability resulting from any mistake in the designation or description of the bonds, so that in no event shall the United States be called upon by a rightful claimant for a second payment thereof." The proposition is that the Government shall pay bonds alleged to have been destroyed by fire nearly twenty-three years ago.

The Secretary of the Treasury states that an application for the payment of these bonds, made by Mr. Fulford himself, was rejected by the Department because he was unable to describe the bonds in such a way as to permit their identification and because the evidence of their destruction by fire was inconclusive.

The Senate Committee on Claims, however, in their report on the bill under consideration, state that they are entirely satisfied that Mr. Fulford was the owner of four Government bonds, one for $500, one for $100, and two for $50, and that they were burned with his residence, which was destroyed by fire on the 9th day of July, 1872, and that while he could not furnish the numbers or descriptions of said bonds he understood all these bonds were of the class known as consols of 1867, and that he had collected the coupons thereon for the interest due July 1, 1872.

The particular class of bonds mentioned were dated July 1, 1867, and were payable or redeemable not less than five nor more than twenty years from their date. The short period expired, therefore, on the 1st day of July, 1872. That was the date when the last coupons on Mr. Fulford's bonds, which it is alleged were detached and collected, became due, and only nine days before the supposed destruction of the bonds by fire.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury dated July 20, 1892, attached to the report of the Senate committee made upon a bill similar to this which was pending at that time, discloses the fact that among the consols of 1867 then outstanding there were 107 of the denomination of $500, 167 of the denomination of $100, and 85 of the denomination of $50. This statement merely shows that there were numerous bonds precisely similar to those described as belonging to Mr. Fulford which had not in July, 1892, been redeemed, though the extreme limit of their maturity expired on the 1st day of July, 1887. The letter of the Secretary further discloses, however, that there were two of these outstanding bonds of the denomination of $500 and two of the denomination of $100 upon which coupons of interest had not been paid since July 1, 1872. Of course this

lends plausibility to the cuggestion that two of these four bonds, one of each denomination, were those destroyed when Mr. Fulford's house was burned in July, 1872; but this suggestion loses its force under the additional statement in the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury that in July, 1892, there were no consols of 1867 of the denomination of $50 whose last coupon was paid July 1, 1872. This shows conclusively that no fifty-dollar bonds of this class were destroyed by fire in Mr. Fulford's house and casts great uncertainty upon the description of the other bonds, inasmuch as the theory of the claimants seems to be that all the bonds destroyed belonged to the same class.

In 1893, upon an examination of the records of the Treasury Department, it was found that the two unpaid bonds for $500 reported in 1892 as outstanding, from which no coupons had been paid since July 1, 1872, still remained unredeemed, but that one of the two one-hundred-dollar bonds which were in that condition in 1892 had been since that time paid and canceled. I think it must be conceded that this late redemption of this bond greatly weakens any presumption that the other three will not be presented for payment.

It is perfectly clear that so far as this bill directs the payment to the persons therein named of two consols of 1867 of the denomination of $50 each on the ground that such bonds were destroyed by fire in July, 1872, it requires the payment of money to those not entitled to it, since it is shown that these consols could not have been destroyed at the time stated, because coupons due on all consols of that denomination unredeemed have been paid since that date.

While the objections to the payment of the amount of the other two bonds mentioned in the bill are less conclusive, there seem to be so much doubt and uncertainty concerning their description and character, and their identification as unredeemed consols of 1867 is so unsatisfactory, that, in my opinion, it is not safe to assume, as is done in this bill, that they are represented among those bonds of that class recorded as still outstanding whose coupons for some reason have not been presented for payment since July 1, 1872.

I do not believe that an indemnity bond could be drawn which, as against the strict rights of sureties, would protect the Government against double liability in case all the payments directed by this bill were made. Even if the payments were confined to the two larger consols described, there would be great difficulty in framing a bond which would surely indemnify the Government.

There should always be a willingness to save the holders of Government securities from damage through their loss or destruction, but, in my judgment, a bad precedent would be established by paying obligations whose destruction and identification are not more satisfactorily established than in this case.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 19, 1895.

To the House of Representatives:

I return herewith without approval House bill No. 6244, entitled “An act to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of Jacob Eckert."

This bill directs the Secretary of War "to cause the records of the War Department to be so amended as to remove the charge of desertion from the service record of Jacob Eckert, of New Philadelphia, Ohio, late a private in Company B, Sixty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and to grant an honorable discharge to said Jacob Eckert from the service of the United States Army as of date when said company was mustered out of service." The regiment and company to which this soldier belonged, except such members as reenlisted as veterans, were mustered out of the service October 17, 1864.

Jacob Eckert did not reenlist and was not mustered out with his comrades for the reason that he was then under arrest on a charge of desertion. In November, 1864, he was tried by a general court-martial and convicted of having deserted on the 1st of September, 1864, and again on the 2d day of September, 1864, and upon such conviction he was sentenced to forfeit all pay due him from September 1, the date of his first desertion, until the expiration of his term of service, to be dishonorably discharged and confined at hard labor for twelve months.

This sentence was approved by the reviewing authority, and I assume the convicted soldier served his term of imprisonment, since the statement contained in the report of the House committee to whom this bill was referred that he was dishonorably discharged in 1865 can be accounted for in no other way.

It seems to me that the provisions of this bill amount to a legislative reversal of the judgment of a regularly constituted court and a legislative pardon of the offense of which this soldier was convicted. If this doubtful authority is to be exercised by Congress, it should be done in such a manner as not to restore a man properly convicted and sentenced as a deserter, without even the allegation of injustice, to the rights of pay, allowance, and pension belonging to those who faithfully and honorably served in the military service of their country according to the terms of their enlistment. GROVER CLEVELAND.

To the Senate:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 20, 1895.

I return herewith without approval Senate bill No. 1526, entitled "An act for the relief of Henry Halteman."

This bill directs the Secretary of War "to grant an honorable discharge from the United States service to Henry Halteman, late of Company F, Second United States Artillery."

It is conceded that this soldier enlisted in the Regular Army on the 18th

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day of December, 1860, for the term of five years and that he deserted on the 18th day of August, 1865. The only excuse or palliation offered for his offense is found in the statement that his desertion was provoked by his company's being ordered to California so near the termination of his enlistment that his term would have expired before or soon after his company could have reached California, and "that his return would have been both tedious and somewhat perilous, if not expensive."

The fact must not be overlooked that this soldier enlisted in the Regular Army and that his term had no relation to the duration of the war or the immediate need of the Government for troops at the time of his desertion. The morale and discipline of the Regular Army are therefore directly involved in the proposed legislation.

The soldier's name remained on the records of the War Department as a deserter at large for twenty-three years, and until the year 1888. In August of that year application was made to the Department for the removal of the charge of desertion against him, which was refused on the ground that it was not shown that such charge was founded in error. Thereupon he applied for a discharge without character, as it is called, as of the date of his desertion. This was granted on the 21st day of September, 1888. Such discharges, which were not uncommon at that time, omitted the certificate of character which entitled the soldier to reenlistment.

In 1892 a bill similar to that now under consideration was referred to the Adjutant-General of the Army and was returned with an adverse report. The record of the War Department on the subject of this soldier's separation from the Army is absolutely correct as it stands, and no sufficient reason is apparent why another record should be substituted. If this deserter is to be allowed an honorable discharge, I do not see why every deserter should not be absolved from the consequences of his unfaithfulness.

The effect of this bill if it should become a law would be to allow the beneficiary not only a pensionable status, but arrears of pay and clothing allowances up to the date of his desertion and travel allowance from the place of his desertion to the place of his enlistment.

It is not denied that all these things have been justly forfeited by deliberate and inexcusable desertion. In the case presented it seems to me that the laws and regulations adopted for the purpose of maintaining the discipline and efficiency of the Army ought not to be set aside.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 23, 1895.

To the House of Representatives:

I return herewith without approval House bill No. 8165, entitled "An act authorizing the Kansas City, Oklahoma and Pacific Railway Company to construct and operate a railway through Indian reservations in the

Indian Territory and the Territories of Oklahoma and New Mexico, and for other purposes."

This bill contains concessions more comprehensive and sweeping than any ever presented for my approval, and it seems to me the rights and interests of the Indians and the Government are the least protected.

The route apparently desired, though passing through or into one State and three Territories, is described as indefinitely as possible, and does not seem to be subject to the approval in its entirety of the Secretary of the Interior or any other governmental agency having relation to the interest involved.

There is no provision for obtaining the consent of the Indians through whose territory and reservations the railroad may be located.

Though it is proposed to build the railroad through territories having local courts convenient to their inhabitants, all controversies that may arise out of the location and building of the road are by the provisions of the bill to be passed upon by the United States circuit and district courts for the district of Kansas "and such other courts as may be authorized by Congress."

The bill provides that "the civil jurisdiction of said courts is hereby extended within the limits of said Indian reservations, without distinction as to citizenship of the parties, so far as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act." This provision permits the subordination of the jurisdiction of Indian courts, which we are bound by treaty to protect, to the "provisions of this act" and to the interests and preferences of the railroad company for whose benefit the bill under consideration is intended.

A plan of appraisal is provided for in the bill in case an agreement can not be reached as to the amount of compensation to be paid for the taking of lands held by individual occupants according to the laws, customs, and usages of any of the Indian nations or tribes or by allotment or agreement with the Indians. It is, however, further provided that in case either party is dissatisfied with the award of the referees to be appointed an appeal may be taken to the district court held at Wichita, Kans., no matter where on the proposed route of the road the controversy may originate. If upon the hearing of said appeal the judgment of the court shall be for the same sum as the award of the referees, the costs shall be adjudged against the appellant, and if said judgment shall be for a smaller sum the costs shall be adjudged against the party claiming damages. It does not seem to me that the interests of an Indian occupant or allottee are properly regarded when he is obliged, if dissatisfied with an award for the taking of his land, to go to the district court of Kansas for redress, at the risk of incurring costs and expenses that may not only exceed the award originally made to him, but leave him in debt.

It is probable that there are other valid objections to this bill. I have only attempted to suggest enough to justify my action in disapproving it.