munists were able to worm their way into positions of importance and gradually to infiltrate the government and gain an ever-increasing element of control. This was magnified under the succeeding administration of Jacobo Arbenz, and during the early 1950s the situation became extremely serious. Guatemala was drifting toward a complete Communist takeover. It was only as a result of the revolution of mid 1954, in which the United States was involved quietly but effectively, that the Arbenz government was removed and this menace destroyed, at least for a time.

We might examine Communist activities in a few other countries. Costa Rica is certainly one of the most democratic states in all of Latin America, but the two leftists administrations in power between 1940 and 1948 permitted a Communist infiltration into the government that for a time seriously threatened the country. This danger disappeared with the revolution in 1948, which served to preserve democracy.

In Mexico broad economic, social and cultural reforms, arising from the 1910 Revolution, were well under way before the Communists began extensive international operations, and the Mexicans have been able to carry out their revolutionary program without serious Communist interference. The Mexican Communist party, founded in 1919, did manage to gain a foothold in some labor unions, but has never had much success in politics and for many years has not shown sufficient strength to participate in elections. Mexico's one strong political party, now known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, has held undisputed control of the country since its organization in 1929, and minor parties have been of little consequence. Thus, contrary to some other Latin American republics, leading Mexican political figures have not found it necessary or expedient to seek or accept Communist support and in turn have not been vulnerable to Communist intrigues. In Mexico, where Communists have been free to operate, politically they have little strength, but Marxism as a philosophy does play a significant role, especially among certain artists, writers and students. The Mexican Revolution, on the other hand, was home-grown, and there has been no place in it for Communist influence.

Although Cuba's drift into communism and subsequent events there have been widely publicized, a brief discussion here is in order. A Communist party was organized in Cuba in 1925, but under the Machado dictatorship (1924-33) its activities were severely restricted. In the late 1930s, after Batista had become the Cuban strong man, the Communists were given greater freedom, in line with his then policy of trying to appear democratic. While still illegal, the party was allowed in May 1938 to begin publication of a daily paper, Hoy. Following this, the Communists began to cooperate more closely with Batista and a few months later the party was legalized for the first time. During the next few years, and especially from 1940 to 1944 while Batista served as President, the Communists made significant progress, particularly in organized labor, where apparently they were given a free hand. Under these circumstances party membership rose to about 150,000.

In March 1943, after the party became an official part of the coalition supporting Batista, he appointed a Communist to his cabinet-the first time in Latin America that a Communist attained such a position. In the 1944 elections the Communists won three seats in the Senate and nine in the Chamber of Deputies. For a time in the mid-1940s there was cooperation between the Communists and President Grau San Martín as he needed their support, but subsequently the government began to restrict their activities. Especially under the Prío Socarrás administration of 1948-52 Communists found the going difficult and began to lose ground rapidly. Between 1948 and 1950 party registration fell from about 150,000 to 55,000. After Batista's seizure of power in March 1952, the party met with severe treatment and in less than two years was declared illegal. The Communists could claim no credit for Batista's return to power, and by now he needed U.S. friendship more than Communist support. Although some of its former members remained in the government, the party went underground.

When he gained control of Cuba at the beginning of 1959, one of the first things Fidel Castro did was to free the Communist party. Party membership, reported at that time as 12,000, increased very rapidly. Castro, formerly a fascist, found Communist support most welcome as his rise to power and control of the country were based to a large degree on anti-United States policies. Subsequently, as is well known, Castro of necessity has been closely allied with the U.S.S.R., which has furnished most of his external economic support, although from time to time he has appeared to prefer the Chinese Communist philosophy.

Brazil, the largest Latin American republic, has faced a serious Communist threat within the past decade. For many years the Communists there were carefully held in check and their party remained illegal. Particularly was this so during most of the 15 year dictatorship of Getulio Vargas (1930-45). However, there was a rather sudden turn of events in 1945. Vargas, seeing potential use of this additional political support in elections scheduled for December, legalized the Communist party. Elections were held in late 1945-after a coup had toppled Vargas from power. A major surprise was the relatively strong showing of the Communists who received more than 600,000 votes. In elections of early 1947 they did even better, polling 800,000 votes-about 16 percent of the total. By now they had elected 2 senators, 14 members of the Chamber of Deputies and about 70 members of state legislatures. President Dutra was so disturbed by this show of strength that within a few months the party was declared illegal, Communist members were expelled from Congress, and Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. But as an outlawed party the Communists were permitted to operate freely because there were many politicians who recognized that here was a bloc of votes. From time to time there were agreements whereby Communist support would go to a given party which in turn would back certain Communist candidates running under other labels. Communist advances under this system reached a climax in the early 1960s during the Goulart regime. He apparently was trying to use this situation to his advantage, but actually was being used by a few effective Communist leaders who were rapidly gaining control of the government. This increasingly dangerous situation together with a serious economic crisis resulted in the revolution of early 1964 which toppled Goulart from power. Under the strongly anti-communist military regimes which have followed, Communist influence has been drastically curtailed.

At the present time the two Latin American countries, outside of Cuba, in which the Communists are operating most successfully are Chile and Uruguay. As the current Chilean situation is of such great concern, some details on how it came about should be of interest.

Chile has the longest history of democratic government of any country in Latin America. For many years it has been a multi-party state and government is usually by coalition. The Chilean Communist party was organized in the early 1930s and began to gain a following, especially among the rather numerous industrial labor element. As part of a coalition this effectively run party has been able to wield far greater influence than would be possible under other circumstances. In 1946 Gabriel González Videla was elected President. He was a member of the Radical (actually a moderate) party, but some of this support had come from the Communists. In return he appointed three Communists to his cabinet. However, they soon caused so much trouble that they were thrown out, the party was outlawed, and Chile broke off diplomatic relations with all Communist countries. But shortly before the 1958 elections, the Communist party again was legalized and has been very active and successful since. In each of the last three presidential elections (1958, 1964 and 1970) Salvador Allende has been the candidate of a coalition composed of his own Socialist party (actually more radical than the Communists), the Communist party and several other leftist groups. It was such a coalition that brought him to the presidency in 1970. In this election he polled only a slightly larger vote than Jorge Alessandri, his conservative opponent. As he did not have a majority, Congressional approval was necessary. In order to obtain this, Allende had to back away to a considerable degree from his announced campaign platform. One thing he had to promise was to preserve democratic government in Chile in very much the same form it has been known for so long.

In almost all Latin American states the military plays a very important role politically and in the majority of them it is the controlling factor. Chile is an exception to the general pattern. It has probably the best organized military in Latin America, but it is a military which customarily has been non-political. However, in 1924 the military did step in, took over the government, and until 1932 was in a controlling position. After that it faded again into the background. Since his election Allende has been very much aware that he has to be careful as far as the military is concerned. I was in Chile a few months ago, and one of the most interesting things I found was a standoff between Allende and the military. Military leaders were saying, "We support constitutional, democratic government in Chile." In other words, "We support the government as long as it remains constitutional." If he strays too far from the democratic path or they think he is going too far, Allende may find himself out of office.

A casual observer viewing the Latin American scene today probably would conclude that in most of these countries Communist interest and effectiveness have declined to the point where the Communist movement no longer should be considered a danger. The Sino-Soviet rift has weakened Communist efforts in many cases, and general Soviet policy appears to have mellowed to the extent of opposing violence. Recent attempts at cultural and economic exchange, aimed at eliminating Latin American fear and distrust, have met with only minor success. However, a closer look coupled with an understanding of the background should reveal a somewhat different picture. Officially the U.S.S.R. has turned away from its former crude efforts to promote revolution in Latin America and today is following a more peaceful and sophisticated policy. But Soviet leaders really have not abandoned their long-range objective of establishing Communist power in this part of the world. They still hope, through skillful exploitation of urban labor and rural peasant classes, as well as certain pseudo-intellectual groups, to convert the Latin American republics to socialist systems. On the other hand, recent desires of Latin American governments to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. have been based primarily on an attempt to pursue an international role independent of the United States rather than any love for the Soviets and communism. Moreover, in the past a very large percentage of Latin American political and military leaders have shown keen awareness of Communist designs and considerable skill in dealing with them. This awareness and skill should be expected to continue.

Mr. PEPPER. Is there any other witness now, Mr. Schultz?

Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, sir. I would like to call Albert Solomon, investigator.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT H. SOLOMON, JR.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Would you state your full name for the record, please? Mr. SOLOMON. My name is Albert H. Solomon, Jr.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Where are you employed?

Mr. SOLOMON. I am employed as an investigator by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Solomon, Dr. Davis has just given testimony regarding the English-language version of the Cuban newspaper, Granma, and commented on its content. The masthead of this publication identifies it as the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Did you make inquiries to determine the number of copies of this publication which come into the United States and its distribution in the country?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, I did. However, I determined that there is no established procedure for monitoring, screening, or following such material by the U.S. Postal Service or by the Bureau of Customs. Accordingly, I was unable to develop any precise information regarding the number of copies coming into the country or its distribution here. Mr. SCHULTZ. Were you able to determine the manner in which the English-language version of Granma entered the United States?

Mr. SOLOMON. While I was unable to obtain specific data in this regard, the best information indicates that single copies are air mailed directly from Havana, Cuba, to addressees in the United States and that other copies come in from Cuba by mail through Mexico and Canada.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you determine why the Postal Service or the Bureau of Customs does not monitor or control the import of this publication?

Mr. SOLOMON. I made inquiry at the Postal Service and determined that the mailing into the United States of this publication and others.

like it is not a violation of any United States law or any U.S. Postal regulation, nor is it counter to any international postal agreement to which the U.S. Government is a party.

The current U.S. Postal Service position in this matter is based on a 1965 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Lamont v. The Postmaster General; the citation is 381 U.S. 301. A U.S. Post Office procedure in effect at that time, that is, 1965, required U.S. addressees of foreign-origin communist political propaganda to indicate in writing to the Post Office that they desired to receive such material.

Under that procedure, the U.S. Bureau of Customs at the port of entry into the United States segregated apparent communist political propaganda from foreign-deposited mail. The Post Office then withheld such mail from delivery within the United States until the addressee requested delivery in writing. The Post Office maintained records of such individuals.

The Supreme Court, in its decision in the Lamont case, held that this procedure was in violation of the first amendment to the Constitution and was thus unconstitutional.

Since that time the Postal Service, formerly known as the U.S. Post Office, has had no procedure for identifying or monitoring foreign-origin communist political propaganda placed in the U.S. mails for delivery.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you check with the Bureau of Customs?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes. Inquiry at the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department determined that the Bureau of Customs is authorized to seize any article entering this country by mail or by other means if the article appears to be material the importation of which is prohibited under section 1305, title 19, of the U.S. Code. It was stated that foreign communist political propaganda is considered to come within this statute.

If such material is seized, a decision is obtained from the Department of Justice as to whether it falls within the restrictions of the statute, and if so, it is destroyed.

About 5 percent of the foreign-origin mail coming into the United States is screened by officials of the Bureau of Customs at international mail facilities in the U.S. I learned that there has been no detention or seizure of copies of Granma or other Cuban printed oriented propaganda in recent years.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you determine whether there are Federal regulations covering the importation of material such as Granma in bulk or for commercial purposes?

Mr. SOLOMON. At the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, I was informed that Foreign Assets Control has responsibility for administering controls on all materials imported into the United States, including foreign-origin propaganda, in order to prevent foreign exchange earnings by specified countries. Such controls are currently applied to three countries-North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba.

Foreign Assets Control prohibits the unlicensed importation of any material for commercial purposes. Commercial firms may be licensed to receive such material, but the profit from its sale in this country

must go into a frozen account, which prevents the return of such funds to the proscribed country.

In addition, there are organizations licensed with the approval of the Library of Congress to receive political propaganda materials from these countries, such as approved research projects, college libraries, and the like.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What happens to foreign-origin political propaganda in bulk from proscribed countries, such as Granma?

Mr. SOLOMON. Such material in bulk from the proscribed countries is turned over to the Bureau of Customs at the mail facility of the port of U.S. entry. Customs officials determine whether the U.S. addressee is licensed to receive it, and, if not, it is destroyed.

It was further indicated in my inquiries that members of the Venceremos Brigade, those persons invited to Cuba to assist Fidel Castro in the cane fields, often carry into the U.S. amounts of Cuban political propaganda. The Bureau of Customs is authorized to seize such material, but often these materials are admitted as foreignobtained gifts to the returning U.S. citizens, and of no monetary value. Mr. SCHULTZ. Mr. Solomon, I would direct your attention to Exhibit No. 5, which is before you there. Both Dr. Manolo Reyes and Dr. Davis have commented on this packet to the effect relative to its propaganda values. Did you conduct any inquiries concerning this material?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, I did. Dr. Reyes informed me that this Cuba Resource Packet could be obtained from the U.S. Catholic Conference in Washington, D.C., by mail for 2 dollars a copy, and I made inquiry at the Latin-American division of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Mr. SCHULTZ. Where is this located?

Mr. SOLOMON. That is at 1430 K Street, NW., in Washington.
Mr. SCHULTZ. What did you learn there?

Mr. SOLOMON. I determined that the Resource Packet was a product of an organization known as the Cuba Resource Council, which is connected with the National Council of Churches in New York City. The packet shows as its point of origin the Cuba Resource Center, which is an adjunct of the Cuba Resource Council.

The Latin American Division of the U.S. Catholic Conference had been requested to accept 200 copies of this packet and to publicize its availability through the Catholic Conference in Washington.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Did you make further inquiry to identify the Cuba Resource Council?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, I did conduct such inquiry and determined that approximately 2 years ago the Cuba Resource Council was formed in New York City by professional church people with an interest in Cuba. The council has been supported and financed by church organizations and denominations in this country, including the National Council of Churches, the Methodist Church, other Protestant denominations, and by the Catholic Church.

Mr. SCHULTZ. What kind of a budget does this council have? Mr. SOLOMON. It was stated that the council operates on a budget of $20,000 a year, which is contributed by the organizations and denominations which support it.

Mr. SCHULTZ. Do they maintain a coordinator and office space?