authorize the Administrators of the City to Modify the Last Budget and Tax Levy, and to Repeal conflicting Laws and Penalties," the object of which was to relieve the authorities of the city until December, 1876, from the duty of estimating, levying and collecting any tax for a sinking fund for the purpose of purchasing any of the bonds issued under the Acts mentioned.

The petition also alleges that, in further violation of the provisions of the Act of 1852 and of the contract with the holders of the bonds, the Legislature, on the 6th of March, 1876, passed another Act, designed, as stated in its title, to adjust, regulate and provide for the bonded debt of the City of New Orleans, and authorize the exchange of its bonds for other bonds to be issued on the plan known as the premium bond plan, the avowed object of which was to impair, if possible, the obligation of the contract between the bondholders and the city, and devest the rights acquired by them under it, by prohibiting the city authorities from levying a tax in any year under the provisions of the Acts of 1852, by shackling the judicial tribunals in the issue of process, and by repealing the provisions of that Act. The 7th section is as follows:

which was refused, the city authorities answering that there were no funds out of which they could be paid; and that the city and the taxable real estate within its limits are liable for the payment of the matured coupons and for the purchase of said bonds to the extent of $650,000 per annum, for the years 1874, 1875, 1876 and 1877, less coupons paid for 1874 and | 1875.

The petitioner, therefore, prays for a writ of mandamus and injunction against the city authorities; the former, commanding them to levy the special tax of $650,000 for the years named; and the latter, enjoining them from levying any other tax on real estate within the limits of the city which is subject to the special tax for the consolidated debt, until the special tax has been levied.

Upon the petition, an alternative writ of mandamus was issued, requiring the city authorities to show cause why they should not comply with its prayer.

The authorities appeared on the return day and excepted to the jurisdiction of the court to grant the writ, on the following grounds:

not liquidated by judgment, or to levy and collect any interest tax other than that provided in Act No. 31 of 1876, the Premium Bond Act;

1. That by the provisions of the Acts of the Legislature, No. 5 of the extra session of 1870 "Sec. 7. Be it further enacted, etc., That no tax and No. 31 of 1876, the courts of the State for the payment of bonds or interest on bonds were prohibited from issuing a writ of mandaother than that authorized by the preceding sec-mus to compel the respondents to pay any debt tions (the premium bonds), shall be levied either for the year 1876, or any year or years thereafter by the City of New Orleans, and that all existing laws requiring or authorizing the city council to levy any tax whatsoever for bonds or interest on bonds, other than said premium bonds, be and the same are hereby repealed; and it shall be hereafter incompetent for any court to mandamus the officers of said city to levy and collect any interest tax other than that provided in this Act, or in case of such mandamus, by a receiver or otherwise, to direct the levy and collection of any such tax."

2. That the duty of the respondents by the city charter and the 6th section of the Act No. 31 of 1876, was limited to the levy and collection of a tax on the assessed value of all property subject to taxation within the city, at a rate not exceeding one and one half per cent on the dollar, to meet all expenses of the city government, and to pay the interest on its bonded debt;

3. That the respondents are expressly forbidden by Act No. 31 of 1876, the Premium Bond Act, from levying the tax demanded for the year 1876, or for any year afterwards;

4. That the Legislature, by Act No. 53 of 1874, had suspended the levy and collection of any tax for the sinking-fund under the Act of 1872 until December, 1876, which, the respondents charge, was passed with the assent of the Southern Bank.

And if the exceptions should be overruled, the respondents, reiterating and pleading the matters contained in them as part of their answer, further add :

5. That the provisions of the 37th section of Act No. 71 of 1872 are unconstitutional and void, because their object is not expressed in the title of the Act, as required by article 118 of the Constitution of 1845, in force at the time;

The petition then avers that these Acts of the Legislature of Louisiana are in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, in that they impair the obligation of the contract between the bondholders and the city; that, nevertheless, the authorities of the city, its Mayor and administrators, in disregard of the provisions of the Acts of 1852, and in contempt of their duties and of the rights of the relator and other bondholders similarly situated, have refused to perform the duty imposed upon them by those Acts for the years 1874, 1875, 1876 and 1877, to levy a special tax for the payment of the matured coupons and the purchase of bonds; that they have levied upon the property subject to the levy of such special tax for the payment of the consolidated bonds, other taxes to meet other bonds issued by the city, in disregard of the 6. That the tax provided by the section menprohibitory clauses of section 37 of the Act of tioned is unconstitutional and void, and in vio1852, and the moneys collected have been ap-lation of section 127 of the Constitution of 1845, plied to the payment of those bonds, and other illegal purposes; that the authorities of the city have been notified to levy the special tax required for the years mentioned, but they have refused to discharge their duty in that particular and, in place thereof, have sought by all sorts of frivolous and unfounded technicalities to contest the validity and integrity of the consolidated bonds; that the relator has demanded payment of the matured coupons held by it,

and article 123 of the Constitution of 1852: be cause, first, it is to be assessed on real estate and slaves and not on personal property; and, seeondly, because the rate per cent of the tax in each municipality is to be in proportion to the indebtedness of each.

By a supplementary answer, the respondents reiterated the same objections to the vrit in more ample terms.

Various parties, including the State of Louisi

Nearly all legislative contracts are made in a the proper subjects of legislation in the Act similar way. The law authorizes certain bonds which took them out of existence as separate to be issued, or certain work to be done upon municipalities and created a new corporation in specified conditions. When these are accepted, their place, with power to deal with their af a contract is entered into imposing the duties fairs. We hold, therefore, that the Act of 1852 and creating the liabilities of the most carefully was not invalid, on the ground that its object is drawn instrument embodying the provisions. not sufficiently expressed in its title. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall., 535 [71 U. S., XVIII, 403]; Hartman v. Greenhow [ante, 274]; People v. Bond, 10 Cal., 563; Brooklyn Park Co. v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y., 235.

There were other provisions in the Act of 1852 besides those stated, which, though not essential to the obligatory form of the contract, were designed to inspire the creditors with confidence in the punctual payment of the interest and principal. It declared that all ordinances, resolutions, or other Acts passed by the council after the first day of January of each year should be null and void, unless the ordinance imposing the consolidated loan tax should have been previously passed. It also declared that after its passage no obligation or evidence of debt of any description whatever, except those therein authorized, should be issued by the city or under its authority. Whatever legal force may be ascribed to them, they were intended as solemn asseverations that the pledge of the annual tax should never be violated.

The second ground of objection to the validity of the Act of 1852 is, that the tax prescribed is to be levied upon real estate and slaves, to the exclusion of personal property, and in each municipality in proportion to its indebtedness; which, as contended, violated the rule of equality and uniformity required by the Constitution of 1845. The language of the Act is, that, "The common council shall annually, in the month of January, pass an ordinance to raise the sum of $600,000 by a special tax on real estate and slaves, to be called the consolidated loan tax, and the rate per cent of said tax in each municipality shall be in proportion to the indebtedness of each." This amount, as already stated, was, upon the annexation of the City of Lafay ette, increased to $650,000. On the passage of this Act, February 23, 1852, the Constitution of 1845 was in force. The Constitution of 1852 was not adopted until July of that year. Article 127 of the Constitution of 1845 is as follows: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. After the year 1848 all property on which taxes may be levied in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law. No one species of property shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value on which taxes shall be levied; the Legislature shall have power to levy an income tax and to tax all persons pursuing any occupation, trade or profession."

The question then arises: was the Act of 1852 valid? Its invalidity is asserted, as stated above, on two grounds; the first of which is that its object is not expressed in its title, as required by article 118 of the Constitution of 1845. The title of the Act is "An Act to Consolidate the City of New Orleans, and to Provide for the Government and Administration of Its Affairs." The article of the Constitution declares that "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed This article has been frequently before the in the title." A similar provision is found in Supreme Court of the State for construction, several State Constitutions. Its object is to pre- and until the decision of the present case the revent the practice, common in all legislative bod-quirement of equality and uniformity in the tax ies where no such provision exists, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters, having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures are often adopted without attracting attention, which, if noticed, would have been resisted and defeated. It thus serves to prevent surprise in legislation. But it was not intended to forbid the union of several different provisions in the same bill if they are germane to the general subject indicated by its title. A bill to incorporate a city and provide for its government may, without conflicting with the constitutional clause, contain provisions relating to the various subjects upon which municipal legislation may be required for the preservation of peace, good order and health within its limits, the promotion of its growth and prosperity, and the raising of revenue for its government. So here, under the title of the Act in question, provisions might be enacted, not merely relating to the union of the different municipalities and the government of the city, but to all the varied details into which the general administration of its affairs might lead. The municipalities were in debt at the consolidation, and this was well known to the Legislature. A change in their government, and in the administration of their affairs, required some disposition to be made of their debts. Whatever interests were possessed by them were

has been held to apply only to taxes levied for State, and not to those levied for muncipal purposes. The first case was that of the Se ond Municipality of New Orleans v. Duncan, 2 La. Ann., 182. That municipality had passed an ordinance imposing a special tax of one per cent on all real estate within its limits for the purpose of paying its debts and providing for the support of schools, and objection was taken to its constitutionality on two grounds: 1, that the power of taxation was vested exclusively in the Legislature and could not be delegated to the municipality; and 2, that the taxation authorized impinged upon the rule that no one species of property should be unduly as sessed. Both grounds were supposed to derive support from the article of the Constitution in question; the first, because, as contended, the equality and uniformity required throughout the State were only obtainable by confining the exercise of the power of taxation to the Legislature, whose authority was co-extensive with the territorial limits of the State; and the second, from the inhibition against taxing one species of property higher than another. But the court replied, speaking through its Chief Jus tice: "The article, by its terms, applies to state and not to municipal taxes. It provides for equality and uniformity of taxation throughout the State. *** The framers of the Constitu

*

filling the state Treasury. It does not take away the power of making local assessments for local improvements, upon the equitable principle that he who reaps the benefit must bear the burden. * It is notorious that an acre of land pays twice as great a tax for local purposes in one parish, as an acre of equal value pays in another parish. Yet no one thinks the Constitution infringed by such a state of things." 11 La. Ann., 220.

tion had before them the condition of the mu- pality had imposed a tax on the owners of propnicipalities of New Orleans, with their debts, erty contiguous to a newly opened street, to pay their abuses and their wants; and their corpo- the expenses of opening it, under a law which rate existence is recognized and continued, as authorized the apportionment of the cost in such to certain public rights, by an express provis- cases upon the owners of adjacent property, acion. The jurisprudence under which the pres- cording to the benefit derived from the improveent system of taxation had grown up was be- ment. The court was of opinion that the law fore them and the power of remedying the evils was liable to the objection that the tax was not of misgovernment was left in statu quo, with equal and uniform, as required by the clause in the Legislature; and the convention confined it- question, and held it to be unconstitutional. The self to providing for the State Government, decision was in conflict with that in Duncan's leaving the municipal bodies, as it is believed Case, but it was rendered by a divided court; sound policy justified, under legislative control." and in Yeatman v. Crandall, which arose in And referring to the admission made in the rec-1856, it was overruled. In the latter case, the ord that there was no special ordinance of the plaintiff sought to enjoin the collection of a municipality assessing taxes on personal prop- levee tax, which was imposed on certain alluerty, the court added: We know of no reason vial lands, on the ground that the statute auimperative on the municipality to impose their thorizing it was unconstitutional, in that it viotaxes in any particular form, or to include any lated the rule of equality and uniformity preother species of property in an ordinance im- scribed by the article in question. But the court posing a tax on real estate. It constitutes no ob- said: "This article refers to state taxation, in jection, under any view of the subject, to the its proper sense, for general or state purposes. validity of this tax, that personal property was When it says that taxation shall be equal and not also taxed by special ordinance." uniform throughout the State, it points directThis case was decided in 1847, and it is object-ly to its object, which is to regulate the mode of ed that it arose before that part of the article went into effect, which declares that "No one species of property shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value on which taxes shall be levied." It is doubtful * whether this objection be correct in point of fact, but assuming it to be so, the requirement of equality and uniformity was in force; and the part cited does not require that taxation shall be universal. It simply requires that when different kinds of property are taxed, the rate of taxation shall be the same on all. The construction given was afterwards affirmed by the same court in Lafayette v. Cummings, 3 La. Ann., 673, which was decided in 1848. There the question was as to the validity of a municipal tax on the trade and occupation of the defendant as a butcher, levied under an ordinance of the city passed in 1847. There were other trades and occupations not embraced in the Ordinance and, consequently, not taxed. It was, therefore, contended that the imposition of the tax was contrary to that clause of the article of the Constitution which provides for the equal- The doctrine of this case was affirmed the ity and uniformity of taxation throughout the same year in Surgi v. Snetchman, and Surgi v. State. But the court replied that "In the case Batalord, 11 La. Ann., 387; and again in 1859 of Duncan v. Second Municipality, this ques- in Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. Ann., 503. In its tion, after very thorough argument, was deter- opinion, in the latter case, the court said that mined by this court, and the article was held the questions in the Yeatman Case were decided applicable only to state and not to municipal upon full consideration, after having the aid of taxes." It is said in answer to this decision, the arguments of learned counsel in that case, that the language of the court was a mere dic- and also in another case then under considera tum. We do not so regard it. The point of tion on a rchearing, and were subsequently afcontention in the case was, whether the equal-firmed in the two cases mentioned; and added ity and uniformity applied to taxation on occupations and trades as well as on property. The answer which met the objection to the taxation on real property exclusively was held to meet the objection to taxation on certain occupations to the exclusion of others.

The Constitution of 1852 contained a similar clause (identical in language, omitting the words after the year 1848") and, with one exception, subsequently reversed, it has received a similar construction from the Supreme Court of the State. The case referred to was that of Municipality No. Two v. White, which arose in 1854. 9 La. Ann., 446. The munici

By this decision the doctrine of the earlier cases, upon the clause in the Constitution of 1845, was re-established; and one of the Judges, who had concurred in the decision in the White Case, stated that he had been led to reconsider his opinion, and that he yielded his former impressions on this point the more readily, because the Supreme Court which sat under the Constition of 1845, and five of the seven Judges with whom he had sat upon the bench, had concurred in holding that the article in question was not intended to apply to municipal or local taxation for local improvements.

that, "After these decisions, which were in conformity with those under the Constitution of 1845, we had hoped the question would be considered as at rest.'

""

The objection to the want of equality and uniformity in the taxation authorized by the Act of 1852, in that it was to be levied on the property of the different municipalities in proportion to the indebtedness of each, does not strike us as possessing much force. The debts created by the municipalities were separate and different in amounts, and before the consolidation the taxes upon the property in them must necessarily have been assessed at different rates.