whole Germanic population, to a man. Could Austria have afforded to aid him in the struggle which would have risen, she would have been obliged to draft her regiments from her Sclavonic frontiers. There can hardly be a doubt that the issue of such a struggle would have proved disastrous to France, besides aiding Prussia to realize with greater promptitude that scheme of genuine imperialism which she is now accomplishing by gradual annexations. The only question, then, is, whether it would have been more conducive to the interests of France to maintain the status quo, rather than to have remained with folded arms a passive spectator of the establishment of a great empire on its frontiers which must place limits to its power. The maintenance of the old state of things in Germany could be regarded as profitable to France, only upon the principle that a flourishing State always derives prestige from the weakness-as a wealthy individual from the poverty of his neighbors. It proceeds upon the assumption that there is only a certain amount of political power and riches in the world, and that where new claimants for these objects come into being, they can have their demands satisfied only by detracting from the stores enjoyed by the present possessors. But surely there is a great fallacy underlying this reasoning, which supposes there is a limit to political power and industrial wealth, and that such limit has been already attained. If a people acquire fresh strength by centralizing their energies, developing their resources, and opening out new fields of industry, the advantages thus acquired, instead of being a detriment, must prove eminently beneficial to their neighbors, by increasing the value of their exchanges, and by stimulating them to move more quickly along the path of political eminence. The accession of power thus acquired by a new State, instead of detracting from the prestige of its maturer neighbors, only enables them, by invigorating their energies, to maintain the same prestige from a higher platform of excellence. In this respect, the modern family of nations, interlaced as they are in a reciprocal network of interests, flourish to some extent simultaneously, like the branches of a tree: a weak member can not have fresh vitality infused into it without increasing to a proportionate extent the strength of the whole. But this proportionate accretion of strength refers only to the sound elements in a State, and by no means implies an increase in its standing armies, which are often a direct cause of its weakness. The new organization of Italy and Germany confronts France with military levies even superior to its own; but this limit to its fighting power is the very thing wanted to eradicate from the French mind the medieval notion that the greatness of a nation must depend upon its power of bullying its neighbors. The old cabinets of France appear to have acted upon the assumption that their country had no internal resources; that its treasury could be enriched only by foreign plunder, for which purpose it was always of momentous importance to keep its military supremacy, that it might be ready with numerous forces to pounce upon any country whose internal dissensions afforded it an easy opportunity of conquest. And these false ideas of increasing the greatness of their country by a menacing attitude have, unfortunately, become too deeply rooted in the minds of the present generation, from the military achievements, of Napoleon. But what has all this stirring of armies, this movement of muskets, done for France? What advantage has she derived from her frequent invasions of Holland, her periodic raids into Italy, and her numerous aggressions on the Rhine? The tide of conquest has only advanced one day to be rolled back the next, until she has come, in this present year of grace, to have pretty nearly the same frontier that she had before she was haunted with the mad idea of dominating over Europe. With the exception of the deadly swamp of Algeria, we know of nothing that France has conquered, beyond her own territories, which she has been able to retain. Even the prize of her last military achievement, Mexico, is about to follow in the wake of all the others which have slipped from her grasp. What human force could do to interfere with the general law of national development, France has effected; but that general law has baffled all her efforts, which, as if directed against the rock of inexorable destiny, have only recoiled on herself. Even when her military strength was directed by the genius of Napoleon, the empire he constructed was but for a day. The fates again rose up, and persisted in confining France within her old limits. But now, when his nephew is restored to the throne, for the purpose of resuscitating that empire, he is driven by the course of events, even in the zenith of his power, to become an agent in raising up barriers against the encroachments of his country, stronger than those which his uncle's enemies constructed when France lay bleeding at their feet. statesmen, from a united Italy and a If France, therefore, has gained nothing by her military ascendency, we do not see that she has anything to lose by forfeiting it. But in no other point of view can the recent changes in Italy and Germany cause any diminution of her powers; while the fresh accessions of wealth which must accrue to these nations from their improved organizations must overflow their boundaries, and pour a new stream of riches into the treasuries of France. There will also be the advantages resulting from mutual rivalries between the three nations, not in the battlefield, but in the fruitful paths of commerce and the arts; where the exchanges will not be in the shape of mutual wounds but of reciprocal profit, and where, if any ascendency be acquired, it can be based only upon the general prosperity. There can then be little doubt that the real interests of France will be benefited by the change. For the series of advantages attending the new is still further enhanced by the series of disadvantages attending the old state of things. What France will gain from a united Italy, and a united Germany, may be counted in increas-tures her upon the advantages of the poed argosies, in overflowing exchequers, in the augmented refinement of her cities, and in the multiplied comforts of her population. But what she has lost from a fractionized Italy and Germany can be computed only by years of energy misapplied in fruitless struggles for their dislocated territories, by hecatombs of subjects slaughtered to no purpose, by millions of treasures wasted in equipping armies, either to gain fruitless victories, or to be beaten back to their homes. For ourselves, who have no interests on the continent but those that are in unison with the progress of humanity, we cannot but be satisfied at the results which have been so far realized, notwithstanding our disgust at the chicanery and the coolness employed in bringing them about. With France accepting her Prussian rebuff with patience; eating her leek in humiliation, while the Emperor lec sition as the very state of things which his uncle desired to bring about; with a united Italy; with Austria excluded from Germany; with a population of twentynine millions directly or indirectly brought under the government of Prussia, and a prospective addition of some twenty-two millions more as a certain result, all these are an index that European state organizations are developing themselves after natural laws of brotherhood and fraternity that must redound to the general Whatever disasters France may have weal. If it were only for the settleto suffer, in the opinion of her Orleanist | ment of the Austro-Italian quarrel, there For it cannot be overlooked, whatever advantages Prussia has bestowed or may be destined to bestow upon Europe, that the example she has more recently set of the wanton infringement of the law of nations, her utter scorn of treaties when they stood in the way of her selfish purposes, her masking of private cupidity under the cloak of patriotic ends, has introduced further lawlessness of action into international statecraft, and inclined each kingdom to its own selfish ends, irrespective of its past engagements or its present obligations. would be much cause for gratulation. | come the advent of a man who has But in addition to this, there is the sacri- achieved greatness by means which, if fice of French ascendency upon the con- generally followed, would be highly prejtinent; the cooping up of that efferves- udicial to society, but who is content to cing people within their own boundaries, spend what he has plundered from indiby barriers far stronger than those erect-viduals upon advancing their corporate ed at Vienna, because they are natural prosperity. and not factitious; there is the promise of a compact German State, which will give Europe as little cause of uneasiness in its external relations, or as little cause for interference in its internal affairs, as Great Britain has done for the last one hundred years, or is likely to do for one hundred years to come. Now, there is no nation on the continent to which we would accede more readily the government of such a State than Prussia, because there is no other which has displayed more aptitude for directing the energies of large masses of people to useful ends; more skill in reconciling the Russia, seeing that no regard is paid greatest liberty of individual action with to treaties, that each nation is allowed to the loftiest requirements which can be follow whatever course is conducive to exacted from its subjects by a State; its interests, has openly avowed that it more generosity in sharing with those also feels itself, in the promotion of its subjects the sacrifices demanded, or sup- designs, as unshackled as its neighbor. porting the burdens which are imposed Now this silence, with the guns of Canfor the good of the community. The dia booming in our ears, is a harbinger welfare of the State is so identified with of future mischief, not less to be attribthat of the subject, that a man cannot uted to the success of Prussian spoliation perform the duties he owes to the gov- than to our indifference as to whatever ernment without advancing his own in- State should turn up the trump card on terests, just as he cannot discharge the the continent. We have openly avowed, duties he owes to himself without ad- or at least the present ministry has done vancing those of the common weal. We so for us, that we have no concern with have no fears at beholding Prussia take the political transformations on the Euher place in the vanguard of political ropean continent, but that, quite secure power, because she is already in the van- on our rock-built isle, we are alone conguard of civilization. She is the only cerned with the guardianship of our Indocountry which has obtained empire with- Colonial dependencies. This appears to out contracting debt, or which can obtain us only a general invitation to any Euthe ascendency of a great military nation ropean State, which harbors mischief, to at the expenditure of a small one, because carry its plans into effect without the she has solved the problem of the maxi- slightest prospect of armed intervention mum of political strength with the mini- on our part, even where we are bound to mum of standing armies. Even the interfere, not merely by moral obligamen whom she has under arms, she tions, but by the solemn stipulations of makes the best behaved portion of the treaties. Now, though the English nation community, by turning them into the may permit evil to be done, when certain most industrial. Looking at these results good is to result from it, we cannot think we are half inclined to endure the infamy it desirable to permit evil to be done with which Prussia has covered herself where our interests are concerned, when in rising to her present pitch of greatness. greater mischief is certain to result from We welcome the advent of Prussia to the it. To act up to the full extent of front rank, not with unmitigated pæeans the doctrine of non-intervention would of gladness, but just as we would wel- be as effectually to shut ourselves out from European, as Austria has excluded | separation between the man and the qu herself from German confederacies; for thor. Only an old and good-natured man our presence therein would not be of the can frankly avow all the faults and shortslightest account, if it be trumpeted forth comings of a light-minded and blundering that there is no possible readjustment of youngster, reprimand him severely, and European territory, no matter by what yet follow him with patronizing benevomeans brought about, which would war-lence through all his scrapes, even to rant us in unsheathing the sword. But prison. This is the position Mignet even apart from our special interests, we occupies with respect to Francis I. It have an interest, in company with all is amiable. But not all men are so well-meaning States, in the general pres- amiable as the Nestor of French histoervation of peace, and in punishing any rians. We must sometimes part commarauder who endeavors to interrupt the pany with him, and even occasionally general harmony for the gratification of try his patience by dry business questions his own rapacious purposes. Instead, proffered in a dry manner. therefore, of abandoning the field of Eu- Mignet published as far back as the ropean politics, at this turning point to year 1824 his Histoire de la Révolution a new era of diplomacy, it behooves us Française, a masterpiece which raised him to enter into those alliances which will at once to the highest position in literaenable us to resist lawless aggression, to ture. He had, consequently, then already build up an equitable system of federa- attained to the full development of his tive law in Europe, and to assist the de-intellectual powers. His Rivalité de velopment of nationalities upon the basis Charles Quint et de François Ier, which is of representative institutions. We have now publishing, shows that his mental long since made the advancement of our faculties are quite unimpaired by his sevmaterial interests one of the vital constit-enty years of life. Mignet is still as uents of modern progress. France is also rapidly acquiring the conviction that she can have no prosperity apart from the European common weal. Unity of ends ought to inspire mutual confidence and support. If the newly-constructed nationalities will act in unison with two such powerful nations, a confederacy of European States would no longer be a chimera,, but a reality, which would render war only a remote possibility, and disencumber modern communities of those vast armaments which are a disgrace to their civilization. Fraser's Magazine. MIGNET'S CHARLES V. AND FRANCIS I. MIGNET is most certainly a remarkable man, and a remarkable writer. We purpose to speak of him only in his quality of a writer, although we confess it is often difficult to draw a clear line of Rivaité de Charles Quint et de François Ier, by Mignet. Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 Janvier 1854, 15 Mars 1858, 1 Avril 1858, 15 Février 1865, 15 Février 1866, 1 Mars 1866, 15 Mars 1860, 1 Mars 1860, 15 Mars 1860, 1 Février 1866. fresh and as teeming with projects and written are, nevertheless, by no means numerous. He has never permitted himself to be hurried on. The publication of the Rivalité de Charles Quint et de François Ier, for instance, was begun in the month of January, 1854. The work has up to this moment advanced from the year 1519 to the year 1528. Thus, the history of eight years has absorbed at least twelve years' labor. When the ten chapters which hitherto have been printed in the Revue des Deux Mondes, shall be collected in a book, they will fill one volume of scarcely more than four hundred pages. Nevertheless the result is in perfect keeping with the time, industry, and genius bestowed on the work. The Rivalité de Charles Quint et de François Ier embodies as much information as is available in our days to any one man. The delineation Mignet gives of persons and of events is clear, vivid, and life-like. His judgment is honest and penetrating. The style is so perfect that we should hardly wish to see a single word added, suppressed, or altered. If, in spite of all the praise due to Mignet, we find fault, and serious fault, with his work, it is not to the author we address our reproaches. He has done whatever a historian can do to offer to the public a work as near perfection as possible. But the state in which genuine historical documents now are is so little satisfactory that only a restricted use can be made of them. With a few exceptions we may state that in our days the archives of the various governments of Europe are accessible to the student of history. Dispersed and unsifted, however, as these historical documents aremany thousands of them in cipher, without the corresponding deciphering-even a life so long and so well employed as that of Mignet does not suffice, first to find out where they are, and then to read them and mould them into history. As long as one dispatch must be sought for in one country, and the answer to it or still worse an inclosure in cipher which orders the ambassador not to execute the instructions written in plain writing-is preserved in another country, perhaps a thousand miles distant, it is impossible for the historian to discover them, to read them, to compare them with one another, and to elicit from them the real intentions of the government. That can be done only when all the documents which hitherto have remained in undisturbed repose in the different archives of Europe are collected, arranged, rendered easily intelligible by deciphering those of which the decipherings have been lost, and made accessible to the student of history by publication. Attempts to execute such a task have been made, and are still making. We acknowledge them with gratitude. But all the various plans upon which these publications are founded are too narrow. They will not, we are afraid, lead to satisfactory results so long as they are not based on the largest foundations. The widest plans which hitherto have been, we do not say executed, but only contemplated, are those of publishing the correspondence of one given government with certain other governments. Suppose, for instance, the French commission had really collected the whole correspondence between Francis I., on the one part, and the Pope, Charles V., the King of England, etc., on the other part: should we be enabled thereby to form a well-founded judgment on the political relations of Francis with any one of his brother kings? Certainly not. The Pope, the Emperor, the King of England, etc., might all of them send loving messages of peace to France, and at the same time concert between themselves a plan to destroy that kingdom. That is not an idle surmise of ours. Such has been the almost unvarying policy of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries-a continual conspiracy of all against all. In order to know whether any one government was right in trusting or suspecting the professions of any other government, it is not sufficient to read the dispatches addressed to this government alone. The correspondence of all the other governments with each other must be consulted. If we, for instance, wish to know whether Francis I. acted on a certain occasion as a clear sighted politician, or as a poor dupe, we must inform ourselves of what the real intentions of the Pope, the Emperor, the King of England, etc., were, and those intentions we only can learn from the correspondence between themselves, not from that with France. What the student of his |