Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

This Wood-Forbes report, based as it is upon indisputable evidence, could not be controverted, however unpalatable it proved to the small coterie of politicians to whom Harrison had abdicated control. In effect it was an indictment of the Nacionalista party, and of Quezón and Osmeña, its leaders, who had dominated the government for eight years. The Demócrata, or opposition party, acknowledged the findings of the report as true, cast the blame upon Harrison and his Nacionalista henchmen, and appealed to the people "to turn the rascals out." La Nación, official organ of the Demócratas, in its issue of December 13, 1921, stated editorially:

Let us not deceive the Filipino people with cablegrams from our Resident Commissioners in Washington who present President Harding as a man ready to disregard the recommendations of the Mission, because it is a fact that no Filipino delegation can deny the truths printed in the report of the Mission. Should the Delegates air the Filipino case in the halls of the American Congress, it would be still worse for the Philippine Islands, because then the whole history of the scandals and calamities which characterized the administration of Harrison in the islands will be unfolded before the bar of American public opinion.

What is more important for us to do at the present time is to accept the bitter truth, and to rectify the errors of the past. From now on the basis of appointments must be the fitness of the candidates for discharging a public duty and not merely the interests of a certain party. That is the only way we can avoid any serious conflict with the Chief Executive of the islands, and fulfil the letter and spirit of the Jones Law. Thus shall we show the Chief Executive that we have no intention of limiting his powers as provided for in that law.

Mr. Quezón met this situation in characteristic fashion. For years he had chafed at dividing his power and prestige with Mr. Osmeña, who, as head of the Nacionalista party,

had the weight of that organization behind him. Quezón had sought to supplant him in this position and failed, and now took the only other course to dethrone his rival, which was to disrupt the party and at the same time cast the onus of its shortcomings upon Mr. Osmeña. He accordingly branded the Nacionalista party as "Unipersonalist," or one-man rule, and proceeded to organize a party styled the "Colectivist," or rule of the many. In the light of after events a letter written by him to Mr. Osmeña when the break occurred has become historical. Mr. Quezón said:

Since the Government of the Philippines was established by virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law (1916), the members of both houses of the Legislature, as well as the Nacionalista members of the Cabinet, permitted that you control and direct legislation in our country on the one hand, and the administration of public affairs on the other. It may be said that practically all measures which received your approval were transformed into laws and no law could be approved without your consent. The department secretaries, individually and collectively, guided their course of action under your inspiration, and nothing that was against your opinion was ever done by them. Recommendations on appointments made by the secretaries to the Governor-General were made upon your initiative, at least with your consent. Your veto in these cases was final and definite. The majority of the Senate with the exception of the President [Quezón himself] was not aware of these recommendations before they were submitted to the Governor-General. However, it was pretended that each and every one of these appointments was to be confirmed by the Senate, as in fact they all were.

This practice put the executive and legislative powers of the government of the Philippines in the hands of one, or at the utmost in the hands of two men. I say two, because all this was allowed to go on with my knowledge and consent, or at least with my tolerance.

Discounting only Mr. Quezón's inclination to minimize his personal responsibility for this perversion of powers, the control which he here concedes was exercised by Osmeña over both houses of the Legislature and the

Executive from 1916 to 1921, existed as to the Assembly, or lower house, from 1907 to 1916. His analysis, however, reflects little credit upon his benefactor, Mr. Harrison, and is a rare admission to make by one who has sanctioned and quite largely shared the spending of hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to convince our public and Congress that the Philippine people had established and were maintaining a stable and "representative" government. For all practical purposes, the elective Senate and House were superfluous, the government being administered under the orders of two men, neither of whom is Malay nor in any sense typical of Filipino capacity or limitation.

In the elections (June, 1922) following Quezón's attack on Osmeña and the Nacionalista party, several things happened. Osmeña, sensing defeat in the House, of which he had been Speaker since its organization in 1907, was elected to the Senate, where he is side-tracked, at least temporarily. The Demócrata party, relieved of Harrison and his Nacionalista backing, and with the damaging. record of that party and its Colectivist offspring as a point of attack, elected a goodly number of Senators and Representatives, and made a clean sweep of municipal officials in Manila and Cebu. The Nacionalista and Colectivist parties split fairly even, with result that in the House neither of the three groups held a majority. Quezón still dominated in the Senate, and was reëlected its President. After a prolonged struggle in the House he was able to effect a combination against the Demócratas and elect his candidate, Manuel Roxas, as Speaker. As Roxas is "his man," Quezón thus accomplished his purpose, becoming the virtual dictator of both houses of the Legislature, as also of the Board of Control in charge of

"National" companies and of the Filipino members of the Council of State. The "one-man rule" denounced by him in Osmeña was now glorified in his own person, and the Colectivist slogan upon which he had split the Nacionalista party and eliminated his rival, went into the discard. His every effort was now directed toward healing the breach with that party and effecting a coalition against the Demócratas. Within less than two years after his memorable letter to Osmeña, therefore, Quezón had created a situation which brought upon himself, and with more justification, a similar condemnation at the hands of his opponents. Ruperto Montinola, President of the Demócrata party, in describing the turn of events said:

During the last seven years of Nacionalista régime, we had a government of men and not of laws. Osmeña was the sole god of those last years. He did as he pleased. Nothing moved without his consent; no bill ever passed the Legislature without his approval. The courts were invaded by politics. In the provinces, election frauds were the rule rather than the exception. Nacionalistas nominated their candidates on the eve of election days, and such nominees always came out elected, whether the electorate wanted them or voted for them.

To-day Quezon occupies the same position in politics. When Governor Wood made a statement about the next budget, Quezón immediately replied saying the Legislature will approve its own budget regardless of what the Governor proposed. Who is Quezón any way? Is he the Legislature? Do the Nacionalista and Colectivista legislators act like effigies in accordance with the movement of Quezon's finger? The case is one of two alternatives. Either the coalitionist legislators follow Quezón blindly or they do not know their duties.

In the meantime (October, 1921) President Harding had prevailed upon General Wood, as the one man best qualified by training and experience for the work, to become Governor-General of the Philippines, and undertake the gigantic task of bringing order and stability out of the havoc wrought by Harrison. In accepting the appoint

ment, General Wood relinquished a life position as Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, carrying salary of $25,000 a year; that of Governor-General-of uncertain tenure-paying but $18,000, the great bulk of which is consumed in entertainment expenses and other public outlays. Despite this considerable personal sacrifice, however, and with no illusions as to the difficulties involved, he shouldered the responsibilities as a patriotic American interested in the welfare and prestige of his country.

The first imperative step was to rehabilitate the "Currency Reserve Fund," sacrificed through the frenzied operations of the Philippine National Bank; also to supply working capital to the Government, a considerable portion of whose funds had been lost or "frozen" in like manner. The Wood-Forbes Mission had sent a hurry call to Congress in June, 1921, to authorize an increase in the bonded indebtedness of the islands, which authorization was promptly granted. Between August, 1921, and July, 1922, Philippine bonds were sold in the United States aggregating $48,000,000. Of this amount, $33,000,000 were issued at 4 per cent., $5,000,000 at 5 per cent., and $10,000,000 at 5 per cent., all at approximately par value. At the same time, France and other countries were floating loans in the United States at from 7 per cent. to 10 per cent. and accepting a material discount from par.

Filipino politicians offered no opposition to borrowing this money, despite the heavy burden it imposed upon island credit and revenues. They have, in fact, evinced no hesitation at any time in securing public funds from whatever source possible. To General Wood's appeal, however, that liberal subscriptions to such bonds be made by Filipinos themselves, thus evidencing their patriotism