and one which may yet paralyse her progress, is the growing self-consciousness and self-assertion of a heretofore subservient proletariat, and their refusal further to accept implicitly the fetish of a dynasty divinely called to regulate and rule their every thought and action.

Filipino advocates of independence pretend they are now qualified to establish and operate a modern democracy, and any judgment as to the fact must have reference to that particular kind of government. What it involves and the conditions for success were stated by Viscount Bryce as follows:

Democratic government rests upon and requires the exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of the citizens. Where the materials for the formation of such an opinion are so artfully supplied as to prevent the citizens from judging fairly the merits of a question, opinion is artificially made instead of being let grow in a natural way, and a wrong is done to democracy.

I use the word democracy as denoting a government in which the will of a majority of the qualified citizens rules, taking the qualified citizens to constitute the great bulk of the inhabitants, say, roughly, three fourths, so that the physical force of the citizens coincides (broadly speaking) with the voting power.

No person having personal knowledge of the congeries of peoples inhabiting the Philippine Islands can consistently argue that they remotely meet this requirement, or that it is possible for them to do so within a future at all proximate. This conclusion involves no criticism of or reflection upon the Filipino race. No more would it be an arraignment of a child to say that he is not prepared to assume the financial and other responsibilities of a household. It would be asking and expecting the impossible for Filipinos, with the limited facilities at their disposal, to achieve in twenty-five years a position which it has required other peoples centuries to attain.

Filipinos have given no evidence that they can reverse the laws of Nature, or that they stand alone in matters governmental among the peoples of earth. As pressure has been removed, or opportunity offered, they have run true to form, differing in no respect from like types wherever found. Despite the protection afforded them by American sovereignty, and the material and other advantages accruing from the connection, their few brief years of license under Governor-General Harrison sufficed to demoralize and bankrupt the government and to enthrone two or three of their leaders as supreme arbiters in island affairs. It required some $48,000,000 in bond issues to place the Government in working order once more, while the appetite for power, whetted in a few individuals by the unrestricted control given them, created a situation embarrassing to American authority and destructive of the true interests of the Philippine masses. As a test of self-governing capacity, or of ability on the part of the people as a whole to administer a "stable government," the Harrison experiment proved a cruel one, accentuating as it did traits and characteristics better kept in the background.

It is within the power of the United States to abandon the Philippines and to replace our sovereignty by a turbulent and short-lived oligarchy. It is not within the power of our Congress to confer upon Filipinos "the steadiness and self-control of political maturity," without which any independent government launched by them is foredoomed to failure.

CHAPTER XI

PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE (Continued)

THE present demand for "immediate and absolute Philippine independence" is voiced by the Philippine Legislature, by the native press of the islands, by propaganda organs and spokesmen, and by various others, Filipino and American, who echo what they believe to be a popular cry. While there is every reason to believe that many of these neither expect nor desire "absolute" independence, all of them have one trait in common, which is a refusal dispassionately to consider or discuss just what would happen to the Philippine people and to the Far East generally should their demand be granted. Every attempt to bring them to grips in this regard is met by the stereotyped reply, "Give us independence and we will cross that bridge [or bridges] when we come to it."

Considering that once independence is granted its perils cannot be sidestepped, wisdom would counsel that the possible dangers be thoroughly canvassed before taking the plunge. It is not enough for native politicians to declaim their preference for a government run like hell by Filipinos to one run like heaven by the United States. Americans and Filipinos alike are entitled to know just how much hell would result and whether it is to their respective interests deliberately to invite it. What, then, would "absolute independence" involve to those mostly concerned the Philippine people?

In the first place, every advantage and privilege now

accruing to the islands through American sovereignty or by congressional action would automatically terminate. These include, among others, our backing of their currency system, Chinese exclusion, credit for bond issues, protection of the United States Army and Navy, service and protection of American diplomatic and consular officers, free entry of island products to the United States and vice versa, security from foreign aggression, and unrestricted access of Filipinos of all classes to the United States and its territories. Waiving the matter of preservation of internal order and restraints exercised over rival and bellicose leaders, now assured through American authority, how are the Filipinos prepared to surmount the sacrifice of these specific benefits?

The total insular revenues are now less than $35,000,000 per annum. It is generally conceded that failure of worthwhile capital to invest in the Philippines during the past twenty-five years has been due almost entirely to the uncertain political future of the Government. Certainly this situation would not be bettered through a complete withdrawal of American sovereignty. It is prima facie that any normal increase in revenues must have as its basis increased development and production, which can occur only through favourable investment conditions. A Philippine Republic, lacking American protection and denied free access to our markets, must inevitably suffer in its income, whereas the requirements of the situation would be materially enhanced. Every outlay now incurred by the United States on behalf of the islands, or which is saved to them because of our sovereignty, would then become a burden upon insular revenues and represent a clear addition to present expenditures.

In the matter of providing for national defence, plans

and estimates recently prepared by an American army officer fix the minimum cost, distributed over a ten-year period, at not less than $125,000,000 annually. As the raising of this or any like sum in the islands through taxation, exclusive of other public needs, is prohibitive, any adequate provision by a Philippine Republic against foreign aggression would be hopeless. To preserve internal order, however, and to police outlying islands, a Philippine army of at least 25,000 men, also various gunboats and naval craft, would be indispensable. Aside from the original cost of vessels and army equipment, the subsequent maintenance of such units would hardly be less than $25,000,000 annually. Other millions would be required to support diplomatic and consular officers throughout the world, upon which service, given the natural love of Filipinos for ostentation, large sums would inevitably be wasted.

By the Treaty of Paris, the United States paid Spain $20,000,000 to satisfy an indebtedness charged against the Philippines, and acquired from Spain, as part compensation for war expenses, her public holdings in the islandsagricultural, forest, and mineral. Even should these former Crown Lands, to which Filipinos at no time held title, be donated to them along with independence, a refund of the cash outlay of $20,000,000 would seem in order. Added to this obligation are $75,000,000 in bonds, sold to American investors, for the payment of which the United States is morally if not legally responsible. The interest and funding charges on this indebtedness amount to some $6,000,000 annually, being a further drain on Philippine resources. It is interesting to note that in October, 1923, when Filipino politicians were assailing General Wood and demanding his recall, the provinces