the slow-moving processes of evolution, both in the development of natural capacity and of ability to control economic forces, there is scant basis for believing that another twenty-five years will work any material transformation in the Filipino race, nor that they will be fitted then, or in a much longer period, to establish and successfully maintain an independent, self-sustaining government. Americans who bluntly state that we should get out of the Philippines because it is to our interest to do so, and who make no pretense of caring what happens to the Filipinos, have the merit at least of being consistent and understandable. Not so much can be said for those who, while acknowledging our obligations in the premises, profess nevertheless to believe that the withdrawal of United States sovereignty would be for the good of the Philippine people.

AMERI

CHAPTER XIII

ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE PHILIPPINES

MERICANS have had their attention so persistently distracted by agitation concerning the "political status" of the Philippines that little thought has been given to the economic value, past or future, of the islands to the United States. It is a prevalent belief, in fact, that our colonial venture has cost and is costing us millions of dollars annually for which no returns are received. What are the facts?

Our original occupation of the archipelago, and the restoration of orderly government thereafter, were a logical outcome of the war with Spain, and the money thus spent is not a proper debit against the islands. Thereafter all expenses of the insular government have been paid from local revenues, the only direct outlay incurred by the United States being the slightly increased cost of maintaining a portion of our army in the Philippines to what it would cost at home. To this some would add money spent in enlarging our Navy and in building island defences. Eliminating the Philippines, however, we have the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, Guam, an extended Pacific Coast line, and the Panama Canal, quite sufficient in themselves to justify our naval programme. Money spent in fortifying naval bases and coaling stations can hardly be deemed wasteful, as these would likely be retained in any event. The Secretary of War, in a statement filed with the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs,

March 1, 1924, estimates that the only real saving to the United States through abandonment of the Philippines would be the present upkeep of the Philippine Scoutsapproximately $2,000,000 per annum. What, then, of the credit side of the ledger?

As a heritage from Spain the United States acquired ownership of all public buildings and improvements in the islands, including title to the public domain or "Crown Lands." These latter comprise more than 60,000,000 acres, of which some 40,000,000 are available for agriculture. Filipinos own approximately 10,000,000 acres, of which only 8,000,000 are under cultivation. There are 64,800 square miles of forest, of which 99 per cent. belongs to the Government. These forests include immense quantities of valuable hardwoods, the supply of "Philippine Mahogany" alone being estimated at 192,000,000,000 board feet. The mineral resources of the islands are abundant and varied, the available supply of iron ore being figured at more than 500,000,000 tons, with large deposits of coal and copper. While "administration" of these public lands, forests, and mines has been vested by Congress in the Philippine Legislature, subject to approval by the President of all Acts relating thereto, such holdings still remain property of the United States and represent an asset of tremendous potential value. This "public domain" was held and administered by Spain for more than three hundred years, and was never owned, occupied, or claimed by Filipino-Malays-themselves invaders of the islands-either before or after Spanish occupation. Title to and possession of such lands by the United States were acquired through conquest, through cash payment, and through formal cession by Spain, its ownership therein being more clearly vested than applies

to the great bulk of our domestic public domain. America is not an interloper in the Philippines, having dispossessed no rightful claimant except Spain, and that through more formal and humane methods than adopted by Filipinos in dispossessing the aboriginal inhabitants of the islands. The advantages accruing to American trade through Philippine occupation have already been a big item. In 1895 (being the last year of Spanish occupation for which reliable data is available), the trade of the Philippines with the United States was but $5,288,341, or 17 per cent. of the total. In 1923 such trade amounted to $132,387,472, or 65 per cent. of the total. Moreover, since 1909 American merchants and manufacturers have enjoyed free trade with the islands, giving them this considerable leeway over foreign competitors.

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The influence exercised by American ownership of the Philippines over our Far Eastern relations, with the consequent awakening and development of interest among our people concerning the Orient and its opportunities, was pointed out in earlier chapters. It was shown that whereas in 1900 but I per cent. of the total foreign trade of the United States was with Asiatic countries, this had increased by 1923 to 21 per cent., our trade with the Far East for that year amounting to $1,736,824,000. While causes other than possession of the Philippines have played a part in this phenomenal gain, the fact of the United States having become an Asiatic Power, and its active presence on the scene, had no small part in the happening.

Another by-product of Philippine occupation, possibly more far-reaching in its influence upon the fortunes of the United States than all others combined, was the practical training in military affairs it gave our army officers, and 3

the important and decisive part it enabled them to take thereafter in the World War. Most persons are familiar with the deplorable condition of our army upon outbreak of the Spanish-American War and for months thereafter; of the inefficiency of our Commissary and Quartermaster departments, and of the tremendous death toll among our soldiers from preventable diseases. Without our occupation of the Philippines, and the resulting lessons gained through constant transportation of American troops to the islands and return, through the proper supplying, quartering, and care of such troops in the islands, and the familiarity with army needs acquired by our officers through this semi-foreign service, there is every reason to believe our military arm would, in the untroubled years between, have lapsed into much of its old-time, easygoing ways. The "unpreparedness" of the United States in 1917 was bad enough, but without this Philippine schooling of those called upon to organize and lead our armies, it would have been infinitely worse. Most American officers who achieved outstanding distinction during the war had back of them years of active service in the Philippines, where they largely qualified for the bigger tasks ahead. The following are a few of the many who might be named;

General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. who was on duty in the Philippines from 1899 to 1903, and again from 1906 to 1913. During most of this latter period he was Commander of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and Governor of the Moro Province, winning his star as Brigadier-General because of successful Moro campaigns.

Major-General Leonard Wood-whose work in organizing the Plattsburg Training Camp, and in preparing two