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would be an actual improvement, to incorporate so many CHAPTER of the proposed provisions for the protection of personal rights as might secure the concurrence of two thirds of 1789. both houses, and of the Legislatures of three fourths of the states. He introduced a series of resolutions embodying certain amendments which he thought of that character; and, after some discussion, it was agreed to refer them to a committee of the whole. Previously, July 21. however, to any further discussion, both Madison's resolutions, and the amendments proposed by the various state Conventions, were referred to a special committee of one from each state. The report of that committee Aug. 13. coming up for consideration, the first question that arose was, In what form should the amendments be made? Should they be incorporated into the text of the Constitution, or should they be appended to it, as a series of distinct provisions? Sherman suggested the latter method, the more feasible in the present case, inasmuch as the articles proposed by the committee were mostly in the nature of a mere bill of rights, by no means inconsistent with the Constitution as it stood, but, in fact, for the most part, implied by it. This suggestion, though voted down at first, was ultimately adopted. The report of the committee was debated from time to time, first in Committee of the Whole and afterward in the House, occasionally with a good deal of warmth. It was denounced by Burke as not containing "those solid and substantial amendments which the people expected;" as, in fact, "little better than whipped syllabub, frothy and full of wind, formed only to please the palate; or like a tub thrown out to the whale, to secure the freight of the ship and its peaceful voyage." He noticed that on this committee of eleven there were no less than five who had been members of the Federal Convention. Gerry, who

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CHAPTER took a very active part, complained of a disposition to smother debate. The committee of eleven had been got 1789. up lest "a free discussion should lay bare the muscles and sinews of the Constitution." The only debate of much interest arose on a motion by Tucker to add to the proposed amendment securing to the people the right of peaceably assembling together, the right also "to instruct their representatives." This proposal was supported by Jackson and others, with the understanding, however, that it would not imply, on the part of the representative, any obligation to obey. Gerry, who was very urgent for the amendment, seemed to look at the matter in the same light; but this idea was combated by Page, Sumter, and Burke, who maintained that the representative would be bound to obey, as Gerry admitted he ought to be. Page thought "this amendment absolutely necessary, and strictly compatible with the spirit and nature of the government. All power vests in the people of the United States. It is, therefore, a government of the people, a democracy. For convenience, and for convenience only, the people had agreed that their representatives shall exercise a part of their authority. To pretend to refuse them the power of instructing their agents appeared to him to deny them a right." The proposed amendment was warmly opposed by Hartley, Clymer, Sherman, Wadsworth, Smith of South Carolina, and Madison. If the right to instruct implied no obligation to obey, it was amply secured already; if it did imply such obligation, it was highly pernicious, and ought not to be given. "Suppose," said Madison, "a representa

tive is instructed to violate the Constitution: is he at liberty to obey such instructions? Suppose he is instructed to support certain measures which, from circumstances known to him, but not to his constituents, he is

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convinced will endanger the public good, is he obliged CHAPTER to sacrifice his own judgment to theirs? Suppose he refuses, will his vote be the less valid, or his constituents 1789. less bound to yield that obedience which is due to the laws of the Union? If his vote must inevitably have the same effect, what sort of a constitutional right is this to instruct a representative who has a right to disregard the order if he pleases? The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Gerry) asks if the sovereignty is not with the people at large? But would he infer that the people, in detached bodies, can contravene a law established by the whole people? My idea of the sovereignty of the people is this: the people can change the Constitution if they please; but, while it exists, they must conform to its provisions. I do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can speak the voice of the people; so far from, it, their ideas may contravene the sense of the whole people, and hence the doctrine of the binding force of instructions is of a doubtful, if not a dangerous character." It seems difficult to answer these arguments, yet they departed very far from the popular opinion of Madison's own state, and from what came to be the recognized political creed of the party with which Madison ultimately acted. The restricted right of suffrage, and very limited constituencies in many parts of Virginia, and the ample leisure of the planters for the discussion of political affairs, to which subject many of them devoted their principal attention, naturally made the right of instruction a very popular doctrine in that state, and in others in which a similar social condition prevailed.

Seventeen amendments were finally agreed to by two thirds of the House. The Senate, by compression and modification, and leaving out two articles altogether, reduced the number to twelve. Of these twelve, the first

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CHAPTER two related to the number and pay of the House of Representatives; the other ten were pronounced by Liver1789. more to be "of no more value than a pinch of snuff, since they went to secure rights never in danger." Yet it was only these ten, being in the nature of a bill of rights, which, in the course of the next two years, received the sanction of a sufficient number of the state Legislatures to make them a part of the Constitution.

The importance of immediate legislation on the subject of the public lands was strongly urged by Scott; but nothing more was done at present than to pass an act for the government of the Territory northwest of the Ohio, by which the famous ordinance of 1787 was recognized and confirmed, but with such alterations as to make it conformable with the powers vested by the new Constitution in the president and Senate.

The important subject of the national debt was deferred till the next session, the Secretary of the Treasury being directed to prepare a report or plan for its liquidation. For the present, Congress contented itself with providing for the payment of its own members, and passing an appropriation act fixing the salaries of the officers it had created.

The salary of the President was established at $25,000, exclusive of the use of a furnished house, provided at the public expense. It was stated in the debate that under the old system the household expenses of the presidents. of Congress, paid by the public, had varied from $8000 to $13,000 annually. The salary of the Vice-president, though not without some opposition, was fixed at $5000, an amount by no means corresponding to Adams's expectations, nor adequate to the scale of expenses which he had adopted. Washington caused the expenses of his household to be graduated in accordance with the

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salary allowed, so as to carry out the proposition of his CHAPTER inaugural speech, to receive only the payment of his expenses.

The Secretaries of State and the Treasury were allowed $3500 each; the Secretary of War, $3000; the Controller and the Treasurer, $2000 each; the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the Auditor, the Register, and the Post-master General, $1500 each; head Clerks, $600 to $800; inferior Clerks, $500; the Governor of the Northwestern Territory, $2000.

The Chief Justice was allowed $4000, the other justices of the Supreme Court, $3500; the Attorney General, $1500. The salaries of the District Judges varied from $1800 to $800. The District Attorneys, Marshals, and Clerks, as well as the officers of the Customs, were for the most part paid by fees, producing sal-aries in some districts out of all proportion to the importance of the office or the general scale of compensation, an anomaly not yet entirely done away with. The Deputy Post-masters were paid by a certain per centage on the amount of their receipts.

The pay of senators and representatives was fixed at six dollars for every day's attendance, and the same for every twenty miles "of the estimated distance by the most. usual road" from the member's place of residence to the seat of Congress. The Speaker of the House of Representatives was to be allowed double attendance. The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate were to have as salary $1500 each, besides clerk hire, and an additional allowance of two dollars per day during the session. A proposition to allow the senators, out of respect to their superior dignity, a higher rate of pay than the representatives, was voted down in the House; but the Senate strenuously insisted upon it, and finally, by way

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