CHAPTER duct of Great Britain, as it respected the Algerines, the VI. Indians, or the Western posts. This speech, which was 1794, afterward published in a pamphlet form, contained a very

searching criticism of the statements and reasoning of Jefferson's report, going to show that, whether contrasted with the commercial policy pursued by England toward other nations, or with the policy adopted by other nations, particularly France, toward the United States, there was nothing in the existing state of commercial relations with Great Britain to afford any special ground of complaint.

It had been represented in Jefferson's report, as a proof of the disadvantageous character of our commerce with Great Britain, that while not less than three fourths of our entire imports came from that country, she took in return less than half of our exports, and a great part of these not for her own consumption, but for re-exportation to the Continent, a trade which we might carry on more beneficially for ourselves.. To this Smith replied that the purchase from Great Britain of so large a portion of our imports was evidence in itself that we could buy of her more advantageously than elsewhere. The secret was, that she alone was able and willing to give the credit which the circumstances of the United States required. As to consumption of our products, deducting all her reexports, she was still a better customer than France. Nor was her trade of re-exportation necessarily a disad vantage to us. In the uncertainty of foreign markets, it was a great advantage to have a customer always ready to take, what we had, and to hold it till vent could. be found at a remunerating price.

"I am at no loss," wrote Jefferson to Madison, "to ascribe Smith's speech to its true father. Every tittle

of it is Hamilton's, except the introduction.

There is

VI.

Jan. 14.

scarcely any thing in it which I have not heard from CHAPTER him in our various private though official discussions." Smith was followed by Madison in a very labored re- 1794. ply, which contained, however, little more than a repetition of his arguments urged in the first Congress, and stated in a former chapter. He insisted now, as then, that the adoption of the policy which he recommended would not lead to retaliation on the part of Great Britain. The indulgences which she allowed to our trade. were entirely founded on views of her own interest. Her object was to find the largest vent for her manufactures; and, however we might impede their introduction, she was not likely to do any thing to add to that impediment. The struggle might call for some self-denial, but the advantages were all on our side. We imported. luxuries; our exports consisted of necessaries, without which the English manufactures could not be carried on. The contest would be certain to end in a triumph on our part, by compelling England to agree to an entire reciprocity.

While disclaiming any intention to make this debate any thing but a mere commercial discussion, Madison took care, however, to stimulate the feeling against Great Britain by an artful recapitulation of all the existing grounds of complaint. "Ill will and jealousy were, and always had been, the predominant features in the conduct of Great Britain toward America. She had been encouraged by the idea of impotence in our government and want of union; and the fate of the present resolutions would show whether we were in fact so feeble, or the interests of the states so discordant as she supposed. To reject the resolutions would be to rivet the fetters of American commerce."

Forest of Maryland could not agree that in the con- Jan. 15.

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CHAPTER test of commercial regulations we should have the adVI. vantage. The trade of Great Britain to America con1794. stituted a sixth of her entire commerce; our trade to Great Britain was more than one half of ours. If a breach took place, who would suffer most, she by the interruption of a sixth of her trade, with the means of getting most of the articles supplied by us on as good terms from other nations, with great internal sources of revenue and a people used to taxes, or we, with an interruption of half our trade, with few internal resources and citizens little accustomed to be taxed? The fourth of our revenue was supplied by imposts on British goods. How was that to be made up? The recollection of 1774 and 1775 might serve to show what little effect we could produce on Great Britain by the non-consumption of her manufactures. "I am not a stock-holder; I am not a bank-holder!" exclaimed Forest; "I am too poor to be either, and therefore can have no separate interest in view; and where I am known I shall not be charged with partiality to Great Britain. But I hope I am free from such unwarrantable prejudice as to lead me into measures to the injury of my country."

The same argument, with additional points and illustrations, was pressed with great force by Smith of Maryland, afterward for many years a very strenuous advocate of the party of Jefferson and Madison, but who held during the present Congress a somewhat equivocal position. Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Russia, and the Hanse Towns were in the same predicament with Great Britain. They had no treaties with us, yet they were excellent customers, and was their trade to be burdened with extra duties for the benefit of France, who did not scruple to violate the most beneficial article in her treaty with us, the provision that free ships should make free goods?

VI.

He trusted no one would tax him with prejudice in favor CHAPTER of Great Britain. He had suffered severely by recent British depredations. He had fought against Great 1794. Britain, and, should duty call him, would do so again. But the question now was, not how we might most injure Great Britain, but how we might best protect ourselves.

Findley insisted that the credit granted by British merchants was no benefit, but an injury, leading to a system of indebtedness running through all society, and very dangerous from the British influence thus introduced. Those merchants trading on their own capital were in favor of the resolutions; the only opposers were those trading on British capital.

Nicholas insisted that the circumstances of America since its settlement had placed her trade entirely in the hands of Great Britain, leaving the consumer no opportunity of choice. These artificial causes must be counteracted by artificial means. He was for building up a French market for American products, even at the risk of some immediate loss. By giving to French manufactures a preference in our markets, we might draw off the French agriculturists into workshops, and the consequent diminution of French agricultural produce would open a market for ours. As to British credits, it was a great object to break them off. The habit of running in debt had reached an intolerable pitch throughout the South. It had been hoped, in vain, that some check would be found in the provisions of the Federal Constitution guarding the sanctity of contracts. Nothing could work a cure except a radical change of commercial system a cutting off the trade with Great Britain like that to which these resolutions tended.

Goodhue remarked that, if there was no friendship in

CHAPTER trade, as some of the speakers on the other side had sugVI. gested, there ought also to be no hatred in trade. Trade 1794. ought not to be made an instrument for the gratification

of political antipathies. As, in the present circumstances of Europe, Great Britain alone could supply the manufactures we needed, to increase the duties upon them would not affect her, but us, by raising the price to the

consumers.

Clark scouted this appeal to mercantile considerations. Merchants might calculate in their counting-houses, a Legislature ought to act on political grounds. We had many wrongs to complain of., The English had violated the treaty of peace, first, by carrying off negroes, and then by retaining the Western posts. They had set the savages on our backs, and just now let the Algerines loose upon us. Shall we sit still and bear all this? A non-importation agreement, as he remembered, had made Great Britain repeal the Stamp Act. ment we did not perish with cold. clothe ourselves then, and we should do so now. carried our point then, and we should now be much more powerful at the same weapons. Many British manufacturers were already starving for want of employment. By adopting the policy proposed, we should add greatly to their distress, should soon bring the government to their senses, and make them glad to enter into a commercial treaty.

During that agreeWe found means to

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Smith remarked that perhaps he was one of those whom it was intended to stigmatize as merchants trading on British capital, and therefore opposed to these resolutions. Findley disclaimed any such allusion; upon which Smith added that, although not now trading on British capital, that charge might once have been alleged against him with truth. He had sacrificed a fortune in