CHAPTER IX. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. MISSION AND RECALL OF SECOND SESSION MONROE. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS. JAY'S IX. AY'S treaty relieved the country from the immediate CHAPTER and pressing danger of a British and Indian war. But as respected relations with France, it exposed the admin- 1796. istration to new and very serious embarrassments. In nominally yielding to the position of neutrality assumed at the breaking out of the war by Washington's proclamation, neither the administrators of the French gov. ernment, nor their numerous and enthusiastic partisans in the United States, had contemplated any thing more than a sort of trick upon Great Britain. They were willing that the United States should secure, if they could, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the advantages of a neutral position; but they expected that substantial aid and service would at the same time be rendered to France, not only by giving a most liberal construction to every provision of the treaty in her favor, but by stretching indulgence even beyond. Such a course of policy, at once weak and treacherous, was entirely repugnant to Washington's temper and judgment; and the steadiness with which he had maintained a real neutrality had greatly disappointed both the French government and their partisans in America. It was impossible for them, inflamed as they were by the most excited feelings, to reconcile such a course of even-handed impartiality with the obligations, direct or implied, growing out of the treaties; with that friendship for France which, on CHAPTER all public occasions, Washington uniformly expressed ; IX. and still less with that sympathy and fraternity which, 1796. as they thought, ought to exist between two sister republics. Hence, even before Jay's mission, the belief on the part of France and her partisans that Washington's administration was secretly hostile to the French cause. Not to take an active part against the "conspiracy of kings," however such a course might have been useless to France and ruinous to the United States, seemed like treachery to the rights of man, and a mean subserviency to hated England. This view of the feelings and policy of the American administration, constantly held forth in the diplomatic correspondence of Genet and Fauchet, and countenanced by the tone of the opposition newspapers, received additional confirmation in the minds, first of the Girondists, and then of the Jacobins, by whom the affairs of the French republic were successively administered, from the opinions and conduct of Gouverneur Morris, Jefferson's successor as the representative of the American government in France. Amid all the tumultuous scenes which had attended and followed the formation and downfall of the first Constitution, the overthrow of the monarchy, the proclamation of the republic, the expulsion of the Girondists from the Convention, the triumph of the Jacobins, and the establishment of the Reign of Terror, Morris had discharged the duties of his difficult position with great tact and good sense, and with a strict adherence to Washington's system of exact neutrality. This alone might have been sufficient to render him obnoxious; but there were other reasons also. Cool, sagacious, and having enjoyed the experience of one revolution, he shared but little in the prevailing political enthusiasm. He thought something more necessary for IX. the establishment of liberty than the proclamation of the CHAPTER rights of man and the overthrow of authority. He did not believe France capable of a republican government. 1794. His friends and associates had been chiefly among those denounced as Monarchists and Moderates, He had also been the friend of the unfortunaté Louis-a circumstance which disqualified him from possessing the confidence of any of the republican factions which so rapidly succeeded and guillotined each other. While sending letters of recall to Genet, the Committee of Public Safety, in which Robespierre and his associates were predominant, solicited the recall of Morris. For reasons of policy, the president had yielded; but he wrote, at the same time, a private letter expressing his satisfaction with Morris's diplomatic conduct. That letter, sent by a British vessel, fell into the hands of the French govern-ment, and tended to increase the suspicions with which the American administration was regarded. In sending Monroe as the successor of Morris cotemporaneously with the mission of Jay to England, Washington probably hoped that the appointment of so open and decided a friend of France would tend to mollify the French government, as well as the French party in the United States. It was probably expected that, by accepting the mission, Monroe would find himself, as Jefferson had done in the case of Genet, constrained to support the policy of the government, even against his own private inclinations—a support which could hardly fail to render that policy less obnoxious to the American friends of France. But there was a great difference between Jefferson writing under Washington's supervision, and with the keen eye of Hamilton upon him, and Monroe across the ocean, able, by a liberal interpretation of his instructions, to presume, however he might really know CHAPTER the contrary, that the policy which he himself approved IX. was that which the government intended to pursue. 1794. Care, indeed, had been taken to tie up his hands by reserving for discussion in America all new stipulations, either regarding the guarantee, or with respect to commerce or navigation. But with the new French politics, new maxims of private honor seem to have come into vogue, and neither his instructions, nor the general obligations of good faith to which he subjected himself by accepting the mission, prevented Monroe from adopting a course greatly at variance, as he could not but know, with the policy of the administration, for which he seemed inclined to substitute, as a guide, his own private and party political views. Monroe arrived in Paris shortly after the fall of Robespierre. The government had passed into the hands of those members of the Convention known as Thermadorians, who had combined to overthrow Robespierre's tyranny. But the Reign of Terror, in the atrocities of which many of these same men had largely participated, was yet by no means at an end. Most of the arbitrary decrees issued during that period still remained in force. Such were the laws relating to foreign commerce, which had originated partly in hatred of the Girondins, mostly of the class of merchants, capitalists, and manufactur. ers, and partly also in a real terror of the introduction of foreign influence and foreign gold through the channels of trade. All exterior commerce carried on by individuals had been abolished. The government was the only purchaser. Ship-masters arriving with cargoes in French ports had no option to sell or not; they were obliged to sell at all events. To pay for these purchases, principally provisions, of which there was a great scarcity in France, the government had nothing but as IX. signats, already at a great discount, and rapidly depre- CHAPTER ciating. Even these it was difficult to get, and, when obtained, they could not be laid out in the purchase of a 1794. return cargo without special license. According to his own account, in an official letter in vindication of himself against the strictures of the State Department, Monroe found American affairs "in the worst possible condition." "Our commerce was harassed in every quarter and in every article, even that of tobacco not excepted"-a very poor return for the zeal of Virginia in the French cause. "American seamen, taken from on board our vessels, were often abused, generally imprisoned, and treated in other respects like the subjects of hostile powers. Our former minister was not only without the confidence of the government, but an object of particular jealousy and distrust. In addition to which, it was suspected that we were about to abandon them for a connection with England, for which purpose principally it was believed that Jay had been sent there." In consequence of unfavorable reports brought home by the officers of French ships of war, the friendly disposition toward America had greatly abated. Even Monroe, though his zeal for the French cause was well known, was received at first with marked coldness, it being naturally supposed that, having accepted an appointment from the American government, he must be prepared to conform himself to its policy. The Committee of Public Safety-in which the administrative functions continued principally to rest or, at least, the controlling party in it, were disposed, according to Monroe's account, to delay his reception, indeed, to throw him entirely out of view, and so to destroy the effect of his mission. The connection between the two countries seemed to hang upon a thread, and Monroe insisted that if some |