purpose was to deprive the Carrington Publishing Company of its liberty to carry on its business in its own way, although in doing so it interfered with no right of the defendants. The motive was a selfish one, to gain an advantage unjustly, and at the expense of others; and therefore the act was legally corrupt. As a means of accomplishing the purpose, the parties intended to harm the Carrington Publishing Company, and therefore it was malicious. It seems strange that in this day, and in this free country, a country in which law interferes so little with the liberty of the individual, it should be necessary to announce from the bench that every man may carry on his business as he pleases, may do what he will with his own, so long as he does nothing unlawful, and acts with due regard to the rights of others; and that the occasion for such an announcement should be, not an attempt by government to interfere with the rights of the citizen, nor by the rich and powerful to oppress the poor, but an attempt by a large body of workingmen to control, by means little if any better than force, the action of employers. The defendants and their associates said to the Carrington Publishing Company: "You shall discharge the men you have in your employ, and you shall hereafter employ only such men as we shall name. It is true, we have no interest in your business, we have no capital invested therein, we are in no wise responsible for its losses or failures, we are not directly benefited by its success, and we do not participate in its profits; yet we have a right to control its management, and compel you to submit to our dictation." The bare assertion of such a right is startling. The two alleged rights cannot possibly co-exist. One or the other must yield.

If the defendants have the right which they claim, then all business enterprises are alike subject to their dictation. No one is safe in engaging in business, for no one knows whether his business affairs are to be directed by intelligence or ignorance, whether law and justice will protect the business, or brute force regardless of law will control it; for it must be remembered that the exercise of the power, if conceded, will by no means be confined to the matter of employing help. Upon the same principle and for the same reasons, the right to determine what business others shall engage in, when and where it shall be carried on, etc., will be demanded and must be conceded. The principle, if it once obtains a foothold, is aggressive, and is not easily checked. It thrives on what it

feeds on, and is insatiate in its demands. More requires more. If a large body of irresponsible men demand and receive power outside of law, over and above law, it is not to be expected that they will be satisfied with a moderate and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and excesses are inevitable. The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers, creates an unappeasable appetite for more.

Business men have a general understanding of their rights under the law, and have some degree of confidence that the government, through its courts, will be able to protect those rights. This confidence is the corner-stone of all business. But if their rights are such only as a secret and irresponsible organization is willing to concede to them, and will receive only such protection as such an organization is willing to give, where is that confidence which is essential to the prosperity of the country?

Again, if the alleged right is conceded to the defendants, a similar right must be conceded to the promoters of the Carrington Publishing Company and those with whom they may associate; otherwise all men are not equal before the law. It logically follows that they in turn may control the business matters of the defendants,- may determine what trade or occupation they may follow, whether to work in this establishment or in that, or in none at all. Obviously such conflicting claims, in the absence of law, can lead to but one result, and that will be determined by brute force. It would be an instance of the survival, not necessarily of the fittest, but of the strongest. That would be subversive, not only of all business, but also of law and of the government itself. The end would be anarchy, pure and simple.

Once more: suppose the government should assert the right in the same manner to regulate and control the business affairs of the Carrington Publishing Company and other business enterprises, how long would the people submit to it? And yet the exercise of such a power by government would be far more tolerable than its exercise would be by secret organizations, however wise and intelligent such organizations might be; for government is established by the people and for the people, and is responsible to all the people. If it abuses its power, the people have the remedy in their own hands; but if a secret organization, in the management of which the

people at large have no voice, abuses its power, and is not amenable to law, where is the remedy?

It is further alleged that another purpose of the defendants was to injure and oppress John E. Skinner and seven other workmen of the Carrington Publishing Company, by depriving them of their employment. What we have already said applies equally well to this purpose of the defendants. The workmen named have just as good a right to work for the corporation as the defendants have, and this right is entitled to the same consideration and the same protection.

Then there are these further considerations: it is a combination, not against capital nor employers, but against fellowworkmen,—men whose earnings are comparatively small, and who presumably need all their earnings for the support of themselves and their families. They are ordinarily poor men, and men whose entire capital consists in their trade and time. It is proposed wantonly to deprive them of a livelihood, and practically of all means of support. If a capitalist is driven from his business, he has other resources; but the poor mechanic, driven from his employment, and, as is often the case, deprived of employment elsewhere, is compelled to see his loved ones suffer or depend upon charity.

It is also a combination of many to impoverish and oppress a few. The weaker party needs and must receive the protection of the law. If in any case it is criminal for many to combine to do what any one may lawfully do singly, it would seem that this would be such a case. Numbers can accomplish what one man cannot,-evil as well as good; and that is the reason of the combination. The law encourages combinations for good, and combinations by workmen to better their condition by legitimate and fair means are commendable, and should be encouraged. But combinations for evil purposes, whether by one class of men or another, are detrimental to the public weal and cannot be regarded with favor by the courts. But combinations for good purposes may be perverted, and when their power is sought to be used to harm their fellow-men, to deprive others of their just rights, then, not the combination, but the use of it, becomes criminal. In such use there is a large element of wantonness and malice. Any one man, or any one of several men, acting independently, is powerless; but when several combine and direct their united energies to the accomplishment of a bad purpose, the combination is formidable. Its power for evil increases as its num

bers increase. No one man can drive these workmen from their situations; numbers, if allowed their will, may do it. The intention by one man, so long as he does nothing, is not a crime which the law will take cognizance of; and so, too, of any number of men acting separately; but when several men form the intent, and come together and agree to carry it into execution, the case is changed. The agreement is a step in the direction of accomplishing the purpose. The combination. becomes dangerous and subversive of the rights of others, and the law wisely says that it is a crime.

It is no answer to say that the conspiracy was for a lawful purpose, to better their own condition, to fix and advance their rate of wages, and further their own material interest. It is certainly true that they had a right to have such a purpose, and to use all lawful means to carry it into effect. And so a purpose to acquire property is lawful so far as it contemplates lawful means only. But if it contemplates the acquisition of money by means of murder, theft, fraud, or injustice, the end does not sanctify the means.

Neither will these defendants be permitted to advance their material interests, or otherwise better their condition, by any such reprehensible means. They had a right to request the Carrington Publishing Company to discharge its workmen. and employ themselves, and to use all proper argument in support of their request; but they had no right to say, "You shall do this, or we will ruin your business." Much less had they a right to proceed to ruin its business. In such a case, the direct and primary object must be regarded as the destruction of the business. The fact that it is designed as a means to an end, and that end in itself considered is a lawful one, does not divest the transaction of its criminality.

In considering the demurrer, we would not overlook the fact that it is alleged that one object of the defendants was to extort money from the Carrington Publishing Company. It must be conceded that the exaction of money otherwise than by legal means is unlawful in a criminal sense. But the sufficiency of this information does not depend upon that allegation. It is therefore unnecessary to notice it further.

Neither do we overlook the character and magnitude of this conspiracy, as evidenced by the wholesale boycotting contemplated of the patrons of the Carrington Publishing Company. Perhaps no new or different principle applies to this part of the case. We cannot forbear remarking, however, that it

AM. ST. REP., VOL. III.-8

evinces a recklessness and disregard of the rights of others seldom witnessed in business affairs. Assuming, as we do, that these defendants are honest, well-meaning men, it is difficult for us to understand how they could be willing to involve the innocent patrons of the Carrington Publishing Company in embarrassment, and possible ruin, merely for the purpose of furthering their cause in a controversy in which these patrons were not concerned. Prima facie, such conduct must be regarded as malicious and corrupt.

We will also notice that it is alleged that the conspiracy contemplated boycotting as a means to the end sought. That word is not casily defined. It is frequently spoken of as passive merely, -a let-alone policy,-a withdrawal of all business relations, intercourse, and fellowship. If that is its only meaning, it will be difficult to find in it anything criminal. We may gather some idea of its real meaning, however, by a reference to the circumstances in which the word originated. Those circumstances are thus narrated by Mr. Justin McCarthy, an Irish gentleman of learning and ability, who will be recognized as good authority. In his work entitled "England under Gladstone," he says: "The strike was supported by a form of action, or rather inaction, which soon became historical. Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer of Lough Mark, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenantry suddenly retaliated in a most unexpected way, by, in the language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott to Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population of the region for miles round resolved not to have anything to do with him, and as far as they could prevent it, not to allow any one else to have anything to do with him. His life appeared to be in danger, he had to claim police protection. His servants fled from him as servants flee from their masters in some plague-sticken Italian city. The awful sentence of excommunication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly alone for a time. No one would work for him, no one would supply him with food. He and his wife had to work in their own fields themselves, in most unpleasant imitation of Theocritan shepherds and shepherdesses, and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields with the shadows of the armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of the north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and the