App. Div.] FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1901. hoe, 68 Hun, 131; 143 N. Y. 203, 211; Gardiner v. Pollard, 10 Bosw. 674; Greaves v. Gouge, 52 How. Pr. 58; 69 N. Y. 154.) It is unnecessary in this case, and it would be unwise, to attempt to define the extent of the jurisdiction of our courts over corporations organized in other States for the purpose of doing business here. The orders and decrees of a court have no extraterritorial effect or force. They can only be enforced directly against property within the State, or in personam against individuals or officers of corporations found within the jurisdiction of the court, and thereby affect property without the State. When a judgment against a foreign corporation would not be effectual without the aid of the courts of a foreign country or of a sister State, and it may contravene the public policy of the foreign jurisdiction or rest upon the construction of a foreign statute, the interpretation of which is not free from doubt as where the subject-matter of the litigation and the judgment would relate strictly to the internal affairs and management of the foreign corporation the court should decline jurisdiction because such questions are of local administration, and should be relegated to the courts of the State or country under the laws of which the corporation was organized. (Ives v. Smith, 19 N. Y. St. Repr. 563, 568; affd., 28 id. 917; D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. N. Y., S. & W. R. R. Co., 12 Misc. Rep. 230; Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N. Y. 563, 572; Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 id. 196; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Kimball v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mass. 7; Madden v. Penn Elec. Light Co., 181 Penn. St. 617; North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 154; Gregory v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 44; 2 Cook Stock & Stockh. [1st ed.] § 688.) The order in the case at bar, among other things, enjoins the Cobre Company from collecting any debts or paying out or disposing of any of its property or effects, and appoints a receiver of all its property of every name, nature and description, wherever situated, and authorizes the receiver to take possession of, sue for and recover such property and all debts, demands and claims belonging to said company, and in effect to assume and take general charge and management of the business and affairs of the company. This order is altogether too broad and is in conflict with the general rule already stated, which, we think, should be applied in this case. FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1901. [Vol. 66. The proper tribunal to appoint a general receiver and to grant such a sweeping injunction order, practically restraining the exercise of the ordinary business of the corporation and the exercise by it of its charter powers, is a court of general jurisdiction in the Territory of Arizona. In the action now pending there the plaintiff may be granted in that regard whatever relief he shows himself entitled to. There was no jurisdiction to grant the injunction against the Phoenix Bank, it not having been served with the summons and not having appeared in the action, and that part of the injunction, therefore, which purports to operate against said bank must be vacated. The defendants Greene, the Cobre Company, the Cananea Company and the Greene Company are all properly before the court. The trial court will, therefore, have jurisdiction of the parties, and may, we think, without infringing upon any rule of comity, or upon this rule forbidding interference with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, try the issue as to this conspiracy and fraudulent agreement, under which it is proposed on the part of the appellants to divest the Cobre Company of all its property without consideration, and may, if the facts shown and circumstances then existing seem to warrant that course, perpetually enjoin the consummation of such fraudulent contract and transfers of the property of the Cobre Company, and require an accounting and compel the restoration of any of its property appropriated by the defendants, even though such decree will operate upon property beyond the jurisdiction of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1780; Ives v. Smith, 19 N. Y. St. Repr. 556; 28 id. 917; Ernst v. Rutherford & B. S. Gas Co., 38 App. Div. 388; Chase v. Knickerbocker Phosphate Co., 32 îd. 400; Prouty v. Mich. So. & N. I. R. R. Co., 1 Hun, 655; Babcock v. Schuylkill & L. V. Ry. Co., 9 N. Y. Supp. 845.) So far, therefore, as the temporary injunction restrains the further consummation of the fraudulent contract and transfer of the mining properties in Mexico, and the delivery of the deeds and title papers thereto and the settlement of the actions pending in Mexico, Texas and New York, or the transfer or delivery of the property involved in those actions or the proceeds thereof, it was properly granted and should be continued until the trial and decision of the action on the merits, and in all other respects, and as App. Div.] FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1901. against the Phoenix National Bank, the injunction order should be dissolved. If the court in Arizona should appoint a receiver, its order would not operate upon the fund belonging to the Cobre Company now in this State. On the case as presented, that fund is now in jeopardy and liable to be lost to the creditors and stockholders of the Cobre Company through collusion, fraud and mismanagement on the part of its directors. In such a case a court of equity has inherent power, at the suit of a stockholder, to appoint a receiver of the fund to preserve it until the final judgment, which shall direct what disposition shall be made thereof in accordance with the rules and practice in courts of equity and the rights of all the parties interested as they shall then appear. (Woerishoffer v. North River Construction Company, 6 Civ. Proc. Rep. 113; Redmond v. Hoge, 3 Hun, 171; Popper v. Supreme Council, 61 App. Div. 405 ; Glines v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 21 N. Y. Supp. 543; Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196; Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U. S. 148, 161; Piza v. Butler, 90 Hun, 254; Halpin v. Mutual Brewing Co., 91 id. 220; Beach Rec. [2d ed.] 86; Gluck & B. Rec. § 9.) The order appealed from should be modified as indicated, and as thus modified affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellants. PATTERSON, INGRAHAM and HATCH. JJ., concurred; VAN BRUNT, P. J., dissented. VAN BRUNT, P. J. (dissenting): I do not think we can reach anything but the fund here. I, therefore, dissent. Order modified as directed in opinion, and as modified affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to appellants. FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1901. [Vol. 66. DENNIS SMITH, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent. Negligence-a collision between a street car and a wagon presenting a question of negligence and contributory negligence· a case not to be taken from a jury because its verdict will be set aside as against the weight of evidence. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of a collision at the corner of One Hundred and Twenty-fourth street and Lexington avenue, in the city of New York, between one of the defendant's north-bound street cars and a wagon driven by the plaintiff, evidence was given tending to show that the accident took place about four o'clock in the afternoon; that the plaintiff had driven down Lexington avenue on the westerly side; that his horse was walking, and when he reached a point about the middle of One Hundred and Twenty-fourth street he proceeded to guide the horse straight and not diagonally across the tracks; that at this time the plaintiff noticed that the car was about a half block away; that he did not watch the further approach of the car, but kept his attention upon the horse and the street in front; that the motorman's view of the horse and wagon was unobstructed and that there was ample time to enable the plaintiff to clear the tracks if the car had not approached with great rapidity; that under the conditions existing at the time of the accident the car could have been stopped within ten or fifteen feet. Held, that the questions of the defendant's negligence and of the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury, and that it was error for the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Where the evidence given on a jury trial presents an issue of fact, the court has no power to direct a verdict for one of the parties on the theory that a verdict in favor of the other party would be set aside as against the weight of evidence. APPEAL by the plaintiff, Dennis Smith, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 11th day of March, 1901, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court after a trial at the New York Trial Term dismissing the complaint upon the merits. Roger Foster, for the appellant. Theodore H. Lord, for the respondent. LAUGHLIN, J.: On the 4th day of November, 1897, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, plaintiff was seated upon a single coal wagon, driving App. Div.] FIRST DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER TERM, 1901. easterly across Lexington avenue, at One Hundred and Twentyfourth street, and a north-bound car of the defendant struck the left wheel of the wagon, precipitating him to the ground and inflicting certain injuries, to recover damages for which this action was brought. Plaintiff's counsel duly excepted to the direction of a verdict and requested to be permitted to go to the jury upon all the questions in the case. The question presented by the appeal is whether the evidence required the submission of the case to the jury. Upon the trial plaintiff testified that he was employed by Mr. Hobble as a driver; that he had had twelve years' experience as a driver at the time in question; that he started with a ton of coal from One Hundred and Twenty-sixth street and Park avenue, drove over One Hundred and Twenty-sixth street to Lexington avenue, turned into that avenue and drove down on the westerly side, intending to cross to the easterly side of One Hundred and Twentyfourth street, his destination being premises located between One Hundred aud Twenty-third and One Hundred and Twenty-fourth streets. Other evidence was given by or on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that the horse attached to the coal wagon was walking and was not turned across the street until the vehicle reached about the middle of One Hundred and Twenty-fourth street, and at that time the car which collided with the vehicle was about in the middle of the block between One Hundred and Twenty-third and One Hundred and Twenty-fourth streets; that the vehicle turned, not upon a slant, but practically straight toward the track to make the crossing; that after seeing that the car was about half a block away and proceeding to guide his horse across the track, the driver did not watch the further approach of the car, but kept his attention upon the horse and the street in front; that the car was coming very rapidly and there was nothing to obstruct the view of the horse and wagon by the motorman; that there was ample time for the vehicle to clear the tracks if the car had not approached with great rapidity; that the grade at that point was practically level and the condition of the weather was such that the rails were not slippery, and that the car at the speed at which it was going could have been stopped within ten or fifteen feet. This evidence, although contradicted by the evidence introduced |